


State Terrorism and
Political Identity in Indonesia
Fatally belonging

Ariel Heryanto

POLITICS IN ASIA



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State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia

Approximately one million innocent Indonesians were killed by their fellow nationals, neighbours and kin at the height of an anti-communist campaign in the mid-1960s. This book investigates the profound political consequences of these mass killings in Indonesia upon public life in the subsequent decades, highlighting the historical specificities of the violence and comparable incidents of identity politics in more recent times.

Weaving a balance of theory with an empirically based analysis, the book examines how the spectre of communism and the trauma experienced in the latter half of the 1960s remain critical in understanding the dynamics of terror, coercion and consent today. Heryanto challenges the general belief that the periodic anti-communist witch-hunts of recent Indonesian history are largely a political tool used by a powerful military elite and authoritarian government. The book investigates what drove otherwise apolitical subjects to be complicit in the engulfing cycles of witch-hunts. It argues that elements of what began as an anti-communist campaign took on a life of their own, increasingly operating independently of the violence and individual subjects who appeared to be manipulating the campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s.

Despite the profound importance of the 1965–6 events it remains one of the most difficult and sensitive topics for public discussion in Indonesia today. *State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia* is one of the first books to fully discuss the problematic representation and impacts of a crucial moment of Indonesia's history that until recently has been largely unspoken.

Ariel Heryanto is a Senior Lecturer at Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, The University of Melbourne. His research interests include cultural studies, media and identity politics. He co-edited *Challenging Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia* (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

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For Arya and Nina

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1 Remembered signs, dismembered bodies

‘[I]ntimate tyranny’ is the very stuff of which society . . . is constituted . . . There is no better sign of this intimate tyranny that makes society possible than ‘language’, or the symbolic, the originary tyranny *par excellence*, a regime of violence we escape (?) only in death.

(Olaniyan 1992: 50)

Heavy rain on the morning of Thursday 16 November 2000 did not deter some 300 villagers of Kaliworo in the province of Central Java, Indonesia, who gathered in a small forest nearby called Situngkup. What attracted them was an unusual event in their neighbourhood; one whose historical significance for the nation-state was far beyond their, as well as historians’, comprehension. The occasion was the beginning of a series of exhumations of the bodies of local residents who were believed to have been slain with no resistance more than three decades ago for alleged association with the then legitimate and strong PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Communist Party of Indonesia). The proceeding was sponsored by a group of Jakarta-based intellectuals, called *Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965/1966* (Investigation Foundation for Victims of the 1965/1966 Massacre), founded just a year earlier following the fall of President Soeharto’s New Order government.¹

Literally and symbolically, this exhumation marks the first step in an ambitious plan of activities with far-reaching historical consequences to unearth the nation’s political past, which was full of violence, propaganda, mysteries, gossip, and lies as much as silences. Understandably, it took persistence, tactful negotiations, and great courage on the part of the committee before permission was granted for the event by local governmental officials and military commanders. Notwithstanding the tensions in the process and distress upon the discovery of skeletons, the proceedings went smoothly. They found the broken skeletons of eight bodies on the first day, nine the next, and seven others on the third and concluding day. Preliminary forensic study on-site by a volunteer physician identified a couple of females among the exhumed, including one with a wedding ring dated 28/06/1965, or nine

months prior to the date on which the mass murder had taken place (according to local residents, on 3 March 1966). Most had apparently been shot at point blank range from above, with guns that were available only to the military. As many as 13 cartridges were also found.

As expected, things could not continue much further without serious problems and challenges. When the bodies were brought to Sarjito Hospital in the city of Yogyakarta, it took many weeks before anyone from this reputable hospital had the courage to proceed with the autopsies as requested. They refused to do anything until the Republic's Police Chief granted official permission, which involved another long series of negotiations with local, regional, and national authorities. The most decisive challenge came in late March 2001, when the bones were about to be reburied by the victims' relatives.

As news of this historic event spread by word of mouth, it evoked mixed reactions. Sympathizers took journeys of hundreds of kilometres from several islands of the archipelago to attend the multi-religious ceremony preceding the reburial on 24 March 2001 in the village of Kaloran, near the town of Temanggung, also in Central Java. The venue was the private house of Irawan Mangunkusuma, aged 80, who had been a political detainee for eight years during the biggest wave of the anti-communist campaign that began in late 1965. The exhumation and reburial had also provoked fear and anger among other segments of the population. On the day of the scheduled reburial, 15 people occupied Irawan's house, while a hostile crowd of around 3,000 according to one estimate (TAPOL 2001b) encircled the house, 'many of them brandishing sharp weapons and yelling slogans like "Death to Irawan" and "Irawan PKI"' (TAPOL 2001b).

Not only were the ceremony and reburial cancelled, several attendees of the ceremonies were beaten, and vehicles damaged before the police stopped the crowd from burning them. According to one report, at least 'five coffins . . . were dragged out, broken into, and the bodies strewn on the ground' (TAPOL 2001a). The attacking group, which called itself *Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Kaloran*, demanded that no bodies of the alleged communists or their associates and kin should be buried or reburied in their surrounding areas. Several figures on the local council endorsed this demand, and those in charge of the ceremony duly complied.

The incident brought a premature end to the historic investigation. It was estimated that more than 5,000 lives (Andri and Fitri 2000) had been lost around the area where the bodies and broken bones of 24 people were about to be reburied. These figures are a small proportion of the total casualties that ranged from one to two million according to different estimates nationwide (see Cribb 1990), mainly on the islands of Java and Bali. The gloomy past was once again sealed, retaining its mysteries and miseries to haunt the world's fourth most populous nation. The same past, however, was also the foundation upon which the world's longest-running authoritarian regime in a non-socialist country, called *Orde Baru* (New Order),

had been established, with President Soeharto as sole ruler (1966–98), during the height of the Cold War.

This book makes several arguments that are worth spelling out from the outset. One basic premise is that the mass killings in 1965–6 laid the foundations of the New Order's authoritarianism which enjoyed generous assistance from the US government and other leading world advocates of liberal democracy at least until around 1990. With periodic modifications, that past violence has been a crucial force in the formation of the subject identities, fantasies, and everyday activities of this nation for decades, and it has outlived New Order rule itself. Arguably, in varying forms and to varying degrees the same past may continue to be a defining factor in the national imagination and historical trajectory in the decades that follow, presuming that the nation manages to resolve threats of disintegration. Crucially, despite the profound importance of the 1965–6 events, and the impossibility of the nation forgetting or ignoring them, the same violent past remains one of the most difficult and sensitive topics for public discussion, and until very recently it had been largely an unspoken and unknown part of the nation's history (see Purwadi 2003, Zurbuchen 2002).

The official end of the Cold War in 1990 took away one of the basic original reasons for the New Order's existence, as well as the legitimacy and credibility of its protracted anti-communist witch-hunts. Indeed in the 1990s the New Order went through a complex, but nonetheless observably consistent, series of political, cultural, and moral crises before the 1997 economic crisis gave it the final blow. On 21 May 1998 President Soeharto was compelled to resign. Not surprisingly, many Indonesians and sympathetic observers expected a significantly different Indonesia after Soeharto's political exit, not least in matters related to the seemingly obsolete legacies of the Cold War (such as anti-communist policies, militarist institutions, authoritarian language, and routinized stigmatization). However, by 2000 it was already clear to many that a great number of such expectations were misplaced. Several important things have indeed changed in post-Soeharto Indonesia, but certainly not everything that was characteristically New Order. Anti-communism, and the mass violence that was significantly a part of – but clearly irreducible to – anti-communist outrage, outlived the New Order; indeed, in several instances these have in fact become stronger in the first decade of the twenty-first century than in the decade that preceded it.

At face value Indonesia underwent several changes. Between 1998 and 2000, Indonesians had three new presidents, after having lived under one president for more than three decades. To the surprise of many, Indonesians also seemed readily able to forget their recent past in trying to come to terms with contemporary rapid changes and pursuing a better future.² However, it does not take a specially trained eye to recognize that, in several areas, old problems have not gone away. Many long, haunting questions surrounding the 1965–6 killings and their aftermath remain central in public rumours and in the analyses of overseas observers. They still remain too sensitive for

public scrutiny and sober response, while a series of mass killings that had no immediate links with anti-communism continued unabated in the years before and after Soeharto lost power. Coming to terms with the violent past, especially of 1965, and with its traumatic legacy in subsequent decades, is a prerequisite to any attempt to rebuild the nation beyond the New Order. In fact it may be a prerequisite for the survival of the nation itself as it confronts the recurring threats of crisis and demoralization, if not disintegration.

This book is primarily an investigation of the profound political consequences of the mass killings in 1965–6, mainly in Java, Bali and Sumatera, upon public life in Indonesia, mainly in the 1980s and 1990s. It examines the almost unstoppable mechanical reproduction and elaboration of fear and intimidation surrounding the possible re-occurrence of such major violence. This book seeks to examine where, if at all, there is any space for the largely repressed public to negotiate, avoid, or resist the suffocating political environment – decades after the actual killings in 1965–6. It takes issue with the general and easy tendency to see the periodic anti-communist witch-hunts as nothing but a political tool in the hand of a powerful military elite and the authoritarian government of the New Order to repress political dissent, discredit potential enemies, or attempt to legitimize its responsibility for past killings (e.g. Goodfellow 1995). It looks at the circumstances that drive otherwise apolitical subjects to be complicit in the engulfing cycles of witch-hunts that also victimize them. The book also argues that elements of what began as an anti-communist campaign took on a life of their own, increasingly (though never totally) operating independently of the 1965–6 violence and of the individual subjects who appeared to be manipulating the campaign in the 1980s and 1990s.

For the purpose indicated above, this book focuses on the various memories and representations in the 1990s of the violence, rather than on the actual instances of mass killings in 1965–6 and others of more recent times. It looks at selected incidences of refractory measures of the anti-communist witch-hunt, and demonstrates how highly comparable practices of othering, stigmatization, and violence can be found in a wide range of the nation's post-independence social relations. To concentrate narrowly on the “substantive” aspects of communist ideology and its individual proponents and followers (or their antagonists) is to miss the point. This is not to suggest that one should study violence and representation in “purely abstract” forms of signification. Indeed, the notion of “pure abstraction” and its opposition to “concrete reality” is highly problematic, and will itself be problematized in the chapters that follow. Particular articulations of such forms of violence in a given history will be accorded considerable, though not primary, attention in this book.

This chapter will further elaborate the main substance of the book's arguments, and will situate the central issue within contemporary Indonesia. I will introduce key concepts adopted in the analysis that follows, and will highlight some of the historical connections and disconnections between

the various incidents and related discourses. Chapter 2 will look specifically at the year 1988, when the anti-communist witch-hunt reached a climax in terms of surveillance and extensive stigmatization, if not in terms of the actual violence against people's lives and civil liberties. Chapters 3 and 4 will present one remarkable case study of the trials and prosecutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s of three young activists under the Anti-Subversion Law for possessing, circulating, and discussing novels that allegedly smacked of communism. Chapter 5 will consider the questions of vigilantism and militancy of identity politics in a broader context and beyond anti-communist campaigns. This will allow us to assess what is so particular or general about the remarkably successful anti-communist campaign in much of the New Order's three decades of authoritarian rule. The book will conclude with Chapter 6, where the concepts of power, identity, and resistance shall be critically analyzed on the basis of the preceding chapters and general relevant literature.

Given the centrality of the consequences of the killings in 1965–6 to public life in Indonesia in the second half of the twentieth century, it is necessary for me now to provide some background information on these events for readers who are unfamiliar with Indonesia's history. Given the fragmentary studies on the various aspects of the incidents, and the nebulous and controversial aspects of the incidents themselves, only a brief outline of the major contours and commonly agreed aspects of the events will be presented here.

The 1965 killings: a master narrative

An Indonesian quasi-historical novel of 1986 begins as follows:³

Soft Prayer Turned Into Vicious Shriek

The breeze came without prejudice, caressing the trees in the village of Kanigoro, Madiun, East Java. It soothed the tips of leaves, shook twigs, and played around with the paddy field ghosts that occasionally startled the birds. The rest was a rhythm of peace, a rhythm of eternal tranquil nature. There was also the sound of the stream of water from the clear river, hitting stones, leaving strangely formed but pleasing bubbles. The same bubbles, in much greater numbers, were attached upon the vast sky. The sky became the perfect backdrop to nature's harmony.

Towards the bottom of the first page the narrative shifts from the romantic description of nature to a cryptic one of suspicious shadows in the dark. The following page introduces a different locale and specifies a historical date: 13 January 1965.

From some of the trees, birds flew in fright. They flew forward in haste, passing over a mosque from where emanated the *azan* [call to prayer].

Inside the mosque, there were clean faces that became one with the morning atmosphere. They were reciting the *Subuh* [morning] prayer.

The expected violence bursts out by the middle of page three.

All of a sudden the peaceful atmosphere in the mosque was torn. Tranquillity disrupted. The soft prayer was taken over by some vicious shriek. Doors were smashed, reflections of weapons flashing. Hoes, spades, crowbars, knives, and machetes, all hacked, stabbed, slashed, struck, and pierced the bodies that sat solemnly. Blood splashed, spurted in all directions. It flooded the prayer mats that were ripped, torn. The Holy Koran was torn apart and stamped on.

The *imam* [religious leader] who was in charge of the mosque tried to stand up, as if trying to understand what was going on, when a machete swung, and a crowbar pierced his neck and head. The *imam* fell, his hand reaching out for the Koran, trying to rescue it from humiliation, when the shouting and stabbing became more frantic.

‘Crush. Destroy the world’s poison.’

The coarse shriek. The brutal moves. Innocent bodies fell. The youth who was going to celebrate his birthday lay with the rest.

While the gross violence is stressed, it is never made clear why it has to happen. Events take place ‘all of a sudden’. The motive for the murders is only vaguely hinted at. The killers are unnamed farmers, their victims are anonymous land-owners, and land appropriation is at issue. Neither precision nor causality intrudes into the narrative; pathos subsumes both of them. The novel’s intended readership is one already familiar with the message, the main events of the narrative, and the mode of narration. The novel ends with these words: ‘This book records a small part of the PKI’s ferocity, which has become a black and repulsive page in our history. Therefore, our caution must never diminish.’ The moral of the story comes out strongly, tearing apart any previous indications that separate fiction from history or propaganda.

The novel is entitled *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, or *The Treason of G30S/PKI* (the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party). It is derived from a film of the same title, whose authorship ultimately rests with the military leadership that has ruled New Order Indonesia since 1966. The film was produced by the state’s film company *Perusahaan Produksi Filem Negara* (PPFN), “The State Film Production Company”, in 1982–3 and released in 1984. The novel was published by Sinar Harapan, a major private publisher. It was the work of Arswendo Atmowiloto, a prolific young writer of “popular” fiction, who had been commissioned to undertake the adaptation of the film into novel form.⁴ Recent studies on the event at Kanigoro indicated that there was neither any murder, nor Quran being stamped (Adam 2004).

Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI was the first film accessible to the public about an aspect of the most important series of events in contemporary Indonesian history.⁵ It is blatant government propaganda advocating the official version of the violent events leading to the military's ascent to power. The film runs for almost four and a half hours, and deals mainly with six days of events (from 30 September to 5 October 1965);⁶ this time span is officially designated as the abortive coup d'état by the Indonesian Communist Party and the army's subsequent victorious counter-movement.

When the film was initially released, students in Indonesian schools were required to pay to attend regular screenings at movie theatres during school hours.⁷ Within a few months a major daily newspaper hailed it as Indonesia's most successful film 'commercially', with no reference to the conditions under which it had drawn its audience.⁸ From that time onwards the state television network, TVRI, broadcast the film annually on 30 September, and it continued to do so until the last few years of the New Order regime, joined by several private television stations that were required to follow suit. Off-air on that date all buildings were required to fly their flags at half-mast, returning them to full-mast on the next day, to celebrate the triumph of the military and the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party.

What really happened on the night of 30 September 1965 remains less than entirely clear to independent observers. Despite the growing number of studies of the events, many of the central questions surrounding them remain contentious. Worse still, there are no promising prospects for any substantial agreement on several central questions of political and historical significance about what happened around the eve of 1 October 1965 in Jakarta. What follows is an elementary account, presenting the less debatable information that can be collated from the studies of many scholars, journalists, and official documents.⁹ The most important texts in this area include (alphabetically) Anderson and McVey (1971), Budiardjo (1991), Bunnell (1990), Caldwell (1975), Crouch (1978), Holtzappel (1979), May (1978), Rosa, Ratih, and Farid (2004), Scott (1986), Southwood and Flanagan (1983), Stanley (1996), Sulistyono (2000), Weiringa (1999), and Wertheim (1979).¹⁰ More materials that are less "systematic" or less "scholarly" in style, but no less relevant to this study, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Long-standing questions over the event include how and to what extent certain key persons (including President Sukarno and Major General Soeharto) and organizations (the PKI, the Council of Generals, the US government, the People's Republic of China) had any foreknowledge of (or were implicated in) the movement and shared responsibility for the events. *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* shows many scenes of PKI leaders burning key documents, without revealing to the audience what they contain. Given the vastly divergent accounts of the events, it is difficult to offer a short and convenient name for the affair, that does not have unwarranted political overtones. The standard term imposed by the ruling Indonesian military is

(aborted) 'coup' or 'treason', or 'rebellion of the G-30-S/PKI'. Some foreign observers, and President Sukarno (whose power was supposedly targeted by the alleged coup), have preferred to isolate the G-30-S and elements of the PKI leadership from the PKI as a whole. They do not call the movement a coup. Some of them call it a mutiny within the army, while others see it as a political blunder by middle-ranking officers. Still others see the whole event as a (successful) military conspiracy to take over the government.

Around 4 o'clock on the morning of 1 October 1965, a small group of middle-ranking officers kidnapped six senior generals and one lieutenant in their homes in the capital city, Jakarta. They brought their captives to a place which later became well-known as Lubang Buaya ['Crocodile Hole'], near what was then the Halim Perdanakusumah airport of the capital city, and there they killed them. For reasons that remain unclear, at some point both Aidit (Chair of the strong Communist Party of Indonesia) and President Sukarno were also present in Lubang Buaya. At 7 o'clock that morning the movement announced their identity and motives in a government-run radio broadcast, and called for public support. Proclaiming itself to be representing the Revolutionary Council, and calling itself the 30 September Movement, it described its actions the night before as an attempt to rescue the President by pre-empting an alleged coup d'état by a group from within the right-wing and American-backed Council of Generals. The latter had allegedly been planning to topple the legitimate government on 5 October, Armed Forces Day. The 30 September Movement annulled the state cabinet and announced the composition of a new one, accommodating a curiously mixed group of people. Within hours the movement was under fatal attack, led by then little-known Major General Soeharto. In the days that followed, an almost systematic pogrom of members of the Communist Party and its affiliated organizations and sympathizers ensued, especially in Central and East Java and the islands of Bali and Sumatera.

Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI has constituted a 'master-narrative' in Indonesia's official history and political discourse since 1966. In that year President Sukarno was effectively ousted, Soeharto took over his place, and the Indonesian Communist Party was officially banned. I adopt the concept of 'master narrative' from what James Clifford calls 'master script' in his discussion of Griaule's ethnography of the Dogon.¹¹ A master narrative functions as a canon, on the basis of which 'a potentially endless exegetical discourse can be generated' (Clifford 1988: 86). In a study of contemporary political violence in Venezuela, Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski (1991) employ a similar method of identifying a salient narrative and relating it to the contours of specific political violence. They argue that although '[m]oments of political violence may appear shatteringly similar in their grim outcome and in the sheer physicality of the destruction they inflict', they are in fact 'shaped by each society's particular history and myths of collective identity and energized by sedimented memories of threats to the collectivity' (1991: 289).

Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI conveys a twofold message. First, the event is to be seen chiefly as an abortive coup d'état by the 30 September Movement, masterminded by the Indonesian Communist Party, thus providing legitimation for the military's eradication of its main political enemy as the perpetrator. Second, the Soeharto-led military counter-attack is presented as a spontaneous, heroic, and interest-free initiative to rescue the nation-state not only from a communist take-over, but also from chaos, terror and social disintegration. *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* is overtly divided into two parts, each asserting one of these contentions. The significance of this master-narrative, and the ambitions of the film, are self-evident once we consider what happened across the nation from the second week of October 1965, the point at which the master-narrative ends, and all official history textbooks are totally silent. It was then that modern world history saw one of its bloodiest massacres.

The massacre and its aftermath remained largely unaccounted for years after the New Order officially ceased to exist. Yet these events have played a determining role in shaping all levels of Indonesian life. The massacre is extraordinary for the sheer numbers of killers and killed. Estimates vary, but they are more than one million, or several hundred times more than the number killed in 1989 in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.¹² The silence and indifference shown worldwide by the mainstream media about the 1965 killings makes the hysteria over the Tiananmen incident appear ludicrously hypocritical.¹³ Considering the historical changes that ensued from the violence, and in comparison with other cases of political violence, historian Robert Cribb describes the Indonesian case as 'incomprehensibly excessive' (1990: 22). More notable is the fact that many of the killers and those killed were close neighbours, colleagues, or kin. Another notable feature of the killings is the degree to which they were communalistic. By this I refer to the fact that the killings were not exclusively a top-down co-ordination, although all sorts of military encouragement and support (which in turn were linked to US intelligence and military aid) were reportedly available. In spite of their relative simultaneity, these killings varied from region to region with respect to their probable motives, pace, style and scale (see Young, K. 1990). The complexities and incoherence of the events make it impossible to construct any single grand narrative. Despite this, some of the communalistic characteristics of the 1965–6 violence foreshadowed the uncontrollable inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence that prevailed in the many islands of the country from the last few years of New Order rule, and remained unabated after the government collapsed in 1998.

Cribb (1990: 17–18) notes three other striking characteristics of these killings: the meekness of the victims, the general lack of shame or guilt on the part of the killers, and their swiftness. He observed the entire phenomena with bewilderment:

the killings burst suddenly upon the scene and then are over, having arrived and departed with the rapidity and evanescence of a tropical thunderstorm. Historians of Indonesia seem to have found it difficult to identify both those aspects of Indonesian society [that] might have alerted us to the fact that the killings would take place and any traces they have left on the present political order.

(Cribb 1990: 1–2)

The bloodshed, torture, death, and terror of these few months generated a deep trauma of a magnitude whose boundaries have remained obscure. The trauma helps explain the efficacy of the master-narrative. As will be detailed in the ensuing chapters, the legacy of this period has permeated and re-defined social relations and subject identities in the most quotidian spheres. The calamity and the trauma were largely responsible for Indonesia's post-1966 "political stability" and pro-world market "economic growth". Commenting on what he observes as 'global, yet American, postmodern culture', Jameson contends that this 'is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror' (1991: 5). While not wanting to lose sight of the international dimensions of the events, and considering some of the globalized post-modern conditions of contemporary Indonesia in some of the chapters that follow, we cannot simply reduce their atrocious, complex and incoherent plurality to global politico-economic terms or conceptual abstractions. Jameson provides a useful reminder of what tends to elude post-modernist discourse on culture. However, his metaphor of 'superstructural' is clearly as contentious as his locating political violence as the mere 'underside' of culture. We will return to this issue when discussing hegemony, culture and coercion in the final chapter.

Dominant discourse

The term "discourse" is used in this book in the Bakhtian sense, designating a mode of communicative action, involving particular interlocutors, contingent upon specific underlying assumptions, and taking place in limited domains (social groups or communities) at certain moments and in certain contexts.¹⁴ Discourse in this sense is both wider and narrower in scope than language. It is wider because it concerns itself neither exclusively nor primarily with verbal communication belonging to a particular ethnic or national group. It is narrower in the sense that it refers only to a particular instance of communicative practice. Thus, no discursive practice is repeatable.¹⁵ If the idea of good/bad or correct/incorrect language makes little sense, it is utterly nonsensical with regard to discourse. This is because discursive practice deploys nothing but arbitrary, open-ended, plural mean-

ings with no permanent centre or criteria for judging one value against another.

The above concept is obviously indebted to post-structuralism, specifically to its attention to the consequences of the indeterminate relations between arbitrary signifiers and signifieds. However, I subscribe to neither Foucauldian discursive determinism nor the reading of Derridean deconstructionism that implies a view of the whole universe as nothing but a textual galaxy of unlimited *differance*, *aporia*, or a regression of free-floating signifiers. I shall emphasize unequal power relationships among diverse texts and discursive practices in actual experiences of unequal social beings, without implying any simple homology between those unequal relationships.¹⁶ The term “non-discursive” practice, occasionally used here, refers to any activity that does not aim to make a statement to anyone about anything, although such activity is nonetheless meaningful and can be “read” or interpreted by observers as a “text”. The distinction between the discursive and non-discursive must not be overemphasized. It can be useful only for limited analytical purposes.

The brief introduction to *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* above serves as a preliminary attempt to identify four major features of the New Order’s political discourse. First, there is the disposition to perceive events and organize perceptions in dichotomous extremes. This feature characterizes the relationships among subjects that the discourse “talks about”. By reduction and appropriation, the dominant discourse simplifies the complex and incoherent plurality, diversity, and contradictions of the subject matter, and reorganizes them into a model of a neat, stable and conveniently controllable order.¹⁷ There is fundamentally nothing unique about this. This is neither peculiarly Indonesian nor militaristically New Order. Post-structuralism has helped us recognise how hierarchical models of binary oppositions are profoundly embedded in modern Western discourse (see Tyler 1986; Young, R. 1990).

Second, there is a totalizing disposition, akin to totalitarianism, in the New Order’s dominant discourse. This second feature refers to the relationship between interlocutors: a monologic speaker and its implied audience. It is a desire to overdo things, or an expression of unrestrained self-assertion. In practice, this ambition manifests itself in stridency, disproportion, overstatement, over-emphasis, hyperbole, and exaggeration. Paradoxically, in order to overstate something, one has to understate or be silent about other things.¹⁸ Understandably, no ironic voice has a place in this discourse. This inclination can easily translate into blind resoluteness, combativeness and overkill at the level of non-discursive practice.

The third feature concerns a relationship between the dominant discourse and its context. Inseparable from the ambitious and totalizing master-narrative are coercion and violence. The next section will delineate in depth the specific embodiments of these aspects. Ambitious and totalizing assertiveness demands that the condition for its existence and activity be cleared from any challenge; furthermore, these repressive measures must lie outside the discourse. In other words, the dominant discourse must be totally silent

about (rather than actively denying) the conditions under which the totalizing discourse takes place.¹⁹

Finally, the fourth is a crucial feature that mediates the inevitable discrepancies between the ambitious claims of the dominant discourse and what they can actually achieve. Such discrepancies can be enormously vast and troubling without the service of what we can call the *simulacrum* or *simulacra*. The term “simulacra” is used here to refer to replicas that overtly represent and replace the unattainable ambition for totality that the dominant discourse claims. I say “overtly” to emphasize that the dominated are not mystified by the simulacra; they do not, for instance, mistake them for an embodiment of a totalizing dominance. Neither does the ruling elite seriously expect the dominated to be so mystified. “Simulacra” is, therefore, neither a new name for the old Marxist concept of ‘false consciousness’ nor a mystifying “dominant ideology” which was familiar in the social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, coercion prohibits “naming the game” or exposing the nature of simulacra.

Potentially, simulacra may deceive a few. But simulacra are there not as much to deceive people as to intimidate and humiliate them, demonstrating the regime’s capacity to manipulate situations out of proportion and at will, and get away with it. To concentrate our analysis on the regime’s formal pronouncements merely to reveal its lies and expose “the truth” is to miss the point.

I use the term “simulacra” in a narrow political sense, not so far-reaching as the way Jean Baudrillard or Frederick Jameson use the same term. However, both Baudrillard and Jameson make succinct remarks that help clarify the concept. Baudrillard considers simulacra as “hyperreality” produced by media images and electronic simulations in post-modern or post-capitalist societies.²⁰ Unlike “ideology”, which conceals or misrepresents something “real” that precedes it, simulacra are (according to Baudrillard) signs that precede the “real” and conceal nothing. In Jameson’s Platonic conception, simulacra are ‘the identical copy for which no original has ever existed’ (1991: 18). Therefore, to Baudrillard, simulacra are not unreal, but more real than the real (hyperreal).

One illustration of the prominence of simulacra in New Order Indonesia is the government’s obsession with the official state ideology, *Pancasila*. Until 1980 official histories acknowledged that the late President Sukarno had drafted the “original” *Pancasila* in 1945. After 1980 the Soeharto government presented another version of it as something more original and more all-encompassing than anything that preceded or coexisted with it. In 1985–6 the government insisted that all mass organizations declare *Pancasila* as their sole organizational foundation. Although formal acquiescence yielded no direct material gain politically, because no significant opposition to its authoritarianism had been possible, the government was very insistent despite strong criticism.

By means of simulacra the New Order maintained its delusion of grandeur. Coercive and repressive apparatuses were deployed to defend and adore fetishized simulacra in potentially indefinite forms. Hence, the unitary character of what have been customarily perceived in the social sciences as two distinct forces of domination: the ideal and the material, culture and violence, or consent and coercion. Simulacra make the question of totality (or lack of it) in hegemonic power relations, as debated in contemporary social sciences, irrelevant (this will receive more attention in the last chapter). While there is a recognizable difference between simulacra and a totalizing dominance of the ruling power, simulacra celebrate the ruling group's dominance over the oppressed in strategic, albeit limited, spheres as if they signified a total dominance.

In the following I will try to show how these four discursive features were manifested both within *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* and far beyond. Before that, I must make two notes about the nature of these four features and their interrelationship. First, they are by no means objective descriptions of real facts. They are falsifiable constructs of a working discourse adopted in this analysis. When one discourse takes another discourse as an object of analysis, there can be no claims for objectivism. It is not possible to deny being judgmental. The potential danger of this, when overlooked or taken for granted, hardly needs explication. And yet no discussion of a particular discourse can take place outside a chosen discourse, whether the same or a different one. Thus, in itself, the strategy adopted here is necessarily neither superior nor inferior to any other, including those analyzed. Second, although these four features arguably characterized Indonesian political discourse during the New Order and beyond, they operate in a less than systematic, coherent, or totalizing fashion. They are neither uniquely Indonesian nor New Order.

Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI derives from a purportedly historical document published in 1968, co-authored by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh. The former was then Director of the Department of Defence and Security's Institute of History, the latter an Instructor at the Army Staff and Command School. The film's credit title names Nugroho Notosusanto as the more important individual responsible for the joint authorship. Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh originally wrote the book, entitled *The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement in Indonesia*, in English. For reasons to be explored in Chapter 2, the book was not published in Indonesian translation for domestic consumption until 1989. In the Preface to the English version, the authors stated straightforwardly that their joint endeavour aimed to counter critical accounts of the 1965–6 incidents that were circulating overseas. Foreign commentators would have to be given counter-arguments because they could not be ignored, silenced, or killed.

It is easy for us to read seriously, without having to accept, many of the foreign accounts of the 1965/6 event. These accounts are widely accessible to English readers and presented in a discourse that is most familiar to

them. Partly to explore different interpretations for readers unfamiliar with Indonesia, I have chosen to concentrate on *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, which is in disrepute for its vulgar propagandizing character.²¹ I will refer to events in the film/novel in present tense, to distinguish them from whatever “really” happened in 1965. But I have another and more important reason. Rather than pursuing some sort of objective, transcendental, or historical “truth” of the events, or exposing the blatant lies in government propaganda (presumably an agenda in many foreign texts), I am reading *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* as discursive practice.

Until the mid-1990s this official version had been the only account that Indonesians were allowed to mention, let alone to discuss, in public.²² Until the late 1980s, to most Indonesians, documents on the subject from outside Indonesia had been not simply inaccessible but non-existent or unheard of. Consequently, *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* set up the framework for legitimate public fantasy and discussion for a considerable part of the New Order period. Despite its overtly moralizing and coercive character, *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* is illuminating because of its unintended polyphony and internal contradictions. For instance, one of the aims of the master-narrative is to refute the allegation that G-30-S is essentially an internal affair of the Armed Forces (Atmowiloto 1986: 166, 189). Thus, the novel *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* begins with the scene of the PKI’s unprovoked violence against civilian Muslims engaged in solemn prayer, as quoted at length earlier. More significant is the novel’s frontispiece, showing a worker raising a hammer and a peasant raising a sickle in the foreground, both backing up a couple of soldiers shooting General Ahmad Yani, one of the seven officers. However, in the assertion that G-30-S/PKI is an armed attempt to topple the existing government, and that the Army plays the leading role of a rescuing hero, the narrative is necessarily dominated by scenes of hostile persons in military uniform speaking, marching, invading, and firing. This is more vivid in the film than the novel.²³

The superficial insertion of civilians into the official narrative is only visible outside the film/novel. Major streets in New Order Indonesia’s urban areas have been named or renamed after the seven officers concerned, thus raising their status above that of the late President Sukarno. Despite Sukarno’s unrivalled popular fame in modern Indonesian history, his name seldom appears on roads (van de Kok *et al.* 1991: 85). In Jakarta the New Order government built a fine open-air memorial on several hectares of well-grassed land in honour of the same seven officers (Gittings 1990: 5, McGregor 2002). Those civilians who died at the hands of the communists before September 1965 remain anonymous, not to mention the hundreds of thousands slaughtered afterwards because of their alleged sympathy with the communists.

Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI accuses the PKI of having masterminded the G-30-S. The latter in turn is accused of having committed a coup d’état. However, speaking unrestrainedly for the Army, the narrator criticizes the

incumbent head of state for having sided with the alleged rebels (vis-à-vis the Army) during the most crucial hours and for having defended them afterwards (Atmowiloto 1986: 180–1, 201, 227–8).²⁴ The narrator tells us that in the name and interest of the nation-state, Major General Soeharto appoints himself to the Army leadership left vacant after the death of General Yani. This gives him the authority to combat the G-30-S. However, his actions are, as *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* makes clear (Atmowiloto 1986: 191, 208, 211, 229, 236), in direct defiance of two decisions of the President. First, the President assumes the position of the Army leadership himself, and appoints Major General Pranoto Reksosamodra his executive deputy. Second, he instructs all sides to restrain themselves, especially from possible armed confrontation.

To stress the evil character of the G-30-S/PKI, the narrator elucidates at length the horrifying violence in the killings of the seven officers. But this depiction inevitably invokes the immediate audience's memories of the 1965–6 massacres, about which the master-narrative is completely silent. And compared to the violence of the massacres, the killings of the seven officers appear to pale into insignificance.²⁵ The master-narrative can be silent about, but cannot ignore, the 1965–6 massacres. In fact the narrative serves partly to provide an alibi, implicitly justifying the massacres. The trauma of the massacres prompted the need and provided the conditions for the production of the master-narrative in its canonical forms: the film and the novel. While invoking the 1965–6 trauma, the master-narrative is incapable of incorporating it within its discourse, control and manipulation. Images of the trauma must be left to the silent and heterogeneous fantasies of the general population. Of a similar situation, Michael Taussig (1992b) argues that such silencing will enhance, not undermine, terror.²⁶

Throughout *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, events and characters are caricatured in black and white extremes. There is little suggestion that the series of killings develops from analyzable conflicts. Like the violence depicted at the beginning of the novel, and cited above, the killings of the officers happen “all of a sudden”. The heroes are all innocent, apolitical and non-communist; qualities exemplified most clearly by the seven military officers who were murdered. Most of the first half of the novel is devoted to detailed depictions of the virtues of the officers; significantly, they are portrayed in family situations, and not on official duty. Bland homogeneity predominates in their characterization:

- a) they all live comfortably in big and well furnished houses in the most prestigious districts of the capital city (during a very difficult time of the nation's economy);
- b) all the generals are ideal fathers and husbands who lead harmonious lives with their families; and
- c) many of them are devoutly religious, and thus necessarily anti-communist according to the dominant mythology of the New Order.

The following is a typical depiction of their daily lives:

All laughed . . . Happy, delightful, a warm familial atmosphere. Always intimate. This was how it felt to build a home, to build a relationship between children and parents. Yes, at moments like these everyone in the family shared warmth and love.

(Atmowiloto 1986: 108)

The narrator tells us that Brigadier General Panjaitan is reading *Church Dogmatics* on the night of 30 September. He is shot dead a few hours later at point-blank range when he continues to pray instead of immediately getting into the van as his kidnappers demand. This parallels the killings of those praying in the Kanigoro mosque at the beginning of the novel. In the film, the anti-religious character of the G-30-S/PKI is further elaborated through a series of conversations of a devoutly Muslim family. In the 1965–6 massacres, Muslim youths took a large part in the killings. Islam was a dominant popular ideology, and it has become the most powerful since 1990 (see Hefner 2000). Invoking issues of religion in *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* as in many other texts serves as effective rhetoric.²⁷

The scenes that open the novel also throw light on the way the narrator identifies nature with the events narrated. There is a constant inclination to naturalize the course of events and the mode of narration. Most chapters of the novel begin with a depiction of nature, either indicating the inner feelings of the partisan narrator and the “good guys”, or anticipating the fate of the latter. The long and detailed descriptions of the generals invariably aim to present them as too-good-to-be-human.²⁸ Non-human characterization of another kind applies to the “bad guys”: ‘Ferocious, savage, brutal. No more human qualities. Turning into savage wolves’ (Atmowiloto 1986: 134).

State terrorism, silence and conviviality

Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI is as much a source as a product of state terrorism. Since 1966 the surviving mass media and schools, all under tight military control, vigorously produced scattered and fragmentary accounts of the 1965 events in line with the official view.²⁹ These accounts increasingly subordinated the amorphous corpus of oral narratives among the people. As indicated, until the 1980s there was no urgent need to construct an official canon except for overseas consumption.³⁰ Now I will focus on the violence and terror before the 1980s out of which the canon was produced. On the basis of this account I will formulate a notion of “state terrorism” as a key concept for this study.

The 1965–6 massacre, as partially analyzed in Cribb’s edited volume (1990), was only the beginning of the frenzied aftermath of a transition in state power. Hundreds of thousands of other Indonesians were abducted,

tortured or exiled on the island of Buru for ten years or more without trial. Among them were individuals, including pre-school children, who were taken by mistake or as convenient substitutes for the suspects who escaped the purges. Many of these prisoners died in the camps. Others, such as Chinese Indonesians, who survived or were exempted from the official purge, became subject to continual, less official assault and intimidation.³¹

When hundreds of thousands of detainees were released in the late 1970s and up to 1980 they were condemned to pariah status, and they became subject to periodic “re-victimization”.³² They had to carry an identity card at all times bearing the special mark “ET” (*Eks Tahanan-politik*, “ex-political prisoner”, henceforth ex-tapol). They had to report periodically to the local police and military apparatuses. Depending on the category of charges against them (see below), the lifelong stigma denied them basic civil rights. These included freedom of movement (such as going out of town or moving to a new house within the same district; overseas travel was out of the question); freedom of association (meetings in groups of more than five individuals, becoming village heads, joining political parties or legal aid institutes); freedom of expression (including writing ‘letters-to-the-editor’);³³ and access to employment (especially in the Armed Forces, government service, ‘strategic’ national and private commercial enterprises, and in areas related to public opinion, such as teaching, the priesthood, journalism, or as traditional puppeteer-storytellers). In everyday life, these individuals regularly became convenient targets for further scapegoating and blackmailing.

It is impossible to gauge with certainty the magnitude of these repressive measures. To gain a sense of it, a rough estimate of the number of potential and actual victims is useful. A handy source of reference to begin with is the official classification of G-30-S/PKI suspects and convicts. Category A refers to those charged with having some foreknowledge of the G-30-S/PKI or having direct involvement in the movement. Only those in this category were qualified for trial. Category B is for individuals who were thought to have supported the cause of the G-30-S, the PKI or its affiliated organizations, but who could not be tried because of a serious lack of evidence. Category C1 includes those charged with involvement in the alleged PKI-backed insurrection in Madiun in 1948 who did not actively oppose the G-30-S. Category C2 comprises former members of the then legitimate mass organizations with a similar outlook to that of the PKI. Category C3 is for persons deemed to have been sympathetic to the PKI in word, attitude, or conduct. Category F refers to those thought to be ex-members of the PKI who are still operating underground (AWC 1989: 60).

Shortly before the 1965–6 massacre, the PKI claimed to have a membership of over 27 million, including its various related mass organizations (Southwood and Flanagan 1983: 202). This is likely to be an overestimate, but it has been widely accepted that the PKI was the strongest mass-based organization in the nation and the largest communist party in the world outside China and the Soviet Union. It is safe to speculate that we are talking

about the plight of several million people directly and less directly affected by the official anti-communist pogrom, purge and continued degradation.³⁴ As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, those stigmatized (whether ex-tapols or not), invariably bear the standard designation of being “involved in G-30-S/PKI” or “unclean”.³⁵ Consequently, the rest of the population were required to regularly endure a series of security screening procedures to obtain clearances and renew them periodically.

The problem of making a fairly accurate estimate of the victims has been compounded by three additional factors after 1980. First, the number of victims multiplied as a result of a 1982 official measure that discriminated against those who had any relationship either by marriage or blood with any “G-30-S/PKI” ex-tapols.³⁶ It declared the stigma to be socially contagious and hereditary. As a result the 1980s, especially 1985–8, saw the massive break-up of engagements and marriages, as well as the dismissal of thousands of employees.³⁷

Second, although there was no indication of a communist revival in any foreseeable future, the government’s incessant calls for vigilance met with a positive response from various segments of the population for different reasons and in different ways. The reasons were often personal rather than motivated by any genuine anti-communist feeling. Among privileged urban youth, the term “PKI” gained increasing currency as an intimate swear word which was independent of any allusion to the bygone political party. As in other post-colonial capitalist countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia, Indonesian local authorities liberally branded peasants and workers as “communists” when the latter protested against unbearable exploitation of their bodies, labour or property.

The scope, as well as the methods of the communist witch-hunts, became more and more diffuse up until the New Order regime lost power in 1998. The confusion reached a climax in 1988, when the leadership of the ruling party (Golkar) and other members of the political elite (including the Vice-President) became targets of evasive yet pervasive allegations of “communist association”. The discourse of “the latent danger of communism” proliferated and took on a life of its own.³⁸

In 1990 the government introduced a new screening regulation.³⁹ This time the locus of interrogation was no longer kinship and association, but the values, attitudes, opinions, and thoughts of individuals. This makes virtually every citizen liable to renewed scrutiny. While the “latent danger of communist revival” is reproducible, its mode of reproducibility itself needs periodic modification and reinforcement. Though the new regulation was officially meant to replace the pre-existing ones, in practice it added a new procedure of victimization on top of the old, and added further confusion.

Third, to further complicate matters, there was no stable status of liability or clearance. Many who had been cleared after a series of official screenings later became the subjects of renewed screening and victimization. Some who

had been officially detained were later rehabilitated, only to be victimized again in another round of witch-hunts.⁴⁰ Shifting categories of charges and guilt applied to the same individuals at different times. This was not a totally new phenomenon, but it loomed large in the 1980s.⁴¹

These three phenomena – expansion of the scope of vigilance, diffusion of procedure, and unstable clearance status – embody the four major discursive features discussed earlier. Not all factors increase the actual number of political victims from previous years. They make a quantitative estimate of the number of victims not only difficult but redundant. While some of the factors broaden the categories and increase the absolute number of victims, others disarrange the whole enterprise. The chaos adds to the efficacy and expands the pervasive terror that began as exclusively anti-communist in substance. This creates a sense of constant threat, helplessness and unpredictability. Only when this state of affair is borne in mind can one appreciate the experience of activists discussed in Chapter 3. Having said all the above, I must stress that no intentionality on the part of the ruling regime, or any other agents, is necessarily implied. The final outcome of the various forms of repressive force cannot be attributed, at least not exclusively or directly, to any conspiracy.

In the final chapter I will explore “state terrorism” theoretically both as a general concept and as a particular practice in New Order Indonesia. For the moment, let me formulate a working definition of the term. By state terrorism I mean a series of state-sponsored campaigns that induce intense and widespread fear over a large population, involving the following five aspects:

- i) the fear is derived from severely violent actions conducted by state agents or their proxies;
- ii) these actions are directed against selected individual citizens (primary victims);
- iii) these individuals are selected as representatives of one or more social groups (target population) which are often publicly identified;
- iv) the victimization of the selected individuals, their representative status and the motives for the violence are publicly exposed in order to spread fear and uncertainty among the wider target group against whom similar violence can take place in an unpredictable future;
- v) consequently the general population reproduces and elaborates the image of violence and intense fear among themselves.

For scholars defining the term “state terrorism” is as notoriously difficult as defining other key words (see Duvall and Stohl 1983; Stohl 1983; Schmid and Jongman 1988). My working definition is admittedly susceptible to criticism, but this is the most convenient and useful formulation I can achieve from reading the literature cited above. My chief disquiet with nearly all

existing definitions stems from their over-emphasis on the intentions and actions of state agents, overlooking the crucial importance of the victims' active reproduction of fear and suspicion among themselves and against each other as attested to in Chapters 3 and 5. State terrorism is more aptly understood as a "dialogical", or "collaborative" process than an imposition of coercive power top-down.

State terrorism is defined not merely by who its perpetrating subject agents are. It also distinguishes itself from other forms of terrorism that can be attributed to any uncontrolled accident or sporadic and ad hoc non-statist ones. Its violence is differentiated from violence whose primary motives, targets or effects are the physical harm or material destruction of the victims. Thus there is a significant difference between the straightforward demise of the G-30-S/PKI and the spectre that has grown out of it, notwithstanding the fact that the actual victims have often been the same. Not all political violence that generates state terrorism is deliberately designed from the outset by agents of the state. The 1965–6 massacre preceded the New Order's state terrorism, but it cannot be said to have been conducted purposefully to create the latter.

Where political violence is deliberately designed to invoke state terrorism, agents of the state select the victims either randomly or individually. Selection of victims may be based on more than one criterion, but the victims always represent the ultimate target population of the terror. Their representativeness may or may not conform either to objective reality or to the victims' subjective worldview. What counts is that they appear to fit into the dominant discourse. The selected victims are not necessarily prominent members of the target group. As a result, any ordinary member of the target group can identify her/himself with the victims and conceive of the possibility of her/himself being the next victim. Therefore state terrorism often victimizes vulnerable or even compliant individuals.

State terrorism in New Order Indonesia did not concern itself solely with anti-communist issues. All kinds of legal repression and extra-legal violence have prevailed (AWC 1989, 1990a). Restrictions on freedom of speech, of association, or of movement are the general rule for all, though they are far from being comprehensively enforced. Severe terror and naked violence have recurrently targeted dissidents from Muslim communities, separatist movements, disenchanted retired military officers, and various intellectual activists. In none of these cases, one may argue, can the scale of violence be compared to that of the anti-communist massacre and the periodic witch-hunts. But such comparisons divert us from the main issue. In effect they make intertextual connections in the dominant discursive practice. The plight of the G-30-S/PKI ex-prisoners in itself does not tell us enough about the New Order's social reproduction. Ultimately we must examine how the different and interrelated acts and conditions of state and social violence merge and become a whole set of spectacles for the general population

to witness and to be affected by. It is imperative to examine the specific working of state terrorism in a specific social history.

Let us return to the ominous silence about the anti-communist massacre, the single most important source of the New Order's state terrorism. This silence is distinct from the government's systematic cover-ups of its continuing violent conflicts with the separatist or nationalist movements in Aceh, West Papua (formerly called West Irian) and East Timor. In all the latter cases, the government attempted to keep the general Java-concentrated population uninformed or misinformed about various aspects of the ongoing violence. The 1965–6 massacre, by contrast, is no secret to the general public. But censorship against invoking it is barely necessary. People prefer not to discuss it anyway, even in private conversation. The trauma still persists towards the end of the New Order regime, if not beyond. Most parents of my acquaintance indicated that they preferred not to discuss the 1965–6 massacre with their children, who did not ask about it in the first place because it did not occur to them to do so.

As noted, the silence about the aftermath of 1965 (the violence was worst in the islands of Java and Bali) is unlike the silence about the political violence in the outlying areas of Aceh, West Papua or West Irian (as it was called during the New Order period) and East Timor. Neither can the difference be explained simply in terms of geographical distance from the centre of national government in Java. The 1983–4 summary execution of nearly 10,000 suspected criminals mainly in Java helps clarify this. The government presented these latter killings to the public as a spectacle to be celebrated with pride. In his autobiography President Soeharto takes credit for the killings and calls them “shock therapy” to solve the problem of crime and restore order.⁴²

These killings are known as “*Petrus*” for *Penembak(an) Misterius* (Mysterious Killings/Killers), though they were never mysterious to anyone. Usually four to ten heavily-built men looking like soldiers would come to the house of the suspected criminal. They shot the victims at close range in the head and chest with as many as 12 bullets (sometimes five bullets in the head alone) in front of their spouses, children and neighbours. Alternatively they took the unresisting victims away before shooting them, and then tossed the corpses into crowded public places, such as bus terminals, schools, main roads, movie theatres or markets. Individuals who wrote letters of protest and journalists who published critical reports on the incidents received bundles containing heads or other parts of the bodies.⁴³

Although the 1983–4 executions were aimed at a specifically defined group, they inflicted terror upon the general population all the same.⁴⁴ They displayed the seemingly unlimited destructive power of the state and an apparent general acquiescence. One difference between *Petrus* and the 1965–6 massacre was that the killers in the former case were unified and professional. Yet, like the 1965–6 killings, the *Petrus* executions had extended

ramifications (disappearance of human rights activists, bribery, blackmail, mistaken victims, paying off old scores etc.).⁴⁵

We must also carefully consider the ways in which Indonesians spoke of *teror* (as distinct from the English word “terror”) during the period, a word that overshadows the dominant public consciousness just as the word “terror” became the most important catch word following the 11 September 2001 attack in the USA and 12 October 2002 in Bali. More than a few outsiders either failed or refused to understand the level of fear that Indonesians endured during the New Order period, considering the word “*teror*” an exaggeration. One notable exception is Mary Zurbuchen’s perceptive analysis (2002: 566). It appeared that Indonesians’ use of the word *teror* during that period was significantly more frequent and with reference to much less serious situations than the English counterpart “terror” in the same period. The reverse has been true since 11 September 2001 when many non-Indonesians panicked. Indonesians have upset many foreigners for their apparent lack of concern about the supposedly global “terrorism” and the victims of the New York and Bali violence.

Indonesians often prefer to say nothing, or rather to say it, with a meaningful silence, in situations when English speakers may speak of terror. Strange as this may seem to outsiders, when Indonesians do speak of gruesome violence and terror they tend to do so matter-of-factly and with unwitting smiles. This tendency was partly responsible for the national outrage in Australia in mid November 2002 when the media presented images of the Bali bombing suspect Amrozi smiling, laughing, and waving his hands to journalists. Elsewhere I have argued that this gesture was largely unconscious, rather than expressing any particular antagonistic message towards the Bali bombing victims and their families (Heryanto 2002b). If they have any rationale, perhaps unconsciously such smiles are a psychological defence mechanism for both distancing the unpleasant subject matter and securing the flow of speech, by repressing a potential outburst of emotion.

In the light of this discursive practice, we can appreciate why some Indonesians referred to the mutilated corpses of the 1983–4 killings as *bandeng* (a popular fish used in the preparation of a fancy dish).⁴⁶ It is not entirely clear why this name was chosen. I asked several witnesses, but all invariably gave only a shrug in reply. My speculation is that *bandeng* is a euphemism, or perhaps better a *plesetan*,⁴⁷ playing alliteratively with two sets of familiar metaphors in Javanese. The first consists of curse words that are also used in reference to the underworld: *bandit* (bandit), *bajingan* (recidivist, thug), *bangsat* (outlaw), *bandel* (stubborn), *badung* (naughty), *bandot* (dirty old man). The second are crude words denoting corpses or carcasses (*bangkai* in Indonesian and *bathang* in low Javanese), while *badheg* means “bad smell”.

Yet, why should a *plesetan* with a culinary association be coined to refer to the corpses of innocent victims of state-sponsored crime? Simply to be grotesquely funny? Or is this a convenient appropriation of an already

familiar idiomatic expression “to get a *bandeng* or *kakap*”, meaning to get a good catch? I do not have the answer, but whatever the reasons may be, there is indisputably a juxtaposition of playfulness or conviviality with disgust, repulsion and horror in the name. It invites a bitter and familiar ironic smile. This is a theme that will run through some of the ensuing chapters, particularly the last two. There is nothing uniquely Indonesian or Javanese about this. Achille Mbembe (1992a, b) discusses comparable practices in African societies as ‘the aesthetic of vulgarity’ in post-colonial states, and Trouillot (1992) shows its broader commonality across continents and histories.

To be sure, Indonesians have not lived exclusively in constant “terror” for the last quarter of the twentieth century. This is especially true if by “terror” we employ the narrow denotations of the term from Western psychiatry: ‘chronic fear’, ‘extreme form of anxiety’, ‘overwhelming fear’ or ‘hysteria’ (Schmid and Jongman 1988: 2, 19, 20). State terrorism, defined for this book, refers to a basic or a determinant condition for a general state of fear and acquiescence, which erupts periodically. Great eruptions are rare and often short-lived. But each eruption must be dramatic enough for its effects to be durable and intense.

State terrorism is a dynamic state of being, or, better, of social relations. Its intimidating effects and political efficacy fluctuate and spread unevenly across various social spaces. Once it is deeply instilled in the public consciousness and discourse, a recurrence of the eruption is latent, despite the pervasive denial or misrecognition. Thus, the conviviality and suspicious smiles find a place in everyday life even under such unpleasant circumstances. The maintenance of this ethos may come to depend on initiatives taken by agents outside the state apparatus. When overt terror recedes from the surface, it does not evaporate into a metaphysical world and disappear, but resides, self-reproduces and re-emerges on the surface of fantasy, memory, jokes, and rumour. In today’s Indonesia it has been responsible for the long silence, understatement and convivial euphemism in reference to great violence and terror. It may also have been a contributing force to what have appeared to be an uncontrollable series of inter-religious and inter-ethnic killings during much of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

In New Order Indonesia terrorism inscribed its effects conspicuously on public life through occasional outbursts of violence, thorough militarization of all key institutions, and promulgation of martial law-like regulations. But it operated in juxtaposition with the extravagant festivity of the growing tourism industry, an enthusiasm for advanced technology, an unprecedented scope and intensity of global consumerism, and vigorous campaigns for development.⁴⁸ Terror is not hidden on the underside of culture as Jameson suggested in the citation earlier (1991: 5). It is very much part of its centre-piece, on its surface. But it is never pure, total, nor stable.

Beyond the New Order, beyond anti-communism

During much of the New Order period, the murky history of the violence in 1965–6 and its haunting effects on the everyday lives of millions of Indonesians were both as taboo and as tantalizing as pornography, especially to those not personally affected by the 1965–6 killings. Segments within the population had a strong but repressed desire to unravel them, although for different reasons. Without denying the importance of these, and the fact that the government had not allowed the whole story to be told, more than a few in the population felt it would be best for all to just leave it covered over and unspoken. As demonstrated in the subsequent chapters of the book, others, especially the young, urban, and educated enjoyed various relevant gossips, and flaunted the possession of some limited information whose validity was questionable at best.

Despite some minor exceptions, the departure of the New Order government does not mark a major transformation of the nation-state, not even in the narrow sphere of political life. The New Order's political machinery, Golkar, remained alive and kicking.⁴⁹ Partly as a result of the continued inter-communal violence, and subsequently exacerbated by the terror-fever of post-11 September 2001, the military continued to enjoy significant political influence in addition to free parliamentary seats until 2004. Indeed a good number of individual state officials from the political and economic elite of the New Order, its institutions, and its style of administration (including corruption and coercion) strongly characterize the poorly-integrated coalition governments after 1998.

Unsurprisingly at the end of November 2002 the law makers of this self-appointed 'reformist' government decided to re-strengthen the New Order's ban on communist participation in the political life of post-Cold War and post-1998 Indonesia (*Tempo Interaktif* 27/11/2002). Socialist and communist-phobic rhetoric outlived the Cold War which had created the original circumstances that brought it into existence and it also outlived the New Order which had been its main author and custodian. These phenomena could not possibly have been a response to any potential revival of post-Cold War communist ghosts. Rather, they appear to demonstrate the difficult struggle to deal with an extremely traumatic history, and the legal and moral culpability that came with that history. The enemy of the post-New Order elite was not any communists past or present, dead or alive, but something within itself in the form of social memory, institutions, state officials, individual and historical subjects.

This should help to explain why the efforts to investigate the 1965 murders in Kaliworo (as depicted in the opening section of this chapter) appeared to rub some raw wounds among sections within the local community as well as the nation's elite. However, for the same reasons, this period of uncertainty also witnessed another investigation and discovery related to the mid 1960s killings almost two years after the Kaliworo affair. On this occasion, a

group of investigation teams excavated a place called Gua Tikus (Mouse Cave) at Kedunganti village, Bakung regency, near the town of Blitar (East Java) and found the skeletons they sought.⁵⁰ Local elders gave testimony to the moments immediately prior to the incident where several young men and a few women were herded to the prepared pits and tortured to death in 1967–8. The local authorities were quick to stop the investigation team from completing its work, on the pretext that such activity would stir social unrest (see *detikcom* 23/08/2002; *Kompas* 25/08/2002; 29/08/2002; *Koran Tempo* 27/08/2002). For the moment, the investigation work stopped short of its goals. It is unlikely that such an investigation would be able to progress at a desirable pace in the near future, but neither is it likely to give up its commitment in the years to come.

The long-standing failure on the part of individuals to come to terms with their own repressed histories, latent fears, and the difficult moral issues that surround major government-sanctioned violence to a significant degree helped perpetuate the communal inability to come to terms with, let alone control, the series of scattered and localized inter-ethnic and/or inter-religious violent incidents across the islands (see Colombijn and Lindblad 2002). In many cases, massive violence continued to break out over a long period of time, as if no one was able to stop. It was as if Indonesians had become desensitized and willing to accept the fates of the warring communities with no moral difficulty beyond individual griefs and moral appeals.⁵¹ These outbreaks of violence took place without the familiar anti-communist rhetoric necessarily being invoked, although such rhetoric continued to be heard elsewhere.

The heavy, unsettled past has also arguably been responsible for the easy formation of a new panic over so-called “Islamic fundamentalism” as the new threat to the collective sense of security, resilience and identity, at national, sub-national, and international levels. In more than a few instances, the dangers of these post-1998 Islamic threats have been portrayed, discussed, and responded to in ways that resonate with the anti-communist campaign. These include: caricaturing the perceived “enemy” as the culprits in various violent incidents outside and before their trials; the over-production of juicy political gossip about underground terrorist movements; conspiracy theories; and extended power on the part of the security apparatus to conduct sweeping security checks without having the ability or intention to ensure that such measures do not go too far. This is not to say that the so-called Islamic threats are purely an invented myth or fantasy of a few in the political elite. Like its counterpart communism, Islam has long attracted dedicated but frustrated public intellectuals and urban youths as a source of political energy and moral inspiration for change in a depressingly corrupt society, and the extended absence of solid national leadership.

The above is not to suggest that the anti-communist massacre of 1965–6 was the origin of the things that followed in contemporary Indonesian history. Neither the more recent inter-religious and inter-ethnic killings nor the

post-1998 “anti-terrorist” campaign is a direct descendant or a reincarnation of the 1965–6 violence. However, the lived histories of the violent past have helped provide the conditions for the more recent violence to take place to the extent and in the fashion that it did. To reiterate the previous citation from Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski (1991), the post-Cold War terror and violence have been ‘shaped by [this] society’s particular history and myths of collective identity and energized by sedimented memories of threats to the collectivity’ (1991: 289) from the past, of which the 1965–6 massacre was a significant part.

A major protracted and life-threatening danger to post-New Order Indonesia has been the militancy of identity politics, primarily but not exclusively in ethnic, national, or religious terms. This militancy is both the child of, and a fertile ground for, the kind of tyrannical identity markers that are so central to their sense of self, pride, and being (such as those prevailing in 1965–6 and 1998). Paradoxically, a secularization of (and not an unreserved deference to) the orthodox understanding of ethnicity and nationality may save the Republic from further self-destruction. A coerced self-restraint or moderation, as most often called for by concerned elites and foreign observers, may be helpful in the short-term. In the longer run, however, Indonesians need to develop a set of fundamental self-critiques, and not a defensive militancy, regarding the nation’s tragic past and present pride. Contrary to common wisdom in public (especially during crises, and advocated by pragmatic politicians and policy-oriented analysts alike), this is not a technical or financial problem that the World Bank, sympathetic foreign investors, or the United Nations can do much to solve.

The notion that ethnicity or nationality is socially constructed – almost an orthodoxy in today’s social sciences – is essential but insufficient for any serious attempt to redress the fundamental problem that Indonesia faces. That notion is not entirely alien in Indonesian intelligentsia circles. Neither has it been received with hostility or anxiety. But the notion remains largely in the abstract, falling short of effectiveness in responding to real problems on the ground. It is tolerated but perhaps little understood and internalized, in ways similar to others of those externally imposed phrases like “globalization” or “multiculturalism”. All these phrases may have some logical validity among Indonesian scholars, and may acquire some authoritative meanings among specialists, but they have virtually nothing to do with the everyday life of the common people. They can be found in a number of public discussions, and university-affiliated individuals seem to have enjoyed reproducing them. For most people, however, these phrases are as irrelevant and unexciting as many of the items of esoteric jargon from engineers, economists, and computer scientists, or from the omnipresent and pompous advertisements for luxurious consumer products that they would not even dream of obtaining in their lifetime.

In the everyday lives of most Indonesians, ethnicity is deeply internalized as something inherent and inherited, as is nationality (and indeed

“communism”). Ben Anderson specifically chose to open his public lecture to Indonesians during his first visit to Indonesia following the fall of the New Order (which had banned him from entering the country for two decades) with a remark about how nationalism has often been misunderstood in Indonesia as elsewhere. It is misunderstood as ‘something very old and is inherited from, of course, “absolutely splendid ancestors” . . . something that arises “naturally” in the blood and flesh . . . the mania for seeking ‘absolutely splendid ancestors’ typically gives rise to nonsense, and often very dangerous nonsense’ (Anderson 1999: 1).

Of course this is not uniquely Indonesian. Identity politics is a ‘deadly serious’ business in several Asian societies, observes anthropologist Joel S. Kahn (1998: 21). In varying degrees similar mythology can be found not only in other former colonial societies of Africa or America, but also in Western metropolises. In the last several years, around the turn of the century and the end of the New Order government, however, it has become uncontrollable and massively fatal.

The protracted ethnic and religious-based “civil wars” in several islands of Maluku, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, taking thousands of lives during the past two years, provide the most vivid illustration. The violence in those areas could easily give us the erroneous impression that, like the anti-communist campaign, this is a case of elite conflict by proxy that originates from the capital city and finds expression in the remote provinces. Alternatively it might be seen as a case of the failure of modernity, rationality and development to enlighten and civilize “traditional” and “tribal” societies. These localities are often viewed as “exceptions” to “normal everyday life” in Indonesia. One does not need to search very hard to find similarly strong and sincere sentiments of racism, ethnicism, or national chauvinism in the capital city of Jakarta, among its political and cultural elite, as well as among the wealthy and well-traveled Indonesians who have been exposed to the “wonderful world of multiculturalism” in the “advanced metropolises” of contemporary globalized capitalism.

Two overlapping groups of Indonesians in the latter category deserve special attention. The first is those Indonesians who have either been involuntarily labeled or have consciously self-identified as Chinese-Indonesians. The second is Indonesian diasporas of various ethnic groups, including the Chinese, for whom national identity is supposedly above all else in their sense of being. Chinese-Indonesians have of course been subject to a long history of investigation and theorizing (see Coppel 1983, 2002; Mackie 1976). This is not the kind of exercise that I wish to carry out here. The following paragraphs are meant to provide a simple illustration of one case where ethnicity has been constructed and reconstructed from past history and public memory to suit the contemporary interests of the elite. The case also illustrates the ambiguities of such constructions in ways that are not distinct from the anti-communist, or anti-terrorist campaigns. On the one hand, such ethnic constructions are unstable due to their inherent

contradictions. On the other, having been internalized and normalized for more than one generation, ethnicization takes on a life of its own, quite independent from any specific governments that have nurtured it. To understand the recent outbreaks of identity politics among these groups, a brief review of the New Order's skeletal politico-economy is necessary.

The paradox of an ethnic minority

For more than three decades, Indonesians in general bore the brunt of the New Order's heavy-handed industrialization and crony capitalism. The state-sponsored projects of "Development" attracted enormous inflows of foreign aid and investment. Backed by the Western Bloc of the Cold War divide, the state project yielded sustained economic growth that was enthusiastically applauded by the World Bank right up until the spectacular economic crisis in 1997. In all this, the Chinese minority was assigned a contradictory position. On the one hand, the New Order militarist regime favored Chinese businessmen (nearly all of them were males) as opposed to other domestic groups. On the other, the same regime stigmatized the Chinese ethnic minority, making them culturally and politically a pariah of the nation, partly on the grounds of their alleged sympathy for the PKI.

As a result of the regime's economic favoritism, several Chinese-Indonesian businessmen became Asia's prominent tycoons during the bubble economy of the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence of the regime's racial discrimination, Chinese languages, schools, media, organizations, and festival celebrations (including the dragon dance and moon cakes) were banned. Personal names among this ethnic community were strongly recommended to be abandoned and replaced by more Indonesian-sounding ones. There were some restrictions of access to public services for citizens of Chinese descent; in areas available to them, extra documents and extra fees were required. They were comparable to ex-political prisoners, except for the economic favoritism they enjoyed.

Contradictory it may seem, the New Order government's double-edged policy worked effectively to sustain the desired "political stability" and "economic growth". This is an old "divide and rule" tactic, as had been extensively applied by the colonial Dutch government. With the heavy inflows of foreign investments, Chinese businessmen neutralized the possibility of the government appearing to have succumbed to global capitalism at the expense of national interests. Collaborating with this politically illegitimate yet economically competent ethnic Chinese group also gave the government twofold extra benefits. This privileged minority was willing to repay the favors they enjoyed from state officials with funds which in turn were required to maintain the functioning of corrupt yet effective authoritarianism. The collaboration also enabled the government to keep the potentially forceful and colonially designated "indigenous" business community under-

developed, thus pre-empting the possible growth of an independent, perhaps multi-racial, and politically legitimate bourgeoisie outside its patronage.

The few super-rich Chinese tycoons were also necessary as official icons of the perpetrators of the ills of the newly-industrialized society and the excesses of modernity. Like those labeled as communists, they became easy scapegoats in the public imagination; but unlike the latter, the ethnic minority became easy targets for government-instigated popular frustration. Orchestrated violence against the Chinese has been both regular and regulated throughout the history of the modern state of Indonesia. This was to keep this economically powerful ethnic group dependent on the state's protection, as well as to provide the state with an official pretext for taking extra repressive measures and detaining potential opponents (e.g. Muslim leaders) in critical moments, accusing the latter for the periodic social unrest.

The fall of the New Order's authoritarianism has not necessarily precluded the development of other forms of ethnicization in post-New Order Indonesia. Most discriminatory legislation and policies remain intact within the state bureaucracy, although a short-lived euphoria of liberation and celebration of Chinese cultural practice came to the fore in 1998, immediately following one of the worst cases of state-sponsored violence against the Chinese community in many decades (see Heryanto 1999a; Lochore 2000; Tay 2000). Chinese languages have now found a legitimate space in public, and so has the Chinese New Year celebration. Social organizations and political parties mainly or exclusively by and for ethnic Chinese have also been established.

For the first time in decades, more than a few non-Chinese (or so-called "indigenous") Indonesians have expressed strong sympathy and support for these developments, which have been characterized by attempts to rediscover the long suppressed identities of Chinese-Indonesians, their legacies, past injustices, and contributions to the nation apart from economic ones. For the purpose of the argument I put forward here, the irony is that the 1998 violence only further intensified the overdue and emotional assertions of identity on the part of this ethnic minority that is affiliated with the world's racial majority. It will be recalled how Chinese diasporas across major centers of global capitalism took to the streets to protest against the atrocities in Jakarta, Solo, and a few other towns in 1998 (see Tay 2000 for a critical analysis).

The question of what direction today's Chinese-Indonesians should take during this transitional moment of liberalization and uncertainty is a major contention within the diverse and dispersed Chinese-Indonesians. It cannot be assumed that they all want to return to where they were in 1965, internally divided, just before the military came to power and established the New Order government. Amidst this overwhelmingly confused and confusing environment,⁵² however, the old conception of ethnicity as something in the blood (rather than socially constructed) has survived very

well. Chineseness continues to be taken as something fixed and given by so-called Chinese-Indonesians themselves as well as others. The same applies to other ethnicities also. Chineseness is widely understood as something that the New Order attacked (and which must thus now be rehabilitated), but not as something that the regime actively helped to construct. Chineseness is understood to be a victim of ethnic discrimination by the “indigenous majority”; many other ethnicities are seen to be in similar positions vis-à-vis the ‘imperialistic’ Javanese ethnic majority. Since 1988, victims of the 1965–6 violence have often been portrayed in a similar position.

Viewing the 1998 violence mainly or only as a series of attacks against innocent victims because they were or looked “Chinese”, many Indonesians and their overseas sympathizers have failed to understand that the violence also served to construct and reconstruct Chineseness, first and foremost as an ethnic identity and by extension as a stigma. It is not, or not only, because they were or they looked Chinese that others attacked them. Their Chineseness was in fact “(re-)constructed” or reaffirmed by the series of attacks against them. The broken windows of their properties and the injuries on their bodies are renewed inscriptions signifying their otherness in moments of crisis and uncertainty.

Instead of critically questioning the construction of “Chineseness” or ethnicization in any form, many Indonesians and observers alike have inadvertently followed the colonial and New Order governments in reproducing it, though details have changed over time. While the actual details of Chineseness may have undergone transformation, ethnicization and ethnic politics have been firmly consolidated. Instead of arguing that all ethnicities are something other than “natural” and “biological”, the newly liberated ethnic minority demands to be recognized as being as “indigenous” as any other ethnic group (e.g. by virtue of being born in Indonesia, life-long residence there, and deep cultural assimilation). This is the easy way (and for some the only short-term solution) of gaining legitimacy as an equal member of the nation.

The above is more strongly pronounced among the older generation and upper class of the ethnic community who went through the early years of the New Order’s humiliation, repression, and discrimination. Usually the younger generation of Chinese-Indonesians, who grew up under the last years of the New Order, have near total indifference towards questions of ethnicity. They may be regarded as the prototype of post-ethnic and post-national Indonesians, unwitting products of an increasingly globalized Indonesia. Positioned in a moment of transition, they are paradoxically both the last and most thoroughly New Order subjects and simultaneously the first post-New Order subjectivities. That leads us to another interesting dimension that has come into play in the recent endeavours to revive, reconstitute, and rehabilitate Indonesian Chineseness. This is Indonesian nationalism.

Nostalgia for the nation

The recently liberated ethnic minority does not simply want to reassert its “Chineseness”, whatever this may mean. Many of them are aggressively nationalistic. Like those already stigmatized as “communist”, they are demanding from post-New Order governments and their fellow nationals their rightful place within the Indonesian body politic and culture, as equal citizens. In various debates within their own communities over the desired new profile and identity, many Chinese-Indonesians have rationalized their positions within the logic and ideology of nationalism. Once again, in this, they find a fundamental agreement with non-Chinese fellow nationals. It is not enough for the ethnic minority to be legitimately Chinese within Indonesia’s ethnic diversity; they seek to demonstrate how legitimately Indonesian they are as members of an ethnic minority.

This, ironically, is taking place at the turn of the century, when more and more Indonesians are calling for regional secession, prompting many to anticipate the disintegration of the old Republic. What can be more confusing than this for the Chinese minority, only recently liberated from pariah status, and seeking a better and more secure position within the nation’s political and public culture at a time of intense global mobility of people and information? The threat of Indonesia’s disintegration has obviously affected a vast segment of the population, not only one of its ethnic minorities. While the long-term consequences of such an event (albeit an unlikely one) are economic and political, for many of today’s Indonesians a more devastating threat is the loss of a fundamental part of their long-treasured national identity. While it is tempting to call them true nationalists, one must not do so too quickly. As I have tried to argue from the outset, it is the *socialization* of such an identity, rather than a sanctified *national identity*, that is of most concern.

Failing to take the nation as a modern historical construct, Indonesians have mistaken it as something “natural” and inherent in the blood, in the same way as ethnicity (or communist or Islamic ideology) has been widely perceived. If nations, as commonly theorized, are constructed and must necessarily imply universalism (i.e. all are equally sovereign), Indonesian nationalism (at least as developed during the New Order) has denied this basic principle. This has made it possible for Indonesians to overlook the validity of other national aspirations, such as those among the East Timorese prior to their independence in 1999. The failure to recognize the constructedness of a nation and its regalia makes it possible for some Indonesians, for example, to take offence against Australian protestors who showed disrespect to the Indonesian flag during the months leading to East Timor’s independence. Such an offence was taken more seriously than, say, the public burning of petty criminals in Jakarta or the attacks against civilians in East Timor during the “scorched earth” operation after the 1999 Referendum.

Likewise, many Indonesians would find it difficult to refer to a time – as recent as 100 years ago – when Indonesia as we see it today was non-existent, indeed unimaginable. Equally or if not more painful for them is to imagine a hypothetical future – perhaps less than 50 years from now – where Indonesia is only a past history to remember, or has been fragmented into several other entities, smaller nations or otherwise. Today the same inability to recognize the constructedness of social identities has been responsible, to a considerable extent, for the widespread violence that threatens to dismember the nation. This failure goes far beyond the scope of ethnic or national politics, but also pervades all other areas where identities are constructed and sanctified, including religions, political parties, and ideologies. Contemporary Indonesia has many examples of how unreserved loyalty, aggressive militancy, and fatal combativeness can adhere to particular markers of such social identities. The new militancy, for example in Islamic jihadism that attempts to both modernize and to correct the ills of secular modern life, is but one of many feasible and potentially infinite forms.

Examples abound, including the mass violence during the periodic election campaign triggered by a war of designated colours – not even ballots – that were supposed to represent rival candidates. The chapters that follow will examine several of these cases in detail. Any graphics that even faintly resembled a hammer and sickle (on a toy, a candy wrapper, or a key-chain) had serious consequences for their owners during the New Order when anti-communist witch-hunts were periodically conducted. Likewise, a few drops of paint in the form of politically correct words on the front of a building (e.g. “native” or “Islam” during the anti-Chinese riots) could rescue the property from mass attack in times of political turmoil. The same logic can explain why the New Order banned Chinese characters and coerced the ethnic Chinese to give up their personal names for something less “Chinese”. This was also the logic that generated the long-term attempt to purge Indonesia’s body politic of Communism, and of the skeletons of its sympathizers who were murdered decades ago. This is a world where signs and the world they represent were believed to be inseparable.

2 The implosion of stigmas

To account for postcolonial relations is thus to pay attention to the workings of power in minute details, and to the principles of assemblage which give rise to its efficacy. That is, one must examine the orderings of the world it produces; the types of institutions, knowledges, norms, and practices that issue from it; the manner in which these institutions, knowledges, norms, and practices structure the quotidien; as well as the light that the use of visual imagery and discourse throws on the nature of domination and subordination.

(Mbembe 1992a: 4)

The previous chapter indicates how central the 1965–6 massacre was for the formation of the New Order, and the crucial role of narration of the event both during it and afterwards to ensure the legitimacy of the new regime that had benefited from the largely unaccounted killings. Chapter 1 began with an excavation in search of victims' skeletons, for them to be reburied properly according to local customs and the religious beliefs of their descendants. Local governments and civilian groups rushed to stop these endeavours by force. The reasons are clear; it is not possible to dig up the soil where a past murder was committed, without raising questions about that murky history, and without touching old wounds and rekindling the collective guilt of at least some significant groups of present-day Indonesians.

At face value, the New Order's anti-communist groups appeared to oppose any endeavours to unearth past history, in the interest of maintaining social harmony, the status quo, and official history. Their critics were apparently in search of alternative histories. Ironically, spokespeople for the New Order government regularly accused those who challenged the official narrative of 1965–6 of trying to deny history, to distort and gloss it over. This chapter will examine the effects of the master narrative upon the life of the nation in the decades after the actual killings in 1965–6, and the increasing difficulty on the part of the government to maintain a strong, stable and credible account of its own birth and legitimacy for its extended rule.

In particular this chapter will examine a series of anti-communist witch-hunts in 1988. It will portray the protracted trauma of the 1965–6 massacre,

and also the human cost of maintaining a narrative of the ever-latent danger of communists. As one would expect, official anti-communist propaganda had its own contradictions, and it could backfire. It did not go unchallenged. Significantly, although some of these challenges were strongly worded, few were able to undermine the master narrative of G-30-S/PKI. My main purpose in this first section of the chapter is to introduce key concepts in the New Order's anti-communist propaganda, and to demonstrate in as detailed and concrete a manner as possible the magnitude of this anti-communist campaign in the national psyche, public culture and dominant discourse. The series of incidents also demonstrates the extent to which the deep internalization of anti-communism may have long-term consequences, as illustrated by the Kaliworo and Blitar excavation incidents (as discussed in the previous chapter). Towards the end of this chapter I shall highlight the impact of the return of Pramoedya A. Toer as a literary figure (after 14 years of exile without trial for alleged association with the Communist Party) upon the narrative of the 1965 tragedy. No contemporary writer of Indonesian fiction since 1980 has been as controversial as Toer. No other Indonesian literary books have enjoyed the international acclaim and sales of his tetralogy (first published in the 1980s). No other texts have attracted as many young people, some of whom experienced political punishment as a result of their interest in Toer's novels.

1988: the year of living paranoidly

In early 1995 the journalist John McBeth wrote the following:

For anyone who thought McCarthy-style communist witch-hunts had gone the way of Cold War, Indonesia makes a sobering study. In a country still haunted by a failed experiment with liberal democracy in the 1950s and savage anti-communist bloodletting a decade later, the Marxist label remains a convenient weapon with which to stigmatize troublemakers.

(McBeth 1995: 22)

This observation came at a point of anti-climax after years of intense anti-communist witch-hunting. While such stigmatization prevailed over the entire three decades of New Order rule, the scale of the areas affected and the level of intensity varied, the worst being in 1988. During that year, thousands of employees were fired, marital relationships suspended, friendships broken, and professional careers damaged. The timing has nothing to do with communism itself or the demise of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965–6. Rather, this was the moment when divisions within the ruling elite became severe and publicly visible. Crudely simplified, central to this conflict were two camps. The first were those who constituted the president's immediate circles in the palace. The second were selected top

military officers and members of the bureaucratic elites who felt increasingly uncomfortable with the uncertain status and political fate of military privileges (see note 5) as well as with the lavish lifestyle of the President's children and their predatory expansion of business empires during the so-called "economic boom".

The following titles of journalists' reports from the largest and most respected presses represent the thousands of articles, interviews and news reports that swamped the public arena throughout 1988. All of these materials pertained to the single theme of the revived danger of communism: 'Minister of Defence and Security: For Former Members of the PKI the Party Still Survives' (*Suara Pembaruan* 02/08/1988); 'Beware the Double-Faced Activities of the Residual PKI' (*Kompas* 03/08/1988: 1); 'The Threats Are Still Here' (*Tempo* 13/08/1988: 28). Even the 'apolitical' entertainment magazine *Kartini* followed suit in the nationwide propaganda. One editorial title warned unequivocally 'Once again, Beware of the Residual G.30.S PKI and Their Sympathizers' (No. 363, 17–30/10/1988: 15).¹

While the stimulus for such articles came from conflicts at the apex of the political pyramid, what happened in the rest of society was more than just ripples or spill-overs. As seen in 1965–6, the anti-communist witch-hunt took on a life of its own when it swept across regions and across segments of various social groups. I will provide a diverse range of examples below. It is important, however, to recognize the logic or framework that provides some links between these myriad forms of incidents and some basis for their significance: namely, the conception of the danger of communism that the New Order government effectively instilled in the public consciousness. Instead of formulating this conception in my own words, I have taken the liberty of presenting the following citation at length as it succinctly captures the salient sentiments of the dominant discourse of communist danger:

It's not easy to recognize the behaviour of communists. This is especially so when they operate 'underground' [inverted comma in the original]. Under unfavourable circumstances, while they are vulnerable, they can reportedly transform themselves into chameleons, or become wolves in sheep's clothing, or take on two faces . . . they take all means to achieve their goal. In other words, their ends justify their means. In real operations, it is no longer a secret that they infiltrate organizations or institutions that they can use to advance their endeavours. This is the so-called 'cell system' that they adopt in all arenas before they take control of them: political parties, mass organizations, the armed forces, government institutions . . . they disappear, disguise themselves, infiltrate, and move underground. Then before you know it, they restore their power. After G-30-S/PKI was defeated, for instance, they adopted the tactics of GTM (*Gerakan Tutup Mulut*, 'silent movement') and OTB (*Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk*, 'formless organization').²

(*Tempo* 12/11/1988: 28)

Because '[i]t's not easy to recognize the behaviour of communists', so the logic goes, one should neither underestimate the danger, nor be too sure that it is not there right next to us. Because communists are good at "infiltration" one should never assume that the danger of communism is somewhere at a distance. In fact it is possible that they might turn out to be innocent-looking people around one's home, or work place, or community. We must be ever-vigilant about everything around us, so the message suggests. If necessary we must take the initiative to watch for, suspect, and perhaps take action against these insidious threats, before it is too late. Finally, because of their strategy of being "silent" and "formless", we must not trust our own intellectual capability or our own perception to recognize their existence. Mercifully, the New Order has anti-communist intelligence to keep us alert, as recently reported in the media, and will do all that is necessary to protect us from the calamity that we have failed to comprehend. As the Minister of Defence and Security, General L Benny Moerdani stated, 'following the elimination of the physical force of the G-30-S/PKI, what next deserves our attention is those movements that continue to be carried out by the residual G-30-S/PKI, namely those movements that attempt to whitewash their traces and to infiltrate . . .'. (*Suara Pembaruan* 19/07/1988)

Central to putting this vigilance into practice are five key terms:³ *ET* (eks-tapol, "ex-political prisoner"); *tidak bersih diri* (unclean in itself); and *tidak bersih lingkungan* (unclean by association; literally "environmentally unclean"); *terlibat G-30-S/PKI* (involved in G-30-S/PKI) and "*litsus*" (*pene-litian khusus*, "special screening"). In the next few paragraphs I will explain each of these key terms. The first, ET (as noted in Chapter 1) is a generic term for any ex-political prisoners, but in the entire history of its use during New Order rule it primarily referred to those who had undergone detention for alleged links with communism. Following strong pressure from the Carter administration, around 1.4 million survivors of the 1965–6 massacres, of a decade or more of exile, and of detention without trial were "released" – but only to be continually subject to further cycles of interrogation, abuse, and humiliation. As already indicated in Chapter 1, these people were denied most basic civil liberties (such as freedom of expression and movement), and were prohibited from employment in any area deemed strategic (as journalists or civil servants, in the armed forces, as school teachers or university professors, as puppeteers, in any political parties or legal aid organizations, or as religious leaders). To facilitate the enforcement of these restrictions, and the necessary surveillance they entailed, the government issued a decree (No. 15/Kopkamtib, dated 27/06/1982) requiring all village heads and local state administrative officials to stamp "ET" on the identity cards of these former political detainees. The decree was revoked on 18 August 1995. This official ruling did not put an end to the old practices

of discrimination, however, especially at the lower levels of state administration and in areas away from the capital city. In direct contravention of government ruling, the Social and Political Affairs Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid, declared in August 1996 that all candidates for membership of Parliament must pass the government's approved screening procedures, called *litsus* (*Media Indonesia* 20/08/1996). A week later, as many as 130 persons were screened accordingly, to qualify for sitting in the house of representatives (DPRD or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, Regional People's Representative Council) at the West Java provincial level (*Pikiran Rakyat* 29/08/1996). Then in October 1996 as many as 55 Islamic leaders (*kiai*) were disqualified from the Central Java DPRD for failing to pass a *litsus* (*Jawa Pos* 24/10/1996). Even as late as September 2002 in Garut, only two hours' drive from the capital city, local politicians found it difficult to abandon the "*bersih lingkungan*" (unclean by association) test as a requirement for legitimate political life. They proposed that the concept – already discarded from the formal Indonesian state administration – be readopted to screen candidates for village headship (*Kompas* 13/09/2002).

In other contexts, the use of a term like ET in the sense described above may invoke some sympathy for those who had been so badly and unjustly treated by the state after its extended failure to bring suspects to trial. In Indonesia under the New Order, the term invoked intense fear for three decades. Rather than invoking sympathy, it was used as a way of officially and unofficially victimizing people who had previously been penalized by the New Order without any due legal process. Among the original victims in 1965–6 were children and those who were arrested purely by mistake, as will be shown in detail below. These are conceivably the "genuine" ETs. However, by extension, the stamp ET was also used liberally by state officials on the ID cards of peasants who refused to give up their lands for major "development" projects sponsored by the state or commercial projects by well-connected business people. Having their ID cards stamped as such deprived them not only of a wide range of public services, but also of a sense of safety on a daily basis.⁴

Individuals were officially designated as "unclean" (*tidak bersih diri*) if they were in one way or another declared or believed to have had some sort of association with the PKI (even when this was legal), or with any of the Party's various affiliates or allies, not only during the 1960s but also in previous years. They were not necessarily ETs, in the sense that they experienced no detention. Because such associations varied greatly, the government issued a set of classifications (already discussed in Chapter 1, under the sub-heading 'State terrorism, silence and conviviality').

As if the above were not absurd enough, there were a few million other Indonesians who fell under the category of "*tidak bersih lingkungan*", "environmentally unclean" or unclean by association, due to marital, descent, or institutional links with any of the former two categories of political pariahs. These stigmatized people also faced all kinds of state-sponsored

and socially-supported restrictions, abuses, and humiliations. The total number of these politically stigmatized individuals is beyond anyone's knowledge. The scale of bureaucracy that was required to administer the surveillance of them is far beyond the state's capacity. The matter is further compounded by the burst of false allegations by individuals to settle old and personal scores, or to extract financial gain. These formidable complexities notwithstanding, the government introduced the further category of "*litsus*" (special screening) to ascertain a citizen's political status.

The term "*terlibat G-30-S/PKI*" literally denotes those who actually or allegedly took part in the bloody incident of the late hours of 30 September through to the morning of 1 October 1965. Technically, therefore, the term refers to individuals or groups and institutions whose total number is much smaller than any of those three categories above. However, this is not how it worked in public discourse in New Order Indonesia. The distinction among the different official categories discussed above was not usually noted in official statements or in journalistic reports, speeches, interviews or gossip. The term "*terlibat G-30-S/PKI*" has been loosely and inconsistently employed to refer to anyone demonized by the social order of the day by virtue of their real or alleged association with communists, through marriage, relatives or organizational involvement. Within the confused and confusing language of the anti-communist witch-hunt, someone who was not yet born in 1965 – or even in 1975 – could be labelled as "involved" in the so-called "abortive coup" of 1965.

Having outlined all the above, I must add that in actual practice the New Order's ambitious surveillance fell short of the impression it gave. The above could easily be misleading without the provision of counter facts. To illustrate the complexities and ambiguities of the time, let me offer a true story of a colleague in an Indonesian university where I taught for 16 years during New Order rule. During an internal conflict over industrial relations at our university in the mid 1990s, three lecturers lost their positions even though they were detached from the conflict (for more about this conflict, see Heryanto 2003). The formal reason for their dismissal was their politically "unclean" past. What local observers (including myself) believed to be the real reason was their affiliation with a department that had at one time been allied with one of the contesting camps in the university conflict. After years of silence and indifference, rival academic staff from the other camp revealed the "problematic" past of these three individuals to the press and to local military command. Unfortunately, circumstances allowed neither a close scrutiny of the facts that pertained to these individuals' history nor a re-examination of the dominant ideology of the day. To clarify what I mean, let me focus on the experience of one of these colleagues.

This man spent an extended period on the penal island of Buru. Like thousands of his fellow inmates, he went to Buru and left many years later without trial. His ordeal had begun one night in 1965 when a local military officer visited his home searching for one of his relatives. Fearing to return

empty-handed, and thus risk being accused of helping a political fugitive to escape, the officer demanded that my colleague follow him to the military post. Partly fearing to defy the instruction, and partly in confidence of his innocence, he followed the officer. He did not return home for many years thereafter. Through a labyrinth of endless interrogations, detentions, and transfers, he pleaded to be permitted to explain his situation and the reasons for his having been taken into military custody. The officers were either indifferent to his fate or afraid to let him go at the risk of protecting and rescuing someone who might turn out to be a clever enemy. When he left Buru, he was profoundly traumatized.

Like all of those ex-political prisoners who were never proven guilty, not even by the worst and most unbelievable type of show trial, this man was not legally allowed to take up a teaching position. However, as in many things under the grim blanket of New Order militarist authoritarianism, he found exception to the formal ruling. Like several of his former fellow inmates, this man found employment he was not supposed to obtain. He did this without false documents and without secrecy. The local military commanders were fully aware of his background and of his employment. Whatever their reasons, the local authorities were happy to leave him alone, and only occasionally undertook minimal surveillance measures and security checks.

Traumatized and cautious after his extraordinary suffering in the 1960s and 1970s, this man stayed away from the internal conflict in our university that arose in the 1990s. However, out of desperation, one camp in the dispute pointed the finger at him and at two others, mainly to demonize their opponents in a conflict that had nothing whatsoever to do with communism, or the 1965 killings, or the three men personally. Meanwhile, a few hundred kilometres away, a general in Jakarta was cornered by his own political rivals and called upon to validate his sweeping statements about communist revival and infiltration into strategic professions. Expediently, he named the three academics in our university. One opportunist newsmagazine presented his triumphant “evidence” as a cover story to boost circulation. Reluctantly, the local military commander in our town took firm and dutiful action against our colleagues.

This case is instructive for several reasons that will be of great relevance to the ensuing chapters. It indicates not only the arbitrariness of stigmatization and the severe penalizing of innocent persons in 1965. The local authority and militias were as helpless as the suspects during those chaotic periods when the impersonal forces of overwhelming fear and suspicion overruled not only common sense but also individual subjecthood. The above example demonstrates the shortcomings and the deceptive totalitarianism of the New Order’s militarism. It also indicates that there was some, albeit fragile and limited, breathing space for the innocent, for exceptions, and for compassion, which usually go unrecorded in sweeping human rights reports or journalistic writings. Finally, the case perfectly illustrates how a contemporary

conflict could breathe fresh new life into old stigmas, for reasons and in circumstances that have no direct relationship with the politics of 1965. The incident gives us an example of how a local conflict can – in unexpected ways, and almost by pure “accident” – acquire significance for an entirely separate elite conflict hundreds of kilometres away, thanks to the ghostly power of the aftermath of the actual 1965 killings.

Top political friction

The four key terms discussed above (ET, “unclean”, “unclean by association” and “special screening”) are important to an understanding of the political frenzy in 1988, when the anti-communist witch-hunt ran high. Although the physical destruction brought about by this campaign was not as bad as that which had taken place more than two decades earlier, no other period saw an anti-communist campaign as extensive and as peculiar as this. There is a general agreement among analysts that central to the expanded scale of the anti-communist campaign in 1988 was a bitter conflict at the top of Indonesia’s political elite, rather than anything to do with communism *per se*. More specifically, during much of this period, the rhetoric about the threat of a revival of communism was launched by segments within the military as a vengeful attack against the appointment of Soedharmono (rather than someone with closer ties to the military, and who could be made more answerable to that institution) as Soeharto’s hand-picked Vice-President.

It must be recalled that this was the period when the hitherto almost unchallenged rule of the New Order was entering a turning point, marked by irremediable frictions between those belonging to President Soeharto’s immediate circle and a growing segment within the military under the influence of the Minister of Defence Benny L. Moerdani. The history (see Jenkins 1984) and nature of this conflict (for more details see Vatikiotis 1993: 83–6; Schwarz 1994: 37) are far too complex to be analysed here and they are not immediately relevant. Suffice it to note that, during this time, Soeharto’s reliance on the military gradually declined as he managed to secure a more autonomous and consolidated form of power on the basis of personal loyalty plus the well-entrenched bureaucratic and economic empires that the coercive force of the military had helped to establish after 1965. Several highly competent military officers were stripped of power as soon as they showed signs of being too popular or independent-minded. Soeharto preferred to promote officers who had either unreserved loyalty or family connections to him. It was also during this period that both the public and the military showed resentment toward the lavish lifestyle and unrestrained material greed of the President’s children, which would destabilize the status quo in the long-term.

By this time, the military as an institution also began to be less secure about the future of its privileged position – which had thus far been legitimized by the concept of “dual function”.⁵ It tried to do several things to

ensure the long-term survival of its privileged position, of which the renewed propaganda of the ideology of “state integralism” is one famous example (see Bourchier 1997). The expansion of export-oriented industrialization, though illiberal, had transformed Indonesia, especially the cities and urban life, helping to accelerate the growth of a new generation of “middle class” groups. Members of these groups had little or no sense of the political turmoils of the 1960s, but had a high susceptibility to the new patterns and levels of industrial consumerism of the 1980s. In search of a self identity – to be “cool” amid the triumphal global capitalism – which would necessarily be in marked difference to the forms of identity prescribed by the preceding generation, Indonesia’s educated urbanites, often in blue jeans and military camouflage wear, demanded a more liberalized social life. This latter should be distinguished from “democratization”, or “political liberalism”, although many of the youth of this generation came to the fore as radical student activists, challenging state authority in various confrontational ways in the name of democracy, social justice, and human rights.

Details of the tactics employed against the appointment of Soedharmono as Vice-President in 1988 are provided in English by Jean van de Kok and Michael van Langenberg (1990) and the London-based human rights publication *TAPOL BULLETIN* (No. 87 06/1988: 17–19). Soedharmono was accused of having an “unclean” past. He was reported to be a former member of the PKI-affiliated youth organization Pesindo in the late 1940s. When Soedharmono was officially nominated – a formality endorsed by the People’s Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR) – the military took the unprecedented move of proposing an alternative nominee, Jaelani Naro, a leading figure from the Islamic *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party). There was no question that the move was more a symbolic gesture of protest against the President’s nomination than an attempt to challenge it.

When the MPR formally declared Soedharmono’s vice-presidency, another little drama took place: the then unknown Brigadier General Ibrahim Saleh aggressively interrupted the proceedings to oppose Soedharmono’s election. Again, this was simply to demonstrate the lack of consensus in the assembly. He was removed from the parliament soon afterwards. Several journalists who attended the session told me a related but no less interesting story. At the conclusion of the unusually contested parliamentary session, General Benny L. Moerdani (who was to be stripped of his power by President Soeharto within the next few months) called a crowd of journalists and presented an impromptu ceremony. He removed his gold watch, and handed it to Ibrahim as a token of appreciation for his courage in exposing what was not right about the session. Moerdani challenged the journalists who were present to report this in the news. As might be expected, not a single news report appeared in the days that followed.

What had been happening outside parliament is even more interesting. As the supreme legislative body began to meet in early March 1988, a revamped

newspaper appeared in Jakarta, called *Jayakarta*, with the backing of the Jakarta Military command. According to one report, as the publication went into its second month, it reached the unusual circulation of 80,000 copies (Ecip 1988). Each issue presents extremely provocative topics. Headlines in early issues include an interview with General Sarwo Edhie (the most prominent figure in the mass killings of communists in 1965–6), and comments on the publication of Pramoedya A. Toer's books by the publishing company Hasta Mitra. In his interview, General Edhie discussed his decision to resign from parliament and launched a warning about the infiltration of communists into top government positions. This, in fact, was the beginning of the anti-Soedharmono campaign. The topic of Toer's novels came under the heading '*PKI Gaya Baru Akan Muncul 1995*' ('New Style PKI Will Revive in 1995'), and the article contained an interview with another staunch anti-communist figure, Soehardiman.

In the following months, the media drew public attention to sensational news on related matters. The first was a report about Marais Siradj, an ex-tapol Category C from West Sumatera, who proposed forming a new party, accommodating the aspirations of former members of the PKI, two other left-leaning parties, the banned Partindo (*Partai Indonesia*, 'Indonesian Party') and PNI A-Su (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, 'Indonesian Nationalist Party' of the leftist faction led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman in the 1950s).⁶ The second concerned the dismissal in disgrace of Syamsir Alamsyah from his position as leader of the local Golkar organization and its faction in the local legislative body of Payahkumbuh, West Sumatera (see *Kompas* 18/10/1988: 1). Both of these pieces of news were supposed to vindicate the allegation that the communists had actually revived and infiltrated strategic positions.

Then in June, a series of separate news reports reinforced Sarwo Edhie's observation in his *Jayakarta* interview about communists infiltrating the incumbent government and parliament. Sources of these included people like Abdul Malik, former chief of the Yogyakarta branch of KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, 'Indonesian Student Action Front'); Jusaac M.R. Wiro Subroto, a former member of parliament (*Masa Kini* 21/06/1988); Oetoyo Oesman, head of the state-sponsored *Pancasila* indoctrination sessions (*Wawasan* 23/06/1988), and Kharis Suhud, Chair of the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, 'People's Representative Council') (*Suara Merdeka* 25/06/1988). In the last mentioned report Suhud also made a statement that will be of special interest for the following section:

. . . there is one author, an ex-political prisoner of Buru Island who has written a book so subtly that it can stir up social tensions. For this reason the book has been banned. 'This is but one case, from one ex-political prisoner from Buru Island after his release. There are in fact tens of thousands [of such people] who have been released from the Buru

Island', said Kharis Suhud. 'And now we have no idea what they are doing.'

(*Suara Merdeka* 25/06/1988)

In July 1988 a series of allegations of "political uncleanness" named names within the Indonesian Democratic Party leadership in various provinces. Although these attacks did not always produce any effective impact on the targeted individuals, they exasperated the party and served to strengthen the often unproven stories about communist revival and infiltration.

The government did not make any systematic response to these allegations until June that year. Throughout much of the second half of the year it made concerted efforts to launch a counter-campaign, assuring the public that there was no cause for concern, and that there had been no communist infiltration into top government positions. In other words, the government still wanted the public to believe that communism remained a "latent danger", but that the government was in full control of the situation. State officials such as the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Soedomo, made the counter allegation that certain individuals had maliciously spread unfounded rumours to suggest otherwise (*Kompas* 22/06/1988: 1). Minister of Defence and Security L.B. Moerdani added that the suggestion of communist infiltration was a humiliation, underestimating the capacity of the security apparatus (*Suara Merdeka* 29/06/1988).

By September, the government moved further by introducing new regulations in order to streamline the existing and confusing system of surveillance. Both Minister Moerdani and Coordinating Minister Soedomo announced that the concept of *bersih lingkungan* (unclean by association) was no longer valid, except within the armed forces and in the selection process of new recruits (*Tempo* 17/09/1988). Towards the end of the year, a new concept was introduced in its place, mainly by Soedomo. The new screening tool, dubbed "*skrining mental ideologis*" (literally ideological mental screening) was, in theory, more problematic (*Tempo* 12/11/1988). In an attempt to protect the innocent from being punished by guilt of association – as implied by the concept *bersih lingkungan* – the new instrument was intended to individualize enemies and to screen suspects as autonomous subjects. The problem was that these subjects were to be screened for a much wider range of mental orientations and ideological leanings than simply the old (and already problematic) category of communism/Marxism. Now, the same subjects would be designated unclean for having any inclination towards ideas or consciousness deemed antagonistic to the status quo. Regardless of any merits the newly introduced concept may have had, and against the frustration of Soedomo who gave it birth, it never took off and was not adopted in society.

By and large the general public remained preoccupied by various local tensions emanating from the old, and now officially expired, concept of *tidak*

bersih lingkungan. The government had won the war of words at the top level, succeeding at least in defusing the attack against Soedharmono and the President who had chosen him, but it was not immediately victorious at lower levels. The final months of 1988 were highlighted by insistent and frustrated remarks from state officials to the effect that the issue of communist infiltration had been disseminated by those who intended to destabilize the society, confuse the general public, and undermine the government. They even suggested that it was communist elements themselves who were responsible for the untrue rumours (*Tempo* 12/11/1988). An editorial in *Kompas*, the largest daily, noted correctly what was so significant about the situation:

usually the government and its officials would take the initiative to warn the people about the latent danger of the PKI. Now it is the opposite. The government, that is Menko Polkam Sudomo, has appealed to the public not to inflate the issue and make hasty statements in public.

(*Kompas* 02/05/1988: 4)

The anti-Soedharmono faction within the military set to work in earnest soon after losing the vice presidency nomination in March, and following a series of campaigns about communist infiltration of Golkar in July (*Tempo* 16/07/1988: 23, *Kompas* 18/10/1988: 1). In October it managed to install its own nominee at the head of Golkar (van de Kok and van Langenberg 1990: 163). Retired General Wahono succeeded Soedharmono as chair of the immense organization.

Only in November 1988, when the situation was already in his favour, did Soedharmono come out and respond publicly to the accusations about his past, and make an outright denial (*Tempo* 12/11/1988: 22). This, however, was not the end of the use of communist stigmatization in public displays of intra-elite rivalries. In December 1995 a group of 50 people went to the parliament to demand the purging of around 80 “unclean” members of parliament who belonged to the armed forces faction, without further details of their suspicion and suspects. Interestingly, a large number of these protestors were small traders and street vendors, with their spouses and small children. They admitted openly to journalists that someone had mobilized them to chant anti-communist slogans, for reasons of which they were not aware. They had taken up this incitement for a Rp.10,000 (or US \$4.37) payment (see Widyanto 1996, *The Jakarta Post* 16/12/1995: 3). On 30 September 2001, as the country was reminded of the tragedy 36 years earlier and the short-lived presidency of Abdurahman Wahid was facing an uphill battle against almost all factions within his coalition government, a larger group of protesters, involving young boys, marked the beginning of a similar campaign against a communist comeback (*Suara Merdeka* 01/10/2001: 1). An ‘anti-communist’ website was set up at <<http://antikomunis.tripod.com>>, perhaps dating from this period. Although it was still accessible at time of writing, the website appeared not to have been updated since that period.

Even more than President Sukarno, in the eyes of his immediate successor, President Abdurahman Wahid was considered by his critics – mainly Islamic radicals – to be too liberal-minded and left-leaning. Soon after being inaugurated president, Wahid made several bold moves that shocked even his allies and sympathizers. He chose to make his first overseas trip to Beijing and claimed to have some distant Chinese ancestry when speaking there. He proposed the repeal of all regulations against communism, opened up diplomatic relations with Israel, and offered a formal apology to the victims of the state-sponsored terror in 1965 as well as to the people of East Timor. As many expected, he lost power in disgrace soon afterwards. The elite's attachment to anti-communist rhetoric outlived the New Order and its successors.

The refractory stigmatization

Serious divisions within the top political elite triggered the 1988 anti-communist controversy whose scale and consequences were unparalleled before and after the event. This division within the elites, however, was neither the cause of, nor the reason for similar tensions that swept across the nation. Victimization in society at large was in fact a lot more damaging than whatever was happening between Soedharmono and Moerdani and their respective supporters. The following is a list of randomly selected cases that will illuminate the magnitude and the local variants of the remarkable antagonism in 1988, whose foundation was the 1965–6 killings.

Between April and August 1988 as many as 37 employees of the Department of Information were found guilty of being “involved in G-30-S/PKI”, and 14 others were deemed to be *tidak bersih lingkungan* (*Kompas* 27/09/1988). As late as November 1988, when the government was able to play down the social panic of anti-communist infiltration, the newsmagazine *Tempo* (12/11/1988) reported the continued screening and victimization of various local politicians and civilian employees, underscoring the discrepancies between elite's rhetoric in Jakarta and what was actually taking place in the provinces. For instance in Medan, Panangian Siregar, who chaired the provincial executive board of the Indonesian Democratic Party, complained that three of his colleagues were screened by the local government offices due to *bersih lingkungan* allegations. In East Java, several members of the local parliament were judged “unclean”. In December as many as 20 village heads were fired for the same reason (*Tempo* 17/12/1988: 24). Such victimization at various local levels not only continued well into 1989 (when debates at the elite level had subsided) but did so with increased intensity and wider scope. In January 1989 as many as 140 school teachers in the city of Lampung were fired, not long after they began teaching and despite their previous success in passing the required ideological screening tests (*Kompas* 14/01/1989: 1). The official reason for these dismissals was new findings to

suggest they were not *bersih lingkungan*, a concept that had, as noted, already been officially abandoned by the central government in Jakarta.

Examples such as the above abound, but the following cases deserve special attention as more details are available than in most cases. The first and most publicized case was that of Mrs. Asri Soebarjati Soenardi, a Golkar senior official, the first female politician to head the provincial parliamentary house in East Java. In the first week of 1989 she attracted public attention when she resigned from the prestigious post for "family reasons" (*Kompas* 03/01/1989: 1). The public, as might be expected, was not convinced. Just two months earlier, Sugeng Subroto, the regional military commander had announced his discovery that certain individuals who were *terlibat* ("involved") in the PKI were holding positions in the East Java parliament. The commander vowed to take firm action by the year's end (*Kompas* 17/11/1988). Subsequent reports exposed the sad truths which were no surprise to the general public. Asri Soebarjati Soenardi was not in any way a communist; in fact she was recognized by various sections of the provincial political elite as a dedicated government official. Nonetheless, her track record was marred by the fact that her father had once reportedly been active in a leftist teachers' union. As a consequence she was obliged to resign from her post.

On 18 November 1988 Sartojo Prawirosurojo (aged 58) resigned as Head of the Golkar Central Executive Board of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Although the formal reasons given were personal and health, the preceding events were too significant to be overlooked. Back in 1966 Sartojo was reportedly a member of an organization, *Barisan Sukarno* (Sukarno Front) which was banned by the military during the period of violence, and, like many others, he was arrested. He was cleared after a series of tests by military and police institutions in 1967 and by the intelligence office in 1973 (see *Tempo* 19/11/1988: 33; 26/11/1988: 24; *Editor* 10/12/1988: 19–20) and, with his reputation rehabilitated, he pursued a relatively successful career in a government office. After retirement he joined Golkar, and took the position that he was compelled to relinquish in 1988. 'Sartojo vigorously defended his past, claiming that he had been falsely accused in 1966–7. He . . . received . . . a formal clearance, but he nonetheless decided to resign from his Golkar post, for what he said were health reasons' (van de Kok *et al.* 1991: 89).

The story of Sukresna (a pseudonym) came to public attention in the newsmagazine *Tempo* (16/07/1988: 24). Sukresna was a senior faculty member at Padjadjaran University in Bandung. On 24 May 1988 he lost his job in disgrace following a letter of dismissal from the Department of Education. Apparently he had been subjected to a series of interrogations by various military and intelligence offices in the 1960s. He attributed his latest humiliation to a recent dispute with the Dean of his faculty over university housing. Ironically, the same Dean was subsequently given a dis-

honourable dismissal by his superior in another instance of wrongful accusation of communist involvement (*Tempo* 03/09/1988: 25).

Two other cases occurred in institutions of higher education. The first was the dismissal of H.J. Koesoemanto, chief editor of the University Press of the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta. For this 63 year-old man, there was nothing new about such an occurrence. As already mentioned (note 40, Chapter 1), he was dismissed dishonourably from his post owing to his “unsound political background” when he was still an undergraduate student at that university. He had also been fired in 1971 and 1980 for the same reason. Each time, including this latest one in 1988, he retained his position in practice, although not formally (see Hartoyo 1988).

The second concerns the rector of Universitas Tujuhbelas Agustus (UnTag), Sadjarwo. In February 1989, Sadjarwo (at the age of 70) was summoned to the offices of the military for a series of interrogations following several reports about his past political affiliations. The initial report had originated in a very controversial book, *Siapa Menabur Angin Akan Menuai Badai* (*Those Who Sow the Wind Will Reap the Storm*), by Soegiarso Soerojo (1988).⁷ Although Soerojo subsequently retracted his statement about Sadjarwo’s association with the PKI-affiliated *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (Indonesia Farmers’ Front), the allegation spread further by word of mouth, including within the institution that he headed. One faculty member of this university, Ruben Nalenan, investigated Sadjarwo’s biodata further; when he found more “evidence” regarding Sadjarwo’s questionable past, he reported his findings to the military. For some reason the report was leaked to the press (the first to publish it was, unsurprisingly, *Jayakarta*). Prior to 1965 Sadjarwo had been appointed a state minister in several cabinets, and he had served as a member of parliament for more than one term under the New Order. Undoubtedly, then, he had undergone many layers of political screening on many occasions without any dubious political affiliations being discovered.

Effects and challenges

We have seen Soedharmono, the Vice-President, become the target of character assassination by the top military elite because of an alleged association with leftwing groups half a century earlier. He survived. We have also seen several figures of relatively high and middle rank fall in disgrace under the same kind of attack. In addition, thousands of low-level employees were dismissed due to late – and perhaps inaccurate – discovery of their past political associations or family backgrounds. In a few cases, suspected individuals went further than quietly stepping down, or meekly submitting to public humiliation; challenging the accusations in court, they demanded and got compensation (see Happy and Lugito 1990; *Kedaulatan Rakyat* 16/01/1990).

There were also those who were not directly incriminated but who stood up in public to question the whole exercise of stigmatization. The historian Kuntowijoyo commented that the whole affair was simply a series of intra-elite self-serving conflicts (*Masa Kini* 22/06/1988). Well-known columnists Ayip Bakar (1988), Gerson Poyk (1988) and Adeng Sudarsa (1988) made separate arguments with the common suggestion that the zealous proponents of the anti-communist campaign had often committed precisely the wrongdoings of which they are accusing the communists. It is significant that public criticism of the anti-communist campaign came predominately from the section of the population that enjoyed relatively easy access to public debate and the mass media, and who were proficient in the national language: the male, urban middle classes who were not personally targeted by the very same campaign. We must return to this group, and briefly examine their statements, as a necessary component of the picture that this chapter portrays and as a helpful prelude to the ensuing chapters. Complementing John McBeth's comment cited above, his colleague at the same magazine noted towards the end of 1995:

Despite the worldwide collapse of communism, letters-to-the-editor indicate that the notion of a latent communist danger remains firmly entrenched in the Indonesian psyche. At the same time, however, an expanding circle of academics, students, journalists and public servants are growing visibly impatient with the history lessons taught by the New Order government of Soeharto.

(Cohen 1995: 22)

On the whole, legal challenges to invalid allegations about an individual's former association with proscribed political groups or aspirations did not, of course, present any challenge to the status quo under the New Order. In fact, they actually reinforced it, as they followed the agendas and thus supported the ideological domination of the powers-that-be. Not only did lawsuits of this kind imply an endorsement of the government's propaganda about both the communists and the 1965–6 events, but they also expressed this message through a corrupted state apparatus – the judiciary – that functioned primarily to legitimize the regime's repression (there will be further discussion of this in Chapter 4). In other words, they help propagate the idea that to have a “good name” requires that there has never been any association with any leftist politics, even at times when these were officially legitimate as was the case with the PKI prior to 1966.

This interpretation is, of course, not universally valid. Under certain circumstances, the significance of such lawsuits could be different. For instance, when peasants in Kedong Ombo prepared a counter-attack against the government's brutal confiscation of land and eviction in order to build the controversial dam (see note 4 in this chapter), one leading activist suggested

to them that a defamation lawsuit be filed against local officials for having marked their ID cards with “ET” stamps. Here the point was not to demonstrate any strong identification with the government’s demonization of communists, neither was there any implication that the judiciary would respond in their favour and grant them the apology, rehabilitation, and material compensation they were seeking. Rather, the purpose was to educate the general public – and the authorities in particular – about something that was unimaginable in Indonesia at that point in history: that peasants could have self respect and a “good name”, and that they cared about maintaining these.

During the time that Soegiarso Soerojo’s book *Siapa Menabur Angin Akan Menuai Badai* was provoking a backlash among Sukarno’s faithful loyalists, I met one of them. He was a staunch anti-government student activist who shared with me in private his frustration about his idol Sukarno being publicly humiliated as having flirted with communism; this had only hardened his anger against the New Order government. I asked him why he did not take the “accusation” as a compliment. Out of curiosity about his reaction, I posed the provocative suggestions that ‘after all being a communist is not a bad thing’ and ‘from the little that I know, all of the founding figures of Indonesian nationalism had a high respect for socialism and for some version or elements of communism’. The young activist, who had grown up under the New Order, was taken aback. After a moment’s pause, I continued, ‘By rejecting the accusation about Sukarno’s left leanings, you have in fact inadvertently agreed with Soeharto and his government about the evil nature of communism. This is something Sukarno would never have done’. He burst out laughing, never having entertained such an idea before.

Throughout the 1980s, the New Order’s campaign to demonize the PKI was by and large very successful – even among those who identified themselves as critics of the government. In late 1989, the state court of Sukoharjo (in Central Java) heard a case about a student who had physically assaulted a professor for having suggested that the former was a ‘son of a PKI’ member (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 18/12/1989: 5). Indeed in the 1980s and 1990s, especially but not exclusively among the younger generation, “PKI” became a swear word in informal conversations (some exceptions to the general practice exist, and they will be discussed towards the end of this chapter). In 1985 the newsmagazine *Tempo* presented a comparison of two reports from its 1984 and 1985 polls, which included the question ‘What is the single most important domestic threat to Indonesia?’ Communist resurgence outranked all other categories in 1984 – ranking well above corruption – and increased the following year.⁸

The report was presented without any bias towards vindicating the government’s propaganda; quite the contrary, in fact. By the middle of the 1980s, the intelligentsia were beginning to feel uneasy about the government’s

Table 2.1 Domestic threat to Indonesia

<i>Question</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>1985 percentage</i>	<i>1984 percentage</i>
Communist resurgence	316	33.65	24.7
Corruption	173	18.42	24.5
Abuse of power	145	15.44	19.5
Gap between rich and poor	100	10.64	12.5
Drugs	66	7.02	6.7
Decline to answer	61	6.49	2.7
Religious fanaticism	33	3.51	2.9
Other	15	1.59	n/a
Western cultures	14	1.49	n/a
Radical Islam	9	0.95	n/a
Racism	7	0.74	1.5

Source: *Tempo* (17/08/1985: 15); translation from Indonesian by the author.

unrestrained witch-hunting, but this did not necessarily indicate any commitment to upholding the rule of law or political liberalism, let alone populist leftism. Journalists with the same newsmagazine discovered with dismay in 2000 that general perceptions of communism and communists, and in particular that of the younger generation, had not progressed more than two years after the formal end of the New Order government. In a survey that year, capturing the views of 1,101 secondary school students in the three largest cities (Jakarta, Surabaya, and Medan) on 12–22 September 2000, the findings include the following points.

The propaganda film *Pengkhianatan G-30-S/PKI* (Treason of the G-30-S/PKI) was one of the main sources or the sole source of information about G-30-S/PKI for the respondents, second only to ‘teachers and textbooks’ (which were most likely, of course, a derivative of the master narrative). An overwhelming number (87 per cent) of these youths had seen the movie more than once. Most believed that the official accounts of the event were largely true; although they also stated that these accounts required revision, this was presumably to refine the style of presentation rather than to alter the substance. Most also believed that communism would be revived, and that it should not be taught in schools. They also believed that books smacking of communism should be banned. Despite all of this, it is curious to see that a high percentage of respondents believed that Soeharto was at least partially responsible for the tragedy in 1965. The complete results of the survey are detailed in Table 2.2.

The nation’s largest daily, *Kompas*, conducted similar polls in two successive years (2002 and 2003), the results of both surveys confirm those of *Tempo*. Although 85 per cent of the respondents in 2002 (75 per cent in 2003) would accept the ‘return’ of eks Tapol in society, more than 60 per cent (more than 52 per cent in 2003) disapproved of the idea of giving

Table 2.2 The September 30 Movement (G30S)

From where have you learnt about 'the September 30 Movement (G30S)'?	
Teachers and textbooks	97%
Films	90%
Parents	90%
Historical sources	15%
Magazines	15%
Those who witnessed the incident	3%
Friends	2%
Other sources (television, radio, print media)	1%
Have you ever seen Pengkhianatan G30S-PKI (Betrayal of G30S-PKI), the film by Arifin C. Noer?	
Yes	97%
No	3%
If yes, how many times?	
Once	13%
Twice	29%
Three times	20%
Over three times	38%
Do you think the information about G30S contained in textbooks is true?	
Yes	50%
No	38%
Uncertain	12%
If no, do you think school textbooks about G30S need revising?	
Yes	95%
No	5%
In your opinion, what really happened on September 30, 1965?	
<i>Respondents may give more than one answer.</i>	
PKI abducted some generals	78%
PKI rebelled against Soekarno	39%
Suharto attempted to overthrow Soekarno	31%
The Council of Generals attempted a coup against Soekarno	13%
Internal conflict within the army	10%
Internal conflict within the PKI	4%
Others	7%
In your opinion, who masterminded the G30S incident?	
<i>Respondents may give more than one answer.</i>	
Aidit	71%
Suharto	44%
Untung	10%
Soekarno	3%
Soebandrio	0.5%

continued on next page

Table 2.2 continued

Sutopo	0.2%
Oemar Dhani	0.1%
No idea	0.7%
Do you think Soekarno was involved in starting G30S?	
Yes	13%
No	67%
No idea	20%
Do you think Suharto was also involved in starting G30S?	
Yes	59%
No	16%
No idea	25%
In your opinion, what is communism?	
<i>Respondents may give more than one answer.</i>	
An anti-religion dogma	69%
A radical movement	16%
An ideology	21%
No idea	21%
Do you believe communism will see a revival in Indonesia?	
Yes	47%
No	26%
No idea	27%
Should communism be taught in educational institutions?	
Yes	38%
No	57%
No idea	5%
Should books on communism be available in Indonesia?	
Yes	33%
No	59%
No idea	8%

Source: *Tempo* (02–08/10/2000)

these people or even members of their families the same opportunity as other citizens to hold governmental positions. No less than 77 per cent (69 per cent in 2003) considered communism as essentially “bad”, and more than 50 per cent believed that communists were murderers. Another significant finding is that less than 10 per cent had any basic understanding of communist’s official views (see *Kompas* 30/09/2002; and 04/08/2003).⁹

As elsewhere, and especially during times of rapid social change, there were not one or two dominant voices in Indonesia during much of the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time as many young Indonesians were living under the continuing spell of the New Order’s master narrative,

there were several who did precisely the opposite (for example romanticizing communism or the PKI or deliberately making light of the supposed threat) out of boredom or resentment against the excessive state propaganda. We will deal with this further in Chapters 3 and 5. For the moment, suffice it to mention two examples from 2002. The Jakarta Police were in search of a prominent activist who was reportedly responsible for the production and sale of t-shirts with a picture of Karl Marx and playful phrases with the initials “PKI” found earlier at the 2002 Jakarta Great Fair, a government-sponsored celebration of the city’s anniversary (*Kompas* 29/06/2002; *Tempo Interaktif* 28/06/2002). In October the Attorney-General investigated the newly published memoirs of a physician, Dr. Ribka Tjiptaning Proletariyati (2002), entitled *Aku Bangga Jadi Anak PKI (I’m Proud to be A Child of the PKI)*. When the author was asked what she thought of the government’s suspicious reaction to her book, she replied cheerfully that it would be good – and free – publicity (*Koran Tempo* 05/10/2002).

When the academic Schulte Nordholt contends that Indonesians are at the moment ‘a people without a history’, one must question this rather particular and narrow conception of ‘history’: ‘Since his fall, Soeharto’s version of history is no longer credible, but an alternative has not yet emerged’ (2002: 53). In contrast to the views adopted in the present study, Nordholt appears to totally disregard “popular” senses of histories that find expression in a variety of banal forms such as news reports, interviews, letters to the editor, memoirs, diaries, fiction, or even rumours (see also van Klinken 2001a). When asked in an interview about what sort of people must (re)-write Indonesian history, Pramoedya A. Toer replied that anyone is potentially qualified to do so. Any Indonesian who lived through the troubled years of 1965 can write what s/he saw and heard, because ‘the experience of an individual can become the experience of a nation in a very direct way. And the experience of a nation is also the experience of humankind’ (*Inside Indonesia* 20/10/1989: 30).

“Official history” has indeed, as Nordholt suggests, been securely locked within the government’s grip (see also Adam 2005). In 1995 the Head of the BAKIN (*Badan Koordinasi Intelejens*, ‘Intelligence Coordinating Body’), Lieutenant General Soedibyo admitted that the government would not let sensitive materials pertaining to the troubled years of 1965–6 be declassified. As it has not ratified the international convention on declassifying state documents, it is under no obligation to do so (*Jawa Pos* 29/09/1995: 16). Journalist Margot Cohen (1995: 22) explains further the difficulties that confront anyone wishing to probe into the history of which the government wished to be the sole narrator. I take the liberty of quoting her report at length, because of its instructive details:

Scholars are publicly calling for more probing historical research into the 1950s and 1960s. However, a number of obstacles remain. Key informants have died and essential documents were destroyed when

protesters burned the Communist Party headquarters. Many witnesses in villages would prefer to put painful memories behind them.

Scholars also face formidable bureaucratic hurdles. Research projects regularly require permits from the Interior Ministry, National Intelligence Agency, and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. . . .

And once the scholars get permission to go through the door of the National Archives, there's no guarantee they'll find much. According to Chaniago, head of the archives' information division, all documents relating to communism are officially off-limits. Moreover, many records relating to communist activity have never been turned over to the central archive, but remain scattered in the storehouses of government departments.

(Cohen 1995: 22)

However, far from being completely 'silenced' (as Nordholt [2002: 44] believed it was), by the government's lies and propaganda Indonesians have slowly but gradually been creating alternative histories and pushing back the limits of what can be made public. Their results may not meet the intellectual standards of the intelligentsia, but the quality of these different alternative histories is improving significantly with time.

One of the first public and confrontational challenges to the official account came from Wimanjaya K. Liotohe, who published a three-volume "indictment" entitled *Primadosa* against President Soeharto's conspiracy over the 1965 coup. To the disappointment of many anti-government activists, Liotohe's document is largely just a compilation of papers and reports from various sources with widely varying levels of credibility, even so, it was widely circulated in the form of photocopies. Indeed so wide and popular was the dissemination of the document that on 23 January 1994 the President made the unusual complaint that 'someone has discredited me, suggesting that I masterminded the G.30.S/PKI, because Untung [the Lieutenant Colonel, who led the 30 September 1965 movement] was my subordinate. All of this is written in the book *Primadosa*' (*Kompas* 19/01/1994: 1, 11).

By naming names Soeharto was presumably expecting a rush of public support for himself, and a concerted attack against the book's author. But he did this at some cost.

By explicitly describing the substance of the "slander", he helped to amplify the idea across the nation. The day after his statement the Office of the Attorney-General banned the book and declared its circulation illegal. But that was far from sufficient from the viewpoint of the President and his close circle. The expected mass support for the President did not come. A week later Probosutedjo, the President's half-brother, came out in public expressing his outrage about the lack of sympathy and support for the President. He questioned the loyalty of the President's aides and allies, and demanded that the author of *Primadosa* be tried and prosecuted. Far from being tried in court, however, Liotohe challenged the Attorney General's

ban and filed a lawsuit with the State Administrative Court. The Court dismissed the case, and it was soon forgotten by the general public.

Primadosa did not provide a viable alternative to the official history, but at least it succeeded in loosening the grip of the given account of 1965 on the repressed body politic, if only momentarily. So strong was the effect of this shake-up that soon after the controversy of the book, the government hastily announced a new publication that it was sponsoring, entitled *Buku Putih: Gerakan 30 September, Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia* (*White Book: 30 September Movement, the Coup of The Indonesian Communist Party*) with the sub-title *Latar Belakang, Aksi dan Penumpasannya* (*Its Background, Actions, and Eradication*). In essence this is old wine in a new bottle, a revised and refined formulation of the G-30-S/PKI “master narrative”. Instead of bringing all controversy on this sensitive topic to an end, this publication merely marked the beginning of further controversies, which only become more emotional and wider in scope.

A further blow against the government’s attempts to pacify the public was dealt by the publication of two separate memoirs by Sukarno loyalists. The first was Manai Sophiaan’s *Kehormatan Bagi Yang Berhak* (*Honour for Him who Deserves*), launched on 7 September 1994. Sophiaan had been ambassador to the USSR in the fateful month of September 1965. The book’s main message was that President Sukarno was innocent in the 1965 affair, and that the CIA had played a major role in it as part of the larger strategy of the Cold War. The second was Oei Tjoe Tat’s 1995 *Memoar Oei Tjoe Tat: Pembantu Presiden Sukarno* (*Memoirs of Oei Tjoe Tat: Assistant to President Sukarno*), co-edited by Pramoedya A. Toer and Stanley A. Prasetyo. The most critical elements in the book include first-hand testimonies of what happened during the first few months of the 1965 killings in Java, Bali and Sumatera and of Soeharto’s restless behaviour during those volatile months, and also testimonies from other eye-witnesses to the events. Oei was the first Chinese-Indonesian to be a state minister (and the sole one until the last few days before Soeharto stepped down in 1998). Some of the most sensitive materials in his book were derived from his position as a member of a fact-finding committee established by President Sukarno to examine the details and scope of the mass murders from October to December 1965. Oei had spent more than a decade in jail, where he further collected a wealth of first-hand testimonies of the contested history from other inmates.

One common statement in these two publications concerns the assistance of the American government in the affair, especially in mobilizing student activists during the attacks against the Pro-Beijing government of Sukarno, his supporters, all leftist organizations, and the Chinese Indonesian minority. A group of former student activists of 1966 who had belonged to the FOSKO 66 (Forum Studi dan Komunikasi, ‘Forum of Study and Communication’) launched a series of protests against the publication of the two books, demanding that they be banned and their authors tried (see *Wawasan*

11/11/1994: 1). On 25 September 1995 Attorney-General Singgih banned *Memoar Oei Tjoe Tat: Pembantu Presiden Sukarno* after 12,000 copies had already been sold in the first five months of its circulation (Cohen 1995: 22).

Now, in retrospect, these counter “histories” may not appear particularly bold or daring. Yet both of them signify the change in the times, just as they also help to make such changes possible. Back in 1988, the year upon which this chapter focuses, major presses were strongly reprimanded by the government for publishing letters-to-the-editor from ex-political prisoners, or for suggesting that there existed questions and competing versions of the events in 1965 that lay outside the master narrative authored by the New Order. In April 1988 the government issued a strong warning to the daily *Suara Pembaruan* for publishing a letter-to-the-editor from Pramoedya A. Toer (Toer 1988a). The letter was a rejoinder to an opinion column by senior journalist Rosihan Anwar (1988) that reinforced the anti-communist campaign of that year and discussed some of Toer’s alleged wrongdoings. That was probably the first instance since 1966 where Pramoedya A. Toer was given a public space within a legitimate venue. Thus, as in any other repressive regime, such as in South Africa during the Apartheid regime, political pariahs like Toer could be referred to only in order to be demonized, and were never allowed to speak publicly in their own defence. The government made a similar intimidating statement to the newsmagazine *Tempo* for publishing a letter-to-the-editor from Oei Tjoe Tat on 8 October 1988.

More serious was the government’s threat to close down the daily newspaper *Merdeka* for publishing an editorial that did not express unequivocal support for the government’s narrative of 1965. According to the formal reprimand statement (see *Kompas* 06/10/1988), the timidly worded editorial entitled ‘*Menelusuri Kembali Soal Sejarah*’ (*Tracing back a Historical Issue*), had made two mistakes. First, it mentioned G-30-S, but dropped (or separated it from) the “/PKI” that it was official standard practice to add afterwards. By doing so, it appeared to exonerate the PKI. Second, it had dared to acknowledge what the master narrative denied: ‘historians are still to this day raising questions and investigating the incident’ (*Merdeka* 30/09/1988).

The significance of the above incidents is difficult to appreciate beyond their time. In the span of two years, things had changed dramatically. Cover stories on the history of the 1965 events by the newsmagazine *Tempo* from these two years attest to this watershed. Its cover story in 1988 was almost entirely in tune with the government’s propaganda. When it featured the same topic as a cover story in 1990 (the seventh time in 20 years), *Tempo* presented – liberally and in detail – different versions of the 1965 events from different parts of the world, including some that incriminated the Indonesian army and President Soeharto himself. *Tempo* did not do this alone, or rashly; there was no retaliation – indeed no negative reaction whatsoever – from the government.

In the years that followed, these polyphonic voices multiplied quickly and widely inside Indonesia¹⁰ (in contrast to some familiar accounts by distant observers). Taken all together, these still fall short of being a systematic historiography, but they often had more immediate and wider social impact than any formal history book could ever have in this largely oral-oriented society. A more comprehensive and systematic view of history that did not specifically claim to be “history”, and was not concerned directly with the events in 1965, but which posed the most threatening challenge to the authorities, came from the literary works of Pramoedya A. Toer. These were first published during the same turbulent years of the 1980s.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer: a tale of tales

No Indonesian literary figure has been as influential, admired, and resented as Pramoedya Ananta Toer (born 1925). He is one of Indonesia’s few living legends. Earlier in this chapter I quoted him as saying that ‘the experience of an individual can become the experience of a nation in a very direct way. And the experience of a nation is also the experience of humankind’ (*Inside Indonesia* 20/10/1989: 30). Few Indonesians’ lives can match Toer’s to vindicate this statement. He is deeply interested in history and he paid dearly for his personal engagement in the making of Indonesia’s history. He joined the nationalist movements against the Dutch and Japanese colonial governments, as well as opposing post-colonial Indonesia’s authoritarianism. He was jailed under the colonial government, under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy,¹¹ and under Soeharto’s New Order. With the exception of President Wahid’s apology mentioned earlier, successive post-New Order governments have not acknowledged, let alone considered making any token of restitution for, the immense state-sponsored destruction that preceding governments wreaked upon his civil rights. It is neither necessary nor possible to make any comprehensive claims about the significance of Toer’s literary and political career to this chapter.¹²

What I intend to do here is something very modest. I wish to focus on the reception and impact in Indonesia in the 1980s of the publication of Toer’s best-known literary works, namely his semi-historical tetralogy. The titles of the tetralogy, their years of first publication, and the dates of their eventual banning (after the slash), are *Bumi Manusia*, ‘*This Earth of Mankind*’ (Toer 1980a) (August, 1980/May, 1981); *Anak Semua Bangsa*, ‘*Child of All Nations*’ (Toer 1980b) (December, 1980/May, 1981); *Jejak Langkah*, ‘*Footsteps*’ (Toer 1985a) (mid 1985/May, 1986); and *Rumah Kaca*, ‘*Glasshouse*’ (Toer 1988b) (March, 1988/May, 1988. In *Sang Pemula*, ‘*The Pioneer*’ (Toer 1985b) (mid 1985/May, 1986), published soon after the tetralogy, Toer discloses that the character of Minke personifies the novelist-cum-journalist R.M. Tirto Adhi Soerya. All Toer’s post-1980 works were published by Hasta Mitra (Jakarta). I will not discuss the substance of these extraordinarily rich novels here, apart from a few brief remarks in passing.

The tetralogy does not challenge the master narrative of the 1965 incident in any direct way. In more profound and insidious ways, however, it constitutes a set of counter-narratives to the entire corpus of “legitimate” Indonesian history and historiography and the dominant construction of Indonesian selves. The novels are the product of years of research, reorganization, and rewriting about the complex historical circumstances that gave birth to Indonesia as a nation, its nationalists, its national language, and indeed novel writing as a new literary genre in this society (see also Foulcher 1991). Deprived of any writing materials, Toer was only able to narrate this epic-style story orally to his fellow inmates during his lengthy 14 year exile. At a later date, when he was able to get modest writing materials and wrote down a draft, the military confiscated the manuscripts and never returned them. Copies of parts of these confiscated manuscripts survived through being smuggled off the penal island with the assistance of certain religious leaders who were sent there.

The novels were finally published only after the “release” of thousands of political prisoners in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As might be expected, most existing publishing houses were afraid to have anything to do with the manuscript or the author.¹³ When former prisoners helped to set up a new publishing house and published the book, the quality of the print and binding was rather poor, but the sale figures – unsurprisingly – broke records during the first few months of circulation.¹⁴ This took place despite the fact that most book shops refused to sell them, and most print media refused to advertise them. Knowing that it would not take long for the government to decide to ban these novels, I hastily wrote several reviews and sent them to local newspapers and journals. As I expected, all declined to publish any reviews of these books. Interestingly, however, some of the editors of these journals contacted me soon afterwards and asked how to get copies of the books for their private collections.¹⁵

Overseas, the novels found an enthusiastic audience.¹⁶ In their own homeland they became a source of great anxiety. The first 10,000 copies of *Bumi Manusia* were sold out within two weeks of their initial release. When the novel was banned ten months later, it had already been reprinted five times, and had a total circulation of 50,000. Meanwhile 20,000 copies of *Anak Semua Bangsa*, the second volume in the tetralogy, were already on sale to the public (*Tempo* 06/06/1981: 12–13). These figures do not include the widespread practice of photocopying. On 13 October 1981 the Office of the Attorney General admitted to having burned ‘only’ 972 copies of *Bumi Manusia* and *Anak Semua Bangsa*, rejecting allegations that they had burned as many as 10,000 copies (*Tempo* 14/11/1981: 14).

In the standard history books, the birth of the Indonesian nation has usually been attributed to the enlightened activities of a few student activists, mainly males of Javanese ethnicity. There were attempts during the New Order to accord more prominence to the military, but with no significant success. In Toer’s semi-historical novels, the prominence of student activists

remains intact although their role is not exclusive. The novels championed several female and low-class figures, but their main protagonist is Minke, a male, native Javanese, Western-educated aristocrat. His life transformation takes place at a very volatile time and social space at the turn of the twentieth century, and – as hinted by the author in the above citation – was thoroughly interconnected with radical changes in the Dutch East Indies and more broadly in Europe.

As such, the stories in these novels not only present multicultural subjects, unequal histories, and multilingual voices. What is most fascinating – and perhaps historically realistic – is how these differences and gaps interact and collide in the novels, how they mutually interrogate, enrich, negate, and give rise to different forms of hybridization, all of which go to make up the Indonesian nation. Thus, in stark contrast to any historical texts that Indonesians are familiar with, these semi-historical novels are full of drama, complexities, ambiguities and ironies. No less subversive in the novels is the semi-historical content itself. The positions of many national heroes and villains are inverted. New heroes are introduced, with radically new reasons for their prominence. Of great importance are characters that had no respectable place, if any place at all, in the New Order's master narrative, dominant discourse, and official history about the origin and making of the nation: strong-willed and intelligent women, political activists from low class family backgrounds, radicals among visiting Europeans, local Eurasians, Arabs and Chinese-Indonesians, as well as nationalists of non-Javanese ethnic backgrounds. Set at the turn of the century, with allusions to the present, the narrative throws light on many crucial aspects of contemporary Indonesia. Javanese aristocratic values – the New Order's cherished style of "Asian Values" – are constantly mocked in the novels.

Although experiencing the various forms of government repression, Toer's tetralogy succeeded in attracting a great number of admirers, mainly among the new generation of urban educated middle classes. What is remarkable about these admirers is the great price that they paid for their interest in the novels. In September 1981 an Australian diplomatic official, Max Lane, was dismissed from his post at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta after translating the novels into English (*Sinar Harapan* 14/10/1981). On 14 October 1981 four student activists were expelled from the University of Indonesia (Jakarta), and detained for months by the Jakarta military command for inviting Toer to speak at their campus on the role of intellectuals in Third World countries (*Tempo* 24/10/1981: 13). The next two chapters will be specifically devoted to a case in the late 1980s and early 1990s where three young activists were tried under the draconian Anti-Subversion Laws that carried a maximum penalty of death for possessing, circulating, and discussing Toer's tetralogy.

When the first two volumes of the tetralogy were banned, three undergraduate students separately published open letters in the country's biggest weekly, *Tempo*, provocatively defending the novels. They all gave their full

names and addresses. One came from Jakarta, and the other two from Yogyakarta. While the Jakarta student seriously questioned the banning, his two Yogyakarta colleagues ridiculed it. In order to criticize the official pretext of the banning (that these novels propagated the proscribed thoughts of Marxism), the student from Jakarta demonstrated his erudition in the classic texts of Marxism and gave an analysis of the novel that invalidated such reasoning (Sulistyo 1981). By doing so, intentionally or otherwise, this student did several things:

- a) he declared that the bans on Marxist thought had been ineffective;
- b) he demonstrated that studying Marxism was possible in Indonesia;
- c) he suggested that Marxism was not as bad as the government wanted the public to believe; and
- d) he was not afraid of revealing all of this in public in 1981!¹⁷

The two Yogyakarta students exclaimed gratefully about how fortunate they were to have access to the banned novels through friends (who might have obtained them from yet other friends of friends). One of these Yogyakarta students explained why he found the book interesting: ‘The class struggle depicted . . . is a real portrayal of our society today’ (Aswin 1980). The other student emphasized that he had read the novels only after they were banned; in fact, it was the banning itself that had aroused his desire to seek them out from friends. In a sarcastic parody he endorsed the banning, because the novels ‘attack feudalism’, and ‘awaken the spirit of struggle for the human rights of the oppressed’, and the novels’ protagonist (Minke) is ‘too sensitive’ to issues of social justice (Budisantoso 1981).

I recall visiting a boarding house of Islamic student activists in Yogyakarta in the early 1980s, when the government repression against Islamist radicalism was at its height and more political prisoners were behind bars for being what the government dubbed “right extremists” (Islamist political dissent) than its “left extremists” (populist, secular, and Marxist-inspired dissent). I was struck by the large hand-made posters on the walls of these activists’ bedroom, containing citations not from the Quran, but from Toer’s tetralogy!

Back in 1988, the year upon which this chapter focuses, the propaganda press *Jayakarta* printed the very strongly worded headline ‘*Buku-buku Pramudya agar Dibakar*’ (‘Pramudya’s Books Must be Burned’) (20/05/1988: 1). It was during this intense year, the culmination of years of antagonism and paranoia, that the case took place that will be closely examined in the next two chapters. Before proceeding to that, let me conclude the tale of Toer’s tales with one more account of a major controversy that took place in 1995, because this event underscores the position of Toer and the 1965 trauma more generally in the changing political environment of Indonesia that excluded the left and its legacies in a most brutal fashion. In 1995 the Manila-based Ramon Magsaysay Foundation decided to make

Pramoedya A. Toer one of the Asian recipients of its prestigious award for journalism, literature and creative communication, with a prize of US \$50,000. In an angry response to the decision, 26 prominent figures in Indonesia's literary and cultural circles co-signed a letter of protest to the Magsaysay Foundation, because they considered Toer's pre-1965 record in human rights and civil liberty to be very poor. A long and emotionally charged public debate ensued for months in the press (see Laksana 1997).

Dr. Lucila V. Hosillos, a Manila-based professor of comparative literature, wrote an open letter to Pramoedya, suggesting that he reject the award because of the Foundation's past record as an extension of American imperial power in the Cold War. A Filipino novelist, F. Sionil Jose, former recipient of the same award, expressed his resentment towards the Foundation's decision to grant it to Toer for similar reasons to those cited by the 26 Indonesian protestors. A spokesperson for the Indonesian government announced that Toer would definitely not obtain permission to leave the country. One of the 26 Indonesian protestors, the eminent novelist Mochtar Lubis, made a public statement that he would return his own award (which he had received from the Foundation in 1958), along with the US \$25,000 that came with it, if the Foundation stuck to its decision about Toer.

Counter statements, one co-signed by a matching number of 26, and a second bearing the signature of 154 people in non-mainstream cultural and literary circles, were released to express support for the Magsaysay Award to be granted to Toer. A well-attended public forum was held at the Jakarta Arts Centre to review the controversy. The government threatened to close down an Indonesian daily, *Lampung Post* (10/09/1995) for publishing an interview with Toer on the controversy, but the authorities found it more convenient to collaborate with the publication's management in firing the four journalists deemed responsible for the published interview (*Lampung Post* 12/09/1995). The award presentation ceremony took place as scheduled, one day after Lubis visited the Foundation to return his own award and money in protest. Toer did not leave Indonesia; his wife attended the ceremony on his behalf and read his speech.

3 The Yogyakarta case

Don't you realize what a ban is? It isn't a preventive measure. It's a way of punishing people the State cannot punish under normal law. Many of the banning restrictions are designed simply to inconvenience or exasperate. . . . It is to keep you looking over your shoulder, even in your own home. It is to maintain that kind of tension. Besides, all these provisions are designed to make one commit technical crimes – by breaking the ban. They couldn't make you a criminal before, so they set up artificial provisions, and if you are caught contravening these you are technically a criminal.

(Steve Biko, in Woods 1987: 99–100)

The preceding chapters provided a general picture of the anti-communist witch-hunting across the nation, its extensions and excesses. As was noted in passing, the victimization of millions of individuals for more than two decades took place largely without trials. This and the following chapter are based on empirical observation of a series of political prosecutions in Indonesia under an Anti-Subversion Law (ratified in 1963, nullified in 1999). These are the prosecutions of Darmawan and Hidayat in 1989, and Rudy in 1990.¹ These were the first cases where legal charges of communist subversion were used against people who were not, and were not even accused of being, members of the Communist Party or any of its affiliated organizations. The Anti-Subversion Law stipulated a maximum penalty of death. The District Court in the city of Yogyakarta found the three young men guilty and sentenced them to seven, eight, and eight-and-a-half years imprisonment respectively. Like all other political trials in the country, these were 'constructed cases' (see AWC 1990a: 15–16). Around a thousand Indonesians were reportedly victimized by this Anti-Subversion Law. Nearly all of these prosecutions took place after Indonesia's New Order government rose to power in 1966 (AWC 1989: 138).

These prosecutions prompt the question of why a seemingly powerful state apparatus felt it necessary to prosecute innocent and largely harmless individuals. Why did they choose to use legal measures when they had always got away with more naked violence, and when their legal competence turned

out to be so utterly poor? I argue that these prosecutions took place, and took place the way they did, in the context of ongoing state terrorism. The prosecutions were conducted in part to reproduce the very terror that provided their basis. In this light, the quotation from Biko that opens this chapter is instructive. The quotation offers an insight into the intricacies of *teror* in everyday life under a vulgarly authoritarian regime. It indicates the logic of official restrictions that may appear irrational on face value, and the importance of self-police in a so-called “police state”.

The Yogyakarta case was only the third case of New Order student activists being prosecuted under the Anti-Subversion Law. The first was the prosecutions of the leaders of the 1974 student demonstrations in Jakarta, the most violent student demonstrations in New Order Indonesia. The main targets of the demonstrations were the government’s economic and foreign policy and the ethnic Chinese business community. These demonstrations, reportedly backed by a faction of the military elite, paralyzed the capital city for days. Even so, the defendants received sentences of no more than six years, which were later commuted to three and four year probations.

The second use of the Anti-Subversion Law against New Order students occurred in Yogyakarta in 1986. The accused were the editors of the bulletins *Al Ikhwan* and *Al Risalah*, which the state accused of propagating Islamic ideology that undermined Pancasila, the New Order’s state ideology. They were sentenced to a wide range of terms of imprisonment, from three to 13 years (see also ICG 2002: 10). The fourth case of students being prosecuted under the Anti-Subversion Law took place in Jakarta in 1992, this time the two accused were alleged to have organized a peaceful demonstration against the Dili massacre on 12 November 1991 and they were sentenced to nine and ten years.²

It is the third set of trials that concerns us here. The significance of these Yogyakarta trials in 1989 and 1990 goes well beyond consideration of the hollowness of the accusations and the severe punishments that followed. The youths were prosecuted for merely circulating banned novels, and for participating in intellectual discussions. The prosecutions highlighted the New Order political discourse par excellence, featuring elements of state terrorism as introduced in Chapter 1. This will be discussed further below. Contrary to their intended effects, the trials actually provoked urban intellectuals to challenge the long-standing discourse of the communist threat, and this proved to be one of the first widely supported open and direct confrontations against the discourse that had facilitated the New Order regime’s rule of terror for over a quarter of century.³

Overall, the ensuing examination of the prosecutions leads me to make two arguments. First, despite its unrivalled power in the country, the New Order regime lacked confidence and suffered from serious anxiety about critical intellectuals. One of the most important forces behind the prosecution of the three Yogyakarta activists was precisely that anxiety. Second, partly as a result of a failure to recognize the regime’s anxiety, many Indonesians

and scholarly observers alike tended to overestimate the regime's prowess, acting as though its power was more efficient than it actually was. Consequently, they tended to give more credence to the repressiveness of the regime than was warranted. This effect of power in turn added to the efficacy of that power.

The three political trials in Yogyakarta were not signs of the emergence of any significant opposition to the ruling elite. The case demonstrates the regime's ongoing interest in targeting innocent or powerless individuals. However, the case should not lead us to think that it was part of any systematic campaign of repression. Precisely because no extensive repressive operation seemed possible (or indeed necessary), the security apparatus often chose to deal with something small, localized and highly manageable, which they would deliberately blow up out of all proportion. In so doing, they could expect that the fear inflicted would spread more widely and would be more durable.

Some qualification is in order here to avoid the danger of too instrumentalist a view. The case under consideration was undoubtedly much more complex than one of simple political manipulation. It was ironic that the prosecutions of the three young men proved to be as provocative as they were intimidating. This may be one significant sign that the efficacy of the regime's draconian labelling of people as communist subversives was already waning at this time. The experience of these trials was potentially liberating, since it helped to demystify the image of the New Order's unchallenged power. But this is a retrospective thought that will need further examination.

I shall avoid the general tendency, common among activists, to overstate the regime's repressive practices and the strength of domestic resistance. I shall also critically question those scholarly studies of contemporary Indonesia, especially prior to 1998, that emphasize the New Order's strength vis-à-vis weak popular countervailing forces (e.g. Anderson 1990; Budiman 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Liddle 1985; Nordholt 2002; Robison 1986; Tanter and Young 1990; Vatikiotis 1993, 1996). Of course, the more mainstream studies that convey a picture of a harmonious familial relationship between state and people are less appealing and also far from the truth. This study will not follow any of the above or attempt to seek a middle ground. Rather, I shall focus on the complexities, ambiguities, contradictions, and subtleties of state repression itself and the responses it evoked.

I will first offer a quick overview of the major events of the case.⁴ Darmawan was arrested on 9 June 1988 at Yogyakarta's Kridosono Sports Hall, when he was found selling Pramoedya A. Toer's novels. Hidayat was arrested on 20 June 1988. The two were tried in the District Court of Yogyakarta, from late April to the first week of September 1989. Rudy was arrested in Jakarta on 21 June 1989 by the KODAM JAYA (*Komando Daerah Militer Jakarta Raya*, 'Regional Military Command, Greater Jakarta'). After a week of incessant interrogation, he was handed over to the Yogyakarta

KEJARI (*Kejaksaan Negeri*, 'Public Prosecutor') and KODIM (*Komando Distrik Militer*, 'District Military Command') for further interrogation in relation to the trials of Darmawan and Hidayat which were then in progress. Rudy was not tried until 13 June 1990, when the Supreme Court finally rejected the appeals of Darmawan and Hidayat.

All this happened in the context of three separate but relevant events. The first two have already been discussed in Chapter 2, namely the pseudo-communist witch-hunt and the return of Pramoedya A. Toer's literary works into general circulation. Unlike most communist witch-hunts in the past, the one in 1988 was extremely cryptic and confused (as noted in Chapter 2). It was triggered by an attack by a group of top military officers around the Minister of Defence, Benny L. Moerdani, against President Soeharto's selection of Soedharmono as Vice-President in March 1988. One of Soedharmono's close allies who was also implicated in the 1988 controversy concerning communist revivals and infiltration was Attorney-General Sukarton Marmosudjono, who would play a significant role in the prosecution of the three defendants to be analyzed below.

The third relevant incident was a series of student political demonstrations, after almost a decade of low-profile intellectual radicalism. These demonstrations took place mostly in towns and cities in Java, and Yogyakarta was one of the most important bases. Another series of political trials, of six student activists in Bandung, took place in 1989, but less serious charges than subversion were invoked. At dawn on 8 September 1990 a prison guard awoke Darmawan and Hidayat and told them to prepare themselves for exile to the penal island of Nusa Kambangan together with four other inmates. When they reached their destination later that day they met the Bandung student activists, who had been given sentences of between two and three years.⁵ A detour to provide a general introduction to the political significance of Yogyakarta and Indonesian student activism is necessary to familiarize readers with the case under investigation.

Yogyakarta and student activism

Indonesia is a post-colonial society where intellectuals enjoy material privileges and formal respect. Intellectual activism, notably by university students, occupies a prominent position in the standard history of the country, and Yogyakarta has always been one of the principal centres of such activism. Since 1978 no city in Indonesia has been as important as Yogyakarta with regard to student politics. Paradoxically, as with state terrorism, radicalism in Yogyakarta is juxtaposed with the city's famous air of festivity, middle class romanticism, conviviality and tourism. Successive governments have tried to project Yogyakarta as a politically sanitized display of an exotic tropical resort and cultural spectacle – second only to Bali prior to the bombing on 12 October 2002.⁶ The city produces more

first-rate experimental artists and radical thinkers than any other cultural centres in the nation. Small wonder that Yogyakarta has repeatedly experienced exceptionally repressive censorship and political violence. The 1983–4 “mysterious killings” (discussed in Chapter 1) started in Yogyakarta.⁷

Like Bali, Yogyakarta is one of the most written-about cities in Indonesia, albeit often for its fine art and its cultural and historical past, and not for its political significance. Observers have commented correctly that studies of Indonesia have been disproportionately Java centred.⁸ Among these Java-centred writings, studies in the human sciences have been heavily oriented towards the exemplary royal courts of Yogyakarta and Solo (or Surakarta). Compared to Solo, Yogyakarta is indisputably more outward-looking and dynamic. The Yogyakarta courts’ prestige has survived far better than that of their counterparts throughout the archipelago. In 1947 the government of the newly independent Indonesia (self-proclaimed in 1945) granted the Yogyakarta royal elite permanent status of governorship over its home territory,⁹ in return for their support in the nationalist movement. The territory has since been classified as a “Special Region” (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta* or DIY), equivalent to a province with nominal autonomy. From 1946 to 1949, Yogyakarta was the temporary capital city of the young Republic. The city’s stature as an exemplary political centre dates back to its establishment in 1755 (Sullivan 1982: 43). A disproportionate number of the 84 official national heroes hail from Yogyakarta and its neighbouring areas.¹⁰

The city is the site of intense national and international cultural encounters. Unlike other cosmopolitan cities in the country, Yogyakarta is distinct in at least two ways. First, it is relatively small in size, making intercultural exchange more easily felt than elsewhere.¹¹ Second, at least until the 1990s, it resisted the aggressive nationwide industrial expansion, and has been fairly successful in preserving considerable parts of its rural, agrarian components. In the streets of Yogyakarta, overshadowed by billboards advertising consumer products in English, flashy cars and trendy youth of many ethnicities pass each other on motorbikes among hundreds of rural commuters in sarongs pushing old bicycles with broken brakes, or with decorated horse carriages (*andong*) or tricycles (*becak*).¹² In other cities these non-motorized forms of transport have been declared illegal despite popular protests (protests which have sometimes resulted in deaths).

Yogyakarta was the birthplace of major modern ideological movements in the country. The “modernist” Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, was based here.¹³ The city was also the home base of the biggest Muslim students association, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (also known as HMI), established in February 1947. Also in an outlying suburb of Yogyakarta was the original base of the so-called *Laskar Jihad* (Holy War Warriors), the militia wing of the *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah* Communication Forum, a federation of Islamic organizations.¹⁴

Both Javanese nationalists and pre-1965 leftist unionists and intellectuals had a common stronghold here. As will be evident, many of the key figures

in the case study presented in Chapters 3 and 4 subscribed to Sukarno-style Javanese nationalism. The PKI-affiliated Association of Indonesian Scholars (*Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia* or HSI) was founded in Yogyakarta. Half the HSI members exiled to Buru after 1965 were graduates of Yogyakarta tertiary institutions (Irsyam 1985: 20–1). In 1985 the local authorities in Yogyakarta announced not only the official figure of 43,118 ETs (ex-political prisoners), or one out of every 44 adult residents, that they should watch, but also that they had lost track of almost 3,000 of these suspects (*Sinar Harapan* 01/10/1985: 1). This was the basis for a demand for more intensive surveillance. A counter-statement from Retired Colonel Mus Subagyo, one of the victims from 1965–6, claimed that out of some 30,000 members of the PKI captured in Yogyakarta in 1965–6, only half of them were ‘true communists’ (*Tempo* 06/10/1990: 31). Yogyakarta is also the base of most of the co-founders and key leaders of *Partai Rakyat Demokratik* (Democratic People’s Party), the most well-known leftist political party to have existed since 1965. It was founded mostly by (former) student activists in 1996, and was immediately declared illegal by the New Order government.

Yogyakarta is a capital city of what Bourdieu calls ‘cultural capital’ (1977: 183–4). It is the home of seven state-run, and over 50 private, tertiary institutions, including Universitas Gadjah Mada (or UGM – the first national university, founded in 1949) and Universitas Islam Indonesia (or UII – the nation’s first private university, established in 1944). In 1988 – the period we are most concerned with – one in every 26 adults (aged 15 or over) residents of the DIY, or one in every 40 residents of all ages there, was enrolled in a tertiary institution.¹⁵ The comparable national ratios for the period were 1:92 and 1:163 respectively.¹⁶ According to the 1988/1989 national census (BPS 1991: 127, 131), Yogyakarta had the lowest illiteracy rate (7.84 per cent, the national rate being 14.59 per cent, with Jakarta as high as 9.56 per cent), and the highest rate of popular participation in social organizations (61.86 per cent, the national figure being 49.83 per cent).

In the field of the arts Yogyakarta sustains a notable record of censorship. The banning of the film *Perawan Desa* (*Rural Virgin*) in 1980 was a good example. The film was based on a real case of a gang-rape in Yogyakarta on 21 June 1970 which implicated sons of important figures in the military and government.¹⁷ The film was released only after it had been officially censored 16 times in Jakarta (*Tempo* 04/10/1980: 39). After its release it won four national and three international awards, but was still not allowed to be shown in Yogyakarta (for more, see Sen and Hill 2000: 143–6). Rendra, the most acclaimed poet and dramatist throughout the 1970s and 1980s, was banned from performing in Yogyakarta where he lived. Outside the city he became a star and a hero for his satirical poems and plays. Other artistic performances that were banned exclusively in Yogyakarta included Nikolai Gogol’s *The Inspector General* (in translation) by the UGM student theatre group (December, 1981); *Sepatu Nomor Satu* (*Number One Shoes: military boots*) by Teater Dinasti (July, 1985); a short story reading by

arts students (January, 1986); and an experimental exhibition by painter Imam Dipowinoto (June, 1990). In 1983, a secondary school student had to go through a series of military interrogations over a poetry reading (October, 1983).

Moreover, a kind of vigilantism has occurred among Yogyakarta artists themselves in repressing rival cultural activities, as attested to by the incident to be analysed in the subsequent sections. On 20 February 2001 some 50-odd local Islamist youth groups armed with machetes raided the premises of the left-leaning *Lembaga Budaya Kerakyatan Taring Padi* (The Taring Padi Institute of People's Culture), injuring some people and damaging property. This was apparently part of a larger campaign against the "revival" of communism and the fragile coalition government under President Wahid (see Chapter 2). Moral policing has been no less vigorous in this city. The publication of surveys on Yogyakarta youth's permissive sexual behaviour and views provoked angry public reaction more than once. In the more recent case, a survey of 1,660 unmarried female students in Yogyakarta reported the contentious finding that 97.05 per cent of them were not virgins (*Kompas* 08/08/2002). A week later a group of women activists formally filed a legal complaint to the police, calling for investigations of the validity of the facts and motive of the research team (*Kompas* 15/08/2002). In another incident just outside Yogyakarta, a group of Islamist youths raided a major gathering of institutions and activists involved in an HIV/AIDS awareness campaign who had obtained an official permit from the local authorities (*Kompas* 13/11/2000). The attackers justified their action on the pretext that many of the attendees in the gathering were homosexual.

Quite apart from the restrictions on conducting empirical research outside the premises of academic institutions, external as well as self-imposed censorship has impinged upon academic activities on campuses also. In the prosecutions of Darmawan and Rudy, formal charges and evidence were established partly by assessing the working papers and research proposals that the two accused had prepared according to academic requirements and under their faculty's supervision. In April 1990 a group of senior UGM faculty members were prohibited from presenting their research findings to colleagues at a seminar within their home university. The research topic was ostensibly sensitive – a socio-anthropological study of East Timor, then under Indonesia's occupation – but the research was funded and supervised by government officials. In 1991, under the threat of lawsuit and pressures from intimidated colleagues, Yahya Muhaimin (a professor at UGM, who later became the state minister of education) was forced to withdraw and revise parts of his published dissertation (submitted to MIT, USA, in 1982). The one paragraph at issue was where he discussed the business activities of President Soeharto's half-brother, Probosutedjo (already mentioned in Chapter 2 in the context of the publication of *Primadosa*). When the department of literature at a Catholic University invited me to speak

on Indonesian literature in 1988, the committee asked that I drop historical references to the 1960s, which were the political context of the subject.¹⁸

Despite its infamous history of censorship, Yogyakarta has never failed to attract intellectuals, artists, and social activists to stay and base their activities there. Student activists constitute no more than a tiny proportion (my estimate is less than one per cent) of the student population in Indonesia, which is itself a very small and often alienated minority (0.6 per cent) of the national population. In 1991 only one out of every eight qualified applicants gained a place in a tertiary institution (*Bernas* 03/08/1991: 4). The figure had been even more depressing in preceding years. Despite being a minority, however, these young activists occupied a prominent position in the standard accounts of social change, and played a starring role in the New Order's dominant discourse.

It should be noted that, unless otherwise indicated, "student activists" in this study refers to "New Order activists" with overtly political causes, whose networking was secular, relatively independent and legitimate, and involved tertiary students. This is to distinguish their privileged position in regard to those activists who were also students, but were affiliated (or allegedly so) with the so-called G-30-S/PKI, engaged in "fundamentalist Islamic" movements, or involved in the separatist/national movements of Aceh, Papua (or Irian) and East Timor.

The regime's attitude towards student activists was always ambivalent. Student activism was, to a significant degree, a construct of the dominant discourse. This discourse predated the New Order, with ruptures and shifting emphases throughout.¹⁹ It is fair to say, appropriating Foucault's famous aphorism, that the history of Indonesian student activism is the history of the dominant discourse on students. Paradoxically, the students' constructed identity turns out to be occasionally threatening to the New Order state's mode of rule, through simulacra (introduced in Chapter 1, and will be further elaborated in Chapter 5). Students (and only students) in New Order Indonesia occasionally (and only occasionally) had the licence to launch public protests, to attack the regime directly, and to violate all official restrictions, conventional taboos and formal censorship.

Student political activities played a role in the transition of state power in 1965–6 – perhaps a more important one than they first realized, but much less crucial than in the myth that later developed. In retrospect, a former leader of the 1966 student movement speculated that without the students' collaboration the emergence of the New Order would have lacked legitimacy and would have appeared a purely military takeover.²⁰ The role of the 1966 student activists has thus been overexposed in the official narrative of the emergence of the New Order. The political actions of the military before and after the crucial six day period depicted in the film/novel *Pengkhianatan G-30-S/PKI* have been downplayed. Until the late 1990s few student activists could resist the temptation to reproduce the heroic myth. The dominant discourse after 1965 constructed student activism as something purely apolitical

and morally motivated. The standard designations for these student activists are *resi* (traditional sage) and 'moral force' (in English). Central here is an emphasis on the students' virtuous qualities, and the denial of self-interest.²¹ Over time, this dominant perception becomes both the result of and a rewarding call for their activism.

From 1978 all independent student organizations were outlawed. The irony is glaring. In 1965–6 the core group of the New Order was the chief mobilizer and beneficiary of what turned out to be a historic student demonstration. A decade later it became the most intolerant agent against student activism. The New Order state has been more repressive than all its predecessors, including the colonial regime.²² The 1978 crackdown radicalized students in different and potentially more crucial domains. Campus restrictions were partly responsible for driving them off university premises, and for their underground networking off campus after 1980. This in turn provided opportunities for young radicals to explore direct contact with underprivileged groups. The revival of student demonstrations in the late 1980s manifested at least three important features. First, many key figures among their predecessors came from well-connected families, studied in the top five most prestigious state universities in big cities, and were unashamedly moralistic and reformist in outlook. Student activists in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by contrast, were concerned with issues related to peasants and workers. Second, their main base shifted from the state universities in the capital and its neighbouring city in West Java (Bandung) to private universities in Central Java (notably Yogyakarta). Third, they lacked resources, a formalized network, a programmatic agenda and leadership as well as allies among the disenchanted factions within the ruling elite.

Contrary to the familiar myth, including one that characterizes many of the popular accounts of the 1998 "overthrow" of Soeharto, student movements have always had a limited capacity to drive social or political change. Despite this, successive governments have been irritated by student activists and have repeatedly punished them with considerable severity for criticizing the status quo. Indonesian student activism has political significance insofar as it enjoys the special privilege rendered to it by the dominant discourse: it focuses its attacks on the state's sanctified simulacra; the state's mode of rule continues to rely heavily on simulacra; and the plight of the underprivileged still finds no other effective channels of public expression (such as the political parties, parliament, the law, mass media, or other non-state mass organizations). This began to change significantly after the demise of the New Order government.²³

Student activism regenerates through time, although no systematic recruitment and training is possible. This is facilitated by both the surviving discourse on student activism as suggested above, and the material conditions of students' (activists or otherwise) social existence. Until recently the intelligentsia has dominated, if not monopolized, the articulation of distinctively "modern" cultural capital, something the power-holders have lacked.²⁴

From its beginnings the New Order needed to co-opt the intelligentsia to help sustain its hegemony, and to some important degree it succeeded in doing so. Many of the students in the country are the children or in-laws of less formally educated but well-to-do families. More often than not, Indonesian students depend financially on their parents or guardians for survival and schooling.²⁵ Unlike their counterparts in more industrialized countries, these students do not, and are not expected to, enter employment until they graduate. Years before the 1997 economic crisis, they lived in a society where human labour was abundant, docile and notoriously cheap. Unlike many of their counterparts overseas, Indonesian students live comfortably and benefit from the exploitation of fellow citizens of their own age who have to struggle for minimum survival.²⁶

There is no deep-seated conflict of material interest between the young intelligentsia and those who rule the country. However, material interests neither wholly nor immediately determine these students' speech and behaviour. The source of their restlessness, especially during the economic boom of the 1980s, was the convergence and contradiction between the suffocating social life under the militarized conditions of the New Order (plus the impossibility of totally overlooking the increased miseries of the underprivileged) and all the benefits and privileges that the same social life delivered to them. The latter included access to the attractive globalized discourses of knowledge and power from the critical intellectual works of the West, which in turn generated the desire for new morality, political correctness, and a sense of identity which was not identical to that prescribed and imposed by the militarist regime.

Like the three young Indonesians who wrote the open letters in 1980 and 1981 in response to the banning of Toer's novels (see Chapter 2), Darmawan, Hidayat, and Rudy were deeply enchanted by Toer's novels. Unlike the others, however, these three activists were prosecuted under the Anti-Subversion Law in 1989 and 1990 for their allegedly serious attachment to those novels. Earlier in this chapter I noted that the prosecutions can be best understood within the framework of Indonesia's state terrorism. I also argued in Chapter 1 that this state terrorism operated within a specific discursive field, and that some central substance of the discourse served as a master-narrative. I identified four major features of the New Order's dominant discourse, and I indicated the trauma of the 1965–6 massacre as the master-narrative. This chapter and the next will examine the three prosecutions in detail. I will proceed below to discuss the abduction and interrogation of the three men, giving some insight into the discursive practice of military intelligence's.

My primary materials consist of correspondence with the three convicted young men. Only a few of our conversations were recorded on audio cassettes. Although I saw each of them at least once a week throughout 1990, and less often afterwards, we preferred to spend the time discussing more personal matters. When I began my fieldwork in late 1989 the trials

of Darmawan and Hidayat were just over, while Rudy's trial was only just beginning to be prepared. Consequently, Darmawan and Hidayat had much more time than Rudy to reflect and comment on their cases. I had first-hand observation of Rudy's prosecution by attending his trial and having regular meetings with his legal defence team and the more informal support groups. I had the privilege of meeting the Chief of the Yogyakarta's District Police privately to chat about Rudy's ongoing trial. The trial exhausted Rudy and also those who supported his case. Therefore, I did not discuss some issues of relevance to my investigation with him properly until his trial was over on 22 October 1990.

I have complete sets of the legal documents pertaining to each of the three trials. I collected as many journalistic reports related to the three trials as I could, and talked to several journalists about their difficulties publishing those reports. I conducted interviews with the families of two of the three defendants (not Rudy's) and their close associates. I took several photographs related to Rudy's prosecution, and collected reproductions of pictures related to the earlier trials of the two detainees and the demonstrations that they provoked. I smuggled copies of drafts of my analysis to the three prisoners, and I received detailed comments from them. In what follows I shall restrict myself to a small portion of my investigation. While I wish to present the case in depth, to expose all the instructive subtle nuances and complexities that would not be visible otherwise, the case must be seen in the broader contexts provided in the preceding two chapters and the other two that will conclude the book.

I first studied the case in the early 1990s as part of a preliminary on-site investigation of state terrorism through the medium of other people's narratives. As we all know, this is somewhat problematic (see Taussig 1992a: 135). I will return to this issue in Chapter 6. Having read collected accounts of military and judiciary interrogations inhibited me a great deal in asking questions of the detainees. Fearing the parallels between a research interview and the prosecuting interrogations, I often had to resist raising many questions I thought important. Conversely, neither could I expect my informants to narrate a purely objective, historical account of such a traumatic subjective experience as an *a priori* series of events, even if they wanted to. To adopt James Clifford's insightful remark, the textual events I investigated did 'not exist prior to [their] interpretation; [they were] not dictated by fully instructed informants and then explicated and contextualized at a second level' (1988: 86). So, in a sense, my informants and I co-authored the events through narration.

Notwithstanding our excellent friendship and good faith, the outcome remains imperfect, and my primary informants in prison would be the first to notice this through reading each and every draft I produced. I have no right to expect that they should or would simply become my passive sources of data, providing me submissively with all the information I wanted without editing, addition, omission, revision or appropriation (either thinkingly or

not). There is little reason to regret this; but I always strove to question critically every piece of data I collected.

A drama of the ordinary

In the following pages I will document the arrest, abduction, and interrogation of the accused in some detail. This material constitutes a rare and crucial source of interpretation of the prosecution of the three men. Such a key record is totally inaccessible not only to the public, but also to non-military bodies. I shall demonstrate the significance of this material further in the next chapter. Here I will make only brief remarks to highlight aspects of the events that deserve immediate attention. My comments concern four major issues of interest.

The first is the zealous disposition of non-government individuals to facilitate the security apparatus of the government to enforce repressive measures against others outside the government. Darmawan was initially arrested not by security officers, but by a crowd of artists and journalists who wanted the local military to take action against him. After their arrests, Darmawan and Hidayat confronted a comparable temptation, born of fear, to co-operate with their interrogators in constructing formal prosecutions against themselves.

The second is the apparent ease with which military intelligence officers investigated the case with little reference to legal procedures. This is neither fully nor directly explicable by the compliance of the population that they ruled. Apparently without any meaningful understanding of the national law and the formal imperatives of the judiciary, these officers acted in a way they thought they had to. The power of the New Order's dominant discourse worked through them. The record shows how unfamiliar the military officers in charge of interrogating political prisoners could be about the subject matter under investigation. In the next chapter we will also see that court officials were no more knowledgeable about the dynamics of student politics. This is a case also where individuals with formal training in political science (Darmawan), or who are politically and morally committed (Hidayat), could be poorly informed about the practice of political repression in their own militarily-ruled home country. Despite their different bodies of knowledge, both the accused and the military officers seemed not to have any adequate idea of legal procedures or the rule of law. The officers did not pretend to abide by formal rules. The accused barely imagined that legal stipulations could be in existence (if only in theory) to protect them from arbitrary action. The accused and the officers seemed to communicate with each other in a shared discourse governed by state terrorism.

Third, the state's simulacra clearly affected not only the general population but also the agents of state security. The interrogators conducted the investigation largely within the structure and presumptions of the master-narrative familiar to all Indonesians (see Chapter 1). Within this framework,

anyone having any association with or sympathy for Marxism – let alone having been punished as a sympathizer of the PKI – was seen as *ekstrem kiri* (left extreme). It was also believed that subversive agents typically worked for an underground movement in small units of a bigger organized network with some overseas connection. This movement was thought to have one or more key leaders, called *dalang* (Javanese puppeteers). This discourse broadly structured the interrogation. In retrospect, the whole thing appears somewhat boring and pathetic, but this is precisely why I find it important. The drama that captured the public imagination with familiar kinds of spectacle was made of very ordinary individuals with ordinary desires and fears.²⁷

Finally this section will show that the relationship between the security officers and the intellectuals was based on mutual fear and anxiety. Consciously detaching themselves from official propaganda, the student activists imagined themselves to be engaged in genuinely oppositional activity. During their initial interrogation Darmawan, and to some extent Hidayat, had some difficulty rejecting the whole accusation outright, because they had wanted to see themselves as morally oppositional to the regime in the first place.²⁸ Although the military's treatment of Darmawan and Hidayat during the initial interrogation was relatively mild, the effects of their case upon their families and close friends were considerable. This is understandable. It was due to a long-standing imaginary, a self-reproducing simulacrum, which in turn was derived from the traumatic memory of the killings following the events of October 1965. Here we are dealing with state terrorism, rather than direct political violence.

Clearly there can be more than one way to show the evidence in support of the four arguments outlined above. What I choose in the ensuing pages is an ethnographic account, attempting to reproduce the events, moods, and voices of the subjects directly involved in the event. This involves paying attention to a high level of details and facts, changing atmospheres, and a large amount of verbatim dialogue. This choice of narrative strategy was made in keeping with the main central issues of the entire book, as already suggested and will be further elaborated upon in the subsequent chapters. Neither authoritarianism nor state terrorism is just a set of "system" of governance top-down as generally believed. Both are also a series of lived experience among socially structured unequal subjects, with feelings and changing feelings over time. Although one can never pretend to be able to give a satisfactory representation of even half of the experience of those who suffer state terrorism that one studies, it would be both a substantive loss, and ethically unfair, to ignore or silence the voices of these people altogether and substitute them with one's own abstract interpretation. The ethnographic account below also illustrates how dramatic events (such as anti-communism during the Cold War, or "war against terrorism" after 11 September 2001) are made more significant than they would otherwise be by actions and statements that may be considered trivia in other contexts.

Darmawan was arrested at about 7:30 on the evening of Thursday, 9 June 1988. In careful whispers, Darmawan had been offering Pramoedya A. Toer's books for sale to selected individuals who were gathering just outside the gate of Kridosono Sports Hall to see a play (ironically called *Tahanan* or *Detainees*), when someone from the other side of the crowd came up to him, grabbed him and shouted: 'These are banned books, bastard! You've disgraced me. I want to get this straightened out in court.' This angry man was Soleh, a prominent local dramatist who was responsible for the performance that evening. Many believed that Soleh was aware of Darmawan's actions from the night before in the same place, and that he had waited to capture Darmawan on the second night. It remains unclear why Soleh felt that Darmawan's actions 'disgraced' him.²⁹ No one involved in the incident that night seemed to be aware how serious the consequences of the incident would be.

That evening Darmawan had not actually been able to sell any books, but he was arrested for attempting to sell them. According to his prosecutor's requisition, Darmawan was carrying six copies of *Rumah Kaca*, three copies of *Gadis Pantai*, and one copy of *Anak Semua Bangsa* all authored by Toer. The third book had been banned since 1981. The second was only banned two months after Darmawan was arrested. The government had announced the banning of the first book on the state-owned television network (TVRI) only ten minutes before Darmawan's arrest.³⁰ Included in the list of confiscated articles from his bag that evening was a bundle of lottery coupons for sale.

Darmawan's initial reaction to his arrest was a mixture of shame, anxiety, and bewilderment. Soleh took Darmawan to a small room in the south wing of the hall, followed by several other angry looking people. They inspected his bag and wallet, taking out his driving licence and ID cards, and noting down his identity. He thought they were all intelligence officers; only later did he discover that several of them were journalists. He was kept in the room for almost an hour without knowing what would happen. Apparently Soleh went out to contact KODIM (the District Military Command) Headquarters to hand over the captive.

Meanwhile, someone who looked like a police intelligence officer came and began to inspect Darmawan's belongings and made the accusation that he was not alone in selling the banned books that night. He took Darmawan out of the room to find his friend(s). Darmawan had talked for about half an hour with a schoolmate before starting to sell the books, but the latter had not been selling books himself. As the police officer was escorting him out, Darmawan saw his friend at a distance outside the hall, but he denied to his escort that he could see him. He pretended not to see his schoolmate not to protect him, but simply because he did not want to disrupt his friend's enjoyment of the play. Darmawan still had no idea of what was going to happen.

When Darmawan and his escort returned to the room where he was first held, a big muscular man was already there waiting to pick him up. Only then did Darmawan begin to realize that he was going to be handed over to military officers. The big man was later identified as Second Sergeant Ngadimin Brontak, a 42 year-old intelligence officer in the Yogyakarta KODIM. Brontak was familiar to Yogyakarta student activists, being one of the officers who regularly monitored and intimidated them.³¹

Darmawan asked the officer if he was going to be tried for selling the banned books. 'Oh no', said the man; 'Not if you are honest and willing to tell us where you got them from. Otherwise, you might be in big trouble.' A few minutes later they arrived at the KODIM Headquarters in the centre of the city. But at that time Darmawan could not immediately identify the place, as he was unfamiliar with this kind of institution. One officer took a note of his ID cards and his now confiscated belongings. The officers locked him in a cell that appeared not to have been used for a long time. Brontak said to the guards: 'Watch out. He's a PKI.'

An hour later he was called out for an initial interrogation by ten people. They asked if he had any more banned books at home. As soon as he replied that he did, they demanded to be taken to his parents' house to collect them. Darmawan's father received them in the living room, while Darmawan took his time collecting all the books demanded. These included books that were authored or edited by Pramoedya A. Toer: *Bumi Manusia*, *Anak Semua Bangsa*, *Gadis Pantai*, *Hikayat Siti Mariah*, and a copy of *Rumah Kaca* that he had received as a personal gift from Kasto, an employee of Hasta Mitra.

At the end of the visit one of the intelligence officers asked him: 'Is this all? Do you have any more like this?' He was going to say no. However, his father repeated the question, which upset him: 'Do you?' Now Darmawan was too frightened to lie. He told them that there were more at his boarding house. Apparently his father had simply wanted to impress on the officers that the family was prepared to be co-operative and honest; in return he hoped to obtain their favour. As they were all leaving the house, Darmawan asked for his father's forgiveness. In the presence of the officers, his father told Darmawan to take this as a lesson. Taking all the "guests" to the front gate, Darmawan's father asked the officers not to torture his son, adding that Darmawan had recently suffered from very poor health. The officers lied to him, saying that his son would be treated with great care.

All of them went to Darmawan's boarding house to get the remaining books, which included 15 copies of *Rumah Kaca*. They also picked up a small book, called *Kuba dan Revolusinya* (*Cuba and Its Revolution*), with a picture of a soldier holding a gun on its cover. Altogether some 62 items were confiscated. They locked the room and kept the key. Then they brought Darmawan back to KODIM Headquarters and locked him in a cell. While in the cell he overheard an officer sending a report of his arrest via the two-way radio network even though it was late and he had not slept that night.

Later that night, another interrogation took place. The military officers stripped Darmawan down to his underpants, and some suggested that he be given electric shocks. Darmawan was very frightened. However, he was not tortured during the interrogation. All the same, he broke down. He simply could not handle the intimidation, especially from Mawardi, the Head of the Intelligence Section of the District Attorney's Office (*Kejaksaan Negeri Yogyakarta*, commonly shortened to KEJARI).³² The interrogation did not finish until around three o'clock in the morning, when the interrogators became exhausted. They wanted to know what organizations Darmawan was involved in or associated with. Since they knew that he was a Catholic, their immediate guess was that he was a member of GMNI (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia*, 'Indonesian National Student Movement') or PMKRI (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Indonesia*, 'Association of Catholic Indonesian Students'). But he belonged to neither. They insisted that he must belong to some organization, that he was not alone in selling Toer's books, that his action was part of a larger organized effort to disseminate communism. They accused him of protecting others.

This might well have been a standard question rather than any genuine suspicion. However, unfamiliar with the general practice of interrogation, Darmawan was scared to death. His interrogators saw his fear. They said they were prepared to beat him, smash his head, knock out his teeth, give him electric shocks, or hand him over to the KODAM (Regional Military Command) officers for even crueller treatment if he did not admit to their allegations. Out of great distress, Darmawan mentioned the Palagan Study Group as the only social group he had ever had contact with. It was the only group he could think of. However, he stressed that Palagan was neither a political nor a mass organization. It was simply a small forum for intellectual discussion. Now the interrogators showed a sense of victory, and for the first time they smiled. They immediately demanded that he note down all the Palagan discussions he had attended. Again, out of fear and a naivety which he later regretted, Darmawan wrote down that one of the topics discussed at Palagan was 'Socialism Reappraised', about which Hatta had spoken. The interrogators were more interested when Darmawan went on to tell them that in that discussion a reference had been made to the Sandinistas. Apparently the interrogators felt that they had found a key clue. The grand project of constructing contemporary "communists" commenced here and evolved thereafter.

Another set of questions that night concerned the circulation of the banned books. The interrogators wanted Darmawan to explain where he had got the books from, who and where his colleagues in the same business were, how long the business had been in operation, how he had become involved, and how the illegal activity had been organized covertly. Darmawan did not give them full information, but the information he gave was substantial and serious enough for the prosecutors. A piece of information

that excited the interrogators was Darmawan's admission that he had been selling Toer's books since 1987. Darmawan admitted that he had got the books from Kasto. Subsequent questions concerned how he had got to know Kasto. He tried to lie, saying that it was an accidental meeting on a public bus. However, under all kinds of pressure, he retracted his statement. This excited the interrogators, but they did not pursue the matter further as another interrogator wanted to know who else had been selling books with him at the Kridosono Sports Hall that evening. He said that no one was with him. As always, the interrogators accused him of lying. They claimed they knew that he had 'several friends' with him. The schoolmate who had been present could have been wrongfully implicated if Darmawan had lost control of his words.

By the time this interrogation came to an end, Darmawan was physically and mentally exhausted. He could not sleep in the remaining hours before dawn. At six o'clock he was allowed to go to the toilet and to have a quick bath, all the time accompanied by a fully armed guard. A simple breakfast was prepared for him before the morning interrogation, which began at nine o'clock and did not finish until about one o'clock in the afternoon. At five o'clock he was interrogated again. This time his interrogators wanted to know more about other books in his possession. He told them he had no more. They said they did not believe it and wanted to inspect his parents' house the following day. The interrogations were far from over. The procedure described above was only the first day in a long series.

Darmawan could hardly eat or sleep for nearly a week. He had neither soap, towel, nor toothbrush. For the first time in his life he saw nobody for days except the military officers in charge of his interrogation. While the officers progressively got more information – and needed to make less effort to get it – Darmawan was increasingly defenceless. He was pushed further towards collapse. The ensuing interrogations were to provide the substance of what evolved later into a case of communist subversion. The officers prepared a story line and forced Darmawan to admit to it with a few adjustments along the way. They worked hard to make the final outcome coherent and to make it fit the standard narrative of communist threats, focussing on the activities of the Palagan study group, and on the roles of Hidayat, Rudy and a few others in the study group.

Perhaps considering Darmawan too weak to be a key subversive agent, the interrogators pursued the issue of the forces behind him. They asked him again about his source of books after 1987. After a long interchange, Darmawan mentioned Rudy, and more specific questions about him ensued. In response to a pressing question, Darmawan gave them the titles of the books he had obtained from Rudy to sell: *Bumi Manusia*, *Anak Semua Bangsa*, *Jejak Langkah*, *Gadis Pantai*, and *Hikayat Siti Mariah*. Another set of questions concerned the founding, structure and leadership of Palagan; this inevitably led to the naming of Hidayat. Later on, Darmawan

was forced to admit that he had sold the books, that the founding of Palagan was for the purpose of spreading communism, and that Rudy and Hidayat were more responsible than he for these activities. This admission, however, was not reached by quick and easy interrogation. His interrogators went through a long series of negotiations over other names and scenarios before Darmawan gave in. He accepted the damaging lie in order to save himself from what he perceived to be the real threat of having his head crushed or his eyes plucked out.

It is necessary to pause and reflect briefly on the fact that up to this point Darmawan was not accompanied by any legal adviser as stipulated by the law.³³ Up to this point, no direct physical torture was employed by the interrogators to extort Darmawan's confessions. Since torture seems to be the rule rather than the exception in such cases, Darmawan's experience was somewhat unusual.³⁴ Paradoxically, the same fact demonstrates how "ordinary" Darmawan was – like most of us. The officers refrained from the standard violence, perhaps because they had got more than they needed without it. Compliance such as Darmawan's was expected of most members of the urban middle classes. Almost all who were affected by the case or associated with the three suspects were in the first few months as intimidated as Darmawan. In this way the case highlights features of state terrorism as described in Chapter 1.

Darmawan's experience became a point of debate among student activists and general observers alike, in relation to the degree of his responsibility for implicating Rudy and Hidayat. There was an implicit assumption in the debates that Darmawan's incriminating confessions would have been more forgivable if he had actually undergone severe physical torture. This is unfortunate. There is no reason to expect that the interrogators would have hesitated to use more physical torture if Darmawan had been resistant, as Hidayat's experience will demonstrate below. This issue is of great importance to the central issue of this study. The seemingly spontaneous reaction of many people was to blame Darmawan, the victim, and not the authorities torturing him. In fact the victim was made to self-blame. Darmawan shared with me his own view of the issue in different and occasionally conflicting ways. Below is an excerpt from a retrospective account of his difficulty during the KODIM interrogation:

I panicked. I was really in a crisis. . . . They made me confess, like a convert confessing his sins before a priest.

Things got more complicated because I was never close to Rudy or Hidayat. In fact, I had had suspicions about them. I suspected both of them of bad intentions towards me. My friends and I thought of ourselves as 'leftists', and we suspected that Rudy might be an intelligence agent, approaching us in order to keep tabs on us and get us arrested.

I knew Hidayat was a clever person, cunning sometimes.³⁵

The problem with Darmawan's statement was not only that it was untrue and endangered those it implicated, but that it incited the interrogators to pursue further fantastic elaborations of their scenario. Further questions were based on previously extorted confessions, and Darmawan found it harder and harder to satisfy his interrogators. The officers did not bother to find evidence to substantiate previous confessions. For example, after Darmawan admitted to their fabricated allegations about Palagan being a means of spreading Marxism and communism they immediately asked: 'why do you and your group want to spread Marxism and communism?' Darmawan was allowed neither to retract his previous confessions nor to refuse to answer further questions. The tale could only expand, not contract. His answer 'I don't know' to the above question angered those in the room.

To his own surprise in retrospect, Darmawan went on to produce more serious and more elaborate lies in line with his interrogators' demands. As if absentmindedly, he described the different outlooks that members of Palagan had despite their 'common adherence to Marxist or basic communist tenets'. He mentioned that 'Harman proposed the idea of a religious Islamic-based communist state'. While 'Hidayat was leaning towards an Eastern European model', he stated, 'Rudy was unclear, but undoubtedly radically left'. He admitted to being 'attracted by Socialism as practiced in Sweden, France or Holland'. Lies generated more lies. Darmawan was forced to make up more stories about Palagan's emblem and its strategy for action to 'topple the government', all of which was taken as more "evidence" to fit the interrogators' allegations. 'I bet you must be puzzled', Darmawan wrote to me in 1990, about 'how I could have made up such wild and damaging stories. Well, I did try to hold onto the truth, but . . .'.³⁶

Darmawan could neither eat nor sleep during the second night. Amid the attacking mosquitoes he prayed and hoped that his family had already cleared his room and emptied his bookshelves. He had several books, both in Indonesian and English, which were critical of the government. By nine the following morning Sergeants Brontak, Misdi and Mardiyanto and a driver named Sukarno were waiting in a Colt station wagon to take Darmawan back to his parents' house in the countryside. 'We'll take you home and inspect the rest of your book collection'. Darmawan shuddered with anxiety. They found the house empty. Darmawan thought his parents must have been at school, teaching, and his siblings at university. The officers demanded to be taken to his study, which was immediately ransacked for anything deemed useful.

Darmawan almost screamed when he found that none of his banned books, or those obviously liable to be construed as subversive, had been removed from the shelves. In fact, they had been tidied up.³⁷ The officers cleared the shelves. Darmawan was relieved to see that a letter he had prepared to send to Hasyim Rachman³⁸ was not there. *Militer dan Politik di Indonesia*, an Indonesian translation of Harold Crouch's *Army and Politics in Indonesia*³⁹ was lying on the bed next to *Islam Diadili*, an Indonesian

translation of *Indonesia: Muslims on Trial*.⁴⁰ Darmawan became nervous when Mardiyanto discovered an anonymous pamphlet entitled *Kelompok-kelompok Di Sekitar Soeharto (Cliques Surrounding Soeharto)*, but worse yet was to come when Brontak discovered a book called *Program Partai Komunis Uni Sovyet (The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)*.⁴¹ 'Shit. Until then I never imagined . . . really I never remembered having a book like that', he wrote recalling those moments. Meanwhile Misdi was startled to see Darmawan's personal photographs; among them was his picture with Guruh Sukarnoputra, some pictures of Karl Marx with Frederick Engels, and one of Pramodya A. Toer.⁴²

On the way back to the city, the officers wanted Darmawan to take them to Rudy's boarding house. He told them Rudy had moved to Jakarta. This answer angered them. Misdi accused him of refusing to co-operate in an attempt to protect Rudy. So they went off to the house where Rudy had formerly rented a room. Darmawan showed them the house, but refused to get out of the vehicle and to escort them in, pretending that he had a bad stomach ache. Misdi and Brontak went inside only to discover that Rudy had been gone for months. Now they demanded that Darmawan take them to Hidayat's house. Darmawan was upset, but he kept his feelings to himself. Once again he asked to be allowed to wait in the car. This time Misdi dragged him roughly out and berated him as they went down the small alley leading to the house where Hidayat's large family lived. Hidayat's younger sister met them at the front door, and told them that Hidayat was still at work on campus. By this time the officers apparently had either no more time or no further interest in hunting. They went back to the office and locked Darmawan back in his cell.

Hidayat was actually out in the countryside that morning, running a theatre workshop, one of the main venues of anti-authoritarian activism during that time (and even now to a lesser degree). He first learned of Darmawan's arrest at about noon when he read of it in a newspaper. When he went home that evening, his mother and sister told him about the visit of a friend, fair-skinned and bespectacled, who lived in Sleman. But they did not know who he was and who was with him. Hidayat was sure it was Darmawan and the intelligence officers. This was confirmed when he asked his sister for a few more details about the visitors' appearance. Hidayat was shocked and scared, 'what the hell did they come here for? Why did Darmawan want to see me? I sold no books!' Hidayat's sister told him that the visitors had come to pick up a book. Hidayat had indeed borrowed a novel, *Ibunda*, from Darmawan,⁴³ but he still felt uneasy. In the evening he went out to find some of Darmawan's friends to share the news with them. Many had not heard of Darmawan's arrest.

As he began his second week in the military gaol, Darmawan heard that his parents had tried to see him, but had not been allowed to. 'It was a precaution, to avoid unexpected incidents', explained the officer on duty, reproducing the formulaic expressions of New Order officials in justifying

censorship and various forms of restriction. So Darmawan's parents could only leave clean clothes and snacks for him. The next interrogation took place on Saturday, 18 June 1988. It was brief, and only Ngadimin Brontak was on duty. The main questions were about the sources of Darmawan's confiscated books. At the end, Brontak took Darmawan to a room deeper into the prison. Inside that 'closed room that one could only see into from the outside' Brontak wanted Darmawan to read his BAP (*Berita Acara Pemeriksaan* or 'record of interrogation'), comprising an account of the first series of interrogations in the KODIM Headquarters, and sign it. Even at this stage, Darmawan had no idea of the seriousness of his false confessions. Although the officers had prepared most of these confessions, Darmawan himself had formulated several others under duress. What struck him, as he scanned the BAP, was not the main substance of the interrogation minutes, but a declaration that closed the document, saying that to his knowledge all the information presented in the foregoing was correct, and that he was prepared to be punished if any of it was discovered to be incorrect. He told Brontak of his hesitancy. Effortlessly Brontak convinced him that the BAP was not really inaccurate. 'Just sign it, and tomorrow everything will be over. I will release you. You will only be expected to come here just to show up to report weekly at most. After that, you'll be completely free'. Darmawan signed the document, which he did not examine closely, although his hesitancy did not diminish.

The next day was an important day, for it was the first time that Darmawan saw two old friends at the jail. The first was Ngatijo, a former school-mate from elementary school and a neighbour. Ngatijo's wife was a teacher at the school where Darmawan's father was the headmaster. Ngatijo was now a corporal in the army, occasionally on duty at KODIM Headquarters. He was sorry to learn of Darmawan's predicament, but could do nothing to help. In friendly Javanese he said: 'Why did you make trouble? You should have known that obeying the government is the best bet. Why mess around? See, this is what you've got into now'. Every time Darmawan asked Ngatijo what would happen, the answer was always the same: 'Just give them money. Tell your father to make a deal.'⁴⁴ Darmawan was shocked to see the second friend. It was Hidayat, who was now a fellow inmate.

The search for an underground network

The account of Darmawan's arrest and his painful interrogation with the military officers above may appear insignificant if taken out of its immediate context where anyone was subject to severe political and legal penalty for reasons that seem trivial in other contexts. Completing this book during the "war against terrorism" after the Bali bombing in 2002, I found parallels between the case under study here and the arrests, interrogations, and trials of local terrorists in Indonesia as appeared in the news in 2002–3 striking.

In both situations, images of state-sponsored repressive measures, reckless victimization, and pockets of romanticized heroism to challenge the injustice were highly visible. In both situations high level political manoeuvres generate all sorts of localized, and often personalized, expressions and responses. However, most media reports suggested something more dramatic and systematic (e.g. some underground “Islamist” terrorist network was lurking behind every corner of our social space). For these reasons, the case from the past deserves more careful attention – with all its minute details – than it has thus far received.

Hidayat was seized at around 8:30 on the morning of Monday, 20 June 1988. He was eating breakfast at his office when a couple of men he did not know arrived. They asked him if he had a relative in Semarang. When he said that he did, they told him that this relative had just had a traffic accident and was in Panti Rapih Hospital, and that he was supposed to go to see her. Hidayat suspected that he was being taken in by KODIM officers, and this was confirmed when they passed the Panti Rapih Hospital. Pretending not to understand the situation, he protested: ‘You said Panti Rapih, didn’t you?’ They replied, ‘No. Not Panti Rapih. It’s the Bethesda Hospital’. They arrived at the KODIM Headquarters, right across the street from the Bethesda Hospital. The head of the Intelligence section, First Lieutenant Yuwono, was waiting for them.

Until recently the idea of political and civil rights was completely foreign to Indonesians. The presence of all-powerful state officials was overwhelming and a sense of powerlessness prevailed. Under such circumstances, it would be unusual for anyone wrongly arrested to demand the view of an arrest warrant. Hidayat was puzzled by what the officers had done to him, but not totally so. During the previous week, KODIM intelligence officers had continually sought him out. To his family Hidayat had said that he would be away for the next few days; he needed the time to figure out what was going on, and why the military wanted him. What intensified the atmosphere was the spread of news, especially among local journalists, that military intelligence was looking for him. Hidayat could not understand how the journalists knew this. One friend said that the secretary of the local journalists’ association *Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia* (PWI) had heard about it from KODIM, and believed the allegation that Palagan was engaged in subversive activities. No one with whom Hidayat discussed the matter took it seriously or warned him that things would eventually turn out the way they actually did. The only serious advice he got, for which he was grateful, was to remove any sensitive reading materials. He did remove some of what he possessed – but not all, as was later evident from what was confiscated. Until his abduction by KODIM, Hidayat was still unsure of what to do. He knew of the approaching danger, and yet could not think of any reason for it. He could not see how he could be implicated in Darmawan’s selling of books. Therefore he did not see any need to take serious precautions.⁴⁵

Darmawan saw Hidayat for the first time that afternoon when Hidayat was coming out of the bathroom in the west section of the building. Darmawan was going there, too. A guard quickly shouted at him and instructed him never to use the bathroom in the western section. In subsequent days he was repeatedly warned not to make any attempt to communicate with Hidayat. The guards would only allow the two men out of their cells, which were on opposite sides of the military compound, alternately. However, Darmawan often overheard conversations among officers on duty as well as conversations involving Hidayat and his visitors. There was a long bench next to Darmawan's cell where these conversations took place. On one occasion Darmawan overheard Hidayat speaking to a guard on duty: 'I simply can't understand why the hell I am here'. This made Darmawan feel guilty, as he thought it must have been a consequence of his false testimony. Darmawan was unaware of what could happen to Hidayat. He did not expect that it would be anything serious. He remembered that one of the officers had previously said that they wanted Hidayat merely for a 'brief enquiry'. It was simply unthinkable to Darmawan that Hidayat would be treated as he was in the days that followed. Still, from the other side of the wall Darmawan overheard the guard asking Hidayat: 'Do you know the guy in the other cell?' Hidayat's reply puzzled Darmawan: 'I have seen him, but I don't know him personally'. It did not take him long to figure it out. 'Hidayat must have lied on purpose', Darmawan recalled. 'This must have been a political tactic. I was completely unfamiliar with it'.

Hidayat's interrogation began on 23 June 1988 and lasted for a week. During the first three days of his detention, Hidayat underwent a series of intimidations to break his spirit. When formal interrogation began, no BAP was produced. Until then the questioning had mainly concerned Darmawan and the circulation of Toer's books. Hidayat was allowed visitors after four o'clock nearly every evening during the first week of his arrest. Entering the second week, his visitors were allowed to see him only during working hours. Some mornings Darmawan saw from his cell how Hidayat was made to wash the hall floor.⁴⁶ Darmawan also heard him weep. Again, this sounded odd to Darmawan, 'a revolutionary weeps!', before he understood it as an attempt to avoid torture.

In the days that followed, both Darmawan and Hidayat went through more interrogations by the police, KEJARI (*Kejaksaan Negeri*, "District Attorney"), LAKSUSDA (*Pelaksana Khusus Daerah*, regional level organ of the KOPKAMTIB), KOPKAMTIB (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, "Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order"), and KODIM (*Komando Distrik Militer*, "District Military Command"). Hidayat did not provide as detailed an account of these interrogations as Darmawan had. He told me that it was difficult to give a detailed account of the actual interrogations. 'It opens up old wounds'. In response to my request, Hidayat gave me general comments on the actual experience and expressed his resentment. Among the tortures that Hidayat claimed he

had to endure were the following: slapping, punching, whipping, being submerged in a water tank, and having his toe pressed under a table leg while one person sat on it and another punched him in the stomach.

Then a prosecutor, named Darto, came to see Darmawan and started another interrogation. 'Why a prosecutor?' he asked himself. Now for the first time Darmawan thought of the possibility of a trial. The officer asked him if the available BAPs contained the truth, and if he was indeed spreading communism. Darmawan replied calmly that it was not true. He admitted that he had sold Toer's books, but said that this was simply to make money. This led to arguments about his signature on the BAPs. Darmawan did not know why, but he felt he was not afraid to speak his mind to this prosecutor. The officer went away, saying to the military intelligence agents in the room: 'He's hopeless. He was retracting and confused. Next time I'll send him someone smarter'.

Towards the end of July 1988, Mardiyanto took Darmawan out of his cell and brought him into the main hall of the Headquarters. Darmawan had to be seated before a new interrogating team of four terrifying looking men. They were all big, tall, and heavily moustached. They all wore T-shirts and blue jeans. Before Darmawan was able to guess where they came from, he was struck by what he described as their 'thundering voices'. They spoke of Sutardji, Darmawan's uncle, and other relatives of his who had been long-term political prisoners due to their alleged association with the G-30-S/PKI. Later on Darmawan found out that his interrogators were intelligence agents from the LAKSUSDA. They were Second Lieutenant Sardjiman, First Sergeant Slamet Waluyo, Second Sergeant Sardi, and Second Sergeant Ngadiyo (Sardjiman's younger brother). According to Darmawan, the most hostile and intimidating among these officers was Second Lieutenant Sardjiman – whom Darmawan later discovered to be a distant relative by marriage. One of Darmawan's brothers told me that several years earlier his family had won a court case in a family dispute over an inheritance. Sardjiman was related to the losing party.⁴⁷

In a loud voice and coarse Javanese, Sardjiman cursed and humiliated Darmawan. He said that he had long been aware of Darmawan's activities in spreading communism and had been tempted to arrest him, but had been willing to delay it. The interrogators instructed Darmawan to identify all his other relatives who had been officially declared to be "involved in the G-30-S/PKI". Intensely afraid, Darmawan wanted to give all the information demanded, but he knew none of the names. This infuriated the interrogators. They sent him back to his cell and instructed the guards to leave him alone unattended until he 'rots'. Darmawan felt very depressed throughout the afternoon. In the late afternoon, they came back to restart what eventually became one of the crucial points in the series of interrogations. This time Sardjiman just sat back in silence. His colleague, Sergeant Slamet Waluyo, took over with a cheap trick; he offered his hand to Darmawan, shook hands, then said:

Darmawan, let's be friends. Honestly, I have sympathy for you. Everyone is feeling very bad and sorry. Your father has tried his best to get you free. Your siblings and all your friends are gravely concerned about you. Now, to get this matter over quickly, so that you can go back home and be with your family, I want you to give me information properly.

It is often easier to identify the effects of state terrorism than the social processes that constitute it, enhances its efficacy, and extends its longevity. Interrogations of subversive suspects by intelligence officers are some of the important materials that reproduce state terrorism that are inaccessible to the public. For this reason alone, it is crucial to have a close reading of the series of interrogations that Darmawan and Hidayat underwent. Additionally, without looking at the details of these interrogations, it would be difficult to understand the response of each of the detainees to their dehumanizing experience.

Darmawan's interrogation started with further questions about Palagan activities and their relationship to the confiscated materials. Treated in this casual manner, Darmawan spoke openly and insisted that Palagan was no more than a place for intellectual discussions. Slamet Waluyo could not maintain his pretended friendliness. He got angry as soon as he found that Darmawan was not giving him the confessions he wanted; 'I'd rather kill you first, before you kill me'. When Darmawan showed his desperation his interrogators, curiously, softened their stance again. After a break, Slamet Waluyo returned and apologized for his rudeness, before continuing the interrogation. However, it did not take long before the gracious pretense vanished and he resorted to intimidation again. Darmawan considered that the LAKSUSDA interrogation was the longest and most appalling. When everyone felt that their energy was running out, the officers gave Darmawan a pen and paper and dictated their questions to him, demanding that he answer co-operatively. They examined his answers and tore the paper into pieces each time an answer did not satisfy them. Then they repeated the process until they obtained the answers they wanted. Finally, once Darmawan had nearly collapsed, they began dictating the answers word by word. Darmawan's recollection of the interrogation that he shared with me provided one of the rare accesses to the inner logic of the New Order state officials. Throughout the session about 30 questions were asked, including the following:

Q: Why did you sell banned books?

A: I wanted to support Pramoedya A. Toer's struggle for reviving communism in Indonesia.

Q: How long have you been interested in supporting that?

A: My interest grew since I was 18, in 1978, when I met Uncle Sutardji. I often saw him afterwards, and he gave me my political education.

Q: Give us the background to all these activities.

A: I was driven to defend socialist ideology, to which the older generation of my relatives adhered.

[After second thoughts, they preferred 'communist' to 'socialist', and made Darmawan write the substitute.]

Q: Describe how Palagan worked.

A: Hidayat was a co-ordinator . . . Rudy was the main activist. I sold Pramoedya's books supplied by Kasto, and Tanaka sold books supplied by Rudy.

Q: What link connected Hasta Mitra, Palagan, and Rudy?

A: They co-operated in the dissemination of Marxism/communism.

Q: What did Palagan want to do with the pamphlet *Kelompok-Kelompok Di Sekitar Soeharto (Cliques Around Soeharto)*?

A: The pamphlet served to help us understand the ongoing conflicts among military and civilian elites. Study groups must take an active part in these conflicts and join with forces that struggle for the people's cause towards fundamental social transformation.

[At this point, the interrogators protested to the effect that the phrase 'fundamental social transformation' was obscure. Darmawan conceded and suggested 'socialism'. They rejected it and demanded 'communism', which Darmawan eventually accepted. Then Slamet Waluyo dictated further elaboration as follows.]

Thus, study groups set up intelligence units, and made contact with certain ex-political prisoners of the G-30-S/PKI who could help with fund-raising. They also contacted overseas funding agencies, in Australia for example, to help run their program.

Q: What is the grand or ultimate goal of Palagan?

A: Palagan is working for Hasta Mitra, which in turn is working for the People's Republic of China. Ultimately, Palagan's goal is the establishment of a communist state in Indonesia. Consequently, Pancasila will have to be replaced by communist ideology.

Q: How soon will Palagan begin to use the hammer and sickle emblem?

A: I don't know. Perhaps as soon as Palagan is strong enough.

Before they dispersed, Slamet Waluyo said to Darmawan complacently: 'You see, there was no lying or slandering here. It just follows its internal logic, doesn't it?'

To Darmawan's surprise, the LAKSUSDA officers did not leave and take a break; instead they continued their work, this time dealing with Hidayat. Darmawan heard the interrogators yelling at Hidayat, and a few minutes later they took Hidayat out of his cell, and immersed him in the water tank. It was just past midnight. Each time Hidayat's head appeared above

the water, one of the officers would slap and beat it. Later on Darmawan heard Hidayat weep: '*Ampun, Pak. Ampun, Pak*'.⁴⁸ Darmawan heard Sardjiman slap Hidayat and yell again: 'Tell us what Darmawan's ideas are! And Rudy's? Your ideas? Harman's? Adhie's?' A short break intervened. Hidayat cried softly. Then they ordered Hidayat to do push-ups. Darmawan felt terribly depressed and guilty, blaming himself for Hidayat's sufferings. Everything that happened to Hidayat from then on affected him painfully. Slamet Waluyo and his colleague, Sardi, teased Hidayat: 'Come on. We know you're not really crying. You're just faking it. Look, no tear drops! Now I want you to laugh. Do it'. Hidayat (a theatre worker) faked a loud laugh. The whole crowd was amused and joined the laughter, including Darmawan himself. The interrogation ended at three o'clock in the morning.

The following day was Sunday. Many of the offices in the building were closed. No one expected any interrogation that day, but late in the afternoon Slamet Waluyo and Sardi came back to see Darmawan. They took him out of his cell and brought him to the main hall. The enquiry did not last long, but it revealed what they had achieved from interrogating Hidayat the day before, casting doubts upon what they were doing.

- Q: We need a little more information from you, even though your interrogation with us is formally completed. Too bad your friend over there was too stubborn. What we want to know is: who actually master-minded Palagan? Was it you? I want you to be honest. We suspect you are just victimizing Hidayat, in order to get away with your original cause and set up a new group with a different co-ordinator to replace Hidayat. Isn't that the truth? Aren't you really the key man behind Palagan?
- A: That's totally untrue. I was not even involved in the organizational structure of Palagan. I was just an outsider, visiting their discussions occasionally by invitation.
- Q: Come on. That's unbelievable. Perhaps it was you who invited Keith Foulcher, and you intentionally didn't come to the discussion where he spoke. You monitored it from a distance.
- A: I never met or saw Keith Foulcher.
- Q: Sure! You think we'll believe your lie? We are now convinced it has been you who manipulated Palagan. You had the master plan, and you used Hidayat.⁴⁹

Darmawan did not respond to this last allegation. He was brought back to his cell. The search for a mastermind, or *dalang*, is imperative in the New Order's discourse of subversion (see also Chapter 1). It was the need to manufacture a *dalang*, as we will see in the next section, that eventually led to the arrest of Rudy.

In the next few days, Darmawan and Hidayat were questioned further, but in separate rooms. Darmawan began to notice with astonishment how courageous and resistant Hidayat was. He was amused to see how desperate the interrogators had become with their lack of results. They tried to force Hidayat to admit that Palagan was founded in order to establish a communist state. Hidayat refused. Mental and physical torture, although relatively “mild”, did not force Hidayat into submission. This led them to call him a ‘diehard communist’. In contrast to Darmawan, Hidayat was in greater control and better able to manipulate his reactions. He combined weeping with protesting to arouse sympathy, and to give an impression of innocence and an anti-communist stance. Hidayat said he did not always succeed, however. When he denied having bought any books from Darmawan, the LAKSUSDA officers brought Darmawan into the room, admitting that he had sold books to Hidayat. This forced Hidayat to confess. However, it is obvious that these various officers failed to make Hidayat admit to the pre-designed scenario which they had based on their previous interrogations of Darmawan. This failure had a visible impact. The interrogators returned to Darmawan, to reexamine what they had extracted from him and to disentangle some of the things that puzzled them. By now they could see the contingent problems of reporting the contradictory findings to their superiors. They began to blame Darmawan for having made false confessions in previous interrogations.

So far we have witnessed that the construction of communist threats was neither a wholly poor fabrication made by zealous state agents, nor a result of a discovery by clever intelligence work. The process was highly fraudulent and problematic, but it was not attributable to a single author. It was deeply embedded in the lived trauma of the 1965–6, structured feelings, and fantasies of the subjects involved.

On 29 July 1988 another activist, Harman, was arrested in connection with the same investigation. Hidayat, according to his own account, was able to infer from his session with the LAKSUSDA officers that some 11 student activists were on the wanted list, the top four being Rudy, Hidayat, Harman, and Adhie. It remained unclear why LAKSUSDA wanted Harman more than Adhie. At one point Hidayat suggested to me that it was because of the contradictory testimonies of Darmawan and Hidayat concerning Harman. However, on another occasion Hidayat gave me a different account. Before abducting Harman, the LAKSUSDA officers approached Hidayat, treated him to a meal and invited him to read any of his confiscated books. Then one officer asked Hidayat to recommend which of the two should be arrested next, Harman or Adhie. Hidayat chose Harman, believing he was mentally stronger and more resistant. Later, Hidayat thought that he had overestimated Harman.⁵⁰

The manner adopted by the KODIM intelligence officers to capture Harman replicated Hidayat’s abduction. Hidayat was dragged into a

KODIM car and forced to show them where Harman lived. Then a few officers picked up Harman on the pretext that one of his relatives had just been hospitalized with a serious illness. As soon as Harman entered the wagon he saw Hidayat and understood his fate. Harman was not interrogated until the third day. The interrogations revolved around two central issues; his ideas on “communist Islam” that Darmawan had referred to earlier, and who Hidayat “really” was. At one point, Hidayat and Harman were interrogated concurrently. The officers found hardly anything significant to justify an extensive investigation of Harman. Harman was released on 4 August 1988 but put under city arrest, which required him to report every other day for the two subsequent weeks. Several officers were reportedly trying very hard to persuade Harman to co-operate with them to produce false incriminating evidence, and were offering material rewards.

Not long afterwards, the officers put Hidayat in a cell next to Darmawan’s. As they could see each other, the guard put up a wooden board to block their view. When the guards went away, Hidayat removed the board by force and complained about what was going on. Darmawan became worried and warned him that this might anger the guards. Hidayat expressed his frustration: ‘They can kill me if they want to’. The two shook hands. Darmawan felt guilty and afraid to face Hidayat. While Darmawan showed his sense of helplessness, Hidayat retained his attitude of rigorous protest against the injustices he had suffered. The next conversation between the two detainees was crucial in understanding the tense relationship between each other as well as between Darmawan and his family on the one hand, and the local activists on the other who had found it easier to identify with Hidayat. This in turn, and in retrospect, appears to have had unhelpful consequences upon their response to their common difficulties. It is not possible to present a summary of the richly nuanced conversation. Thus I take the liberty to reproduce an excerpt verbatim.⁵¹

Hidayat told Darmawan that he had spoken only positively in the interrogation: ‘The aim of Palagan was to provide a forum for an exchange of views, to enrich knowledge, and to train people to become intellectuals.’ This explanation shocked Darmawan, who replied: ‘Oh. I admitted to them that the primary aim of Palagan was to spread Marxism and communism. Slamet Waluyo still protested. He wanted me to admit that the aim was to establish a communist state in Indonesia.’

This time Hidayat was shocked: ‘Oh my God. That’ll get us into a lot of trouble, man!’ Slowly and rather cautiously Darmawan began to disclose to Hidayat how Palagan had been introduced into his interrogation. The intelligence officers had found an invitation to a Palagan discussion among Darmawan’s books. They had asked about the discussion, about Palagan, and about official permission for Palagan to hold meetings. Hidayat got angry when told that, after being pressed, Darmawan had admitted to being a member of Palagan. He protested: ‘You’re absurd, man. Since

when did you become our member? I only invited you to our discussion. You're mad.'

- D: Yes, I know. But at the time of the interrogation I was so confused, and I panicked. They kept asking me what group, what organization, what association I belonged to.
- H: Why didn't you mention your own group? Farouk, Jono, Satrio, and you belong to one another. Things wouldn't be as bad as this if you had mentioned your own group.
- D: I don't know why I said Palagan. Perhaps Palagan came into my mind because I remembered being invited to your meetings. After a period of bitter silence, Darmawan asked 'I wonder what article of the law we have violated. How come there was no arrest warrant to explain the details of our crime?'
- H: You have nothing to worry about. You only violated an Attorney General's decree by selling banned books. I was accused of holding illegal meetings. Palagan discussions had no formal permission. But I insisted that the meetings were all purely educational.
- D: So, was that what you said in your BAP? I didn't.
- H: What's that? What is PAB?
- D: It's BAP. *Berita Acara Pemeriksaan*. That's the record of the interrogation for the trial.

Hidayat was still unfamiliar with the legal procedure. 'Yes. In my PAB I stated that Palagan was purely an educational forum'.

- D: It's BAP. Not PAB. In my BAP I was forced to admit that my purpose in selling the banned books was to revive communist teachings.

Hidayat was both shocked, puzzled, and amused: 'Wow! You dared say that! To revive communist teachings! Ha, ha, ha. You must be insane. Why didn't you say it was for commercial purposes?'

- D: They wouldn't let me say that. They were going to break my head.
- H: A bit of torture is okay. If you hadn't given in they would have let you go. Perhaps at worst you would have to report regularly.
- D: I was just too scared.

Hidayat raised his fist. 'I have no fear of any of them. I pretended to cry, but how could I be afraid of those bastards?' Hidayat's strength and courage astonished Darmawan enormously.

As the sound of Sadjiman's approaching motorcycle was heard, Darmawan remarked that he would be coming to interrogate Harman. Hidayat replied, 'We will surely be tried. Harman was summoned to be a witness. Mardiyanto told me that. I was also summoned there just now. They said our case had

been transferred to the district attorney's office. But why did they keep Harman in a cell?'⁵²

Once again Darmawan felt guilty as he was sure he was responsible for what had happened to Harman. Feeling ashamed and afraid, he pretended nothing had happened.

H: I wonder if it is because of his writings in the newspaper.

Hidayat continued wondering: 'Just now I saw Mardiyanto and Yuwono reading Harman's article'.

D: Yes, perhaps.

Darmawan was still struggling with his own conscience.

But then Hidayat unconsciously helped Darmawan to speak out. 'Harman always speaks boldly and strongly. I heard the KODIM in Bandung almost got him, but he had already gone to Yogyakarta. Can you imagine, in one of the NGO discussions he was proposing the idea of a religious communist state. Once you get social equity and equality, the only thing we need is how to shape up religion, right?'

D: Yes. That was also there in my BAP, Bung. One day I gave Harman a ride from Jetis to Bulaksumur, and on the way he said something like that.

Hidayat's surprise grew. 'You must be crazy. You've killed your own friend! You're crazy. Did you say Rudy was a radical and all that?' Darmawan cried and apologized.

Many activists who knew Hidayat outside the cell did not have access to the conversation above. Many were misled into suspecting Darmawan of deliberately incriminating Hidayat, and undermining the student-led pro-democracy movement more generally. This explains why many maintained a distance with Darmawan while organizing moral and political support for Hidayat.

About three or four in the afternoon Hidayat was called out. Upon his return, he told Darmawan that three leading student activists (Arjun, Ali, and Cindy) had come to visit him.⁵³ Hidayat asked Darmawan: 'Did you say in the BAP that you were struggling for the ideology of your communist ancestors? Brontak said that when I went to see those friends'.

Darmawan could not lie, 'I did, unfortunately'.

H: Damn you. You're absolutely impossible. What the hell were you doing? Arjun told me the BAP will be read out loud in court.

Darmawan was surprised, 'Will it? Can I request that the interrogations be re-examined and retract my previous statements?'

H: Retract your statements? Are you that naive? You are dealing with the military, man! Are you prepared to be tortured? They can bring your younger sisters or your parents here to see how they torture you. This is a serious matter, man.

Instead of getting the proper legal counselling he deserved, Darmawan was further penalized by both the state agents and the activists who opposed the regime for his honesty and lack of understanding of his rights and situation. Instead of being united, victims of the New Order government blamed each other or themselves. At another point, Hidayat and Darmawan talked about a list that the intelligence officers had found in Hidayat's possession. The list was of participants in a meeting at the Hatta Foundation, with a heading at the top: 'Meeting of the Leftists'.⁵⁴ A little puzzled, Darmawan asked Hidayat who had typed it. Hidayat said he did not remember. All he knew was that it was already in his folder. 'Will you tell the truth if the interrogators ask you who the leftists are?' Darmawan asked further.

H: I told them I didn't know any leftists.

D: Oh, I told them many of us were leftists. Myself, Rudy, and you, too. Also Harman, Hassan, Jody, Tommy, and Krishna.

Hidayat was disgusted. He lamented as if to himself, 'I simply cannot understand you. Why did you dump all these friends into deep water? . . . So you implicated me?'

D: I'm terribly sorry. But, yes, I did slander you. I told them that you're adhering to Eastern European leftism. Palagan was founded to develop communist teachings in an attempt to establish a communist state.

H: Oh, well. What's done is done.

Hidayat was so confused and unprepared to hear Darmawan's honest confession that he did not know how to respond.

In a way Darmawan was grateful to have a friend willing to share his suffering and share the process of learning from their common situation. Unfortunately, the lessons he learned from Hidayat did not bring any immediate change in his attitude towards the authorities. In his next interrogation Darmawan was as submissive as before. Mardiyono of KODIM conducted that interrogation, but Darmawan and Hidayat believed he was acting on behalf of the district attorney's office. I will reproduce parts of the session, in order to present a vivid picture of the relationships between Darmawan, who was deprived of all his legal rights, and his interrogator. In turn, this incident captures the political life under the New Order.

M: What's the purpose of your selling books?'

Before Darmawan said a word, Mardiyanto warned him, 'I don't want you to answer that you sold books to earn some money. I'll break your neck if you won't follow my dictation. Now write 'to disseminate communism'.

Objecting to this dictation, Darmawan wrote his answer: 'to popularize literature'.

M: How dare you! Now add 'which contains Marxism/communism'.

Darmawan wrote as he was told.

The next question was 'Are you a member of Palagan?', to which Darmawan replied 'No, I am not.'

M: What is Palagan's aim?

D: To provide a forum for an exchange of views and knowledge, and for an intellectual exercise.

M: What knowledge? I don't want this.

D: Oh.

M: I don't want 'oh'. Now add.

Darmawan added '. . . knowledge of leftist and rightist leanings.' Mardiyanto was pleased.

M: Mention each and all of the people who bought the novel *Rumah Kaca* from you.

D: Jono, Sonio, Romo Robert etc.

M: How far did you go to spread communism?

D: In Yogya.

M: Mention all the places where you held your discussions.

D: The Balai Wartawan Building and Hidayat's house.

M: Which of the Palagan members are leftists?

D: Rudy, Hidayat, Harman, myself, Hassan, Krishna, Jody.

M: Has there been any training of newly recruited members?

D: No, but there was a plan for that.

M: Have you been to Rudy's boarding room?

D: Yes, I have.

M: Did he keep Marxist books? Tell me the ones you saw.

D: Yes. *Negara dan Revolusi* [State and Revolution] by Lenin, *Manifesto Komunis* [Communist Manifesto], by Karl Marx, *Madilog* by Tan Malaka, *Law, Propaganda and Terror* by Patrick Flanagan.

M: What is your view of those who oppose the government?

D: I disapprove of them.

This answer angered Mardiyanto, who threatened to resort to torture. Darmawan crossed out his original answer and wrote 'I will support them, because they will help push towards structural changes'.

Around late August 1988 Hidayat's friends and family, as well as Darmawan's younger brother, began to organize themselves to seek legal assistance

from the Yogyakarta branch of the well known LBH (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* or the Legal Aid Institute). Hidayat's family filed a formal authorization for the LBH to represent them on Tuesday, 23 August 1988; Darmawan's family did not follow this step until early September.

A couple of days after the LBH received Hidayat's family's authorization, both Darmawan and Hidayat were once again interrogated, this time by four officers from the KOPKAMTIB. They were Lieutenant Colonel Siagian, Second Lieutenant Setiadi, and two assistants to the First Lieutenant named Supardjo and Pamiharso. They represented the highest military authority of all the interrogating teams overtly involved in the case. Unlike the other interrogators preceding and succeeding them, they impressed the two detainees with the appearance of a genuine interest in establishing the actual facts. They did not intimidate or threaten. To these officers, Hidayat presented an account of Palagan that was counter to Darmawan's confessions, and told them that Darmawan's confessions were outrageous slanders against him.

On separate occasions, Hidayat and Darmawan told me that towards the end of their visit, the KOPKAMTIB officers engaged in a serious quarrel with Yuwono, sharply questioning the validity of his findings from previous interrogations. Yuwono was pressed to defend and elaborate the case. He blamed Hidayat's influence on Darmawan for Darmawan's later retraction of his previous confessions. Yuwono found no excuse, however, when his hostile guests from Jakarta indicated that he himself was responsible for failing to keep the two captives separate. Early in the following week, on 29 August 1988, KODIM handed over Darmawan and Hidayat, and all formal documents relating to their cases, to the High Court, which in turn forwarded them to the District Court. From the first of September 1988 the two detainees were held at the Wiragunan Prison, while preparations for their trials were made.

Coming full circle

The above investigation might have been technically adequate for a trial, but it fell far short of the weight and credibility to be a truly serious political case (as the investigators claimed it was) without the capture and confession of a *dalang* or "mastermind" behind all the separate illegal acts. The choice for this position went to Rudy. Rudy was not abducted until mid June 1989, when the trials of Darmawan and Hidayat were halfway through. Rudy's actual involvement in the event differed from the other two not only in terms of timing and location, but also, significantly, with regard to the officers who were in charge and the manner of their interrogations and prosecution.⁵⁵

Many activists initially agreed with the military authorities in thinking that Rudy had run away to hide in Jakarta following the arrests of Darmawan and Hidayat. In fact he had left six months before their arrests to live with Dian his girlfriend (who at that time had just established a career in the

nation's capital city), and her family in Jakarta. Like Hidayat and most other activists, Rudy first learned of Darmawan's arrest from the newspaper. However, Rudy was not initially aware that the captive was Darmawan as the newspaper report did not name him. He found this out several days later when he visited the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute. Contrary to the concerns of many of his friends, he was sure nothing serious would follow Darmawan's arrest. Then Hidayat was abducted, and soon the news spread in Yogyakarta that he had been physically tortured and, along with Darmawan, had been forced to confess to being a subversive communist agent. Many close friends of Hidayat and others were in a panic, but Rudy was still hardly affected. He thought it was simply a matter of selling banned books, and assumed that everything would be over within a week.

Several friends advised Rudy to hide. This advice became more insistent once rumours began to indicate that he was on the list of Yogyakarta activists who had been implicated through the interrogations of Darmawan and Hidayat. Rudy still ruled out the possibility that he might be a suspect. When a senior foreign scholar asked him whether he was considering the possibility of going overseas for a temporary visit, Rudy gave a negative reply. He reasoned: 'It would not be educational for any of us. Besides, things could get worse if they found me trying to leave the country with foreign assistance'.

During his stay in Jakarta he took part in several of what became a large wave of student demonstrations. He co-founded the Pijar Foundation and published the bulletin *Neraca Hak Asasi Manusia (Human Rights Scale)*, which kept track of the most recent human rights campaigns and human rights violations throughout the country. Rudy was critical of his fellow student activists in Yogyakarta and Central Java. He saw several of them flee to Jakarta to find temporary refuge immediately following the arrests of Darmawan and Hidayat. He wrote to several Yogyakarta activists urging them not to be silenced by what had happened. He demanded that they protest about the unlawful abduction and interrogation of the two detainees. He also led two successful student activists' confrontations with the Jakarta Police, demanding the release of students held in temporary detention following demonstrations. One of these took place in March 1989 and another just a week prior to Rudy's own arrest.⁵⁶

In subsequent months Rudy participated in a series of meetings of human rights activists to discuss how to respond to the arrest of the two student detainees in Yogyakarta. He visited several major cities in Central and East Java to help consolidate student activist links and to uplift their spirits. His travels were criticized by several activists who took a more cautious view of the recent developments. Despite his overt political activities in Jakarta, and even though he did not expect to be involved in the cases of Darmawan and Hidayat, Rudy was not totally confident about his safety. He took some precautions when going out, changing buses more than would normally be necessary, and taking indirect routes to travel to the city. At the well

attended funeral of the legendary lawyer and human rights activist Yap Thiam Hien, about a month prior to Rudy's abduction, a friend cautioned him again to go into hiding because there were more signs that the authorities now wanted him. For the first time Rudy began to think seriously of moving away. He still found it difficult to believe that his friends' premonitions could be real, considering that the trials of Darmawan and Hidayat were approaching their conclusions. He had read a copy of Hidayat's BAP, which was circulated quite widely among activists through their defence lawyers. His name was mentioned unfavourably in the document, but this was merely in reference to the alleged possession or circulation of books. Rudy found nothing to seriously alarm him.

What he was not aware of was Darmawan's BAP. He later expressed his regret about the Yogyakarta activists' failure to obtain and circulate copies of this. He found out about it only after he was jailed. 'If only I had known of this [Darmawan's incriminating testimony] I might have run away', he stated. Once behind bars, Rudy discovered that Darmawan had deliberately kept his BAPs from student activists. He was ashamed – not so much for having incriminated others unheroically, but in case he should be recognized by others as having relatives who had been officially branded "unclean" according to the repressive regime he had denounced, by virtue of their alleged association with the PKI. But the student activists in Yogya were also partly responsible for what Rudy referred to as failure to get a copy of Darmawan's BAP. As indicated earlier, being poorly informed of Darmawan's situation, these activists were suspicious of him, especially after they learned from Hidayat about Darmawan's incriminating statements. Until the later phases of the trials of Darmawan and Hidayat, most of these activists kept a distance from Darmawan and those who represented him.

On the evening of Wednesday, 14 June 1989, Rudy and Dian went to see a movie they had wanted to see for months but had not found the time for. Apparently all the while they were being watched and followed by the KODAM JAYA intelligence officers, who were supposed to take Rudy away that night. In retrospect, Dian imagined that these officers must have been moved by what they witnessed, so they decided to let the young lovers enjoy the rest of the evening. Dian assumed that the officers had parked their cars near the house and slept the night there. At 6:30 the following morning, one of the officers asked a vendor who had a stall nearby if Rudy indeed lived in the suspected house. The answer was in the affirmative. Not long afterwards Dian's housemaid, Mugiyem, went out to another stall. This time an officer approached her and asked if Rudy was awake yet. Mugiyem perceptively sensed a threat and was quick to give a negative answer, then rushed home and told Dian's father what she had encountered. She told him that she suspected the strangers to be unfriendly. At seven, just before leaving for work, Dian's father peeped out of the windows and saw a

suspicious group of men outside the house. He went to his daughter's room and woke her up.

Rudy asked Dian to help put a few things away, then took time to prepare drinks before the two officers came in and explained their intention to meet him. Dian went out to see them, while Rudy was still tidying the room. Although she had a strong suspicion of who they were, she nonetheless asked her guests their identities and intentions. One of them, named Warso, spoke for the rest, introducing each of his friends.

W: We're from KODAM JAYA. We are here to see Rudy.

D: What is your concern with him?

W: Come on. You must be aware of your husband's activities.

D: I don't understand what you're talking about. And I need to know.

W: Of course. Our purpose is to ask for some information from your husband in relation to the case of Pramoedya's novels. There is an official suspicion that he may be involved in selling banned books. Can we see him now?

D: Wait a minute. He's in the bathroom. Do you have a warrant? Can I see it?

The unwanted guests were taken aback. After a significant pause, Warso replied apologetically: 'Too bad, we did not bring it with us. But you may be interested in having a look at this document from KODAM IV Diponegoro. And here are our IDs.'

Dian examined all of the documents. The first was a letter from Central Java KODAM, requesting KODAM JAYA to seek and arrest Rudy on their behalf.

Warso tried to assure her: 'You need not worry, Madam. All we need from him is information'.

Then they chatted. They asked how long Dian and Rudy had been married. She said they were not yet married. When Rudy finally came out to join them, the atmosphere was still one of strained friendliness. The officers were very polite, and Rudy teased them for not bringing an official warrant. They played the matter down, assuring him that it would lead to no more than a day of interrogation. They assured their host that he was only required to give some testimony, and that there would be no arrest or detention. Rudy offered them drinks, and they accepted.

Details of what followed contrast significantly to the experience of Darmawan and Hidayat in Yogya. Despite the difference, the restrained tension in the event that morning in Jakarta – as in everyday life under the New Order for more than 30 years – by no means reduced, if not increased, the fear inflicted upon those affected, and thus the efficacy of what locals referred to as *teror*.

Further courteous conversation proceeded, and then Rudy asked for time to wash. When he went to the back of the house he was upset to find an officer near the kitchen.⁵⁷ He returned to his two guests in the living room and asked them to instruct their colleague to get out of the inner part of the house. The two officers differed in their opinions; Rudy lost his temper and assured them that he would not run away, whereupon the two officers conceded. They told the man in the kitchen and one more in the front yard to leave. After bathing and getting dressed, Rudy chatted with the officers. Then, after ten minutes, one of the officers lost his patience and suggested that they needed to hurry.

When Dian asked where they were going, Warso noted down a telephone number at which he said she could contact him. In the last minutes before they departed, Rudy talked to Dian and gave her a few words of advice. He finished drinking his milk and left without taking anything, as he believed that he would be back on the same day, which reassured Dian. This was further reinforced by Warso's consoling words. When they were all gone, Dian threw herself onto a sofa, trying to understand what had just happened. She found Mugiyem a sympathetic listener. Then she realized that she had to rush to her office, a news agency.

As soon as Dian reached her office, she checked up on the telephone number with her colleagues. She was assured that it belonged to KODAM JAYA at Kramat V district – or, as her colleagues called it, 'hell'. She dialled the number and asked to talk to Warso, but was told that he was out of the office. She repeated the attempt several times throughout the day, but to no avail. She became more worried as night fell and Rudy did not come home. Neither did he reappear the following morning. She began to take action, filling his bag with clothes and items of daily use, and heading to the KODAM JAYA. She saw Warso and was annoyed when he said: 'How come you did not come here yesterday? Look, your man needs clean clothes'. She found Rudy there, looking exhausted and worn out, 'but as always, he made a few jokes'.

Dian had no difficulty seeing her boyfriend every day. They were usually allowed to see each other for about two hours. Rudy introduced her to all present in the room, and Dian appreciated the courtesy they showed whenever she came to visit him. They talked in a room which was being used for several other interrogations. Occasionally, the couple were permitted to leave the room to eat at a café within the headquarters compound. This was obviously in sharp contrast to the experience of Darmawan and Hidayat during their detention at the Yogyakarta military gaol. At this point Rudy was still advising Dian not to tell any of his friends about what had happened, for fear that this might cause concern among them.

But what exactly did happen to him? The following is a condensed account by Rudy of what took place during his detention in Jakarta. He and his captors arrived at the KODAM JAYA headquarters a few minutes after eight am on Thursday, 15 June 1989, while the trials of Darmawan and

Hidayat in Yogyakarta were going on and hearings were being held with the prosecutors' witnesses. Officers of the KODAM JAYA did not begin their interrogation of Rudy until about ten o'clock in the morning and it went on until 11 at night – then, after a half-hour break, they continued this seemingly endless interrogation till morning. This was repeated on the second day. There was no direct physical torture, nor even verbal intimidation. Rudy was well aware, however, of the imposition of another form of torture: for two or three days he was interrogated consecutively with what seemed to be the same set of questions, in each case by a team of six officers. The interrogation teams changed, so that each team could take breaks, but no breaks were allowed for Rudy. At this stage, all interrogations were done by rank and file soldiers. In Rudy's words, they were 'cockroaches'. He distinguished them from Second Lieutenants Supangkat and Surachman who conducted the last interrogation at KODAM JAYA with more substance:

They seem to be trying to make me feel tired, exhausted, bored, upset, agitated, and in the end easily manipulated. I did my best to maintain my strength.

In the beginning I was obviously scared, not knowing what to expect. But as soon as I discovered that what happened was only a series of repetitions, I began to regain my courage and to be more relaxed. Each time I was interrogated, I looked straight at the interrogator's eyes.

During that half of the week, the interrogations revolved around four main sets of questions. Significantly, not one of them was directly related to "communism" or to the case of Darmawan and Hidayat in Yogyakarta. The first set of questions was the standard queries about Rudy's identity, education and family background. The next set of questions concerned the bulletin *Neraca Hak Asasi Manusia*: its sources of news and funding, where it was printed, who took responsibility for it, its circulation and subscriptions. Rudy explained that the whole work and financing was done only by himself and his close friend, Solaiman, and was incidental to their other work. A third set of questions was about the organization of student demonstrations: how they were planned, and what preparations were made. Finally there were questions about Rudy's personal views on various political issues: democracy, Indonesia's development programs, Indonesia's economy, the Indonesian military and its *Dwi Fungsi* (Dual Function) doctrine, political parties, and parliament.

On the third day (Saturday, 17 June 1989) the Vice-Commander of the KODAM, Lieutenant Colonel Widayat Karnain, woke Rudy up in his cell in the morning, and invited him to have an informal chat which, to Rudy's surprise, lasted nearly the whole day. This appeared to be an effort – an unsuccessful one – to persuade Rudy to co-operate with the authorities. The officer showed him various documents concerning "right extreme"

Islamist subversion cases.⁵⁸ He also tried (unsuccessfully) to convince Rudy that several figures with whom he had been in close contact were “communists”. These included his close friend Solaiman and Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, then chairperson of the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation, who became a member of the defense team at Rudy’s trial a year later.⁵⁹

Later that day, an elderly officer came to chat with Rudy for some hours. Rudy could not remember his name but he found this officer quite interesting, although unconvincing. What appeared to be an unofficial chat might in effect turn out to be a variant of official interrogation. This man claimed to be a former PKI member who had deserted the party and worked for the military after 1965. He spoke at length about many of his experiences as a communist party cadre. Unconvinced, Rudy did not really listen to his story. But he now began to develop a premonition that he would eventually be charged with issues to do with “communism”. In the more formal interrogation sessions, however, and later in Yogyakarta, no references were made to communism. Rudy was careful not to be swayed by the man’s tales, and remained alert.

No further interrogation took place until the following Monday when BAKIN (*Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara*, ‘The State Intelligence Coordinating Body’) became involved.⁶⁰ Soon afterwards, Rudy was directly interrogated about Darmawan and Hidayat and the cases against them. This interrogation was conducted by Sardjiman of the Central Java LAKSUSDA, who had (as we have seen) been prominent in the interrogation of the two detainees in Yogyakarta. Sardjiman asked standard questions such as when and where Rudy had met Darmawan and Hidayat, and whether he had supplied books to Darmawan. According to Rudy this interrogation was quite simple and superficial, restricted to basic and elementary issues. Rudy answered all the questions with confidence and ease, denying the various allegations implied in the questions. The whole interrogation, including the time consuming typing of the BAP, lasted only two hours.

The last two interrogations before he was deported to Yogyakarta were particularly intensive. The first, by BAIS (*Badan Intelejen Strategis*, “Strategic Intelligence Body”), ran from ten am till noon. The second, by KODAM JAYA, ran from the afternoon until three the following morning. The questions were repetitions of what had preceded them, with the exception of a few on Rudy’s alleged relationship with the Hasta Mitra publishing company and Pramoedya A. Toer, and the circulation of Toer’s novels. Despite the hectic and exhausting character of these interrogations, the interrogators gave Rudy the impression that nothing serious had been discovered. His impression was that there was no reason for them to continue his detention (which was still unlawful at this point), and that nothing warranted his deportation to the Yogyakarta District Attorney’s office. One of the interrogating officers, Major Suwarno, remarked at the end of the session: ‘You will be able to go home soon. You will be able to continue publishing the *Neraca Hak Asasi Manusia*. But we request that you no longer

call our headquarters “Kremlin” [a witty abbreviation of *Kramat Lima*, where it is located]’. Similar remarks had been made on the previous days. Rudy kept asking the officers in charge why, if that was the case, they did not let him go. The answer was always typically evasive: ‘we must talk to our commander’ or ‘we must first get his endorsement’.

It was this same Major who told him on the seventh day that his commander had called him early in the morning and instructed him to escort Rudy to Yogyakarta. The day before, Rudy had incidentally mentioned to Dian the possibility of his deportation to Yogyakarta and left her with a few hints of what to do if this happened. On 22 June 1989 Dian went to visit Rudy again, but as soon as she entered the military headquarter the guard took her to the Vice-Commander. Dian became anxious when she saw how his previous attitude towards her had changed. In her words (written in 1991):

He was unusually courteous and apologetic this time. He gave the impression of being powerless and regretful.

He said: ‘I hope you can be strong and patient. At the request of Central Java [KODAM], Rudy flew to Yogyakarta this morning. He has to testify at the trials of Darmawan and Hidayat. But please don’t be worried. We have treated him well. . . . We assure you that he will be treated equally well over there. So there is nothing to worry about. Never listen to frightening and speculative rumours. May God bless him.’

Dian returned to her office and called a few of Rudy’s friends to inform them of what had happened, as Rudy had advised her to do. A couple of these friends came and picked her up at her office after work. They went out to a small café and bombarded her with impatient questions. Out of a strong sense of concern and responsibility, they could not restrain their protests against Rudy’s silence and overconfidence in himself over all this time. It did not take them long to figure out what should be done next: informing Rudy’s family, and contacting all related and concerned associates both in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. The news of Rudy’s arrest spread widely and quickly. Details of the responses to Rudy’s arrest at this stage, as well as the various responses of various people to the New Order state repression are crucial to understanding the general atmosphere of the time, and ultimately for a general analysis of power relations, and several theoretical comments on “resistance”, to be made in the final Chapter.

Arriving at Yogyakarta airport, Rudy saw from a distance a serious disagreement between Major Suwarno, who had escorted him, and the receiving officers. Rudy could not identify the latter, but he got the impression from their uniforms that these were commissioned officers of some important standing from the Central Java and DIY Diponegoro military division. It took them about two hours to settle their dispute. At one point Major Suwarno came back to Rudy’s guarded car and said apologetically: ‘Rud,

you just stay right here and take it easy. I've got to go to Semarang now to settle some matter'. Rudy never saw him again. Rudy was then taken to the Yogyakarta High Attorney's office as a prime subversion suspect linked to the legal cases in progress of Darmawan and Hidayat. After a brief interrogation he was delivered to the Wiragunan Prison for detention.

Rudy had no doubt that the quarrel at the airport was about his status and how to handle him. Prior to their arrival in Yogyakarta, Major Suwarno had told him, apparently sincerely, that his deportation was a response to a request by Yogyakarta officials for Rudy's presence as a witness at the two detainees' trials. Suwarno even showed Rudy his return ticket. Major Suwarno presumably felt cheated when his charge was unexpectedly taken away. Lack of co-ordination on the part of the officials involved in Rudy's case was evident as soon as Major Suwarno left. Those in charge of Rudy after his arrival at Yogyakarta airport argued with each other over where Rudy should be detained. These arguments were between Ali Karim of the Intelligence section of the local KEJARI and Brontak and Misdi from KODIM. 'In political cases the military see themselves as more competent than other institutions', Rudy noted. But in the end Ali succeeded in persuading the two intelligence officers to 'comply with our previous agreement' and therefore Rudy was dealt with by the District Attorney's office rather than by the military.

The series of interrogations that Rudy had to go through during his detention in Yogyakarta was different from the experience of his two friends in several ways. First, to the relief of many, he was not placed under the authority of any territorial military command. Although the Yogyakarta KODIM was very active in the early interrogations, their set of interrogations were held at the High Attorney's office and the Wiragunan prison. Perhaps the reason was purely practical, or it may have been simply a way of appearing compliant with legal procedures as demanded by concurrent developments in the trials of the two detainees. Once the case had come before the court, no institution – including the military and police – had the right to interfere with the case or to communicate with the accused without special permission from the Court.

Second, during his detention in Yogyakarta Rudy was questioned very little. This raised the issue of the necessity of his detention, which was one of the points that the Yogyakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH) raised in a habeas corpus motion, dated 6 September 1989, on his behalf. By that date, Rudy had been questioned only twice. In the following nine months of detention leading up to his trial, Rudy was interrogated only six times. Third, when he was interrogated there were no signs that the officers in charge wanted to obtain significant new information. They acted as if they were simply going through the motions, and did not seem to care about his answers to their questions. They let him write his answers down in full freedom. The fourth thing that distinguished his experience from that of Darmawan and Hidayat was a greater access to communication with the

outside world. Unlike Hidayat or Darmawan, Rudy was allowed to see his family from the first few days of his detention (although his sister and friends in Yogyakarta complained that it was not easy to visit him). He admitted that he encountered no serious difficulties like those which Hidayat and Darmawan faced (for example, they were unable to send messages without these being inspected and censored).

One more event of interest marked the difference between Rudy's case and that of his two fellow activists. I was alerted to this by Dian's note about the search and confiscation of Rudy's reading materials. There were as many as 47 items of reading material and documents that the authorities confiscated from Rudy's possession. About ten of them were taken from Rudy's parents on 12 August 1989 in Bogor, and the rest from Dian's family on 21 July 1989 in Jakarta. The officials in charge of the confiscation were from the District Attorney's offices in the two cities. Those coming to Dian's house were overwhelmed by the size of Rudy's library. They complained about the effort of inspecting the materials and then carrying them. Dian quickly intervened, saying that many of the books belonged to her. They allowed her to help them choose which books they should take, and she did this carefully. However, one of the officials found Rudy's signature on a copy of Richard Robison's *Sejarah Politik Orde Baru* (*History of the New Order's Politics*),⁶¹ and he included it in the list for confiscation. When the officials finished with their task, Dian discreetly offered a further inspection of more of Rudy's library in another room. They refused, complaining that they already had more materials than they wanted to handle, and that they would not receive any material reward for their work. Instead, they asked Dian to show them a photograph of Rudy. Dian granted their request, and heard all sorts of complimentary remarks about him.

Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, it is useful to look back and note some of the most important issues mentioned and questions arising from these. The case evolved from a very simple incident. A dramatist was angry because an outsider was quietly selling books to the audience at a performance of his play without his consent. For reasons of his own, he handed him over to local military officers. The captive was totally unfamiliar with the immediate military measures taken against his actions, and he proved to be too vulnerable and thus totally unfit to be used as an example of a subversive. The case might have ended here if there had been nothing more that could be used to incriminate him. Indeed it might not have existed at all, had it not taken place in the broader contexts discussed in Chapter 2, of which three separate developments are most important: the intra-elite split, the return of Toer's literary works; and the reemergence of student political activism after a decade of silence.

The case evolved into a train of abductions, confiscations, detentions and sensational reports in the mass media, initially because the innocent captive supplied bits and pieces of information and a far-reaching fantasy that implicated others who had more political weight. The interrogation followed what seemed to be a standard procedure, style, and direction. But within the context of New Order Indonesia, it sent waves of terror (or better “*teror*”, in the sense introduced in Chapter 1) through radical intellectual circles. It ended up with a much more sensational case (namely subversion) than the authorities originally seemed to have intended.

Several questions arise from this. First, the two issues which generated the most controversy among local observers of the incident were Soleh’s motivation for having Darmawan arrested in the first place and the level of Darmawan’s compliance with the military officers during interrogation. Why was Soleh so furious about Darmawan selling Toer’s books? And how far can one blame Darmawan for his intense fear and incriminating testimony? Second, it is significant that although many individual activists were implicated in the interrogations, only four were abducted, and three prosecuted. Why was this so? And why did it take the authorities nearly a year to capture Rudy, when it would not have been difficult to do so earlier?

Third, this was not a well-planned operation. Initially it was a simple response to a trivial conflict between individual cultural activists (Darmawan and members of the *Teater Alam*). In the course of the investigation, there emerged a process of interpretation, official consultation, readjustment and reworking. Why should the state apparatus decide to allocate so many of its resources to investigating and inflating the case? Who benefited most, if indeed anyone did, from this project? How did it benefit them? Who was responsible for it? Is there any reason to believe that the authorities really saw this as a serious case of subversion? Finally, what were the major contributing conditions that made the case possible, and how does this case help us to understand the dynamic character of urban intellectuals and their relationship with the state? These questions are far from exhaustive. The next chapter will address some of them, although it is not possible to answer them all satisfactorily.

4 Law and state terrorism

Where the law has become unpredictable in its application because individual guilt is less important to the regime than collective obedience, we are clearly no longer dealing with a legitimate monopoly of violence, but state terrorism.

(Schmid 1991: 29)

One common mistaken public assumption in the 1980s and 1990s was that there was something fundamental that separated both the law and the state (no matter how bad they might be) from disorder and terror. As more recent studies demonstrate, and as will be further discussed in the last chapter of this book, the opposite is in fact the case. A study of political violence and terrorism is incomplete without a serious consideration of both the state and the law as complicit agencies and institutions. In reference to Indonesia's justice system one eminent scholar has observed:

From the beginning of the New Order era, political crime has been taken more seriously and treated with more elaborate machinery than any other. In some ways its procedures are more efficient and less corrupt than [the] civil legal process. These procedures are also basically not legal and seldom pretend to be. They are essentially discretionary, with the merest pretence of symbolic legality backed up by a widely understood privilege of power.

(Lev 1999: 187)

It is an understatement to say that no political trials in New Order Indonesia had any semblance of fairness, independence or impartiality. There was an element of overkill in most of them. Many of the victims were not only innocent but also compliant. To different degrees these features are observable in the trials of Darmawan, Hidayat and Rudy. It is neither desirable nor sensible to present a comprehensive and legalistic account of the trials. However, they are instructive in other dimensions that will be spelled out below. In this chapter I will present selected details in the light of these considerations. The preceding chapter showed what the military wanted to

learn from and about the three young men. In this chapter we will examine the ways in which the government officials anxiously handled the case, which had attracted public attention. It is significant that the trials did not actually make much use of the incriminating confessions from the previous military interrogations. They took up quite different issues, and confronted different constraints. But ultimately the aim of all three trials was clearly to justify and legitimize the military's findings and pre-trial decisions.

The importance of many political trials, as in the cases of the three under study here, lies in the fact that they allowed an open confrontation between agents of the state and their critics. Some of them provided a rare opportunity for a large number of activists and critical-minded professionals to meet together in public without official permission. Accordingly, intelligence officers and journalists were frantically busy on such occasions. The work of a political prosecution was primarily a discursive craft, reproducing a familiar narrative to legitimize gross political repression. Seeing little hope for the rule of law, most defendants fought back with the only legitimate weapons available: words, morality, common sense, and knowledge. In such situations, defendants tried to ignore all forms of censorship and taboo. This chapter will explore the trials as contests of not only ideas but antagonistic discourses.

Making the accused confess under duress is one thing; prosecuting the accused in public is another. The three trials indicate that the New Order regime seriously sought formal legitimation from the social groups it had favoured in its politico-economic policies but also the same groups that it wanted to control, and repress if necessary: the educated urban population. Hence the inevitable contradictions. Plunging into the court system, the government was juggling with many self-defeating practices. The court officials had to defend the military's illegal and violent interrogation of the defendants, but at the same time they also had to pretend to conduct a legal investigation that was accountable to the public. The court had to appear to enforce and protect the Constitution. But it also had to violate that same Constitution by prosecuting individuals whose alleged crimes were activities that the Constitution protected. These prosecutions met with many difficulties, because the courts and legal discourse was one of the major domains of the intellectuals' knowledge and power. The final outcome of the case gave the ruling regime a victory in legal terms but an expensive symbolic defeat in political terms.

It was a defeat in the sense that it failed to sustain the efficacy of the New Order political simulacra associated with the trauma of the 1965–6 massacre. The consequences of the failure went far beyond the formal trials of the three young men. For the first time in the New Order's 25 years of rule, these trials publicly demonstrated a clear-cut failure of the authorities' use of the accusation of "communist subversion" against innocent individuals. Instead of intimidating the target population (the urban intelligentsia), the trials provoked their anger.

This chapter consists of three sections. We will start with a brief introduction to the law and the legal system in Indonesia. In the second section I will analyze the indictments against the three accused young men. Finally, I will examine how the phantom of 1965 was deployed by the court to legitimize the prosecution, plus the effects of and responses to the already waning terror from a variety of court witnesses.

Legal structure

This introductory note is to familiarize readers with the main framework and spirit of the legal system in New Order Indonesia. The Indonesian substantive law, legal structure and basic premises directly and literally inherited the dregs of the Dutch East Indies colonial legal administration.¹ The Dutch exploited the colony and maintained their power by dividing the population into racially segregated social groups. It put the natives at the bottom of the hierarchy, save for a few members of the native elite. The code of criminal procedure, *Herziene Inlandsch (Indonesisch) Reglement* (HIR), was designed for the natives to ensure the most efficient economic exploitation of the colony. It dated from 1848 as *Indisch Reglement*, was revised in 1926 and amended in 1941 as HIR, and then again in 1981 as *Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana* (KUHP) or Criminal Procedural Code.

Under the humiliating HIR, which Daniel Lev (1985) calls the ‘Indonesian side’ of the colonial plural law, ‘it was easier, for example, to arrest, detain, and convict an Indonesian . . . than a Dutch subject under the *Strafvordering*’. The latter was the ‘Dutch side’ counterpart. “Independent” Indonesia adopted the more repressive half of the colonial law relating to criminal procedure. The reasons for this are still open to further investigation, but there are two possible reasons that are sentimental and technical in nature: HIR had ‘more nationalist cachet than the European code’ and ‘Indonesian judges had little experience with the European codes’ (Lev 1999: 178).

An element of the colonial legal legacy which is directly relevant to the present chapter is a set of articles that penalize anyone found guilty of spreading hatred and disrespect against the government, the head of state or government officials. This code, belonging to the KUHP (*Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana* or Criminal Code), continues to survive well beyond New Order rule, and remained effective at the time of writing in 2004; it was actually used in 2003 to prosecute students who demonstrated in protest against President Megawati’s government (see Farida 2003). During the short-lived transition government of B.J. Habibie, Law No. 27/1999, dated 19 May 1999, made small amendments to the KUHP, adding to a list of punishable acts (mainly those that either promote ‘communism/Marxism-Leninism, or conceivably do so’) (see Habibie 1999).

In 1959 President Sukarno decreed the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution, following protracted tensions in efforts of reform, and heralding what he called ‘Guided Democracy’; the justice system suffered further sub-

ordination by the executive in consequence. In 1960 President Sukarno issued presidential regulation No. 28 requiring legislative processes to be carried out via 'consultation and consensus' (*musyawarah dan mufakat*) with the President. The same principle was applied to its fullest by New Order President Soeharto. 'In this process, legislation becomes policy direction, and effective law-making power is passed to the executive' (Southwood and Flanagan 1983: 220).

The Basic Law on Judiciary Power of 1964 went as far as to explicitly discard the separation of powers that, at least in theory, acknowledges a formal kind of judicial autonomy. The courts were officially turned into legal instruments of the executive power-holder. Immediately after the fall of the Guided Democracy government, the 1964 Basic Law became a point of heated debate. These debates did not last long, however, for it was soon clear that the circumscription of judicial powers would be continued, and perhaps aggravated, when the army-led New Order quickly consolidated its newly assumed state leadership. Compared with Guided Democracy, the New Order resembled the colonial state a great deal more 'in its relative efficiency, economic drive, effective political control, and even its superficial claim to rule by law' (Lev 1985: 73).

The Anti-Subversion Law is a strong case in point. This law allowed the Attorney-General to arrest any suspects and hold them for up to a year without trial, and to direct and supervise the prosecution if a trial did take place. This draconian law on subversion stipulated a maximum penalty of death. The law originated from Sukarno's presidential decree of 1963, at a time when both 'the civilian and military sides of Guided Democracy's government became increasingly sensitive to crimes against the state, sedition, and economic subversion' (Lev 1999: 180).² From the very beginning this decree lacked a legal foundation. There were attempts to propose an amendment to pass it as a legitimate law in the already executive-dominated parliament, but with no success. Significantly, it was ratified in its entirety as a law in 1969, three years after Soeharto succeeded President Sukarno. Ironically, this law was first used to prosecute many members of the former ruling elite who had drafted it and defended its legality.

The Sukarno government showed reservations about actually enforcing the Anti-Subversion decree. Article 1, point 1 of the decree's elucidation as originally ratified reads: '[i]n attempt to eradicate subversive activities the state apparatus must exercise the utmost care and maximum mindfulness so as to avoid unexpected misappropriation or abuse'. One observer has estimated that fewer than ten people were accused of subversion under Sukarno.³ This was despite regular and serious attempts to undermine his government, there were, for example, as many as seven abortive attempts to assassinate Sukarno. During my research in the 1990s, I could not find anyone who could suggest a more accurate estimate with any confidence. Few senior lawyers and scholars on Indonesian law that I consulted could remember any single instance of the law's actual use – if indeed it was used

at all – before the New Order assumed power in 1966. The following obscure reference was typical of the subject matter: ‘Execution rarely if ever happened during the parliamentary years, and did not become common under Guided Democracy, in fact’ (Lev 1999: 180). The man who was technically responsible for drafting the decree, Mayor General (retired) Soenarso, claimed in an interview that the penal code was not in use until Soeharto succeeded Sukarno and the New Order government tried selected members of the PKI (Santoso and Hasibuan 1994: 96).

The New Order regime made extensive use of this law. It has been estimated that the law was used to prosecute almost 1,000 Indonesians after 1966.⁴ In 1989 alone, when Darmawan and Hidayat were tried, there were as many as 100 subversion trials (AWC 1990b: 4). In the same year the New Order government jailed 600 political prisoners (*TAPOL* 93/June 1989: 7). No defendant in a subversion trial had ever been acquitted in the first instance (see also Lev 1999: 187). Among those prosecuted, only one convict has been recorded as having his conviction overturned by the Supreme Court (AWC 1989: 114). The work of prosecuting allegedly subversive defendants was made easier by the notoriously vague and extremely sweeping articles of the Anti-Subversion Law. Key clauses which will be directly relevant throughout this chapter read as follows:⁵

Article 1

- 1) The following shall be convicted of having engaged in subversive activities:
 1. Whosoever has engaged in an action with the purpose of, or clearly with the purpose which is known to him, or can be expected to be known to him can:
 - a. distort, undermine or deviate from the ideology of the *Pancasila* State or the State policy lines, or
 - b. overthrow, destroy or undermine the power of the State or the authority of the lawful government, or State apparatus, or
 - c. disseminate feelings of hostility or arouse hostility, cause splits, conflict, chaos, disturbances or anxiety among the population or broad section of the society . . .
- 2) Anyone who encourages the activities referred to in paragraph (1) shall also be considered guilty of engaging in subversive activities.

With some desperation commentators repeatedly pointed to the evasiveness of key words in the articles above, words such as: ‘distort’, ‘undermine’, ‘deviate’, or ‘encourage’. Actually they are even more vague in the Indonesian original: ‘*memutar balikkan*’, ‘*merongrong*’, ‘*menyelewengkan*’, and ‘*memikat*’.

More distressing to observers, especially professional lawyers, was the key auxiliary verb ‘can’ preceding those activities liable to prosecution. In most subversion trials, the prosecution relied heavily on this point, asserting

that no material evidence was required to indicate actual consequences of the defendants' activities in question. The law was 'a prosecutor's dream, reducing work required. During the 1970s and 1980s prosecutors with weak cases were often tempted to transform conventional criminal violations into subversion issues . . .' (Lev 1999: 188).⁶ To the best of my observation, judges trying subversion cases always accepted the prosecutors' arguments – while prosecutors took full liberty to interpret whether certain actions 'can' or 'cannot' distort, undermine or deviate from the state ideology. The state ideology, *Pancasila*, is itself highly abstract, especially in New Order Indonesia's official interpretation, to the extent that even President Soeharto called it an 'open-ended ideology' (*Kompas* 29/06/1990).

Indonesian observers and law professionals called the language of this law 'rubber language'.⁷ They also pointed out the deliberate glossing over of the fact that this law originated from an illegal decree. It owed its existence only to a unilaterally proclaimed state of emergency and siege. Thus, the law enacted what it promised to eradicate, namely distorting, undermining and deviating from the Constitution. The efficacy of the law in practice nevertheless encouraged the New Order government not only to continue its use, but to expand its application to an excessive degree. It was used to prosecute a wide variety of other crimes, including corruption, smuggling, gambling, and even rioters during a soccer match (for more details see Heryanto 1996e, 1996f). Ironically, the New Order government and its officials were commonly seen as the prominent practitioners of these proscribed activities.⁸

In October 1995 Attorney-General Singgih questioned the relevance of the Anti-Subversion Law (*Kompas* 31/10/1995: 10), but security officers immediately rejected the idea of scrapping the Law (*Kompas* 18/12/1995: 11). In February 1996 the president-appointed National Commission of Human Rights formally proposed the abrogation of the Law (*Kompas* 08/02/1996: 1, 11). The proposal immediately drew unsolicited and enthusiastic support from various social groups, not only human rights organizations but, to the surprise of many, also various top government officials (*Republika* 09/02/1996: 16). However, no serious legal steps were taken about the proposal until Soeharto stepped down in 1998, and his interim successor took over the government already in disarray. Mainly in an attempt to distance and distinguish itself from the resented New Order, and to gain some credibility in the eyes of the angry public, on 19 May 1999 the Habibie government issued Law No. 26/1990 that annulled the Anti-Subversion Law. However, on the very same day, the Minister of Defence and Security drafted a bill called *Rancangan Undang-undang Keamanan dan Keselamatan Negara* (RUU KKN) or 'State Safety and Security Law Draft'. Critics found this as bad as, if not worse than, the just revoked Law. When it went before parliament, the Draft underwent major revision and in September that year it acquired a new title, *Rancangan Undang-undang Penanggulangan Keadaan Bahaya* (RUU PKB) 'Control of Emergency Situation Law Draft'. Indonesia witnessed a series of strong protests against the Draft across the nation.

Despite this, the parliament decided to ratify the bill on 23 September 1999, and submitted it to the government for final certification.

The following day Indonesia saw the beginning of what was to be the most violent confrontation between civilian protestors and security forces over the status of a proposed law. On 24 September 1999 alone, thousands of students, NGO activists and professionals confronted security forces at the gate of the parliament house in Jakarta. Thousands of others protested against the same parliament's decision in Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Medan, Ujung Pandang, and Manado. At least seven protestors were shot dead on that day, prompting the government to cancel the ratification of the controversial Law (*Tempo* 03/10/1999). Further parliamentary meetings made further cancellations, and at the time of writing, the status of this most controversial bill remained in limbo. The 2002 Bali bombing prompted the government's initiative to draft a new anti-terrorism act which was undoubtedly subject to a further controversy.

Relevant to the case under study here is the Basic Law No. 14 of 1970. While containing statutory provisions to protect defendants, it granted authority to the Minister of Justice (who was responsible solely to the President) to control the budgets of courts below the Supreme Court, as well as to promote and transfer judges. Article 31 of the Law stipulated that as Head of the Government, the President appointed and dismissed judges. Commenting on that article, Southwood and Flanagan note: 'Judges are neither appointed nor paid for their commitment to justice. Judges were political appointees, hired and fired at the will of the President' (1983: 147). The Justice Minister's authority was extended further after 1986 to include the power to propose dismissal of judges to the President, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. On paper, things have recently changed since the issuing of Basic Law No. 35/1999 that brings all judges under the supervision of the Supreme Court. This is a welcome development, but it is far from adequate to improve the independence of the judiciary, and it has no immediate relevance to the case under study here. After all, practitioners and analysts alike remain doubtful that things have changed significantly since Basic Law No. 35/1999 took effect.⁹

Another measure of the period under study that circumscribed the judiciary was Presidential Decree No. 82 of 1971. This required all civil servants and state employees to be members of *Korps Pegawai Negeri Indonesia* (KORPRI) or 'All-Indonesia Civil Servant Corps' headed ex-officio by the Minister of the Interior. Every member of this body, the largest professional body in the country, which included all court officials, had to take an oath of loyalty to the government and all its policies. The Indonesian term for "civil servant" is much more apt here: *pegawai negeri* or *abdi negara*, literally "state servant".

The only notable promise of progressive change in legislation during the period of relevance here was the promulgation of KUHAP in 1981. This new procedural code contains provisions that give some protection to detainees.

A major problem with the new code, however, is the absence of provisions to ensure that the police, courts and prosecutors respect the detainee's new entitlements. There is no mention of sanctions upon violations of these new guarantees for suspects. Torture during interrogation still prevails. A couple of cases, both from the time and place of my fieldwork, will suffice to illustrate the point. They indicate both the regular use of torture in interrogation and the limited sanctions against it.

A 17 year-old student died in police custody on 30 April 1988, 40 days prior to Darmawan's arrest (Chapter 3). Two police officers tortured him to death in an attempt to force a confession in a case of minor theft. The two officers were prosecuted by a military court a year later, and sentenced to two-and-a-half years imprisonment. In order to protect them from anticipated retaliation by fellow prisoners who had previously been similarly tortured, the two former police officers were not jailed in Yogyakarta's Wiragunan prison but in Nusa Kambangan island. Two years after the youth's death, his mother sued the Yogyakarta police chief. To the surprise of many, the court found the chief police officer guilty. The judge demanded that the accused pay a monetary compensation of only about five per cent of the amount demanded by the plaintiff. This and a few other similar cases served to create credibility for the regime's tarnished claim to uphold law and order.¹⁰ The story might have been radically different if the detainee had not been killed.

The following year another Yogyakarta student, 26 years old, filed a habeas corpus suit against the DIY police chief for illegal detention under the false pretext of involvement in a robbery case. The newly promulgated KUHAP made the lawsuit possible, but the court overturned the charges. As soon as the plaintiff stepped out of the courtroom he was arrested by police officers on a different charge. The timing and site of this arrest were chosen to make sure that the public saw the direct reprisal. This time the arrest was based on the pretext of the youth's possessing a machete, which the officers 'found in his home in his absence' (*Berita Nasional* 22/05/1991). This, according to the police, made the youth liable to prosecution pursuant to Martial Law Regulation No. 12/1951. When his legal counsel was allowed to see him in the police gaol a few hours later, he was black and blue from brutal torture. A month later a very similar case occurred in Cilacap (Central Java), where the police conspicuously captured a plaintiff as soon as the latter left the court room. The court overturned the habeas corpus suit against his previous illegal detention (*Berita Nasional* 22/06/1991).

The foregoing mainly concerns legal constraints upon the judiciary. On top of these, there were, and still are, unofficial and unwritten but strongly imposed constraints in a variety of forms that will be discussed below. Considering the multi-layered and over-repressive nature of the system, one may think that prosecutors and judges would have no difficulties in convicting alleged subversives. In actual practice, however, the opposite was the case. Even having all those formal laws in their favour, as if they were not

repressive enough, political prosecutions almost always violate the official procedures. Those who have the power to ratify the repressive law also have the power to ignore it.

In the three political trials in Yogyakarta, military officers regularly supervised the court's deliberations. The local military commander often met with the prosecutors and judges in the court building before hearings began. This may also be the standard practice elsewhere. Student activists suggested to me that the regular presence of military officers in the court building was meant to monitor and intimidate court officials, particularly the chief judges, to determine what should and what should not be said during the deliberations. The chief judges, they observed, made frequent and quick interruptions to critical statements against existing power structures.¹¹ Because there were no clear boundaries of censorship, these judges were inclined to be more cautious and repressive than they were expected to be. No audio recording was allowed during court deliberations. Copies of the minutes of the court hearings were totally inaccessible to defendants and their defence counsels, let alone the public. Protests or objections from the defendants or defence counsels against court proceedings often engendered further penalties against the defendants.

Just a year before the case under study began to unfold, the Minister of Justice and the Supreme Court issued an unprecedented joint decision regulating the supervision of and disciplinary sanctions against legal advisers who show insufficient co-operation with the court. In the eyes of legal professionals this decision was blatantly against the law. It was promulgated soon after the Minister of Justice suspended Adnan Buyung Nasution's licence to practise law for a year from May 1987. The minister decided that Nasution had committed 'contempt of court' while defending Lieutenant General (Retired) H. R. Dharsono who was tried for subversion in January 1986.

Outside the courtroom, the pre-trial interrogation of witnesses commonly took place under duress. Lawyers defending political defendants, as well as the lawyers' families, encountered various kinds of intimidation and harassment. Some underwent arrest and prosecution under all sorts of incredible pretexts.¹² Under "normal" circumstances, at least in Yogyakarta, these lawyers had to attend military-sponsored briefings with judges, chiefs of police, and the district attorney to assure concerted "team work" towards maintaining general "stability and order". During political trials, these meetings became imperative. These meetings served as a means of control, intimidation and surveillance with the ultimate aim of securing a pre-determined verdict. The military also organized separate meetings for journalists, reminding them of the taboos, as well as directing the focus and style of reporting. Neither the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court nor the office of the Attorney-General was exempted from the multi-directional penetration of the military in New Order Indonesia. At the time of my fieldwork, only one incumbent in a top judicial office was not a member of the military.

Singgih was appointed Attorney-General in 1990. No political cases proceeded without prior investigation by, and supervision of, military intelligence. Obviously their prominence was absolute in subversion cases. The police and judicial bodies would not be given access to political suspects until the military felt they had completed their investigations. While the military was primarily interested in the political significance of a case, law enforcement officials had to pay more attention to legal formalities and to producing something that might resemble a legitimate prosecution.

Prosecutions and convictions

There was a remarkable difference in substance between the pre-trial military interrogations and the courtroom prosecutions of the three young men: Darmawan, Hidayat and Rudy. Equally remarkable was the difference between the substance of these prosecutions and the popular narrative that grew among the general public. In the military interrogation, the major issue was an allegedly organized communist underground movement with overseas links. The primary substance of the three trials, by contrast, concerned intellectual discursive practices. The three men were prosecuted chiefly for thinking, reading and discussing allegedly subversive ideas. As will soon be evident, most of these ideas were urban intellectual platitudes. However, the general public commonly referred to these trials as being about the sale of Toer's banned novels.

In the courtroom, the responsibility for substantiating the charges lay primarily with the prosecutors. Apparently pragmatism led the three teams of prosecutors to choose discursive practices as the main target for the indictments; it would have been very difficult for the district attorneys to have prosecuted the defendants using the military's far-reaching allegations. The prosecution did not concentrate on Darmawan's selling of banned books either, as the public had expected. The sale of banned books was explicitly covered in a separate legal provision that is much less serious than the Anti-Subversion Law. It carries a maximum sentence of only one year or a Rp. 5,000 fine.

We will not seek to argue whether or not these trials did violence to law, morality and the common sense of the people involved, but rather to examine how badly they did this and why. The district attorneys' task made them appear ridiculous before the public. The show trials were so poignantly laughable that one wonders why the government felt the need to hold them in the first place. As mentioned earlier, the degree of the New Order's insistence on seeking legal justification for their repression had no precedent in the history of either the state or the nation. This is why we cannot simply dismiss the trials altogether, and why we must assess what (if anything) these trials achieved, rather than the legalistic details of the court proceedings in themselves.

I will analyze the substance of the three prosecutions' indictments and BAPs, and will show the discrepancies between each pair of these documents in each trial. These discrepancies, I will argue, indicate two things. First, when interrogating the suspects, these prosecutors attempted to follow the previous military interrogations and the decisions they had reached. Second, the prosecutors were not able to make much use of their own BAPs. They had to construct their indictments, and on the basis of very little substance. In their desperation, they attempted to evoke the residual phantom of the 1965 trauma.

Each of the three prosecutions presented a set of charges on many levels. Legally, the prosecutors needed only to "prove" the first level of an indictment to have their entire case accepted by the council of judges. Only if the first level of an indictment was deemed untenable would the court examine the next level.¹³ Each level of the indictment spelled out specific rules that had allegedly been violated and the actual conduct of the accused in question. In each trial, the prosecutors deemed each action of each defendant to violate more than one rule. Thus, the indictments were full of repetition. In the following I make a list of each of the defendants' alleged offences, and indicate which of these alleged offences constituted the primary charges. I will make my analysis and comments only after introducing the substance of the indictments.

Darmawan's ten alleged offences were as follows.¹⁴ The set of primary charges against him refer to all except activities 4) and 10).

- 1) Since 1981 the defendant possessed, kept, and circulated a) banned books such as the post-1980 novels of Pramoedya A. Toer (*Bumi Manusia*, *Anak Semua Bangsa*, *Gadis Pantai*, *Rumah Kaca*, and *Jejak Langkah*) and a book review of Harold Crouch's *Army and Politics in Indonesia*; b) books that were not specifically banned but were considered to smack of Marxism (e.g. *Program Partai Komunis Uni Soviet*, books authored by late President Sukarno, Tan Malaka and Mao Zedong, as well as a copy of a textbook on the history of Marxism, *Ringkasan Sejarah Marxisme dan Komunisme*, by a sceptical commentator Franz Magnis Suseno).
- 2) In 1986 the defendant asked witness Hidayat in a private conversation at the home of a common friend (witness Hatta): 'Is it true that the 1965 coup was really an internal conflict in the Army?'
- 3) Quoting Wertheim, the defendant said to witness Hidayat, again in a private conversation, that: 'Syam was a PSI agent who infiltrated the PKI to crush it from within.'¹⁵
- 4) In 1987 the defendant attended an academic discussion which was open to the public, reviewing a newly published book by Ian Roxborough in Indonesian translation on theories of underdevelopment.¹⁶ The prosecutors considered that the book contained Marxism, and therefore that the discussion was subversive.

- 5) In 1987 the defendant chaired a public discussion, at which one of the speakers (witness Krishna) discussed Indonesian politics and made a reference to Marxism, albeit a critical one.
- 6) In January 1988 the defendant prepared a paper, intended to be a draft of a research proposal to be submitted to his school, where he questioned the possibility of making amendments to the 1945 Constitution.
- 7) On 9 June 1988 the defendant was caught selling banned novels written by Pramoedya A. Toer.
- 8) The defendant took part in an informal discussion at Hidayat's home, where witness Hassan, a student, made a critical comment about the government-sponsored economic development program.
- 9) In December 1987, at the home of Farouk, the defendant participated in an informal discussion, where witness Hidayat spoke critically of the government and its policies.¹⁷
- 10) In December 1987, the defendant requested witness Hidayat to prepare a paper to be discussed at the meeting previously referred to in point 9) above.

Even with the tension and prevailing anxiety of the time, the above indictments were laughable. In the early 2000s, when I was preparing this book, the whole thing sounded strange, and yet familiar. Many of the points in the indictments were still alive, though with much less powerful and threatening force. In many significant ways, Darmawan's prosecution deserves comparison with that of Hidayat and Rudy. In the following list of Hidayat's four alleged offences, all except the last were used to construct the primary charge against him.¹⁸

- 1) In November 1985 the defendant co-founded Kelompok Studi Sosial Palagan Yogyakarta (KSSPY) with Frans and Kalana. Since then they held 13 discussions, attended by more than five people, and allegedly without official permission.¹⁹ Furthermore, in some of those meetings, Hidayat allegedly made the following statements:
 - a) There was a gap between the rich and poor in Indonesian society.
 - b) Development in Indonesia favoured the middle class.
 - c) Indonesian cultures were dominated by the elites.
 - d) Education in Indonesia was elitist and undemocratic.
 - e) The social welfare program benefited only the middle class, business groups, and upper levels of government employees.
 - f) Rural women were less privileged than their urban counterparts.
 - g) Economic development did not reach the lower strata of society.
 - h) The state was getting stronger, the people were weaker, and development programs had been centralistic.
 - i) The society was considerably dependent upon the government.
 - j) The system of governance in Indonesia was undemocratic.

- 2) In 1986 the defendant invited Dr. Keith Foulcher, a noted Australian scholar of Indonesian culture, to give a talk at an informal KSSPY gathering at the defendant's house. The topic of the discussion was 'literature and society'. The discussion allegedly 'smacked of communism'. By 'communism' the prosecutor was referring to the fact that the speaker (according to collected pre-trial testimonies) reportedly made reference to Toer's novel *Gadis Pantai*, with a complimentary remark to the effect that the novel had a high aesthetic value.
- 3) In 1987 the defendant presented a paper, 'The Central Theme of Development and the Political Development of Youth', to an informal discussion group at the house of witness Farouk, in which he said that:
 - a) The New Order regime had emasculated the politics of young people.
 - b) Critics of capitalist systems and those who promote socialism were concerned about improving the lives of the people at the lowest social strata.
 - c) Despite the 20 years of the New Order's economic development, the masses remained poor. The apparent progress was only material, and this was only apparent if one adopted the government's official perspective.
 - d) The present capitalist system caused a gap between the rich and the poor and created an undemocratic society, and was leading the country to an impasse.
 - e) 'In response to the New Order government's central theme [i.e. Development programs], we need to form political circles that start out from certain ideological ideas that must become forces of tactful resistance.'
- 4) Between 1981 to 1988 the defendant was involved in activities of keeping, possessing, circulating, selling, or reproducing banned literary works by Pramoedya A. Toer.

Before attempting to compare the two indictments above, let us examine Rudy's alleged offences, with the first four being used by the prosecutors to construct the primary charge.²⁰

- 1) In 1986 the defendant encouraged and influenced Hidayat to extend the topics for KSSPY discussions beyond those of culture and the arts as originally intended, and to include politics.
- 2) In 1986 and 1987 the defendant lent two 'Marxist' books to Hidayat, namely *Di Tengah Pergolakan* by Helmi and *Ringkasan Sejarah Perjuangan Marxisme dan Komunisme* by Franz Magnis Suseno.
- 3) In 1987 the defendant told Farouk to form groups of five or seven people to sell and discuss Pramoedya A. Toer's books which contained 'Marxism'.

- 4) In 1987 the defendant told Darmawan to sell *Gadis Pantai* and *Hikayat Siti Mariah* authored [sic] by Pramoedya A. Toer, with a ten per cent commission.²¹
- 5) In 1987 the defendant wrote a paper entitled 'The Middle Class and Social Formation in Indonesia', and presented it to a discussion at his home university under the direct supervision of his lecturers. In this paper the defendant stated that the government was not democratic, that the military and technocrats dominated the country, and that the state was enormously powerful.
- 6) In 1986 the defendant presented a paper on female labour in a rubber plantation to a discussion group held by the *Kelompok Studi Bantuan Hukum* (KSBH), Legal Aid Study Group, and stated that 'the lives of these female workers have not changed meaningfully from colonial times to the present day. They still live in poverty.'
- 7) In 1987 the defendant prepared and presented a paper 'UGM Students' Perceptions of the General Election', which he developed into a thesis. The discussion took place at Gadjah Mada University and the defendant made remarks to the effect that existing political parties in Indonesia had failed to accommodate the students' aspirations, and that consequently these students had no interest in the political parties. The defendant also said that many young people were bewildered by the many and confusing rules imposed by the state.
- 8) The defendant often made statements to the effect that the Indonesian government was undemocratic and militaristic, in the sense that the generals dominated the government leadership.
- 9) The defendant took part in the activities of keeping, possessing, publishing, circulating, reproducing, or trading banned books authored by Pramoedya A. Toer.

One of the reasons why these cases initially created a wave of terror was the fact that these charges were, to say the least, extraordinarily superficial. It was as if the authorities were not even pretending to be serious, or bothering to take the trouble to construct even slightly more credible cases. The implication was that only those who were overwhelmingly powerful, immoral and ruthless could present such a prosecution. Consequently, the atmosphere was very confusing for the defendants and others who were involved. It was unclear whether the government simply wanted to perpetrate an act of terror. If so, why should it choose the court? And why should it occasionally appear to want genuinely to maintain a claim of legality throughout the trials? This is more puzzling when one considers that this government had often managed to get away with naked violence against its subjects. Did the government simply have insufficient courage to be as violent and ruthless as it would like? Or did it reflect an official discriminatory policy against different kinds of perceived domestic threats, favouring urban intellectual dissidents in Java?

It was and still is difficult to believe that anyone responsible for the prosecution took the indictments seriously. Did the authorities want to suggest that all known forms of rationalization be suspended? Did they seriously expect anyone to believe that these students were guilty of subversion for saying 'there was a gap between the rich and poor' or 'the government is undemocratic'? In the trials, prosecutors and judges seriously sought witnesses simply to testify whether the defendants had made those statements of the obvious. In the indictment against Darmawan, passive attendance at open academic discussions was alleged to be subversive, even though no one else who had attended the meeting, including the speaker and organizer, was questioned. This glaringly points to the arbitrary nature of the trials.

A good starting point to explore these questions is the prosecution BAPs, the formal basis of the indictments. An analysis of the BAPs will show that the prosecutors' interrogations did not yield the substance they needed to construct serious charges. These BAPs match the military interrogation better than the formal indictments do. The central interest of the interrogators was neither issues of 'communism' (the chief preoccupation of the military interrogation), nor the circulation of Toer's novels (as the general public imagined). It was the organization and activities of KSSPY. This preoccupation with KSSPY suggests that the prosecutors were seriously seeking evidence that would enable them to construct credible cases of organized crime (i.e. subversion). The trials were not simply a whimsical or capricious exercise of power. The prominence of KSSPY in the overall BAPs becomes more remarkable when we recall the indictments listed above. In no way does KSSPY appear outstanding in any of the indictments. The exhaustive investigations into KSSPY found nothing incriminating.

Obvious discrepancies exist between these BAPs, individually as well as in combination, and the indictments previously discussed. Questions on KSSPY constituted the biggest portion of Darmawan's BAP, but they yielded only two of the ten activities alleged in his indictment to be subversive. And these two specified activities were no more than passive attendance at discussions held by KSSPY, whose speakers and other more active participants were left alone. KSSPY also dominated Hidayat's BAP, but it constituted only one minor point in the indictment. Hidayat admitted his leading role in co-founding and running KSSPY, but there was no evidence to show that this fell under the Anti-Subversion Law. All of the other co-founders of KSSPY were left alone. Most of KSSPY's open discussions had had official permission from the police: they were open to the public and the local media reported them; none of this had ever provoked anyone.

Only one of Rudy's nine allegedly subversive activities related directly to KSSPY, although KSSPY again took up the largest portion of his BAP. The indictment accused Rudy of having encouraged Hidayat to discuss politics in the series of KSSPY discussions. Throughout Rudy's trial, there was no evidence – not even an attempt to fabricate any – that proved this accusation. The verdict faithfully followed the prosecution by leaving this

indictment unproven. All of this consistently points to the conclusion that the work of the prosecution was simply incompetent, even with the repressive legal system on their side.

If KSSPY was prominent in the three BAPs, but not in the actual prosecution, what was prominent in the latter? The answer is different in each of the three trials. In the case of Darmawan, about half of the indictment concerned his attendance at several discussion groups, not all held by KSSPY. The indictment against Hidayat made the most elaborate charges against his various comments on Indonesian society, culture and politics. As Hidayat acknowledged, these comments were commonplace and they were made only during interrogation after his arrest. In Hidayat's BAP, questions about his "personal views" significantly rank second only to his position at KSSPY. Such questions ranked last in Rudy's BAP and two tiers from the bottom in Darmawan's. The most important substance in Rudy's indictment concerned two issues: his involvement in the possession and circulation of Toer's books, and statements that he allegedly made in his working papers for his university courses. In essence these youths were prosecuted for the expression of thoughts. The alleged offences were that they had made statements in academic papers and intellectual discussions (Rudy as well as Hidayat) and in pre-trial interrogations (Hidayat), or had attended such discussions and asked innocent questions (Darmawan). Other issues, such as the circulation of Toer's novels (some banned and others not yet banned), were peripheral.

So far we have looked at some serious problems in the first stage of the court deliberations only. Further sessions of the trials demonstrated how anxious and incompetent these officials were in completing their pre-determined tasks. A few examples shall suffice here. In the trial of Rudy, the prosecutors met difficulties due to serious typing errors on crucial points in the formal indictment. First of all, they repeatedly mistyped the number of the legal provision used as the basis for their primary charges. The primary charge was meant to refer to the prohibition against disseminating Marxism/communism, but the typing error made the indictment refer to a non-existent provision. They also charged Rudy with having engaged in the allegedly subversive activities since '1966' (when Rudy was 4 years old), when they intended to type '1986'.

The mistakes were immediately evident to Rudy, his defence counsel and his close friends as soon as they received copies of the indictments several days prior to the trial. After the court heard the attorney read out the indictment, the chief judge asked the defendant and his defence counsel whether the indictment was clear and understood. Rudy's defence counsel purposefully asked the attorneys whether the formal indictment contained any errors which needed immediate correction. Failing to get the hint, the attorneys said 'no'. To emphasize the point, the defence counsel reiterated the question – and got the same answer. In the subsequent trial hearing, the defence counsel included reference to these errors in their strong attacks

against the whole indictment. The audience, both in and outside the courtroom, shook their heads, finding it hard to believe that such an embarrassing series of slips could have taken place. One court official in uniform standing outside the courtroom next to me expressed his conviction that the errors were so fatal that the indictment must be declared invalid and the case overturned. Of course, he was wrong. The council of judges simply could not afford to do that. They had to forgive and rescue the prosecution at all costs. They accepted the indictment and, against the KUHAP's explicit provisions, considered the typing errors insignificant.

Coincidentally, ten days after the defective indictment was read, or two days before it was criticized and ridiculed in public, the mass media reported a very similar case in the Palembang District Court. This court tried Romsyah for involvement in a case of rape and robbery. The judge declared the indictment invalid due to a typing error and acquitted the defendant. The error was much less serious than in the case of Rudy; in Romsyah's case, the prosecutor mixed up the date of the alleged crime and the date the accused was arrested (*Tempo* 07/07/1990).

There had been several other cases of this kind. These, however, only underscored the arbitrary nature of the judge's decision rather than forming any predictable pattern. A Jakarta-based newsmagazine reported a similar case in 1987 in Surabaya (*Tanakator* 19/12/1987: 56). Here, however, the judge decided to overlook the prosecution's typing error and to convict the accused. Perhaps it was significant that this case (concerning gambling) was initially brought to trial by the then Commander-in-Chief of the East Java KODAM, Major General Ali Sulun, thus making it more comparable to the case of the three men in Yogyakarta. In a clear attempt to question the validity of this court decision, *Tanakator* mentioned a judicial precedent from 1981, also a case of gambling. Here the Supreme Court had acquitted the defendants and overturned the decision of the Tenggara (South Kalimantan) District Court that had been based on an indictment with typing errors. Again, in this case, the error was less serious than in Rudy's case. The indictment had failed to make a complete citation of a relevant legal provision, missing one insignificant phrase. Curiously, no one mentioned these cases in connection with Rudy's trial. I myself found out about them months after Rudy's trial was over.

In the foregoing our focus has been on the work of the prosecutors. All the chief judges, with some exceptions in Rudy's trial, reproduced the same discourse. The extreme case was chief judge Zulkifli Lubis. The audience's loud comments of support for Hidayat during his trial often agitated him. Once, at the conclusion of the court hearing, Lubis took off his gown and challenged some of the young activists in the audience to a fight.

In writing the verdict against Darmawan, the council of judges made a remarkable note, demonstrating how the case was primarily one of discursive repression. The council argued that the defendant, in his paper '*Mencari Bentuk Demokrasi Indonesia*' (In Search of Formats for Indonesian

Democracy), used a lot of 'extreme' words (*istilah-istilah yang ekstrim*). The examples given were 'tuan tanah' (landlords), 'kaum elite' (the elites), 'rakyat tertindas' (oppressed people), 'rejim' (Orde Baru or New Order regime). These, according to the council of judges: 'are terms characteristically belonging to the Communist Party' (Verdict, pp. 129–30). The court had previously found certain statements and kinds of thinking to be illegal. It now decided that the use of certain words in the defendant's research proposal for a thesis was subversion.

Previously, the judge questioned witness Hassan about his use of the term '*kelompok bercokol*' (a derogatory phrase for 'emergent group') in a paper he had discussed at a KSSPY meeting chaired by Darmawan. Then the chief judge reprovingly questioned the witness about whether or not Darmawan had interrupted the witness when he used the term. Later on Darmawan was found guilty for not having interrupted the witness. In the same verdict, the council of judges noted that it found the defendant guilty of subversion for possessing photographs of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and Pramodya A. Toer. Perhaps with genuine surprise, the council of judges noted in the verdict that the defendant had quotes in his diary from Toer's novels. All of this conduct, according to the council of judges, 'does not reflect the quality of a *Pancasila* man . . .' and it constitutes a 'violation of the Decree of the MPR No. XXV/1966', that is the banning of communism/Marxism-Leninism (Verdict, p. 159).

In the verdict against Rudy, the council of judges accepted all the charges and rationalization from the prosecutors, while it accepted none from the defendant and his defence counsel. The case was plainly clear cut. Similar to the other two trials, the verdict against Rudy chiefly contained counter-arguments against the defence appeals. The council of judges raised six points in all against the defendant, two of which are of special interest. In one point, the council of judges expressed resentment against the title of the defence counsel's rejoinder '*Mengembangkan Intelektual, Digebug*' ('Intellectual Cultivation Trampled'). This title was the only aspect of the Defence Plea that the council of judges responded to. In another point, the council resented a caricature inserted in the defendant's plea. The caricature was mild in comparison to what appears daily in the Indonesian press.

Evoking the phantom of 'communism'

It was not to be expected that the prosecution would resist the temptation to follow the general practice in the society of destroying opponents by hijacking the phantom of the 1965 terror. While the court did so excessively, we cannot dismiss its undertaking as simply a cheap trick purely for convenient purposes, and out of total fabrication. As suggested in the foregoing, the prosecution followed the pattern set by the military's investigation. It will also be recalled that the military had both genuine suspicions and confusions about the case. Thus, from their perspective, the cases were presumably not

totally without foundation. I will briefly explore further the source of this foundation, but I will also show the judicial officials' difficulties in implementing the military's decision, due to their lack of professional rigour or familiarity with leftist discourse.

The one original and only credible pretext for the prosecution of the three men was their alleged involvement in circulating and possessing leftist books, some of which were officially banned. Chapter 2 has indicated why and how this could have happened. Proscribed leftist literature appeared not only to have survived; more importantly, it was widely accessible and popular among student activists, at least in the major cities of Java in the latter half of the 1980s, long before it swamped book shops following the formal end of the New Order in 1998. For over 20 years the New Order's seemingly rigorous repression and thorough censorship against leftist thought and thinkers had not met with any overt opposition. Now the case under investigation revealed the hollowness of what at first appeared to be extensive martial law-style repression. Small wonder the regime was in a state of constant anxiety. This is one of the most tenable explanations for the severe persecution of the three Yogyakarta activists.

What constituted "leftist", "Marxist", or "communist" in the minds of the military officers and court officials appeared to be different, if not totally divergent, from what they meant to the intellectual community. The older judicial bureaucrats might have had first-hand encounters with the hyper-politicized Indonesia of the years immediately preceding New Order rule. They might have felt more at ease than their younger colleagues with leftist literature. However, none of them were likely to be aware of the recent developments in student activism – what these activists read and discussed. Those officials must have been struck by the materials confiscated from Hidayat and Darmawan. In this light, one can understand why, in sentencing Darmawan, the council of judges thought it was necessary to include a point of evidence to the effect that the defendant 'admired Pramoedya A. Toer and the Bearded Misterys [Karl Marx and F. Engels]. The defendant kept their photographs in his library' (Verdict, p. 111). The text of the verdict told as much about the council of judges as about the defendant's personal life.

This is not to play down the fact that the formal prosecution blew up the case and symbolically overkilled the innocent. This is simply to appreciate (with the three defendants as they repeatedly stressed in conversations with me) the fear and bewilderment that the officials and officers had experienced in encountering the private libraries and discussions of the young intellectuals. The fear came from unfamiliarity with the major issues in question. The disastrous prosecution followed because the subjective ignorance and fantasy was coupled with the objective power to destroy what appeared suspect and intimidating.

The best expression of this combination of stubborn ignorance and passion to destroy was the official view of the confiscated books and the official

rationale for destroying them. In the verdict on Darmawan, for example, the council of judges referred to witness Ngadimin Brontak's testimony about the defendant possessing banned books. Among the four titles considered to contain Marxism was Iwan Simatupang's *Merahnya Merah*. This is a surrealist novel written by an anti-communist author.²² Many years earlier the novel had entered the official literary canon sanctioned by the New Order government; the nationwide standardized secondary school curriculum included it too. Undoubtedly, the prosecutors and council of judges had never read the book or bothered to find out more from those who knew better about it. These bureaucrats were provoked simply by the title *Merahnya Merah* (*Red of the Red*). In their verdicts, the separate councils of judges instructed the attorney to destroy this novel, plus many other confiscated materials.

Many similar misconceptions (by official standards!) and mislabelings were glaringly evident throughout the three trials. A good example is regarding Magnis Suseno's *Ringkasan Sejarah Marxisme dan Komunisme* (*Brief History of Marxism and Communism*). Reference to this 1976 mimeograph recurred in the trials of the three young men. The book is a critique of Marxism as the author himself, an Indonesian national of German-born Jesuit, and one of Indonesia's most prominent scholars, who teaches at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy in Jakarta. His other published works and public talks during the period under study indicated his non-Marxist, if not anti-Marxist outlook (Magnis Suseno 1990a, 1990b, 1996). The court also arbitrarily labelled a number of papers written individually by students for KSSPY informal discussions as 'smacking of Marxism'. The court found the defendants guilty of keeping the novel by Pramoedya A. Toer, *Gadis Pantai* (*Girl from the Coast*), which the judge considered a 'banned book'. In reality, the government had only banned the book two months after Darmawan was arrested.

One might be tempted to wonder whether the prosecution was acting in this way deliberately, rather than out of ignorance. The evidence, however, supports my argument that this was a case of arrogant ignorance rather than outrageous manipulation. These bureaucrats not only failed to conceptualize what they meant by the 'Marxism' and 'communism' that they condemned. They were not even aware of which books had been recently banned. For instance, they did not realize that Harold Crouch's *Militer dan Politik di Indonesia* was already banned. In using this confiscated book to substantiate their charges, the attorneys described it merely in one short phrase, '*isinya negatif*' ('the contents are negative') without elaboration. One wonders if any of the attorneys had actually seen the book.

The District Court instructed the District Attorney's office to destroy Darmawan's copy of *Teori Ketergantungan* (see note 16, this chapter), but ordered that Rudy's copy be returned to its owner. Other confiscated books to be destroyed because they allegedly 'smacked of communism' were: copies of the US government radio bulletin *Voice of America*; several works

by the late President Sukarno; a published translation of Arief Budiman's dissertation, *Jalan Demokrasi ke Sosialisme (Democratic Road to Socialism)*, which was widely available in book shops; and the novel *Ibunda (Mother)* which Darmawan had borrowed from the local government library.

All of the above leaves no doubt about the ignorance of those in charge of the case. If they intended only to deceive, then these officials must have been totally unfamiliar with the knowledge of the audience they were trying to deceive. Nothing was more embarrassing than the moment when Rudy and his defence counsel demanded that the prosecutors explain what they meant by 'Marxism' and 'communism' as repeatedly stated in the formal indictment. This was the first time that the use of these key words had been questioned formally in a court room. The attorneys were taken aback by the question, and were unable to answer. The chief judge gave them a few weeks to prepare a more appropriate reply. A few weeks later the prosecutors decided to refuse to give a substantive reply. They said that an answer was unnecessary, charging that the defendant and Defence Counsel were only pretending not to know. The judge accepted their arguments, leaving the key words evasive and thus more readily manipulable.²³

Perhaps the only time that the prosecution displayed confidence in evoking the phantom of communism was when they summoned individuals who had been officially branded with communist-related stigmas to testify. The court welcomed these witnesses, even though their status and their testimonies were irrelevant to the cases. To understand this procedure, we must return to Darmawan's BAP. Question 65 of his BAP, concerning Darmawan's genealogy, produced one of the longest and most informative replies. The answer includes information not only on Darmawan's own large family, but also on those of his parents and in-laws, as well as his father's step-parents. A total of 22 people were identified with their full names, home addresses, occupations, religions, ages, and membership of political and social organizations. The aim of the question was to uncover evidence of any "unclean" and/or politically vulnerable relatives.

The pursuit became even more specific in question 67: 'Which of your relatives were involved in the G-30-S/PKI?' Darmawan signed the BAP that lists four names given in reply to this question. We do not know exactly under what circumstances this answer was given. In response to my question a year later, Darmawan admitted that none of these relatives was ever tried and found guilty. Thus, the reference to 'involved in the G-30-S/PKI' in both the question and the answer above was totally misleading, but was made and accepted by all. At the same time, from discussion presented in Chapter 2, we can understand that Darmawan's self-damaging actions did not arise from pure negligence or innocent misunderstanding. They were the product of years of inculcation of the New Order's discourse and its master-narrative.

The court did several things with Darmawan's confession. It summoned Sutarji, one of Darmawan's four "unclean" relatives, to testify at Darmawan's trial. The court simply wanted him to testify to two points: to the fact

that he was imprisoned soon after the so-called “G-30-S/PKI” coup attempt, and that the defendant was his nephew [sic].²⁴ In the verdict the council of judges included a point saying that the defendant had relatives who were ‘involved in G-30-S/PKI’ and listing all four individuals (pp. 110–1), thus implying guilt by association, and in effect rendering the whole trial proceedings redundant!

Sutardji’s testimony and the inclusion of this point were blatantly flawed from a legal perspective. First, article 168 of the KUHAP stipulates categories of individuals who may be exempted from the obligation to testify in court. One of these refers to anyone having a kin relationship to the accused. Second, Sutardji’s “uncleanness” had no legal status. Like his three other relatives, and for that matter hundreds of thousands of other Indonesians, Sutardji went through years of severe punishment without ever having been tried. In fact some of Darmawan’s relatives were punished simply by virtue of having other relatives similarly accused and punished. Accusations of communism have brought suffering to hundreds of thousands of families, including now at least three generations of descendants of the initial victims. Darmawan’s mother saw her father, her brother, and now her son being punished inside and outside prison with the same kind of illegal accusation. Under the state terrorism at hand, both “law enforcers” and the innocent victims were commonly (though not equally) powerless.

For similar reasons, another ‘unclean’ witness, Kasto, was summoned to testify at the trials of Darmawan and Rudy. Rudy’s prosecutors found no one “unclean” with any links to Rudy, but they still summoned Kasto and his employer Hasyim Rachman to testify.²⁵ Neither of them had met or even heard of Rudy, and thus neither was legally qualified to testify. It was obvious that the court wanted them to appear simply because of the lack of spectacle during Rudy’s trial, to say nothing of the lack of evidence against him.

For the same purpose, the court summoned Hendricus Johannes Koesoemanto during Hidayat’s trial. He was the only “unclean” individual who could be remotely connected to Hidayat (see Chapter 2 on his stigmatization). On behalf of Gadjah Mada University Press, Koesoemanto occasionally provided institutional assistance to KSSPY in organizing public discussions of newly published books. Apparently Koesoemanto had never been tried or imprisoned. But he had two stigmas that the court were quick to expose. First, he had been a member of the then legal BAPERKI (*Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia* or Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship), a leftist mass organization dismantled after the 1965 bloodshed together with all other leftist organizations in the country. Second, he was of Chinese descent (see the last section of Chapter 1 on the status of the ethnic Chinese minority under the New Order). It is worthy of mention that Koesoemanto was the only witness in the three trials who was asked about his ethnic identity in court. It was documented and highlighted in the subsequent legal documents. The Chinese ethnicity

of the prosecutors' star witness Farouk, meanwhile, who testified at all three trials, was never disclosed by the court. Ironically, the only person to highlight this was Darmawan, when angrily countering Farouk's incriminating testimony.

Witnesses: the work of terror and its limits

It is depressing to realize that the seemingly mindless state functionaries discussed in the previous section represented one of the most stable state powers on earth. The regime's success in maintaining power is partly understandable when we consider the continued support it enjoyed from the urban middle classes, either through coercion or otherwise. Such support appeared to be remarkably generous in the witnesses' testimony in the trials of the three accused young men. As suggested earlier, these urban intellectuals did not form a monolithic bloc. Below we will examine some of the intimidated witnesses and their incriminating testimonies, as well as a couple of odd counter cases.²⁶ Before we examine individual witnesses, a few words of methodological precaution are in order.

I have relied in the following examination primarily, but not exclusively, on written legal documents from the three trials. This is admittedly problematic. Many witnesses in the case under study experienced great fear when embroiled within the legal discourse. That is a common experience for Indonesians, especially in cases of political prosecution. Generally speaking, witnesses often misunderstand the questions, and make unwitting statements. When officials record and reproduce their testimonies for legal documentation, gross distortions and misrepresentation can occur. Under great mental stress, most witnesses prefer to sign the BAP rather than to extend the interrogation for the sake of accuracy. These documents are not accessible to the public, except in reproduced form in the prosecuting requisition and the council of judges' verdict.

Judicial officials have full liberty to select, edit or paraphrase all testimony in the course of interrogation. Not all existing distortions must be assumed to be a product of clever manipulation, however. My first-hand observation of several cases suggests that quite often they are the outcome of poor mastery of the national language (which is most unlikely to be a mother-tongue to these officials – also the case with many of their fellow nationals of the same or older generation, including President Soeharto), and poor writing and typing skills, something consistently evident in the three cases under investigation here. Thus, one cannot place too much emphasis on the BAPs, or argue how intentional or consensual the incriminating testimony discussed below really is. In order to cross-check, I have consulted other primary sources before writing this section.

Political trials often present star witnesses who provide generous incriminating testimony. In the three political trials in Yogyakarta, the star witness

was Darmawan's closest friend, Farouk. Farouk was so important as a witness that the prosecutors and judges relied on his testimony in all three trials. He testified more than once in Darmawan's trial. Throughout Rudy's trial Farouk's testimony was the only conceivable evidence to substantiate the prosecution's charges. Farouk was not the only witness to have given incriminating testimony. But apart from the three KODIM officials, he was the only witness who testified ferociously against the defendants without showing any apparent anxiety, guilt, or irony.²⁷

In Darmawan's trial, Farouk testified that Darmawan and Hidayat held all responsibility for the discussion at the witness's house in November 1987. Previously Darmawan and Hidayat had argued strongly that the discussion from its earliest conception was Farouk's initiative. The prosecutors and council of judges were happy to consider and accept only Farouk's story. According to Farouk, Darmawan and Hidayat had asked him repeatedly for permission to hold the meeting at his house on a topic he was never informed of. When the discussion materialized, Hidayat spoke on 'The Central Theme of Development and the Political Development of Youth'. In his testimony, Farouk explained that he had strongly denounced the speaker because in his view those ideas were against *Pancasila* ideology and the existing political system.

Elsewhere in his testimony Farouk said that Hidayat's paper contained Marxism as Farouk learned it in school. Farouk also told the court that soon after the authorities had arrested Darmawan for selling Toer's books, Hidayat came to Farouk for advice. Hidayat allegedly looked very anxious and intended to run away. In court, Farouk claimed to have asked Hidayat: 'Why worry if you're innocent?' Farouk also attacked Rudy in all three trials. He testified that Rudy asked him to sell Toer's books, and to form small groups of students to discuss them. Farouk told the court that Hidayat discussed with him the possible arrest of Rudy, following a demonstration against the "Brest incident" at the French Embassy in Jakarta.²⁸ According to Farouk, Hidayat anticipated that if Rudy was arrested the rest of the activists would be arrested too. Again, Farouk claimed to have replied: 'Why worry if you're innocent?'

Farouk's rhetorical question is intriguing. This is not simply because it was doubtful that Farouk actually asked this question. Farouk's question did more than support the charges. It made the prosecution appear natural. It implied an assurance of justice and the rule of law. The lie was cruelly powerful, precisely because it was only implied, as if this was only to be taken for granted. Although his supposed question (and his whole testimony, for that matter) was a product of the prevailing *teror* which he denied, this same rhetorical question reinforced its efficacy, and reproduced the conditions for its further prevalence. Farouk had the discursive competence (even if only to overcome his own anxiety) that all the prosecutors and judges in the trials badly needed.

Other incriminating testimonies came from witnesses who did not – perhaps could not – hide their expressions of fear and distress. Hidayat's three best friends testified unfavourably against him and the other two defendants. The three were Kalana, Harman, and Susilo. Kalana had co-founded KSSPY with Hidayat and Frans. His testimony supported some of the central charges against Hidayat and his two fellows. We must appreciate the fact that Kalana was the first of all the witnesses in the three related trials to testify. This was at the time when the pervasive trauma of the case was still extremely severe. During his first appearance in court he fainted in the middle of the deliberations. He had to be hospitalized several times while the trials were in progress. He could not come to testify in person at Rudy's trial. Afterwards, he never wanted to speak of or be seen again by anyone involved in the case. He died at the age of 36, on 7 August 1991.

Harman, who was discussed in the previous chapter, was the only one arrested and released without being tried. Like Kalana's, Harman's testimony contained subjective opinions about Hidayat's and Rudy's attitudes towards the ruling regime, and speculative statements about Rudy's involvement in the business of selling Toer's novels. Like Kalana, Harman disappeared when the court repeatedly summoned him to testify at Rudy's trial. What was remarkable about Harman was the drastic change in his outlook in the eyes of his close friends. Previously this student of anthropology at UGM had been well known for being among the most provocative and radically leftist activists. His writings against the regime were very critical and bold. When I conducted my field research in 1990, he had already detached himself from his old friends; they told me that he had found a new preoccupation in Javanese mysticism.

Susilo did not present the most incriminating testimony against Hidayat, but many of his friends bitterly regretted his untrue and damaging statements both in his pre-trial interrogation and in court. Hidayat had formerly regarded Susilo as a prominent source of political inspiration and moral courage. Testifying at Hidayat's trial, however, Susilo stated that he was displeased with Hidayat's thinking for being too politicized. He explained that he was present at KSSPY discussions only as a journalist, but had decided not to write reports of the discussions. The reason, he testified, was that these discussions were politically 'too hot'. Paradoxically, Susilo soon added that 'after all there was nothing new from those KSSPY discussions to report to the public'.

Like most of the witnesses, Susilo was preoccupied with self-protection. He denied many things and consequently put Hidayat in an even more difficult position. A common friend expressed to me his strong resentment of Susilo's 'betrayal'. More than one source told me that Hidayat had given generous assistance to Susilo's intellectual growth and career. When I left Yogyakarta at the end of my fieldwork in 1991, Susilo had never visited Hidayat in prison, or shown any intention to do so. Many spoke of his deep regret and tears when this incident was brought up in conversation.

But unlike Harman and Kalana, Susilo did not totally withdraw from his previous circles. I saw him several times by chance at the office of the daily *Berita Nasional*, where he worked. Several times I refrained from raising the many questions I had long had in mind. Finally I requested an interview. He did not only reject it categorically, but also avoided me thereafter.

It was not only state employees who performed badly in the show trials. The silent but pervasive feelings of terror among intellectuals assisted a desperate prosecution. The intellectuals involved in the affair had other handicaps as well. Apart from a lack of organizational resources, most of the previously strident activists were shocked to face the reaction of the regime that they had so often challenged and provoked. Compared to both Darmawan and Hidayat, these activists appeared to be no more knowledgeable about, resistant to, or tactful about the efficacy of the New Order's political prosecution. To better illustrate the point, the following is testimony from senior-year undergraduate students of UGM, two of whom were from its famous department of social and political sciences. They were Adhie, Basuki, and Arjun.

Adhie testified with genuine distress. He was always slow to respond to questions in the court, and his voice was very low. Taking advantage of the witness's distress, the chief judge at Rudy's trial asked Adhie whether he had ever heard Rudy saying that the New Order government was 'undemocratic' and 'militaristic'. For a while, Adhie kept silent. Then the chief judge asked courteously: 'It is neither wrong, nor against the law to have such opinions, is it?' Adhie agreed. Then the question was repeated. This time Adhie gave an affirmative answer. Later, the judge explained that although it was legal to have any opinions in this 'democratic' country, we must comply with 'rules and laws about how to express and disseminate them properly'.

The pitfalls in these trials for many witnesses who came from academic circles were unmistakably discursive ones. Few, if any, had ever previously attended a trial at all. They were not as co-operative as Farouk, but neither were they aware of the consequences of what they were willing to testify. These academic individuals took for granted statements about the "undemocratic" and "militaristic" features of the regime. In fact, they regularly saw these statements in speeches by and interviews with certain members of the political elite, and in the mass media. These academic witnesses were led to believe that testifying what Rudy had said about the country would be inconsequential.

When Basuki testified at Rudy's trial he looked confused throughout the hearing session. While many of his subjective opinions about Rudy clearly supported the prosecution, he appeared to be unaware of what he was doing. After the hearing was over, I found him alone outside the court complex. He looked perplexed and worried. He approached me and asked, apparently with total sincerity, whether I had found that anything he had said in the court was against Rudy.

Arjun's testimony was remarkable in its own right, as it was one of the very few testimonies that challenged the validity of the prosecution of the three defendants. Arjun overtly identified himself with the defendants and their alleged crimes. For instance, in reply to the court, he admitted to having read Toer's banned novels. Furthermore, he said he saw no contradiction between those novels and *Pancasila*, the official state ideology. He admitted that he discussed Marxism at study groups. He expressed his criticism of the education system, and stated that he regarded the New Order government as undemocratic.

Arjun's testimony was full of personal opinions against the regime and references to personal preferences, and thus it was legally as defective or irrelevant as that given by the intimidated witnesses. However, the judge and the prosecutors demonstrated in their own ways how Arjun's testimony could be made as relevant and useful as the more overtly incriminating testimony. The court found both Darmawan and Hidayat guilty for participating in discussions where statements such as those made by Arjun were aired. Significantly, the court and the security apparatus left Arjun alone.²⁹

Arjun's testimony manifested an important variation of the diverse character of the Yogyakarta intellectuals. But he was not alone. Tanaka (another colleague of Darmawan and Rudy) presented the most remarkable testimony. Like Arjun, he challenged the court. Unlike Arjun, however, Tanaka did not simply defend or legitimize the substance of the defendants' intellectual exercise. He undermined the precarious authority of the court, by directly confronting the legal pretence that formally defined the discourse of the court deliberations. Although Tanaka was a witness for the prosecution, there was no way the attorneys or the judges could manipulate his testimony to their ends as they were able to do even with Arjun's testimony.

In short, Tanaka shook up everything that was previously established both inside and outside the court: discursive parameters, expectations, beliefs, intimidation, power relations, the centre of authority, and emotions. Previously the chief judge had always been in the highest position. He presided over the court, interrupted or overturned supposedly 'irrelevant' issues. Now witness Tanaka took over that position. Repeatedly he stood up and boldly refused to answer questions from the attorneys and chief judge, declaring them irrelevant. In shock, the chief judge warned him of articles 12 and 15 of the Anti-Subversion Law, stipulating the obligation to testify and penal sanctions for failure to meet this obligation. The witness persistently remained silent. It soon became clear that the real power and authority of the council of judges was not without limit, and this limit fell short of everyone's prior expectations. While the court represented unrivalled state power, backed by ruthless coercive force, it was commissioned to punish only the three chosen defendants. The court was neither prepared, nor equipped or instructed specifically how to handle unexpectedly stubborn witnesses. Tanaka's testimony had been simply unthinkable.

In desperation, the chief judge declared a five-minute break for consultation with other members of the council of judges. Upon resumption, he declared the trial adjourned, saying that he wanted to give the witness (rather than the council of judges!) extra time to reconsider his stance. The chief judge warned that he would not hesitate to issue an arrest warrant if the witness remained resistant in the next hearing.

The bluff did not work. In the following session Tanaka took out a pocket tape recorder from his bag and recorded the deliberations. The chief judge prohibited this. Tanaka demanded that the rules of such a prohibition be read out aloud. Instead of doing what Tanaka asked, the chief judge pronounced that the witness had violated court etiquette and procedures, and demanded that he surrender the recording machine at once. The witness refused and continued to record the ensuing debates. By now, the chief judge's vulnerability was laid bare. He refrained from further confrontation.

Witness Tanaka refused to answer many of the chief judge's further questions, calling them irrelevant. Actually they were much more relevant than most of the other questions that the other, intimidated, witnesses had had to respond to. For instance, Tanaka declined to answer the question 'what was the theme of the KSSPY discussions at Hidayat's house?' Tanaka argued that this had nothing to do with defendant Darmawan's case. He added that he would be willing to answer the same question when testifying at Hidayat's trial. The trial was at an impasse. There was another break, and again upon resumption the chief judge still could not produce any legal sanction to punish Tanaka. Instead, he conceded to argue defensively the relevance of his question to the defendant's case. By the end of the trial, several questions from the judge remained unanswered.

At one point, the chief judge tried to save face by scapegoating the defendant. He asked the witness if it would be more convenient for him to speak up in the absence of the defendant, and whether he was afraid of the defendant. The chief judge said that he would instruct the defendant to leave the courtroom if the witness so wished. In response, witness Tanaka waved his left hand to the defendant and exclaimed cheerfully: 'Hello, Darmawan!'³⁰ This went beyond the security officers' tolerance. At the conclusion of the trial, Tanaka was arrested, again illegally, and detained for a day. His audio recording was confiscated, with no respect for due legal procedures. But after his appearance there, the court was never the same again.

The last few cases of witnesses and their testimonies highlight the variety of effects of and responses to the New Order's state terrorism. This heralded a new, if minor, change in the status of the master narrative, the authority of the seemingly unchallenged regime whose longevity among the world's capitalists states was second only to that of Cuba's Fidel Castro. As the trials of Darmawan and Hidayat concluded, anti-government student rallies were on the rise in different cities. The Yogyakarta trials were not the only

cause of the new political opposition, but it clearly provided one impetus. The next chapter will explore these fledgling experiments of political resistance in broader contexts, before the book concludes with a chapter that critically examines the concepts of power, identity, and resistance more theoretically.

5 Hyper-obedience as subversion

The end of the Cold War entailed a serious erosion of the foundations of Soeharto's New Order government, involving a painful process of political and economic decay in the 1990s. Prior to the regime's formal demise in May 1998, the US and its allies reduced their previous heavy diplomatic support for the regime. Very slowly, but consistently, the rhetoric of anti-communism as a pretext for the government's wide-ranging policies and actions lost its power, and the official narrative of 1965–6 came under wider scrutiny. In the early 2000s, major bookshops and the print media were flooded with what for the last three decades had been politically taboo; the classic works of the left, and accounts of the crimes of the New Order state and its individual agents. Notwithstanding all that, the formal end of the Cold War, as well as of the demise of the New Order government that was a product of that War, did not signal the beginning of a complete reversal of things. At best, profound uncertainties prevailed in post-New Order Indonesia. At worst, mass killings appeared to be unabated across the country, and were inescapably reminiscent of the New Order.

Although "globalization" swiftly became a new key term, the legacies of anti-communism survived well in post-Cold War Indonesia. They did not do so, however, without significant changes in meanings and behaviour. Of immediate concern to this book is a series of new problems that challenge Indonesians, in political, moral, and intellectual spheres. How will they deal with the unravelling of the three-decades-old trauma, silence, and memories of political violence that began, but did not stop, in 1965–6? An analysis of how Indonesians endured the agony in the intervening 32 years on a day-to-day basis provides a clue to the answer. That is the focus of this chapter.¹

The term "authoritarian" in twentieth-century English is a convenient but deeply problematic word. Its convenience is most visible in the self-congratulatory and triumphalist speeches of Western politicians, who have made it an antonym to the term "democracy", itself highly problematic. Authoritarianism has come to the public imagination as something bad, static, or totalizing, where a ruling agency holds full control of the population largely by coercion and in a systematic manner. Accordingly, it is easy to imagine an end of an "authoritarian" regime as the removal of strong

containment that will automatically entail an outburst of the old repressed energies, revenge, and desires. Many observers, however, have resisted the temptation to simplify in this way.² Likewise, in what follows I attempt an analysis of how authoritarianism, and by extension and anticipation post-authoritarianism, operates in ways that are much more diffuse, insidious, and messy than many familiar labels have been able to capture. Even at the height of the New Order's authoritarianism, its fabric of power was far from being efficient and comprehensive. It was full of contradictions, anomalies, ironies, and convivial misunderstanding. These did not necessarily make New Order authoritarianism less effective. Rather, the contrary is true. Neither should one too quickly attribute those imperfections in New Order power to the results of popular resistance.

One of the arguments presented in this chapter is that, out of powerlessness, many Indonesians survived the extended Cold War authoritarianism (and occasionally subverted it) by engaging in a series of hyper-obedient practices. I have adopted the idea of hyper-obedience from the works of Baudrillard and Mbembe. Rather than merely demonstrating the merit of this idea (which I will also do) I will conclude this chapter with a critical re-examination of the concept. It is important to recognize its limits for any analysis of political violence, and for that matter social and cultural studies in general.

It is to be recalled that one of the main arguments of this book is that violence, and its aftermath, constituted a major force in the formation of subjecthood and specific social relations in Indonesia after 1965. This chapter serves to make the necessary elaboration and qualifications to the argument. While the terror, coercion, and violence of the past constantly foreshadow the present, they never do so without mediation and complications. The bulk of this chapter focuses on the everyday details of such mediations and complications. Both abstract generalization and instrumentalist analyses (humanist, rational, or otherwise) are inadequate to analyse the various political and cultural practices in question. Neither can authoritarianism be seen as a "system" of rule where some powerful social agents do something freely and unilaterally to others (e.g. dominate, repress, exploit, or inflict violence) exclusively in an attempt to maximize their own interests. The victims' complicity is always required, and frequently present.

A series of fragile mutations

As Indonesia slumped deeper into its worst economic crisis, a bomb exploded in the heart of the capital city of Jakarta in January 1998. It was not a major explosion, but the political significance with which the event was supposed to be endowed was great. Top government officials accused the banned and left-leaning *Partai Rakyat Demokrasi* (Democratic People's Party) or PRD of being responsible for the incident, but this was only an intermediary accusation. Sofjan Wanandi, a tycoon of Chinese descent and

until shortly before that time a major ally of the New Order, was the ultimate target of suspicion. He was charged with having backed the PRD financially to commit the crime. The leaders of the PRD, mostly young activists in their late twenties, were already in jail. Sofjan Wanandi was immediately summoned by the Jakarta Police for questioning. His picture appeared on the front pages and covers of major print media for weeks, Wanandi was a helpless victim of character assassination in the final months of the long-reigning New Order government.

This was nothing less than a subtle trick to attack Wanandi, along with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which he co-founded and directed, and the top business network of Chinese-Indonesians he was perceived to represent. Not long before the explosion Wanandi expressed some reluctance to support Soeharto's anointing of Habibie as Vice President, to come into effect in March 1998. More seriously, Wanandi had made a public statement rejecting the emotionally-charged "I Love Rupiah" campaign which had been launched by Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (President Soeharto's eldest daughter) in a futile attempt to rescue the value of the sliding Indonesian rupiah (and her own business empire). Soon after the bombing and the official allegation of Wanandi's complicity, a small and deeply suspect group of protesters demonstrated at the CSIS, demanding that Wanandi be tried and the Centre be closed down.³

In the days that followed, inciting pamphlets and rumours had it that a conspiracy of overseas Chinese people were responsible for the nation's economic disaster as part of a larger attempt to topple the "legitimate" government of Soeharto. A few state officials described unnamed Chinese tycoons as traitors (for details of these statements and their immediate context, see Hefner 2000: 201–7). Incidentally, Singapore's senior minister Lee Kuan Yew also made comments on Indonesia's current situation that could easily be taken by supporters of Habibie in Jakarta to be criticism of Soeharto's endorsement of him, an interference in Indonesia's internal affairs and, worse still, evidence of a large-scale overseas Chinese conspiracy against the nation. Another small demonstration was held in front of Singapore's embassy in Jakarta before a series of acts of anti-Chinese violence erupted across the country in the subsequent weeks.

The above raises a number of issues that we must take up in the ensuing discussion. First, up to its last few months the New Order was still trying to deploy the already defunct anti-communist spectre, along with the colonial legacy of racism, as a convenient political instrument. Because the PRD was earlier declared to be 'neo' communist, Wanandi was likewise stigmatized by implication in ways reminiscent of the days in 1965 and early 1966. However, as should be evident from the previous chapter, many things have changed since then, mainly spurred by the government's success in economic growth, industrial expansion, and global consumerism. The government's actions in the late 1990s made little sense to an increasing

number of younger Indonesians. Such actions signal a failure to deploy anything rhetorically more innovative, credible and forceful.

Second, the small incident demonstrates how protracted use of the past anti-communist bogey can become more and more complicated. Political demonization can no longer be as straightforward as it used to be. It requires a series of intermediaries or mutated references. It was increasingly difficult to argue that a political enemy was bad simply because s/he was a communist survivor in a post-Cold War world. Let me elaborate upon this, before discussing the last point of significance of the January 1998 bombing.

At face value, the accusation that Wanandi backed the PRD is absurd. The two are politically incompatible, but the substance of the accusation was beside the point. It was the intended effect that mattered. Demonizing Wanandi exclusively on the basis of his Chinese ethnicity would not be adequately forceful in 1998, for reasons I have elaborated elsewhere (see Heryanto 1998: 104–10; 1999a: 171–3), and thus it was necessary to establish an alleged association with the already prosecuted PRD. However, for this propaganda to be effective at all, the government had to rely in turn on the public's acceptance of its previous propaganda about the PRD's ferocious crime, namely subscribing to communism. The effectiveness of the stigmatization of the PRD depends, in turn, on the government's ability to maintain its hitherto successful demonizing of communism in general and the bygone Indonesian Communist Party in particular.

In mid-1996 the PRD actually occupied a position comparable to that of Sofjan Wanandi in 1998. The fledgling party was barely two weeks old when chosen as a convenient culprit for the then biggest and most violent protest in Jakarta that the New Order government had encountered since 1974.⁴ A nationwide campaign was launched to back up what appeared to be a flimsy accusation against the PRD and the propaganda about a communist revival. The government's propaganda was widely pilloried, and as a result of this, no reference to communism was made in the trials of the leaders of the PRD in 1997. Neither were these young activists accused of any responsibility for the 1996 riots, which had been the original pretext for their being kidnapped, detained and later tried. Now their alleged crime was establishing an unlawful association, and committing defamation. The accusation of the PRD as communistic was replayed only in 1998 when the party was made responsible for the January bombing and an alleged association with Wanandi.

That the New Order had to rely on multiple layers of equally precarious assumptions in order to make a strong political statement in the late 1990s suggests its ideological bankruptcy, despite its continued strength in political and economic programs before the 1997–8 monetary disaster. Most accounts of the fall of the New Order by overseas observers in the media and scholarly writings alike suggest that the event was something sudden and unexpected.⁵ By contrast, most Indonesians with whom I have discussed this had sensed the collapsing of the regime in a gradual process over a period of several

years after 1988 (as analysed in Chapter 2), and especially after the 1994 banning of three Jakarta-based weeklies (see Heryanto 1996a). Let me now return to discuss one more issue that the January bombing signified.

The further the “originary” communist stigmatization recedes into the past, the less it has the capacity to evoke any clear meanings. As should be clear from previous chapters, by the 1990s “communism” could refer to anything and anyone. Communism turned into a floating empty signifier, purged of any fixed historical referent, just like sexy women, cars, or jeans in advertisements of late capitalism:

Meaning is produced by endless, symbolic exchanges within a dominant code, whose rhetoric is entirely self-referential; a sexy woman is used to sell a car; a car sells cigarettes; cigarettes sell machismo; machismo is used to sell jeans; and so the symbolic magic circle is sealed.

(Porter 1993: 2)

This is not to suggest that there is no limit to the comparison with advertising and mobility of meanings. Unlike advertisements, the New Order anti-communist discourse can be said to have had a more or less permanent and ultimate basis in the series of bloody events in the final months of 1965 (see Chapter 1). However, to say that these killings were the origin of contemporary Indonesia’s political life is to oversimplify matters.

The mass killings of 1965 are not generally acknowledged to be the origin of Indonesia’s New Order. The official history suggests that the killing of generals by “G-30-S/PKI” was the beginning of all that unfolded since 1965, and to which the killings of suspected communists and their alleged sympathizers were a due response. The official narrative during the New Order innocently gives birth to its own narrator, and pretends to merely describe that origin, rather than invent it. We can easily read all of this in reverse. The New Order can be said to have in fact authored an autobiography, in which the “communist coup” and “communist threat” are but part of the story, fictional or otherwise. This is not to suggest a case of fabrication from pure fantasy. With Baudrillard (1983c, 1988) we can view the New Order regime’s act of narration as simulation, where ‘images precede the real to the extent that they invert the causal and logical order of the real and its reproduction’ (cited in Rojek 1993: 115). For a moment we can be less concerned about which reading or writing is closer to truth, but as demonstrated in previous chapters, the salient issue is how such narratives or simulacra can have generated far-reaching consequences in the lives of Indonesians that have little to do with any historical truth being revealed or concealed by any narrators and their varied narratives.

Neither the officially designated coup nor the ensuing murder of the generals provided a stable origin for the grand narrative of communist threat. The regime claims its legitimacy partly by locating its origin in a patriotic counter to the September 30th movement. That short-lived movement made

a similar claim. In its official statement on the radio on the morning of October 1, 1965, it proclaimed itself as a counter-coup against an anticipated coup by a CIA-backed Council of Generals. But, in the end no one really knows: was the anticipated coup real? Was it sincerely, but falsely, imagined? Or was it crudely fabricated in haste, and after the fact, for practical convenience? To what extent do such questions really matter, if at all, for Indonesians, especially those who have borne the brunt of the nation's violent past? Even if widespread and conflicting rumours preceded – and presumably prompted – the killing of the generals, by no means can these rumours occupy the privileged position of being the ultimate origin and cause of subsequent events. A contradiction in terms seems inescapable: no origin can ever be truly original. It can only be manufactured, constructed, invented, or simulated.

Simulacral regime, or reigning simulacra?

The impossibility of fixing a stable or fairly coherent truth of the events surrounding the 1965 killings has brought serious consequences. There was room both for the regime's creativity and the constant pressure upon that regime to revive the communist threat or a simulation to that effect. No other anti-communist regime in the post-Cold War era had been as committed or desperately compelled as the New Order to the militant reproduction of contemporary icons, monuments, fictions, trials, and simulacra. These artefacts testify to the continued threats of immortalized communism, as much as they were to immortalize the New Order regime. They are mutually constitutive. Seen from such a perspective, the victimization of innocent individuals and social groups (as discussed at length in the previous chapters) does not in fact appear to constitute the main goal of some ruthless political repression over resisting and democratically-inclined subjects, as often invoked by the majority of relevant literature. Rather, it was a necessary part of the rites and rituals for immortalizing the regime, and by extension the simulacra themselves.

To gain a sense of the logic of this argument – where simulacra can be out of the control of a seemingly unchallenged authoritarian regime – the following statement from Sutopo Yuwono, former head of Indonesia's State Intelligence Coordinating Body, is instructive:⁶

The funny thing about the world of intelligence is the technique of psywar [psychological warfare]. As intelligence officers, we make up issues, and we disseminate them in the press, radio or television. We treat them as if they are real. When they are already widespread, usually people will talk about them and they tend to add to and exaggerate the issues. Finally the issues will come back [to the intelligence bodies] in reports. What is so funny is that these reports incline us to believe that

these issues are real, hahaha. In fact, we get terrified and begin to think, 'what if these issues are real?' Hahaha.

(*Jakarta-Jakarta*, 361, 5–11/06/1993: 33)

The admission is a crucial reminder of the futility and danger of the familiar but often misleading paradigm of modern social sciences that makes an uncritical assumption about a rationally calculating powerful subject, who masters and manipulates political instruments to maximize interests, values, or dominance at the expense of others. In this familiar discourse there is ample recognition of the complexity of the battleground and antagonism among agents, but the demarcation between the subject and object of power is generally assumed to be clear-cut. So is the line separating the two major contending parties: the ruling and the ruled. We will address this issue further in the next chapter.

One should not ignore such questions and continue to assume that propaganda statements about the “communist threat” do not really matter, because at best they only represent or comment on the “real”, and are therefore a second-order of reality, and at worst empty slogans. It is mistaken to proceed as if what really matters is what action is actually taken, what is politically or materially achieved, rather than said, meant or understood in speeches, headlines, monuments, films, literary works, gossip, dreams and memories – as if the separation between the two is stable and easily drawn.

The New Order government was never satisfied with the near annihilation of its major political enemy in the late 1960s, along with political stability plus economic growth in the decades that followed. It never felt adequately secure and happy with the serial publication in 1994 and 1997 of a ‘white book’, claiming to give a true and comprehensive account of the troubled years of 1965–6 (see Chapter 2). In 1992, commemorating the anniversary of the New Order’s ascendancy and the demise of the PKI, President Soeharto inaugurated a grandiose display of simulation in Jakarta, officially dubbed *Museum Pengkhianatan PKI* (the Museum of the PKI’s Treason), where 37 three-dimensional dioramas encapsulate “the communist cruelty” not only during the “1965 coup”, but also in a series of earlier coup attempts since 1945 (*Kompas*, 02/10/1992: 12; *Jawa Pos*, 02/10/1992: 16; *Bernas*, 02/10/1992: 12).⁷ In the city of Madiun, East Java, a similar monument was inaugurated (*Kompas*, 05/10/1992: 13).

An early section of Chapter 1 has documented the state propaganda in the form of the four and a half-hour kinetic narrative, *The Treason of the G30S/PKI*, whose early screening required school students to attend during regular school hours, and which in subsequent years was annually screened on the state-owned television network. In 1996 the replay of the film was given greater significance, in accord with the government’s fresh pronouncement of a communist revival by the PRD a month earlier. While these allegations did not convince the public, the Ministry of Education (presumably

under pressure from the military) instructed all primary and secondary schools to set up special sessions every Monday morning for the month of September, where the school principal read out a standard account on communist cruelty as shown in the film. For “school projects” pupils were assigned to collect newspaper clippings or interviews that reiterated condemnation of the communists (*Forum Keadilan*, 07/10/1996: 28–9). All of this served as a prelude to the broadcasting of the film *The Treason of G30S/PKI* at the end of the month, with the national flag at half mast across the archipelago.

To problematize the “real” is not to reject it outright and declare it absolutely irrelevant. To do so would be equivalent to retaining absolutism, only in reverse. While acknowledging a problematic world of the real and social, and some communicative service of language as a representation of that “reality”, I wish to concentrate the rest of this chapter on selected day-to-day experience – “popular culture” in the broad sense of the word – of ordinary Indonesians that illuminates the problems with the easily drawn dichotomies of real/fabrication, ruling/ruled, perpetrator/victims, and subversion/obedience. As in Chapter 3, I will pay attention to some minute details of local and banal incidents, not pompous pronouncements like monuments, white books, or a mega-dollar propaganda movie. In contrast to the high-flying propaganda campaign of the official state ideology *Pancasila* that attracted primarily foreign observers to comment and criticize (just as was the case with “Asian values”), the communist threat discourse penetrated profoundly into the everyday activities of ordinary Indonesians. This, arguably, laid the foundation of the New Order authoritarianism.

New Order Indonesia’s style of repression has long horrified the children of Western liberalism, with many of the Indonesian intelligentsia included. This repression also has the capacity to deceive them into thinking with remorse about its unashamed and vulgar brutality. The series of examples below show that the communist threat was not – or was not primarily – a poor fabrication to deceive anyone, used by the state to intimidate the population for some politically expedient purpose. In the following examples, statements, narratives and practices that revive “communist threats” claim a life of their own, quite independent of anyone’s material interests. In this sense, communist threats appear to become ‘more than real’, or ‘hyperreal’ in Baudrillard’s sense (1983c, 1988), although some critical qualification will be necessary later on.

The entertainment industry with its global networks and points of reference permeated deep into Indonesian popular cultures after the end of the Cold War. But unlike in most other places, in Indonesia this phenomenon took place with the legacies of the communist ghosts in commodified forms. In October 1993 in the small Central Javanese town of Purbalingga the State Attorney’s Office confiscated copies of a newly released rock music album *Magis* (‘Magic’) by Atiek C.B., a well-known young ‘lady rocker’, as the Indonesian media described her. The impetus for legal action was the

image on the cover of the album, a collage of colourful people in fashionable styles and postures with metal accessories. In the forefront is a medium-shot picture of the 'lady rocker', wearing sunglasses and a necklace with a cross. Behind her is a long-shot and barely noticeable tiny figure of a man, also wearing sunglasses and a necklace, but his ornament is in the image of a hammer and sickle.

A deep gasp swept across the country, and a furore ensued immediately and lasted for weeks, partly as a result of overexposure in the newly expanding media industry. In retrospect one cannot help being amused, but also appalled by the whole affair. No one even then could be naive enough to ask the question of what intention lay behind the design, the production, the image, and the legal action, as if some secret truth was hidden. To prove that there was no subversive intent, or that the picture of the necklace was only an empty sign, is to miss the whole point. The greatest challenge in the series of events, practices, statements and counter-statements as well as silences was on the very surface of things. Real communists and communism – whatever these may mean – are quite irrelevant here. What is relevant is the effects of their images at specific historical moments.

In the days that followed the discovery of the music album, police officers and officials of the State Attorney's Office roamed the streets of many cities to hunt down the suspected "communist" audio cassettes. They had to summon and interrogate those responsible for the production and circulation of the album. The latter had to formulate credible-sounding answers not only to the interrogating teams, but also to the aggressive media, not to speak of sympathetic friends and neighbours. Important figures commented in columns and interviews. The daily *Kompas* (19/10/1993: 6) reported the Head of a local Attorney's Office in Purbalingga asking why the circulation of the album should come so close to the month of September, 'when the nation was just reminded of the abortive coup attempt of the Indonesian Communist Party' back in 1965. The Anti-Subversion Law (see Chapters 3 and 4), which carries a maximum penalty of death foreshadowed public discussion on *Magis*.

One immediate effect of the incident was the illegal and voluntary suppression of a hit '*Kau Dimana?*' ('Where Are You?'), from the *Magis* album. Music shops and radio stations put the album away and pretended that it had never existed (*Jawa Pos*, 24/10/1993: 6). There was no legal ban, but it would be imprecise to call it a boycott. The amount of material damage to the producer and singer is unknown and no one seemed to bother to investigate it. By the end of the month, the central government decided at its discretion that the case was simply a matter of technical carelessness. It was declared cleared and over (*Kompas*, 23/10/1993: 11). Significantly, no one, not even human rights activists or members of the many zealous legal aid institutes, hinted at the question of possible rehabilitation or compensation to which the producer and artist might be entitled. A legal examination

would have raised difficult questions that many would prefer not to hear or understand.⁸

Despite, or precisely because of, the apparently vigorous measures against simulacral threats, the New Order's enemy has kept coming back. More interestingly, it does so with no pretence of being vengeful and without any recourse to underground conspiracy.⁹ A few months preceding the case of the album *Magis*, another hammer and sickle upset authorities in Semarang, the capital city of Central Java. In February that year the media reported the discovery of the stigmatized image on a T-shirt in a large supermarket. In his speculative comment, the state co-ordinating minister for political and security affairs, Retired Admiral Sudomo, connected the T-shirt design to the release of 30,000 political prisoners who had left the penal island of Buru more than ten years before (*Bernas*, 16/02/1993: 8).

A few hundred kilometres away, in March 1993, the District Military Commander of Blora announced the discovery and mass confiscation of key-rings showing an image of a hammer and sickle. They had an image of a sickle on one side and an axe on the other. But, according to the official story, 'if you connect them, they look like the symbol of the illegal party, namely the PKI' (*Bernas*, 02/03/1993: 8). Although this is only a case of 'if' and 'look like', the district military commander had no reservations in drawing an unequivocal conclusion:

This is not just decoration. There is a certain element of purposefulness. Most importantly, [it serves] to indicate that group [the communists] still exists up to now. Those ignorant of politics will not know it, but for us it is clear that this decoration means something.

(*Bernas*, 02/03/1993: 8)

Back in November 1992 a middle-ranking official lost his job at a regional office of the Ministry of Culture and Education. The impetus was the discovery of what the title of a lengthy journalistic report described as 'a book for pre-school children with a picture of a hammer and sickle' (*Bernas*, 01/12/1992: 1, 11). Not until the end of the same article did readers learn that the so-called "hammer" and "sickle", though they appear on the same page, are widely separated. The hammer icon appeared together with a pencil and a ruler in a multiple-choice question for the young learners: 'which one of these is heavy?' at the top of the page. At the bottom of the same page, there is another question, asking which is the most solid of the three iconized items: a sickle, bread, and water.

Barely a month following the *Magis* controversy the Office of the High Attorney in Semarang was struck by another discovery, namely 87 titles of books that 'contain communist thoughts' (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 01/12/1993: 6). These books arrived at the port of Semarang with 40,000 other academic books as a donation from an American university to Universitas Diponegoro, the largest state university in Semarang, in support of a newly

established postgraduate program. A year earlier I had received a notification from the Semarang Customs Office informing me that the so-called “Anti-Smuggling Section” of the Department of Immigration had confiscated a book that had arrived in an incoming parcel. The book was held because of its title: *Ateis* [*The Atheist*]. The customs official believed the book propagated atheism and that therefore, like “communism”, it was utterly illegal. Ironically, the book was a moralizing novel, written in the voice of a pious Muslim narrator, about the fate of an unhappy young man as a result of his life being misled by “atheist” communists. Like the novel *Merahnya Merah*, which the Yogyakarta Court declared “communist” (see Chapter 4), this book was published by none other than the government, the employer of the official who confiscated my copy. The book was highly visible in all major bookstores across the country. Being required reading for many secondary and tertiary institutions, it had been reprinted 13 times.

In early 1994 security officers in Riau island announced their discovery of a hammer and sickle image in a children’s video game. The game came in a series entitled *Street Fighter*, featuring martial arts champions from many countries (Spain, India, the USA, Japan, China, and the USSR), each of whom had a national emblem tagged on their outfit. The problematic logo presented itself ‘so vividly’, a journalistic report emphasized with due horror, when a certain Soviet figure named Zangief appeared on the screen. Within months, a similar icon was found in Java in sets of pictorial playing cards depicting scenes from *Street Fighter* (*Bernas*, 08/12/1994: 8; *Jawa Pos*, 07/02/1994: 6). Almost two years later, security officers in Java encountered a similar incident in a *Nintendo* video game cassette (*Surya*, 09/11/1995: 5). As the government launched the nationwide campaign against the PRD in 1996, someone found the initials ‘PRD’ in the camouflage pattern of the army-style uniform of the ruling party Golkar. The case subsided only after the highest authority in the nation’s intelligence and military bodies declared that the abstract patterns in question in fact did not read PRD but were actually ‘PRT’ for ‘Printex’, the garment’s manufacturer (*Jawa Pos* 1996).

It would be tempting to dismiss all of the above as simply a case of misunderstanding on the part of uninformed or overzealous state officials. More than one thousand kilometres away from Riau island, where the *Street Fighter* video game had first been discovered several months earlier, the military leadership in Java warned the public of the monstrous image that had appeared in recently circulated toys and children’s collector cards, apparently a derivative of the *Street Fighter* video game series. These, according to the Commander of the Regional Military Command, ‘endanger children’s psyches’ (*Bernas* 1994; *Jawa Pos* 1994). The case did not come to media attention from the imagining of a paranoid intelligence officer, however. Rather, the dangerous image first captured the mind of Pupung Galih Bagasworo, a ten-year-old pupil in the small town of Ambarawa who came into possession of one of the offending cards. Recalling the advice

of his teacher, he submitted the card to his grandfather, Sunaryo (aged 60), formerly a member of the DPRD (the local legislative body), who in turn handed it to the Commander of the KORAMIL (village-level military command), First Lieutenant Inf. Djumadi (*Bernas* 1994). Having wreaked havoc, the stigmatized icon spread independently of anyone's control. There is no need for zealous state officials to reproduce or fabricate it. The victimized subjects cannot help participating in its own stigmatization.

The joy of misreading

It is not easy to say whether, or in what sense and to what extent, the threat of communism was or is "real", partly because of the multifarious and competing senses of what is "real". In any case, the illustrations provided in the foregoing make a case for what has been understood by many in cultural studies as being "hyperreal". In the previous sections we have seen the omnipresence of the hammer and sickle in the everyday life of local communities in Indonesia. They are not uniform in nature, origin, or significance. Some may be an over-reading of innocent commodified signs in public by paranoid security officers. Others may have been deliberately produced by ordinary citizens, if only for reasons of lifestyle, avant-gardism, or innocent humour. In what follows we see that although the New Order's anti-communist propaganda had been far-reaching and damaging to many, it was never totally intimidating.

As Indonesians prepared to celebrate the golden anniversary of their national independence in 1995, 24-year-old Siran, a street vendor of meatballs, was detained and went through a long series of extensive interrogations by security forces in West Java. As tradition required, Siran had decorated his residence and its surroundings for the anniversary like millions of his fellow countrymen. However, he did more than the usual, writing '*PKI Madiun Bangkit*' (The Indonesian Communist Party of Madiun Rises) on the wall of his house. Siran came from Madiun, and like his fellow nationals he had often heard the expression 'PKI Madiun' from state propaganda materials. However, during interrogation with security officers Siran maintained that he did not know what PKI really meant. He consistently claimed that he had written the slogan 'just for fun'. A Regional Military Command officer found such reasoning 'irrational' (*Forum Keadilan*, 11/09/1995: 29–30) – as if detaining Siran, or the vigilante witch-hunt for the last 30 years, were any more rational. Not only was Siran detained briefly, and required to make weekly reports after his release, but his wife and eight other meatball vendors were also arrested and interrogated because of their association with Siran. None were allowed to leave the city without special permission from the regional authorities (*Kompas*, 24/08/1995: 15; *Forum Keadilan*, 11/09/1995: 29–30).

Not all Indonesians who have done similar things have been penalized. In the early 1980s in a rural area of Central Java a group of small children

innocently chose the hammer and sickle as an emblem for their soccer team. Apparently they chose the image up from a poster for the film *The Treason of the G30S/PKI* (which they could not afford to see). Globalized capitalism in the post-Cold War era has changed the entertainment industry, introducing to many Indonesians the powerful notion that scarcity goes together with market value. Many things promoted in advertisements must be read as an attempt to sell something “cool”, as what appeared to these village boys as the strange-looking logo of hammer and sickle must have been.

Contemporary markets have increased the commercial value of the taboos in many societies, including those that were formerly proscribed revolutionary signifiers, and have turned them into a quintessential motif for mass consumerism. In late November 1995 in the town of Sidoarjo, security officers found a suspicious T-shirt on sale. On the back of the item was a picture of a heavily-built man with long hair, holding a hammer and sickle in his hand. The caption below the picture reads ‘Mr. Mbelink’, sub-culture slang for “impish” (*Surya*, 09/11/1995: 5).

The problematic icon seemed to flourish in association with consumer goods for children. In one incident, the all-powerful regional military command in East Java dealt with the wrapping paper of sweets that reportedly had the stigmatized symbol (*Jawa Pos*, 27/10/1995: 8). The following is the most memorable of these many occurrences. In mid-March 1995, another popular children’s toy became the target of a witch-hunt sponsored by the local military and government leadership. What disturbed the local authorities was the fact that this toy was a balloon in the shape of a hammer. Worse still, according to the officials, when children played with it and hammered something, the toy made a noise that sounded like ‘*arit*’, the Javanese word for sickle (*Suara Merdeka*, 18/03/1995: 1). In October 1995, the icon was found again in the logo on a brand of shorts for sale in markets (*Gatra*, 11/11/1995: 35).

Time changes not only the value and significance of the hammer and sickle logo, but also the familiar master narrative of *The Treason of the G30S/PKI*. In 1992 my 10-year-old son came home from school one afternoon, telling me enthusiastically about what fun it had been to play ‘the PKI game’ with his schoolmates. ‘What did you say?’ I could hardly believe what I heard. At school, he explained, the children had enacted the narrative they had heard in History class, reiterated from the televised film *The Treason of the G30S/PKI*. ‘Everyone wanted to play the role of the PKI, chasing after the ones who played the lousy generals, and they had to run as far as the school toilet to hide. We won, and we scolded, and kicked them. It was great fun’.

At face value, one would be tempted to believe that these children must have seen or heard of the film *The Treason of the G30S/PKI* in the same way that Hollywood had trained them to see *Rambo* or *Rocky*, or the much-loved Kung Fu movies from Hong Kong from that period. It is cool to be macho, violent, and victorious. But there is a fundamental difference

between the New Order's master narrative and these foreign films of the time. In most of the latter, the heroes are violent males, representing the twentieth-century empire of world capitalism. Unlike the post-1965 Indonesian master narrative, the post-Vietnam *Rambo* and *Rocky* series expose more honestly the narcissistic desire of Reagan's USA to perpetrate violence on the enemy. If the mission turned out to be too difficult in the tropical mountains of Vietnam, it can be achieved more easily in the simulacral empire of a Hollywood studio and the collective fantasy of moviegoers.¹⁰ The New Order authorship tried to be a little cleverer than the Hollywood and Hong Kong film-makers, by superimposing the violence that it perpetrated on its victim in its narrative, so as to set history on its head and reverse the position of victimhood.¹¹ Such a narrative strategy goes against not only the dominant readings of mass-produced stories from Hollywood and Hong Kong, but also the longer tradition of watching and listening to epic stories (such as *Mahabharata* and particularly the great war scenes of *Bharata Yudha*). In this light, the children's misreading of the New Order propaganda is unsurprising.

The Indonesian children with their soccer team emblem and video game in the above examples may be compared with the adults who were involved with the production and consumption of the *Magis* album, or T-shirts and key-rings with images of the hammer and sickle. These can be seen as an everyday form of vernacular conviviality. They are neither "resistance" after the manner of James Scott's *Weapons of the Weak* (1985) nor Mikhail Bakhtin's topsy-turvy carnival. Baudrillard's understanding of the subversion of the "apolitical" masses is more relevant:

traditional resistance consists of reinterpreting messages according to the group's own code and for its own ends. The masses, on the contrary, accept everything and redirect everything *en bloc* into the spectacular, without requiring any other code, without requiring any meaning, ultimately without resistance [. . .]

(Baudrillard 1983b: 43)

Achille Mbembe speaks of the postcolony as the 'simulacral regime par excellence' (1992a: 11), suggesting a set of power relations that are far from acquiring rational regimentation or panoptic surveillance. Rather, they 'free up the potential for play, improvisation, and amusement, within the very limits set by officialdom'. Many stories can be written about convivial practices of misreading and surviving under authoritarian postcolonial regimes. Several literary and theatrical critics have prominently deconstructed the master narrative of simulacral threats, and they certainly deserve a separate discussion.¹² Of course, this is not to overlook or underestimate self-consciously calculated resistance among literary writers and political activists alike – to which the next section turns.

Festival of democracy

Hyper-obedience proved effective at election time under the New Order.¹³ During that period, elections were never about contesting and winning the majority of votes. Officially dubbed ‘festivals of democracy’, all elections had entirely predictable results. So well-planned, elaborate, convivial, and non-competitive were these events that anthropologist John Pemberton (1986) compared them with the traditional Javanese wedding ceremony. On the surface elections during this period involved a collective “make-believe” that they were about the sovereign people giving a mandate to the existing regime through competition with rival parties, or at least a legitimate government complying with the universally accepted political correctness.¹⁴

There was always nationwide mass mobilization during the so-called campaign weeks. The elaborate series of festivities during these weeks that the government sponsored to gloss over the whole event was not lost on the general masses, who took it for what it was. There were street parades, parties, outdoor concerts, and occasionally free lunches and the distribution of free T-shirts. When the government encouraged the masses to participate in formal politics, obviously it meant this kind of mass mobilization, which did not go beyond street festivities and mass entertainment once every five years. The masses took the invitation and pushed it to its limits.

At the risk of romanticizing “the masses”, the ensuing analysis of the elections in 1992 will reveal the contrast between the politics of democratically-inclined middle class activists and the disempowered masses, in ways that run counter to widely held assumptions. I will show how the severely disadvantaged masses behaved in ways that can be seen to be a lot more subversive than has generally been acknowledged, and which are perhaps more so than the actions of the self-appointed heroes of democracy among the middle class activists. In order to understand this, we must recall a point already raised in the earlier chapters, which will be further theorized in the next one, that power relations always implies some sort of reciprocity and communicative engagement. It takes two to make war.

Given the gross lack of credibility of all elections under the New Order, it seems natural that a significant number of the more liberal and independent-minded segments of the urban middle class would refuse to justify the existing electoral rules and regulations, or to legitimize their pre-determined results. Some intellectuals made public statements that exposed the inherent flaws of the elections, condemned irregularities in the regulations, and ridiculed the results. What has generally been regarded as the most radical opposition to these elections is the largely unorganized network of Golput (*Golongan Putih* or White Group). It found enthusiasts mainly among students in the more prestigious colleges, and young professionals in big cities. Distinguishing itself from anyone boycotting the elections, this group actually participates in the elections, by casting invalid votes in the official ballot (for instance casting more votes than officially allowed, or returning

torn ballot papers), and persuading other eligible voters to do the same. Instead of retreating from the nationwide political ritual, members of Golput were active in invalidating the state-sponsored self-legitimation rituals. The New Order government was often irritated, though not seriously intimidated by Golput. At different times and in various regions, there were officials who took a more aggressive attitude of intimidation and pursued repressive measures against Golput followers, including arrests and prosecution in 1992 (see Heryanto 1996c).

In contrast to Golput there are the officially dubbed 'floating masses'. From the early 1980s the New Order government barred any oppositional political parties from having any activity in villages, where the majority of the population lived (while sponsoring the ruling party Golkar to move freely there), on the pretext that rural people should be left alone in their political innocence and presumably their social tranquillity. Rivaling parties might pit them against each other – as exemplified, so the official rationale goes, by what happened in 1965–6. This policy was criticized by urban intellectuals who took the subalternist stance and spoke in sympathy for the rural masses, but without adequately recognizing the latter's power. Like the government that it was opposing, Golput failed to take the power of the masses seriously. When attacking the elections or individual candidates, Golput radicals often argued that politicians made empty promises to deceive the masses who were assumed to aspire to social change, justice, and democracy.

Looked at differently, the supporters of Golput actually appear more naively complicit with the corrupt system than they would recognize or readily admit. In fact they are more so than the disadvantaged masses that they presumed to be extremely depoliticized (as will be demonstrated below). Golput and the floating masses had something in common. Unlike those who chose to boycott, they took an active role in the elections. The main difference between them is the degree of seriousness with which each took the elections. By making all the criticisms it did against the government, Golput not only endorsed the government-sponsored event as something of consequence, but it often did so more seriously than even the government intended. Golput acquired its credentials and popularity in almost perfect correlation with the government's attempts to denounce it. While appearing to be exact opposites, they in fact enhanced each other's political standing in public discourse.

Golput's inadvertent complicity in the broader framework of the New Order political system can be gauged further beyond its serious attitudes towards the elections. In its discourse, appearance, style, imagination, and behaviour, Golput is characteristically New Order. Its popular nickname is "the alter-ego of Golkar", the ruling party. Like all the officially-sanctioned "party contestants" in the elections, Golput introduced a logo in compliance with the standard regulation: a pentagon. Golput appealed to the public to accept its vision and to follow its directions in the election booth in ways

highly comparable to the activities of the other “party contestants”. Like its counterparts, Golput only appeared momentarily in public debates – once every five years, at the scheduled election time.

All of these features raise the question of “resistance” or “opposition” and “collaboration” at the same time: was Golput in fact an opponent to the New Order? Was it a collaborator? Was it both? Does opposition always already imply, or necessarily entail, some element of mimicry or collaboration?¹⁵ What can an opponent do, and do better within such context? Is a “true” opposition possible at all, here or elsewhere? The next chapter will take up some of these questions in the light of the existing theoretical debate. The ensuing paragraphs will look more closely at the reverse side of the coin: how the seeming hyper-obedience of the masses can be subversive in effect, if not in intent.

During the 1992 elections, as before, the masses seemed not to care about the campaign “promises” that party officials made, and which political activists denounced. In no sense did the masses seem to be fooled. It was not a case of liars, lies, and the cheated party. The masses never demanded that party campaign spokespeople should mean what they said, or say what they meant. More interestingly, the officials, too, appeared to have understood this and did not expect the masses to take them seriously. Only naive urban intellectuals and activists could be misled into believing otherwise. Instead of taking the election campaign seriously, the masses took the event as nothing but free and temporary public entertainment. Instead of challenging the legal or moral legitimacy of the elections, the masses responded by giving excessive compliance. While such an act of compliance cannot be seen as “resistance”, it was nonetheless subversive in effect. Because cultural politics has been sorely understudied or misunderstood in Indonesian social sciences, this subversion by hyper-obedience has largely gone unnoticed.

During the elections, hyper-obedience by the masses means due participation in the state-sponsored elections, but also a pushing of the level of this compliance to the furthest limit. When given “false promises” they devoured them, as they were, without being mystified; and they responded in like manner. When presented with hypocrisy, contradictions, and fiction, they responded with the same – but on a greater scale or with greater intensity. When the state acted irrationally, or violently, or insincerely, the masses responded like mirrors – but with amplification. Once every five years these politically alienated and economically exploited masses became the supreme anonymous subjects that dominated the public space for several nights and days. They celebrated this triumph with the same discursive repertoire they had learned from the state machinery, such as very elaborate colours, loud sounds, mass rallies, displays of masculine strength, and aggressive violence that on most other occasions were the monopoly of the state.¹⁶

Mass rallies were a regular highlight of these celebratory festivities. Convoys of motorcycle riders in elaborate costumes and accessories roaming

the cities and violating traffic rules were the standard trope for articulating their presence. These motorcycles had no mufflers, making roaring sounds of a characteristically masculine, down-to-earth, populist, and vulgar nature. The tradition may have predated the New Order government, but this was the government that enthusiastically pushed its development and elaboration to the extreme, creating its own nemesis.¹⁷

Unsurprisingly, state security officers were much more perceptive than university academics in sensing the potential force of the mass response to the state's politics of spectacle. In 1992 the Yogyakarta local police banned the muffler-free motorcycle convoys. The anonymous and unorganized mass was devastated. Most withdrew totally from the theatre of the elections, thus threatening to invalidate the spectacle – which was both their style and substance. Being masters of simulacra, some of these unorganized segments of the masses went around the city in *becaks* (tricycles for local transportation), blaring the pre-recorded sound of muffler-free motorcycles from cassette players (Susanto, 1993: 37). Technically speaking they broke no laws, although abiding by the laws was never their major concern. More significantly, here the masses proved to outdo the state in the craft of “make believe”, political bluff, public pretence, and convivial insult.

The sound of muffler-free motorcycles, or audio recordings of this, declared the presence of the sovereign but alienated masses. As with the much demonized hammer and sickle images, emblems and logos on headbands, T-shirts, or buildings determined who and what must be attacked, and how seriously, during the elections, as well as beyond. During this period, supporters of the three officially sanctioned political parties often attacked each other's party's banner or posters, or harmed each other's bodies in defence of those signs that were supposed to represent their parties. Because each party expressed its identity in a particular colour, hostility and violence broke out in a war of colours, occasionally with no other overt reference to the parties that these colours were supposed to represent.

The most important colours were yellow for the ruling Golkar party, green for the Islamic-oriented Unity Development Party, red for the nationalist-dominated Indonesian Democratic Party; and white for the illegitimate Golput. In the 1999 elections a youth was seriously assaulted in the centre of the city of Yogyakarta for watching a rally while wearing a shirt of the wrong colour. But to suggest a naive fanaticism or blind loyalty on the part of the “mobilized” masses is highly problematic to say the least. While it is true that many of these people took part in the periodic violence around the campaign period, and often over issues of attacking or defending signs bearing one of the four political colours, most of them changed the colours of their banners and clothes at will. They attended rallies of more than one party, with or without the intention to maximize material and non-material benefits from the occasion. The dichotomy of “politicised” versus “depoliticised” is just too simple and unhelpful for a discussion of the nature of these anonymous masses.

The politics of appearance was highly significant, perhaps even more prominent than individual parties or their ideologies.¹⁸ One instructive case that has no reference to communism, but which attests to the salience of the politics of appearance during the election period, is that of so-called “yellowization”. The Indonesian parliamentary elections in 1997 proved to be the most violent in the history of the Republic. More seriously than previous ones, the 1997 elections carried an especially explosive tension, because never before had the ruling party felt so insecure in the face of its waning economic, political and moral legitimacy.

Although it was crystal clear that the ruling party would win the majority of votes, the Governor of Central Java went as far as to demand that all buildings, including private commercial property and residential houses, be painted yellow, the colour of the ruling party Golkar. On one occasion in early 1996, the Governor of Central Java reportedly instructed the removal of a red carpet that his staff had unrolled at the local railway station to welcome a visit from the Vice-President. The Governor demanded that a yellow carpet be laid down instead. Because his staff could not find the desired carpet in time, no carpet eventually covered the floor at the railway station.¹⁹

The city of Solo was the “yellowiest” place, with trees and public property painted yellow. The population creatively poked fun with all sorts of anecdotes.²⁰ Most memorable is the stubborn opposition of the local branch of the Islamic United Development Party in Solo. They repainted public property white, only to find the following day or week that “yellowization” was back. After several instances of painting over and counter repainting, and scuffles, the head of the local party branch was brought to court.

It was the festivity of Bakhtian-style topsy-turvy and intimacy with disorder and violence that seemed to constitute the main attraction for the crowds. Thus the paradox; although the New Order government was in full control of the results of the elections prior to the election day, the masses were interested in the election campaign for different reasons altogether, without consciously “resisting” or “opposing” the ruling government. The whole event turned into an intimate juxtaposition of political farce, merry-making, an outburst of signifiers, and deadly violence. None of these had any bearing upon the pre-determined results of the elections. Earlier in this chapter I cited John Pemberton (1986), who identifies similarities between selected features of New Order elections and traditional Javanese wedding ceremonies. However, the merits of such a comparison are limited. Traditional Javanese weddings are too well controlled; they are neatly structured with a clear centre, and monological. The New Order elections were definitely much more dynamic, multi-centric and polyphonic, and they almost always had uncontrollable elements that had nothing to do with votes, but everything to do with the politics of popular cultures where appearances on the surface enjoyed a privileged position. Signs became tyrannical, to both the ruling and the ruled.

More and less than show trials

The campaign period for the general parliamentary elections was one of several public spaces where the politics of appearance and the forces of hyper-obedience were most visible. Another important venue for this was the court room. The New Order regularly staged what observers dubbed 'show trials' to suppress opposition forces. Desperation led many powerless subjects to play the same game and to push it to its logical extreme. This strategy was not restricted to the anonymous masses, but also caught the imagination of a few urban middle class activists and the elites alike. Following a variety of measures of state repression, the violently ousted leadership of the PDI (see note 4, this chapter), some abused non-governmental organization activists and journalists bombarded the government with hundreds of lawsuits – without the slightest illusion of being able to achieve a legal victory as a result of an independent judicial investigation (see Heryanto 1996a; 1996d; 1997b). Rather than stripping away the pretence of legality, these lawsuits were meant to exasperate the government, and forced officials to maintain the spectacle of pretence to its extreme limits. What follows is a detailed examination of some of these litigation spectacles.

In 1994 29-year-old Nuku Soleiman, a student activist and the chair of an NGO called Pijar, was sentenced to 5 years in prison. The Jakarta State Court declared him guilty of making stickers, featuring a *plesetan* that "defamed" the President.²¹ As in other political trials, the official indictment seems no more than a simple pretext for prosecuting the defendant. It is tempting to suspect that behind the pretext there might be some other and more real, testable, and rational motives. Even if this line of thinking has any validity, it is questionable why the authorities felt the need to conceal the real charges when there was already enough room to prosecute Nuku using standard procedures. There is no ready rational answer to such questions. As with the reckless mass violence in 1965–6, legal prosecution, state-intimidation, and witch-hunting by the state, political prosecution does not simply follow the logic of efficient instrumentalism.

Trials of student activists had always attracted activists from various cities. They attended the proceedings and took advantage of the occasions as legitimate venues for both reunion and meetings without applying for the required (but rarely granted) permits. The occasion would usually become a forum for making political statements in public of a kind what would be utterly taboo elsewhere. Although the Indonesian courts suffered from public derision for their tarnished credibility, some defendants in political trials and their supporters took the court more seriously than others. The former engaged in legal battles with the prosecutors and judges, all of whom, as noted in Chapter 4, were officially the President's appointees and employees. Critical analysis and strong condemnation of the prosecution, the overall social order and the incumbent rulers found expression in the defence pleas which their authors often hoped would be published and

make history in the future. Although this was not permitted by the legal code, those attending the court sessions applauded during the reading of these documents. Copies were circulated. But in the end, these counter attacks neither rescued the defendants from imprisonment nor harmed their intended targets. By trying to prove that the formal indictments were invalid, ludicrous, or empty, the defendants and their defence lawyers fell prey to the dominant idea of reality and legality in ways similar to the practices of Golput.

In contrast to the usual practice, Nuku and his supporting group entered the courtroom with an air of entering a theatrical stage. They had no illusion that Nuku would be acquitted, nor did they despair of his anticipated conviction. They had no desire to write heroic defence pleas. What they did throughout the proceedings was to strip all the signs of legality, rationality and seriousness off the situation. They took the trial as a “fiesta of simulacra”, and they tried to respond accordingly. They performed hyper-obedience.²²

On the day when the judge was due to pronounce her verdict, just before the final proceedings were to commence, a number of youths arrived in formal outfits and with folders in their hands. They all wanted to meet Mrs. Nurhayati to apply for a job as a driver as attractively advertised in *Pos Kota*, a large daily that specifically targets the capital city’s underclass. Mrs. Nurhayati was the chief judge. The advertisement invited applicants to come to see her at the time and place where Nuku was due to hear the verdict. It was soon clear that the advertisement was a hoax. One of Nuku’s sympathizers must have posted it. But the youths desperately looking for employment did not believe it when they were told that they had been deceived by a fake advertisement. An intense argument followed, delaying the court proceedings, destroying the seriousness of the legal event, and offering the audience some highly original entertainment. When the disappointed youths finally calmed down, they did not go away. Student activists persuaded them to join and enlarge the audience, further enhancing the theatricality of the whole event.

Not long afterwards the sound of a siren attracted people’s attention. An ambulance drew up and medical assistants approached the building in response to a request reportedly made by Mr. Sihol on behalf of Mrs. Nurhayati who was reportedly seriously ill (Mr. Sihol was a member of the council of judges). These interruptions continued for a while with the arrival of a bunch of carnations from a local florist, a Pizza Hut delivery service (demanding a large payment from Mrs. Nurhayati), a taxi pick-up, and several others (*Tempo*, 05/03/1994: 55).

A month later, 21 student activists from various cities were tried in Jakarta following a demonstration that also allegedly defamed the President. This time supporting groups of activists attended the court proceedings costumed as mummies. They wrapped their bodies and faces in bandages, leaving only the eyes visible. Their presence in the courtroom destroyed the whole aura of solemn legality. Like beauty contestants, each of these seemingly

badly injured creatures wore a sash, displaying key names associated with notorious political scandals and state violence in recent times: Kedong Ombo, Aceh, Nipah, Cimacan, Lampung, East Timor, Tanjung Priok, and Marsinah. When the judge put questions to the defendants, different individuals in the audience made derisive replies before the defendants could say anything. Outside the building, another group of student activists performed what they called (in English) “happening art”, parodying the way the judiciary corrupts justice. All of these actions provided journalists with juicy spectacles to write about and take pictures of during an otherwise boring and predictable case.²³

Post-new order, beyond simulacra

In Chapter 1 I briefly mentioned the “mysterious killings” of 1983–4, where tattoos brought death to thousands without trial. Chapters 1 and 2 detailed how images of the hammer and sickle, or something that appeared similar to them, provoked one of the largest massacres in modern history. The last three chapters examined a refractory extension of this tyranny of signs that deprived a million others of civil rights and liberty, while giving birth to all kinds of hyper-obedient yet subversive responses. Further investigation of militant identity politics in this country can be pursued in different directions with reference to specific signifiers such as “militant Islam”, “indigenous”, or “*reformasi*”. Army uniforms used to signify unquestionable power that enjoyed impunity from laws or exemptions from fees in public affairs. From 1967 to 1998 Chinese writings were declared illegal, and considered inherently communist. In 1999 many Indonesians were furious upon hearing that their national flags were being torn or burnt in the aftermath of East Timor’s vote for independence. All of the above can be found in many, perhaps all, other societies. I suspect they run especially high in societies where signs are strongly believed to be inseparable from what they represent.²⁴

This chapter has examined in detail the various discursive practices of terror, silence, memory, vigilant surveillance, misunderstanding, and conviviality in the 1990s that were derived from both the trauma and simulacra of the violence in 1965. The various case studies presented above allow us to speak of another kind of regime; a simulacral regime. This regime has been responsible for the prevailing view of an unproblematic connection between the image of a hammer and sickle, the bygone Indonesian Communist Party, and the contemporary reincarnation of communists. The same regime generates all kinds of other simulacra differing in content and in signifiers. This discursive regime predates the 1965 violence and the birth of the republic itself. By no means is it essentially local or exclusively unique to Indonesia or the New Order regime. It survives well after the fall of the New Order in 1998, although it has not gone unchallenged.

Having relied on Baudrillard’s powerful concept of “simulacra”, one must go further and ask: is “simulacra” really a magic coinage that captures that

which escapes the grid of mainstream social and political sciences? The answer is no. Does the idea of simulacra necessarily provide us with better access to the "truth" about power relations in a former European colonial society? My answer is, again, no. Is the notion of simulacra one of those postmodernist viruses that threatens to put an end to the social and political sciences? No.²⁵ The appeal and power of postmodernist criticism, as Turner tenably suggests (1993), stems from the fact that it fills with rigor an area that neither mainstream sociology nor Marxism is particularly strong in dealing with, namely contemporary cultures. The concept of simulacra can help us to see more clearly a profound lack in the existing social and political sciences. The concept supplements, defers, shifts or simulates that disturbing lack, but never eradicates it.

The idea of simulacra is not a handy instrument that rescues or pretends to rescue the social and political sciences from some of their widely acknowledged predicaments. Baudrillard did not lie about simulacra. The notion of simulacra only reverses the order and hierarchical statuses between image and reality, between copy and original, without permanently privileging one, or dissolving the other. There is some truth, but there are also some problems, in Mbembe's assertion that 'the postcolony is the simulacral regime *par excellence*' (1992a: 11). While this chapter introduces the notion of the New Order regime as a simulacral regime, it will not go as far as to suggest that argument with the epithet *par excellence* attached. On the one hand it is important to acknowledge significant differences in power relations and historical sites between many post-colonial societies and those in the metropolises. On the other hand, *par excellence* can easily exoticize or essentialize postcolonial societies in ways comparable to the old colonial tradition of vulgar orientalism.²⁶

In contrast to Mbembe's view, Baudrillard once regarded North American society, especially Californian, as a simulacral utopia *par excellence*. The argument about simulacral America in particular and about simulacra in general share a common starting point, namely the extent to which electronic media networks transform society, and with it our sense of being. Viewed narrowly in this evolutionary sense, New Order Indonesia seems to be a little behind and irrelevant. But to reduce the simulation effects to electronic media is to recuperate a logocentric nostalgia for non-electronic (or pre-electronic) media. Simulation came a long way with the 'invention of language' (MacCannell and MacCannell 1993: 131). Otherwise, why would Plato have been so hostile to the poets and to writing more generally, agents of simulacra *par excellence* (Kennedy 1992: 10, 28)?²⁷

Although Mbembe and Baudrillard seem to be proposing oppositional views, in fact both are reproducing the old and dangerous dichotomies of East-West, North-South, Developed-Underdeveloped societies under new categories and different names. In arguing the specific character of post-colonial power relations Mbembe emphasizes, among other things, the notion of mutual powerlessness between those who rule and their subjects

(1992a: 24). This is also more or less Baudrillard's argument about consumer society in post-industrial, post-capitalist, post-production masses: 'Manipulation has never existed. The game is played on both sides, with the same weapons, and who can say which is winning today' (1983b: 29). It would not be very difficult to see the parallel between Baudrillard's discussion of the uncontrollable 'floating signs' or the silent masses (1983b) and the depoliticized population that was officially termed the 'floating mass' in the New Order.

There is a danger of overstatement, and myopia, in arguing that the regime of simulacra is particular, unique, or *par excellence* in this or that society, authoritarian or otherwise. However, to suggest the converse – that simulacra are or can be anywhere and everywhere – is no less problematic. It overlooks differences, some more significant than others, among contemporary societies, sub-societies, and groups. One initial step that promises to help us in confronting this dilemma is to work with diverse micro-level studies. This allows us to ask with Michel-Rolph Trouillot under what conditions authoritarianism or the regime of simulacra is 'enhanced or weakened through public discourses and manifestations' (1992: 79).

We must avoid taking for granted prior assumptions that distinguish one kind of society from others in ways tainted with more essentialism than we would like. Studying the complex particular in detail allows us to see that the presence or even prominence of a simulacral regime in a particular society in a particular time does not make that society totally hyper-real. One wishes political terror, killings, torture or imprisonment could only be other than real. The New Order was only one dominant author of the phantasmal narrative. The scars of the victims of the anti-communist witch-hunts as well as past leftist and populist politics are still raw in the everyday lives of its diverse population. The authorial New Order is dead, but the long-haunting questions and memories of the 1965 violence live on, and new questions about more recent violence, stigmas, and witch-hunts are piling up.

6 Identity, power, and history

All of the previous chapters have shown two observations in detail. First, we have seen how the mass killings in 1965–6 laid the foundations of the New Order's authoritarianism (1966–98), not only at the level of state administration and elite politics, but also semi-autonomously in localized everyday life among ordinary people (at least on the island of Java, where most Indonesians reside). Second, the dangerous mode and style of stigmatization and identity politics under study are by no means specific or confined to a series of actions of deliberate scapegoating and character assassination by the anti-communist regime against communists or other powerless people for some clearly defined and immediately acquired gain.

It is not possible to examine the second observation in isolation from the first. Conversely, though valid, it would be inadequate to restrict a study of identity politics and stigmatization in the New Order period by limiting the study to the formal and systematic state-sponsored anti-communist campaign. At times, the perceived communist threats or their phantoms appear to spread far beyond both any association with the bygone Indonesian Communist Party and the best attempts and ability of those who wish to eliminate them. At other times, the militancy of anti-communist witch-hunting appears to be far greater in scope and intensity than its object of attack. Indeed, there are cases where such militancy often appears to be recklessly irrelevant or independent of the actual existence of the enemies that the militants are determined to suppress.

The double move (looking at the consequences of the specific historically-bound violence in 1965–6 and comparable phenomena that have little to do with the 1965–6 violence) allows us to pay due recognition to what is so particular about identity politics and power in Indonesia, and it allows us to consider what is arguably generally true about power and history. This concluding chapter will elaborate precisely upon these points. Some of the most relevant and widely familiar concepts of power, identity, and resistance will be critically analyzed on the basis of the preceding chapters and existing literature.

In brief, this chapter takes issue further with the general and easy tendency to see the anti-communist witch-hunts as a political tool in the hand of a

powerful military elite and the authoritarian government of the New Order to repress political dissent, discredit potential enemies, or attempt to legitimize its responsibility for the past killings. It will also carefully examine where, if at all, there is any space for the largely repressed public to negotiate, avoid, or resist the politically suffocating environment. It will return to a general discussion, acknowledging the need to go back and forth between the two poles of inquiry: particular-general, empirical-abstract, subject-structure, narrative-theory. The oscillation is necessary, because each element of the pairs is constituted by its counterpart. Each is only significant in the light of the other.¹

This chapter consists of two sections. In the first, as promised earlier in this book, I will probe deeper into the problems of theorizing state terrorism and I will enquire into its global dimension. Notwithstanding the particular contours of the events discussed in the foregoing, it is wrong to treat Indonesia's state terrorism as something unique or independent of inter-state relations. I will also argue against any temptation to view state terrorism simply as a neutral instrument of domination that can be employed by whoever happens to assume state power.

In the second section, conclusions from the first section will be related to the recent debates in the social sciences about "power relations" or "modes of domination". I will further explore the argument against the familiar and often insidious temptation to search for a cohering rationality, totalizing mechanism, or any deterministic structure to explain unequal power relations. Such familiar dispositions are compatible with the way the dominant discourse of power operates. The preceding chapters show that agents of state security are not very different from academic scholars in the twentieth century in being investigative creatures obsessed with a will-to-coherence.

This chapter has no ambition to construct a new theory or to reconstruct old ones. My aim is quite modest: to try to open a dialogue between the empirically-based observation and arguments in the previous chapters and relevant theoretical insights. I will present a narrow survey of existing relevant literature, with no intention to denounce some theories and champion others. As may have been apparent from previous chapters, I am both fascinated by and suspicious of any theorizing. Scholarly pursuit of a far-reaching theory has too often led too many to seek to construct a fetish of academic simulacra, not very different from those simulacra pertaining to postcolonial regimes. A theory tends to be totalizing, even when the theorist intends otherwise, 'not because – or not necessarily because – of the *scope* of its subject matter nor because of the structures that it deploys', as Vivek Dhareshwar (1989: 140) reminds us. Rather, she continues, '[i]t tends to be totalizing when it effects a *reduction* of all that resists it and recodes that resistance into its own language'.² Yet theory is not something we can do without, to deny this is self-defeat.

Theorizing state terrorism

The earliest documented use of the term “terror” was a response to the political violence of the Jacobin and Thermidorian regimes in France, from which it was later adopted into English (Stohl 1983: 6). Analysts of state terrorism agree that their subject matter did not constitute a scholarly discourse on its own merit until the 1980s (Schmid 1991: 23–4; McCamant 1991: 42; George 1991b: 1). The rise of the scholarly effort began soon after the Reagan administration declared “terrorism” as one of its greatest enemies (Said 1988; Chomsky 1991a: 13). Since then “terrorism” has become a catch-word, more salient than ever before (Schmid and Jongman 1988: 62). Of course, despite the rise of the word’s currency after the 1980s, a discourse of terrorism did not become a constant public concern worldwide until the series of suicide attacks in New York on 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002. Few discussions on the subject can avoid a reference to Indonesia as allegedly one important base of an international “terrorist” network, called Jemaah Islamiah.

The use and misuse of the term “terror(ism)” is clearly an index of unequal power relations. When I discussed earlier versions of this work in the 1990s, and spoke of “terrorism”, or “*teror*” to be more precise, some American and Australian colleagues in academic circles expressed some reservations, subtly hinting that I might have been exaggerating the situation in Indonesia, and my use of the key term (as introduced in Chapter 1 and elaborated below) was deemed inappropriate. Given the popular usage of the term in English then, such a reservation was, and is, understandable. An unstated but widely held conception of terror and terrorism in most popular discussions in English (especially after 11 September 2001) involves a reference to high-powered explosions (as exemplified by the incidents on 11 September 2001 in New York and 12 October 2002 in Bali).³

In the framework adopted here, I propose that incidents such as those in New York and Bali be better referred to as instances of political violence. Terror and terrorism, as conceptualized in this book, refer more to the severe and often long-lasting fear that may emanate from (but not exclusively) major and spectacular violence. Thus major “political violence” hit New York and Bali and killed many innocent civilians. Each of these incidents “terrorized” a far greater number of people, including those who never set foot in either place. Unlike violence of any scale that refers to overtly material damage and physical injury, terror has a lot more to do not only with the related mental suffering of those immediately or directly affected and in site, but with a greater number of people through mediated messages or images at very different places and times. Of course, it would be ridiculous to deny the links between mental and physical suffering, but to overlook the distinction between the two is conceptually a serious failure for a study of terrorism.

In fact, not every incidence of large-scale or sustained violence with a high death toll resulted in “terror” (for instance wars, or other war-like situations). Conversely, terror may prevail (such as in New Order Indonesia) without constant and widespread violence on a major scale. As previous chapters have shown, in places like New Order Indonesia, terror was kept alive by some knowledge of major violence in the past, and regular displays in the present of selected memories of that past hinting to the general population of its potential recurrence in the present. As in several other countries during the Cold War, terror in New Order Indonesia was maintained and facilitated by vigorous martial law enforcement in largely non-war situations. This brings us to another but relevant argument about why many foreign observers miss the point when Indonesians speak of *teror* under the New Order.

It has not been easy for many foreign observers to appreciate the level of mental suffering among Indonesians during the New Order, or the use of the term “terror” for the situation, because most of the time these Indonesians appeared – in direct encounter, in postcards, or in the mass media – to be quiet and contented with their ordinary lives, not to speak of the comfortable material life and economic growth that the New Order delivered to them. Until 1998 there were no flooding images of bombs, blood, rubble, and dismembered bodies in the international media from Indonesia. Until the end of the Cold War, there were no sustained nationwide protests, and no outcry of gross human rights violation.⁴ The smiling faces of powerless and terrorized subjects across the nation easily misled most sympathetic observers who had never lived in Southeast Asia, or better-informed researchers who nonetheless wished to have their future access to enter and visit the country secured.

An unprecedented series of bombings took place in Indonesia only in the final years of the New Order, signalling its decay. Contrary to the perception from afar, Indonesians appeared to have been less affected by these regular bombings than by the systematic repression of Soeharto’s government, when violence was relatively low in level and frequency, except in images, speeches, and simulacra. Expatriates in Jakarta were often bewildered by what appeared to be a serious lack of sensitivity and sympathy on the part of Indonesians in their response to the news about 11 September 2001. For related reasons, many Australians and other Westerners were shocked not only by Amrozi’s (and the Police Chief’s) broad smile soon after he was captured as suspected bomber of the Bali explosion, but also by what they saw as a failure on the part of the Indonesian public to recognize what was wrong with that smile. Amrozi continued to display his public smile during and after he heard his death penalty.

Existing literature on terrorism has steadily increased.⁵ What follows is a modest exploration of the subject, focusing specifically on one of the most dangerous and prevalent kinds of terrorism, namely state terrorism. This section will revolve around two propositions. First, contrary to the general

notion, state terrorism is a common, persistent and basic mode of rule in the twentieth century with a diversity in scope, intensity, duration and style (see also McCamant 1991: 42). In many societies today it is close to having the status of a standard rather than aberrant mode of state rule. This is more often visible in the so-called Second and Third Worlds, but it is by no means less common or effective in the so-called First World. It has, at least on the surface, some modern and rational elements, and it often proves to be a highly effective force for enhancing – not undermining – social order. New Order state terrorism is not unique, although its particularities are of great interest. Neither is its operation isolated or independent from unequal inter-state power relations. A consideration of its global dimension is certainly important for our understanding. However, we will not dispense with the need to analyse a small-scale, localized operation as depicted in the case study in the foregoing chapters. The different levels of study are equally important and one cannot afford to ignore one or the other.

Second, state terrorism is not simply a neutral instrument, available for any incumbent agents of state to employ. Rather, state terrorism has both a relative autonomy from individual agents of the state and a compelling force upon subjects in contradictory positions (state agents and innocent victims). I would not push this view to argue that state terrorism is as omnipresent and omnipotent as in the Foucauldian sense of the power of discourse. State terrorism works through state agents and their victims, but this does not render the distinction between the two positions redundant. This mode of domination does not affect the ruling and ruled equally, or make them equally ‘powerless’, as Achille Mbembe argues in the extreme that it does (1992a: 5, 15, 24) and I have critically commented on this view in Chapter 5.

A few words of delimitation and conceptual clarification are called for. In Chapter 1 I introduced a definition of state terrorism and an empirical account of how that concept can be related to the historical experience of Indonesia after the 1965–6 massacres. Central to my earlier discussion of state terrorism is the relation between state agents and their victims. A related problem is the conceptual question of what the “state” itself is. The conceptual question of “the state” remains a point of debate in the contemporary social sciences, with no easy answer to date. The great diversity of actually existing states, each with insurmountable complexities, makes any attempt to define “the state” extremely difficult.

It is beyond my competence to discuss the issue. For my purpose here, suffice it to borrow the Weberian definition of the “state” as a system of authority that has a legitimate monopoly over institutionalized violence in a given territory. I will modify this, borrowing insights from selected neo-Marxists, when we discuss the questions of hegemony later in this chapter. A series of more recent theorization of “the state” with particular relevance to analysis of post-cold war violence has been attempted, but most have not departed in any significant ways from the core elements in Weberian concept, although they employ different terms or give different emphases

(see R. Ferguson 2003: 8–14, Y. Ferguson 2003: 83–92). My modest strategy may be insufficient for other analyses, because it does not take into account other important and diverse characteristics of actually existing states. Further qualification will be necessary for analysis of actual cases, and such supplementation will necessarily vary from case to case.⁶ Unless indicated otherwise, the term “states” below refers to twentieth-century states which by and large are characterized by an unprecedented degree of militarization. This is the century where we may believe, with David Pion-Berlin (1991) and P. Timothy Bushnell *et al.* (1991b), that state terrorism has been a most salient feature of state rule worldwide. This is also the century where ‘death by government’ has been several times more likely than death by war (Rudolph J. Rummel in Brian R. Ferguson 2003: 10), and ‘the greatest threat to most of the people in the Third World comes not from internal war, but from their own leaders’ (Steven R. David in Brian R. Ferguson 2003: 10).

International dimensions

A consideration of the international dimensions of state terrorism is indispensable for theorizing particular cases. This implies a recognition of plausible culpability not only of nation-states around Asia (as propagated worldwide after 11 September 2001) but also those at the very core of Western imperial power. This consideration will illuminate the problems of how arbitrarily the scope of the subject matter has often been delimited. It also indicates the complex interrelationships of the various, and apparently separate, local cases of political violence. Considering global factors helps avoid any suggestion that the Indonesian case is peculiar or unique, which is only one easy step away from recuperating orientalism as demonstrated in many (perhaps most) analyses of Indonesian violence in the last few decades.

Most recent writings on state terrorism have stressed the universality of the phenomenon, and the fact that this is already evident in the twentieth century. The practice in many diverse societies bears significant similarities that invite comparative study. It is remarkable to see how bureaucrats in militarized states after the Second World War have shared key phrases, on top of their common frame of thought. The best known such phrase, of course, is “national security”, a euphemism that can imply systematic terrorism against innocent citizens. The political police in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, that arrested thousands of people without trial, was called the Afghan Interests Protection Service or AGSA (*Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satalo Adara*) (Maley 1991: 119). In New Order Indonesia the millions of political suspects who were arrested were described as *diamankan*, literally “being rescued”, “secured” or “protected”.⁷ The government’s perceived enemies were similarly called “extremists”, “terrorists”, or “subversives”.⁸ A large proportion of them were always unionists, peasants, human rights

activists and intellectuals. They were accused of operating so evasively, with international links, that even members of their own families and close friends were allegedly unaware of their subversive activities – thus invalidating any counter-statements demanding due legal procedure and justice from their families or NGOs.⁹

State terrorism not only happens in many places, but its diverse operations often have close connections. The upsurge in the literature on the subject after 11 September 2001 makes it impossible, and unnecessary, to present a satisfying review. It is not possible to go into detail on this subject or to review the existing literature.¹⁰ What needs reiteration here is the increasingly wide acknowledgement that, contrary to the general view in the 1970s and still held in the 1980s, state terrorism is not an exclusive characteristic of the Communist, Fascist and Islamic regimes in Second and Third World countries. In no less significant ways it also characterizes the so-called “liberal democratic” nation-states of the West. Edward Said (1988), Edward S. Herman (1991), Noam Chomsky (1991b) and several others (see George 1991b, Selden and So 2003) make separate but similar arguments to the effect that Western States, especially the USA, have been the most important terrorist states in the world since 1980, if not before.¹¹ Anti-state and non-state terrorism is no more common or dangerous than state terrorism itself.¹²

Considering conditions that are conducive to the spread of state terrorism, Duvall and Stohl (1983: 209–10) identify two syndromes. The first is the ‘militaristic-state syndrome’, and the second the ‘ideological-mission syndrome’. In the first, we find ‘a cultural glorification of violence and large and politically important military/police institutions which are highly bureaucratized and in which the decisional chain is depersonalized’. The second syndrome is characterized, according to Duvall and Stohl, by ‘regime commitment to a zealous, dogmatic nature, which helps to provide an interpretation of the target group, with which the regime is in (actual or perceived potential) conflict, as being inferior peoples’.

Duvall and Stohl give examples of cases where the two syndromes have occurred together in various countries of all the three Worlds. The foregoing chapters indicate that to a significant extent, both syndromes were strong in New Order Indonesia. Duvall and Stohl add that among the First World countries, the USA and UK both make the ‘most use of terrorism as a means of governance’ and bear ‘the closest approximations’ to the two syndromes. Perhaps it is no accident that these two countries were the biggest donors of military aid to New Order Indonesia (see Budiardjo 1991).¹³ Duvall and Stohl qualify their general arguments by tabulating categories to differentiate varieties of state terrorism in terms of the extent, the ways, and social scope of their operation (1983: 200, 211). Their taxonomy deserves serious attention and further elaboration outside the scope of this book.

As with conceptual aspects of the “state”, I cannot do justice to the problem of distinguishing varieties of state terrorism and recognizing their

interconnections. Here I simply want to comment on some international aspects of state terrorism with particular reference to New Order Indonesia. Of special relevance is, of course, Indonesia's militarization. Observers rarely fail to mention the contribution of the US government to the development of the New Order's militarization and intelligence operations. Richard Tanter (1990a, 1990b, 1991) has provided us with further details. He contends that 'the presence or absence of terror and/or heightened domestic political surveillance as an element of rule is generally not explicable by primarily domestic factors' (Tanter 1990b: 266). Such a view finds support in Duvall and Stohl's reasoning: 'Third World governments have acquired capabilities for state terrorism far beyond their limited internal means. . . . Governance through terror in the Third World has strong and important international bases' (1983: 195).

I have no quarrel with both the ideas that the New Order state was strong and that its strength ultimately derived from international sources, mainly the USA, UK, and Japan.¹⁴ But that notion of "strength" needs qualifications that rarely appear in the familiar analyses. In considering the international dimension I am not keen on pursuing an argument about some "primary" or totalizing cause of state terrorism. I believe that interconnected forces are at work in various cases, and that they are too complex to be reduced by dichotomous categories such as "domestic" versus "global" factors.

Coercive strength alone, especially when derived from external relations, will not preclude domestic tensions. This compels us to reconsider the state-qua-state thesis (Anderson 1990) and the view that the state is so independent of domestic legitimation that it has a 'capacity to ignore, or at least postpone, cultivation of domestic support and the class compromises which that process requires' (Tanter 1991: 13, 204). If the New Order state was so well protected by its position in the world order, why then did it not leave its largely compliant population alone? There must be something other than an instrumentalist rationale in the move towards state terrorism. Ironically, the dominant view swings dramatically and unashamedly to the opposite extreme following the official fall of the New Order in 1998. The majority of analyses of the event have taken the convenient and romanticized position of attributing the demise of the regime to largely unorganized and voluntary masses of "student movements". The next section will explore this issue.

Against instrumentalism

It would be foolish to deny that state terrorism has some material politico-economic basis. What remains debatable is how determining this basis is in comparison to others in various cases across societies. Equally tempting is the tendency to see state terrorism as a handy instrument of rule, because it often appears to be a rationally efficient and effective means of exercising power. This section will argue against that line of thinking, by presenting

three major areas where state terrorism is far from being merely instrumental or purely rational.

The first is a situation where terrorism evolves through the logics of its use to become refractory and an end in itself; an end which is difficult to renounce. In the second I will consider how the efficacy of any state terrorism is always dependent on some collaboration on the part of its victims. Finally, I will examine state terrorism as an expression of the state-in-terror. I must stress that the arguments in this section are based mainly on the case study presented earlier in this book and secondary reading of cases elsewhere. I believe the relevance of my arguments goes beyond the particular case investigated here, but it is wise not to make any far-reaching generalization at this point.

Before proposing the three arguments, it is fair to consider briefly the rational elements of state terrorism that can appeal to an instrumentalist perspective. Under certain circumstances, state terrorism appears to be a very effective mode of rule. It combines and mediates what have too often been spoken of as two distinct forces of power: coercion and consent; violence and reward/persuasion; or the material and the mental. This implies certain shared concepts between the perpetrators and the victims, not always as two mutually exclusive subjects.¹⁵

Perhaps more than other forms of political violence, state terrorism isolates individual selves and upsets familiar order and meanings. It educates the population to be individually docile through inhuman violence against a few selected victims:

With the majority neutralized by fear, the well-equipped forces of repression can concentrate on an isolated minority. . . . An individual can no longer draw strength from customary social support. [S/he] can rely only on [her/]himself. Physically [s/he] may be untouched by a terror act, but because of it [s/he] is suddenly terribly alone and in anguish . . . fragmented within, searching desperately to fix [her/his] own personal security.

(Schmid and Jongman 1988: 82, 20)¹⁶

Hence the importance of distinguishing instances of political violence (such as bombing) and pervasive, and often silent and silencing terror.

It is not enough to say that social order *often relies* on state terrorism. Some have even argued that social order *has been the primary aim* of the use of state terrorism 'both in the past and in the modern era' (Stohl 1983: 7). This helps us answer the long-standing question among observers of New Order Indonesia, which Richard Tanter extends further to East and South-east Asia:

Why is it that the governments of the region have, in the past quarter century, diverted huge amounts of scarce resources to the finally wasteful

activity of paying standing armies and buying ever-increasing amounts of weaponry? Why have those armed forces come to threaten their own populations more than neighbouring states?

(Tanter 1991: 5)

‘Wasteful’? The following three counter-arguments render any rational-instrumentalist view of political violence too simplistic. The logic of cost-benefit calculation implied in such a view is unhelpful.

Refractory ends

State terrorism is not a magic instrument that transforms a weak state into a strong one. In the first place, effective state terrorism requires (apart from the crucial collaboration of the victims and international endorsement) immense state strength. State-sponsored terror definitely brings agony to the affected population, but with no definite promise of benefit to the state. In fact, several cases of state terrorism have proved to be counterproductive (Pion-Berlin 1991; Wegner 1991; Shernock 1991), the most notable case being Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (Maley 1991).

State terrorism is not simply a handy instrument under the full control of the state apparatus. Although state terrorism can be construed abstractly as a rational mode of rule and domination, in reality that mode of domination is employed neither on the basis of a well-developed rational design and plan, nor as a choice free of constraints. State terrorism is a purposeful act, not reckless spontaneity; but the actual operation and outcome are usually other than the state’s intention, if not actually against its own interests.

The rationalist view that regards the phenomenon as evidence of either weak or of strong and overconfident features of the state needs reappraisal. Hannah Arendt’s notion of terror as means that later become ends is highly probable and deserves further investigation (Schmid and Jongman 1988: 72). That notion refers to many familiar situations where ‘terror has lost its “purpose”’. Michael Taussig makes a similar critique of rational and politico-economic explanations in his study of political violence in Putumayo (1992a: 148). Other separate empirical studies support that anti-rational/instrumentalist proposition, although they do not formulate such arguments explicitly.

Another situation in which state terrorism works beyond a rationally-controlled instrumental function is what Stanley K. Shernock calls ‘the refractory aspect of terror’ (1991). Individuals in the ruling elite, the rank-and-file agents, vigilante groups and others often have diverse and contradictory motivations for taking part in the snowballing process of political terror. In many cases documented in the literature, the ruling group which has initiated a terrorist campaign has had to try hard to moderate, halt or control the violence that proliferated more vigorously than expected. Based on minute detailed studies of several cases, Shernock concludes that

'terror, once initiated, and even orchestrated, by regime leaders, can proliferate to a point where it threatens not only to undermine particular regime goals, but moreover, to destroy the very foundation of the regime itself' (1991: 170). Between 1933 and 1934, the Nazi regime prosecuted many for wrongful accusations and libel during the anti-Semitic campaign (Shernock 1991: 188–9). The cases of the 1965–6 Indonesian massacre (Chapter 1) and the 1988 witch-hunt (Chapter 2) are no exceptions.

Victims' collaboration

The second, and more common phenomenon that renders state terrorism either more or less than merely an instrument of power is the perpetrators' dependence on the victims' active participation in their own victimization. The previous chapters indicate many different forms of collaboration: from vigilantism, submission, confessionalism and self-remorse, the distorted journalistic reports, to private rumours (among terrorized people each thinking of the other as being military informants). This does not exhaust the multiple forms of collaboration that subjects may be involved in, each according to his or her particular position in relation to the ongoing terror. Rather than exploring all that complexity, here I simply want to suggest possible reasons why potential (target population) and actual (primary) victims are inclined to collaborate with state-agents in the perpetuation of state terrorism. Examples of all these different reasons abound in Chapter 3. These reasons are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Let me proceed with possible reasons for the target population's complicity before probing into the more difficult question of the primary victims' collaboration.

First, I will not rule out the now often dismissed view of ideological mystification as a possible source of collaboration. In many cases, vigilant perpetrators seem to share the official perception of the enemy that threatens their collective existence. Thus, they view their own collaboration not only as justifiable in the name of survival, or opportunism, but also as morally noble. Many Indonesians, regardless of their personal relations to the 1965–6 massacre, seem to be sincere when they say that the communists would definitely have slaughtered them if the massacre had not taken place. Independent observers may consider the statement a poor justification for the massacre, but we cannot too quickly dismiss the statement as a deliberate lie. If the German people under the Nazis were not zealous enough, Hitler explained, they 'may very well disappear!' (Wegner 1991: 161). Hitler's sincere conviction aside, he did not make the statement to be seen as a fool, or as offensively underestimating his audience's intelligence.

The second, and very common source of collaboration is overzealousness, either to gain reward, or as a demonstration of loyalty to the ongoing terrorism, which in turn is an attempt to exonerate oneself from victimization. The third common reason for joining the wave of terrorism is to

settle old scores with personal enemies. Chapter 2 has several examples of both the second and the third reasons.

These are possible reasons for the general target population to collaborate with state terrorism. More disturbing is the fact that many immediate victims, too, seem compelled to collaborate in their own victimization. I shall focus on this in the rest of this sub-section. In short, I argue that effective state terrorism contains a paradox. On the one hand, its coercive operation must be less than extreme or total. It must leave some space for the victims to fill in the gaps, making complements and bringing the state-agents' incomplete perpetration to full circle. Many cases show that state-sponsored terrorism has been less than total, but proved effective, not by design. Rather, it has fallen short of the state-agents' ambitious plans. However, this imperfection has paradoxically enhanced the efficacy of the terror.

On the other hand, paradoxically, to ensure that the victims collaborate, state-agents must *appear* to be excessively powerful. To their victims, the perpetrating state-agents must appear perfectly capable of conducting, and resolutely committed to, total surveillance or extreme destruction with full impunity. A society under state terrorism seems to enter a hall of demonic mirrors. Abram de Swaan describes the situation in the following terms:

people will ask themselves with every action whether their deeds do not create risks for themselves and for the people around them, that they will not just abstain from what is forbidden, but will avoid whatever has not expressly been allowed. They really most continuously try to imagine what the rulers would want them to do, they must become vicarious rulers for themselves. Only then the completion of the terrorist regime has been achieved.

(in Schmid and Jongman 1988: 75)

No doubt, there is a totalist ring of Foucauldian "panopticism" here.¹⁷ In postcolonial states, a vulgar but also less effective variant of panopticism is visible.

Regrettably, the logic in the citation above leads de Swaan as far as to argue that 'whoever mentions it, himself thereby collaborates with the reign of terror,' hence his allegation that in this 'lies the basis of the success of Amnesty International' (in Schmid and Jongman 1988: 76). I find de Swaan's thinking not only wrong, but dangerous.¹⁸ Assuming the totalizing effects of state terrorism, he simply inverts the wishful logic pertaining to heroic narratives of human rights activism. Being blind to the multiple and often contradictory effects of power relations, de Swaan fails to see the inherent instability in any power relations, and thus the possibility for social change. Frederick Jameson's notion of 'winner loses' logic is apt here: 'What happens is that the more powerful the vision of some increasingly total system or logic . . . the more powerless the reader comes to feel' (1991: 5-6).

State terrorism is an overstatement of power which always contains denial, understatement and silences about its own imperfection, as most of the preceding chapters demonstrate. The involuntary resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 and the retreat of the state's assertion of its excessive power would not have been possible if the New Order had been as strong as it had appeared to be. Many student demonstrations have indicated the susceptibility of the security apparatus to pressures from largely vulnerable people who are subject to brutal repression and state terrorism. When they refused to collaborate with the repression, and launched offensive protests, the outcomes have at times been surprisingly effective. On other occasions, however, student activists have been equally surprised to see how brutal the same authorities could be in responding to comparable protests either in more or less the same or later period. In Chapter 5 I mentioned the inconsistent response of the New Order government to the Golput's challenge. A group of student activists in Semarang (the capital of Central Java) was arrested and tortured for questioning the credibility of the general election in June 1992, before being prosecuted (see Heryanto 1996c). Several hundreds of kilometres away, student activists in Yogyakarta made the same protest in a highly comparable fashion in the same weeks, but the authorities left them alone. This discrepancy is far from unusual. The contrast between levels of abuse of human, political and civil rights in the capital city and remote regions in Indonesia, as in most other countries, is well-noted. This is not the place to elaborate on the issue, but I argue that such inconsistent measures often demonstrate a lack of co-ordination, or reflect the inadequacies of the state administration and resources rather than a deliberate cunning tactic.

In order to assure the collaboration of potential victims with state terrorism, there must be some limit to the fear inflicted upon them. This opens a space of hope. This hope derives not from a recognition of the limits of the state-agents' coercive capacity, but from a wish that the seemingly all-powerful state may grant some mercy. Potential victims will collaborate when they believe that such conduct is rewarding or at least worth trying for their own survival. If they are totally desperate, they see no need to collaborate. In the late 1980s the then spokesperson for East Timorese Independence, Jose Ramos Horta, gave an idea of what extreme desperation might mean in an interview about how Fretilin educated and held up the morale of the East Timorese resistance movement against New Order Indonesia:

The war has spread over the whole of the country, everybody has suffered. I doubt if there is any family in East Timor that hasn't lost at least one person. In many instances that I know personally, entire families were wiped out. Some lost half of their family members, I lost three family members, two brothers and one sister. In this kind of situation a political organization doesn't need to do much political work.

I don't need to go and tell a group of villagers who have seen half of the village wiped out that the occupation forces are bad. Throughout the country the Indonesians themselves with their brutality, their repression, racism, arrogance in the face of the Timorese people as a whole, including their former supporters, are the best political education ever.

Lot's Wife (16/08/1989: 10–11)

What happened in East Timor in the late 1980s can be compared with the situation in Aceh or Papua a decade later, but not with most areas of Indonesia. This partly explains the lack of opposition and the general efficacy of silent and cryptic terrorism in the latter. The secret of the New Order's successful domination and its vulnerability are one and the same:

The effectiveness of the New Order system of domination lies in the fact that it is a system of less than total domination . . . any system of less than total domination is inherently unstable. The condition for stability – the total destruction of the dominated – is incompatible with the logic of domination.

(Southwood and Flanagan 1983: 211)

That unstable system threatens not only agents of the state, but also the general populace. The nature and scope of the lack of total coercion is inevitably ambiguous. It is never clear in what way and how much less than totally destructive state terrorism necessarily is at any given moment to be effective. Neither is it clear who will be victimized, when, why or how. State terrorism is acutely defined partly by its unpredictability.

A target population likes to hope for the better, and it is often encouraged to do so to motivate collaboration. But it never knows where hope ends and deceptive fantasy begins. Effective power defines, often variably, what is real and realistic in the consciousness of the affected. James Scott discusses this issue at length (1985: 322–30), but his propositions are challenged by Timothy Mitchell (1990: 554–5) and Susan C. Stokes (1991: 268–9). Paraphrasing Bourdieu, David Harvey (1992: 345) notes: 'every established order tends to produce "the naturalization of its own arbitrariness" expressed in the sense of "sense of limits" and the "sense of reality" which in turn form the basis for an "ineradicable adherence to the established order"''.¹⁹

Under terrorism, victims fantasize both an overwhelming threat and, paradoxically, the existence of hope that may reduce or defer the anticipated effects of that threat. That hope can be just as illusory as the seemingly unavoidable threat. Based on their observation of Indonesia, Southwood and Flanagan see such a disposition in what they call a fetish of law:

When one cannot act to change one's situation, one moralizes, or invokes norms, about how it ought to be . . . the Fetish of Law is the

expression of hopes, wishes, and fears in the face of prevailing power relations which resist change . . . it is the opium, the sigh of the oppressed. Their Fetish of Law expresses and holds out the hope that perhaps there is some justice in an unjust, oppressive world . . . it is not just the ubiquitous presence of police and military officials in the villages and towns which compels them to conform. While there is of necessity, a basic submission to the law as it operates in practice, the Fetish of Law provides the opportunity to wish and hope about how things ought to be. As an 'opiate' this hoping gives some substitute satisfaction of people's wants.

(Southwood and Flanagan 1983: 160, 161)

State-in-terror

We have considered two reasons why state terrorism escapes the full control of the perpetrating state-agents. We have focussed on the refractory potentials of terrorism, and examined the necessary collaboration of the primary victims and the general target groups. Now we come to the third, and final, area of inquiry. We will focus on the internal problems of the agents of state, namely their lack of control of their own fear and desire. I argue that obsessive anxiety about threats, accompanied by a perennial lack of confidence, have encouraged many "strong" states to inflict terrorism upon vulnerable and compliant citizens. The state-in-terror helps engender state terrorism. Contra the "'weak" states foster violence, while "strong" states deter violence' thesis (Welsh 2002: 68), I contend that it is not the weakness or strength of states itself that becomes a major factor.²⁰

In attempting to explain why many states opt for state terrorism, Duvall and Stohl (1983: 203) propose two extreme and opposite situations. In one, they contend, states are in a 'situation of powerlessness'. In the other, states are in a 'situation of confident strength'. On the basis of observation of the situation in Indonesia as presented in previous chapters, we can find reasons to support each of these two isolated hypotheses.

By no means has the New Order state been powerless enough to warrant the view that in Indonesia state terrorism is a weapon of the weak. On the contrary, nearly all observers of Indonesia describe the New Order state as a notably strong state (e.g. Anderson 1990; Budiman 1990; Tanter and Young 1990). There is some truth in this observation, but, as I argued earlier, it needs qualification. Material strength alone does not necessarily engender political legitimacy and confidence. I have argued that the New Order regime lacked confidence for several reasons (to be explored further in a moment). I have also suggested that this lack of confidence was significantly responsible for its state terrorism. Accordingly, I see the relevance of Steve Biko's (1946–77) remark about the state terrorism in South Africa that eventually killed him in custody:

The fact of the matter is that the government and its security forces are also ruled by fear, in spite of their immense power. Like anyone living in mortal fear, they occasionally resort to irrational actions in the hope that a show of strength rather than proper intelligence might scare the resisters satisfactorily. And this is the basis of security operations in South Africa [. . .]

(cited in Woods 1987: 137)

David Pion-Berlin (1991) attempts a general examination of the sources of contemporary states' anxiety and intense fear. To paraphrase, these include:

- 1) an identification of alleged agents of threats;
- 2) overestimation of the capacity and motives of these threatening agents;
- 3) overestimation of the 'worst' consequence that these threats can create;
- 4) the reproduction of internal fear that permeates the security corps; and
- 5) the militarist ideology of security.

Many of these points seem relevant to the case of the New Order state (and indeed of the USA after 11 September 2001), and may prove useful for comparative study. I will reconsider these points in a further exploration of the issue at a general level and then more concretely in the particular case of the New Order. Before that, however, one epistemological question deserves some reflection.

Prior to arguing what dispositions are "inherent" in modern state-agents that presumably motivate state terrorism, it is fair to ask ourselves whether it is possible at all for us, as outsiders, to penetrate the state's secrecy and offer a tenable argument. I find myself less confident than Pion-Berlin in this matter. Let me state the source of my self-doubt and my provisional attempts to overcome it.

I believe there are no fixed or coherent scenarios hidden behind the secrecy of state security operations. There may be nothing as spectacular as outsiders tend to assume. What we can do is to try to reconstruct the thinking of these officials, based on what we can know. Our attempt is indisputably utopian, but is neither senseless nor worthless. Our ultimate aim is inevitably provisional, limited to proposing the most tenable interpretation. In state intelligence projects, we can believe, the aim is to know and thereby to control – if not destroy – the objects of investigation as 'enemies'. Compliance with ideological orthodoxy, lines of command and orientation to immediate action leaves little, if any, room for self-critique and tolerance for complexity and incoherence, regardless of the subjective dispositions of individual officials.

A comparison of the work of intelligence officers and scholarly researchers is noteworthy. At least as the general norm, if not in practice, transparency, public accountability, and self-critique are fundamental in the expected practice of scholarly pursuit. There is reason to appreciate the Foucauldian view of

the inseparability of power and knowledge. The intellectual's will-to-truth often masks a will-to-power, which is very similar to the work of the state intelligence apparatus. Compliance with institutional conventions and material interests, as well as practical constraints, also leaves a significant imprint upon all intellectual activities. Are their differences then only strategies for power (one more direct or overt than the other)? Do their interests in power differ only in a matter of degree, and not of kind? There is no easy answer to either of the questions, and I will not try to resolve them here.

I may have been guilty of being partisan in offering this comparison, and perhaps uncritically driven by self-interest in exaggerating the difference between the research work of scholars and that of state intelligence officers. However, to equate the two modes of investigation simply as one and the same overlooks at least two important differences. First, supposedly 'independent' intellectuals and state agents occupy a different position in the political hierarchy. In many societies we know today the former have often been politically inferior to the latter. Second, modern intellectual communities do not simply produce auto-critics (like Foucault himself) who radically attack the communities' sources of identity, affinity, and formal legitimacy. They can even celebrate such auto-critics to the point that others describe as certain tendencies in post-structuralism and post-modernism towards intellectual machoism. In contrast, to date no comparable celebrities of auto-criticism exist in the communities of actively serving state intelligence officers. However shared in common the two groups' ultimate goals may be, in more immediate terms intellectuals try to win arguments or some privileged symbolic order, while security agents try to win wars and war-like conflicts by maximizing immediately utilitarian values in their procedures of investigation.

Bearing in mind the need not to overstate the difference between the two groups, let us now try to construct possible motivations for the state to adopt terrorism. Two common alternatives come to mind. Both are familiar but problematic. The first is to suggest that state terrorism is essentially motivated by a false anxiety about domestic threats, simply because we see no grounds for such fear. This argument is an imposition of "our" own triumphalist thinking and views on their perspective, and thus represents a failure to admit the possibility that there may be other perspectives than our own. It is equally easy for state agents to do the same to those they suspect, as has been suggested in some of the previous chapters.

Second, opposite to the first, we can also try emphatically to construct a highly developed rationale for the state's concerns so that we provide a rationalization, more sophisticated than state agents can hope to make, and more justifying and forgiving of the violence that they perpetrate. Frederick Jameson's warning about 'winner loses' logic comes to mind again:

Insofar as the theorist wins, therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed and terrifying machine, to that very degree he loses, since the

critical capacity of his work is thereby paralyzed, and the impulses of negation, not to speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain and trivial in the face of the model itself.

(Jameson 1991: 5–6)

Trying to paddle between the two extreme positions above, I will begin with an empathic but critical view. Subsequently, I will supplement this view with alternative models. I find it tenable to envisage empathically that state agents' anxiety has a seemingly real and empirically-tested basis. But to that notion we must quickly add that this basis is largely of their own making. They first deceive themselves before taking highly inconsistent measures to construct sometimes genuine, sometimes fake images of internal threats that warrant violent repression.²¹ Thus their statements that subversives pose an omnipotent threat are self-fulfilling. To illustrate this, let me cite a couple of cases in point.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1988 communist witch-hunt in Indonesia was both intense and confusing. Several officials of high standing had to give up their positions in disgrace after public accusations that they were ideologically "unclean". Their identification constituted hard core "evidence" of the "infiltration" of illegitimate citizens into strategic political positions. Neither their stigmatization nor their high office was a product of instant fabrication. However, closer examination reveals that these individuals were in no way sympathetic to communism or dangerous to the regime. There was no infiltration by subversives. Their "unclean" stigma was a product of the state's own loosely defined construct, beyond the responsibility of the individuals concerned. Their previous employment and promotion in the state bureaucracy was an example of common phenomena that official simulacra do not reveal. There was (and still is) common flexibility, alongside overzealousness, in political victimization at the local level. This was symptomatic of the pervasive ineffectiveness of the state's screening and marginalization of officially unwanted individuals. The dominant discourse allows no serious analysis of complexity to compromise the master-narrative. Precisely because the state-agents know the limit of what simulacra can do, they have "real" reasons to be anxious about the "unreal".

To return to my arguments in Chapter 4, we can understand how the intelligence officers were astonished by the Yogyakarta activists' incriminating confessions and the materials confiscated from their possession. These officers would not be prepared to accept, if so accused, that they had simply fabricated the case out of fantasy, because indeed they had not done so. State agents may believe in hallucinatory threats of subversion, but this belief would not be effective without the subsequent confirming objective and solid "findings" that would have seemed (to these officials) independent of the state's propaganda. This is not to overlook the fact that in the subsequent prosecutions, the state officials found and chose to ignore other find-

ings that ran counter to the charges. There is no question that they used the court as a political instrument. In public they consciously lied, attempting to present the case as neat, coherent, and clear-cut, but among themselves they might genuinely (but erroneously) have believed that those they prosecuted were at least somewhat potentially dangerous.

Agents of state security may not be so lazy or naive as to indulge themselves in overconfidence based on mere self-deception. In fact, existing literature shows that they do their best to make serious use of the instruments of the social science and advanced technology for the purpose of surveillance. It is conceivable that they are often quite aware of their shortcomings when encountering unresolved problems of interpreting data in their intelligence work. They must also be aware of the counter-arguments that come from human rights and civil rights advocates. In both situations, agents of the state may have reasons to retain their own convictions concerning existing subversive threats. I will try to explore the reasons for this below.

Arguing that security agents have the privilege to self-deceive does not imply that they always and consciously choose to do so to carry out their mission. Nor does it imply that they have only one homogeneous, coherent, and false narrative to follow. Chapters 3 and 4 are important in this respect, because they indicate concretely how state agents have competing interpretations of a political case under investigation. When finding contradictions or incoherencies in their intelligence work, they may try to resolve them rationally. But ultimately their main task is not to accomplish accurate analysis and a completely coherent narrative; it is to take resolute actions.

Action-oriented pressures allow security agents to fill holes in their investigation with speculation, especially in Indonesia in the 1980s when there was a very low awareness of “rights” as internationally promoted – human, political and civil (see Jetschke 1999). When they do so, they can make their speculations with full awareness. Lack of knowledge does not stop them from drawing action-oriented conclusions. In fact, not unlike human rights activists, state agents can be easily intimidated by what they want to know but cannot know. The more undecipherable the identified enemy, the more powerful and dangerous that perceived enemy will appear.

Critical accounts of state abuses of human rights agitate regimes that violate them. But depending on their self-perception and dependence on international respect, some agents of state security may just ignore these criticisms, rather than offer counter-arguments. In itself this is not self-evidently an admission of guilt. The reason for their dismissive attitude can be more than an indiscriminate suspicion of their critics’ motivation with no consideration of the substance of their criticism. Agents of state security have reasons to believe that they know best in matters of security, because they have a monopoly of the nationwide network of secret police, intelligence operations, and legal rights of arrest and interrogation under duress. Furthermore, in contrast to intellectuals or human rights activists, state

agents have neither the obligation nor the desire to demonstrate in public what they know and plan to do. Indeed they have reasons to believe that critical activists know less than they say about political violence and national threats. Thus, Indonesia's New Order – notorious for its poor record in human rights – is highly comparable with the Bush government in the USA when handling the arrested suspects of terrorist networks such as Hambali.²²

The foregoing analysis is only a preliminary exploration. However, I hope I have succeeded in establishing two points. First, crudely speaking, state agents must fool themselves at the same time as, or before, they fool others about subversive threats. But they do not fool themselves purely without empirical foundation. The foundation is partly of their own making, consciously or not. Second, security agents may or may not be less intelligent or knowledgeable than academic scholars and human rights activists about national threats. By no means are the former necessarily more irrational than the latter. But that is beside the point. What counts here is that these officials pursue a different agenda from that of intellectual critics and human rights activists. The main task of these officials is not to attain the best possible knowledge of existing subversive threats, to protect the national reputation in the international community, or to gain legitimizing support from the people. Their main task is to eradicate any threats as economically as possible, whether these threats be manifest or potential, real or imagined.

The hypothetical arguments above are too general and insufficient to explain historically specific cases. In the following I attempt to explore six major sources of the New Order state's anxiety, some of which modify Pion-Berlin's points above. These features may not be unique to New Order Indonesia, but let us focus on this limited scope for the moment. The discussion below shows how a particular case of state anxiety demands further exploration beyond the internal security agents' discursive dispositions as outlined above.

First, the New Order's militarist thinking was basically intolerant of any potential challenge, no matter how remote it may have seemed. As incumbent officers regularly expressed it in public, they would as far as possible resolutely seek to eradicate the slightest potential risk, by taking pre-emptive measures before "things get too risky too late".²³ One event that illustrates this disposition well is the case of *Lusitania Expresso*. On 11 March 1992, a group of 73 activists from 21 countries, accompanied by 50 reporters, sailed on a chartered commercial ferry, *Lusitania Expresso*, to East Timor to lay wreaths in memory of the casualties of the Dili incident (12 November 1991). With the intention of stopping this 'mission of peace', as the organizer called it, from entering Indonesian waters, the New Order government deployed 16 layers of defensive strategy ranging from six fully armed warships in Indonesian waters and helicopters above them, to entrenchment of

the Santa Cruz cemetery, the intended destination of the mission. What made the events more theatrical was the fact that all actors involved were fully aware that they were at the centre of the world's attention.

Second, throughout its history the New Order regime disproportionately relied for its power on alliances with outside forces and for its domestic legitimation primarily on coercion. This explains why simulacra were so crucial. The regime was paranoid not only about discursive practice that threatened the simulacra, but paradoxically also with overtly compliant support for them. The state obtained collaboration from many different directions with motivations too diverse and often too unpredictable. Everyone accepted *faits accomplis*, the imposed power relations, within which different people explored various possibilities to advance covertly their own interests that may undermine the status quo. Understandably, the rulers constantly felt anxious even when there was the appearance of general acquiescence. This is something that outsiders often fail to understand, hence the rejection by some foreign observers' of the term "terror" (*teror*) in analysis of the situation.

Third, the common assertion of the great strength of the New Order state itself needs further qualification. In an endnote to his comparative analysis of the states in Indonesia and South Korea, Richard Tanter writes that:

there are three important senses of 'the strong state' on which they [Indonesia and Korea] differ – robustness, administrative effectiveness, and autonomy. . . . While the Indonesian state is quite autonomous from most sources of domestic pressure (certainly from capital), it is highly vulnerable to external sources of pressure and to erosion of the external rents which permits the domestic posture.

(Tanter 1990a: 91, en. 55)

Even in the narrow sense of military competence, the New Order's strength was not as great as it appeared. The seemingly never-ending wars in Aceh and Papua, and the defeat in East Timor, are all evidence of this. We can also appreciate the additional anxiety which New Order state-intelligence must have suffered as a result of the overwhelming task of their own making in surveillance, as indicated in Chapter 2. Poor administration of political victimization generated fear not only among the potential targets, but among the administrators too.²⁴ As domestic outrage exploded in public after Soeharto stepped down in 1998, the state security forces appeared weak and defenceless in the face of public assaults against its members and property (see Bourchier 1999).

Fourth, the New Order state did not fully monopolize the institutionalized means of violence. The regime had come into being and been able to stay in power so long partly because it was in some measure the sponsor as well as the beneficiary of much sporadic local-based vigilantism. The core group of the New Order was not solely or totally responsible for the

1965–6 massacre. Many of the killers acted for reasons other than as service to the emergent New Order state. The state's purge of the Islamist allies soon after the 1965–6 massacre and the “mysterious killings” of 1983–4 (please see Chapter 1) are only some of the glaring examples of the regime's paranoia about coercive power existing outside its direct command.

Fifth, as a consequence of state political violence as a primary mode of rule, there was no popular institution for conflict resolution except in coerced or thinly disguised consensus, denial, or outbursts of violence. Here the common wisdom that violence is the weapon of the weak is clearly evinced. There is rarely any warning as the system shifts rapidly from thinly disguised consensus to an outburst of violence. Achille Mbembe's remark about post-colonial political violence sounds very familiar in the Indonesian situation:

dictators can go to sleep at night lulled by roars of adulation and support . . . only to wake up the next morning to find their golden calves smashed and their tablets of law overturned. The applauding crowds of yesterday have become today a cursing, abusive mob.

(Mbembe 1992a: 15)

Finally, internal conflict within the ruling elite was one of the important sources of the New Order regime's anxiety (for details see Jenkins 1984; Lane 1991). Such conflict is a universal characteristic of states that endorse, if they do not directly organize, political terrorism (see Shernock 1991). The terroristic aftermath of 1965, the “mysterious executions” of 1983–4, and the 1988 communist witch-hunt in Indonesia were inseparable from ongoing elite conflicts.

Before proceeding to the next section, let me sum up my theoretical positions in the foregoing. State terrorism is a global phenomenon, and its diverse operations are often interconnected. There are significant differences of state terrorism in terms of form, scope, or effects, just as there are differences in the changing character of states and nations. It is wrong to seek a single totalizing structure to explain the multiple forms of state terrorism. Consideration of its international dimensions is indispensable for analysis of particular cases, but the former must not subsume or substitute for the latter.

Despite its efficacy, state terrorism cannot be explained primarily in rational-instrumentalist terms. State terrorism is full of contradictions, some of which are inherent. Perpetrating state-agents cannot assume sole responsibility for effective state terrorism, because they can never have full control of its process and efficacy. This is due to refractory aspects of state terrorism, to a dependence on the victims' collaboration, and to the state-agents' own paranoia about subversive threats. All of the above is relevant when we raise the more general questions of power and resistance.

Power relations debate

The nature of consent, coercion, and resistance have been intensely problematized in studies of power relations across social science disciplines in the last few decades (see Mitchell 1990: 545). Questions in this debate include three issues. First, the hegemony thesis: whether social domination has generally been achieved through persuasion or consent of the dominated, instead of coercion. Related to that thesis is the question of whether the dominated have any meaningful capacity to resist that domination. Second, can we view power relations in postcolonial societies as distinct from those in the modern West, without essentializing those societies or recuperating the much discredited orientalism? The third is the post-structuralist notion of power relations as dispersal, a notion that attacks the use of dichotomous categories such as dominant/dominated, consent/resistance, or persuasion/coercion.

I will address these issues in the light of my previous arguments about state terrorism. The foregoing analysis of state terrorism has shown how coercion and consent/collaboration work inseparably. But this does not render the conceptual distinction between coercion and consent useless. Violent coercion seems to be more determinant than consent, although the former may not always be admitted. At this historical juncture, power relations in post-colonial societies are more often marked by a vulgar display of domestic violent coercion (an element of state terrorism) than their liberalist Western counterparts at home. This phenomenon has always been a product of identifiable historical circumstances on both local and global scales, whose constitution demands specific analyses. More often than not, power disperses. However, this does not necessarily dissolve the distinction between the dominant and dominated.

Hegemony: consent and resistance

I will proceed with the debate over Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony, and a critique of it by James Scott in one of the most influential works on the subject and in Asian studies during the last few decades, *Weapons of the Weak* (1985). Considerations of Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony usually refer to his *Selections from Prison Notebooks*. Here, Gramsci made different uses and meanings of the term without attempting any coherent synthesis. To add to the difficulty of interpretation, the text was prepared when he was in prison 'under atrocious conditions, with a fascist censor scrutinizing everything that he produced' (Anderson 1976/7: 6).²⁵

In Gramsci's text, the term "hegemony" refers sometimes to bourgeois domination of the political and ideological aspirations of the general population, and other times to a strategy employed by a proletarian leadership to gain consent and alliance from as many sectors of the working class as possible. Contemporary references to hegemony often pay more, or

exclusive, attention to the first sense (the bourgeoisie-state's hegemony), and consequently the term's problematic meanings are often simplified.

In discussing Western bourgeois hegemony alone, Gramsci presented different models concerning who exactly exercises hegemony. Sometimes he referred to the so-called civil society, while the state exercised coercion. On another occasion Gramsci suggested that civil society and the state jointly practiced hegemony. And on still another, he considered the state as the hegemonic actor, considering civil society as part of the state (Anderson 1976/7: 21–3). Unfortunately, until recently many of the problems in Gramsci's text have not been properly considered in the debate. The controversy also suffers from shortcomings on its own terms. To understand this confusion, one must begin with one of Gramsci's own formulations of hegemony in Western bourgeois civil society, the one that recent social science has helped to make famous.

The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.

(Gramsci 1971: 12)

Here Gramsci spoke of hegemony as one of 'two major superstructural levels' of domination. The other is 'direct domination' which is:

the apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.

(Gramsci 1971: 12)

A central issue in the recent debate over domination and resistance concerns the nature and degree of consent. Gramsci's text alone does not make it clear how spontaneous and complete consent needs to be to qualify as hegemonic. However, Gramsci used the term 'hegemony' in the other sense (the proletariat's political, moral and intellectual direction or leadership over allied groups), implying that bourgeois hegemony (just like Marx's equally inconsistently conceptualized 'ideology') is not total and that the dominated retain a space of challenge against it – hence the quotation marks bracketing the word 'spontaneous'.

James Scott's critique of the hegemony thesis in *Weapons of the Weak* (1985) is one of the most influential and provocative contributions to the debate, especially in Asian Studies.²⁶ Unfortunately, Scott's forceful propositions largely miss the point. He offers two main criticisms of Gramsci.

First, he argues that dominated groups in his specific case study, which he universalizes to the status of a general societal phenomenon, are aware of their condition and subordination. Hence, Scott claims, they are not mystified by the dominant ideology. Second, Scott tries to demonstrate that the dominated have more room in the realm of consciousness than in that of action to manifest their resistance to their subordination and assumes that Gramsci argued the opposite. Scott admits that Gramsci is less open to his critique than others like Milliband or Althusser, who elaborates on Gramsci's original formulation. Scott charges that 'many of Gramsci's successors have, . . . substituted a kind of ideological determinism for the material determinism they sought to avoid' (1985: 137).

In elaborating on these points Scott makes some insightful arguments. However, Scott's attacks on Gramsci are overall a little far-fetched and unwarranted.²⁷ First of all, Scott constructed a simplified version of what in Gramsci is a complex notion of hegemony. Noting the familiar phrase in *The German Ideology* (Marx and Engels 1965: 61), '[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas . . .', Scott quickly declares '[h]egemony is simply the name Gramsci gave to this process of ideological domination' (1985: 315). Scott thus fails to see that Gramsci's concept of hegemony, as Williams (1980: 37) and Mouffe (1979: 185) have persuasively shown, represents a radical break with the classical Marxist conceptions of the relationship between ideas or ideology and the material conditions of social life. It is 'one of the major turning-points in Marxist cultural theory' (Williams 1977: 108). Of course Scott is neither alone nor the first to make such an error. Several years before he published his *Weapons of the Weak*, Chantal Mouffe (1979: 203, fn. 40) already made the remark that '[a]s regards work on Gramsci in English, the dominating tendency has been to identify hegemony with ideological domination'. Mouffe's article was devoted, among other purposes, to correcting this tendency.

It is open to question whether or not Scott's otherwise excellent ethnography of the Malaysian village Sedaka is a valid ground for testing Gramsci's theory of hegemony in the first place. The one version of Gramscian propositions on hegemony which Scott applies in his study is the one which Gramsci originally presented as an attempt to understand the features of bourgeois domination in the "West", specifically in distinction to the "East" (Russia). If Sedaka is in any way comparable to the two societies Gramsci discussed, certainly it is not with the bourgeois West. Sedaka may present a case of "domination", but not necessarily "hegemony". Gramsci made a sharp distinction between the two, as Scott is aware (1985: 330). Neither does Scott's argument take consistent account of his own admission that '[e]xactly how voluntary and complete this hegemony is likely to be is not entirely clear, even on close reading of Gramsci' (1985: 316).²⁸

Implicit in Scott's arguments is the allegation that Gramsci attempts to argue quite naively for a totalizing domination when he speaks of hegemony.²⁹ Although Gramsci does not explicitly enunciate how voluntary

and how complete domination must be to constitute a hegemonic power relationship, it is clear from *Selections from Prison Notebooks* that he is not so deterministic and naive as to make such a totalizing claim.³⁰ This should be obvious even from a quick reading of Gramsci's discussion of everyone as an intellectual and philosopher (1971: 5–6, 323, 327). His preoccupation with various strategies and forms of resistance (1971: 106–7, 229–35) indicates his awareness of the imperfection of hegemonic practices, and his conviction that the subordinate people are capable of resisting them. Even if Scott demonstrates convincingly that some peasants do resist sometimes, it is totally unclear whether hegemony, in whatever sense, is completely absent in Sedaka or whether it is simply not total or perfect. Timothy Mitchell (1990) goes so far as to suggest that Scott's superb empirical narrative of Sedaka in fact evidences precisely the working of that hegemony which Scott tries to disprove.

Finally, Gramsci's discussion of the role of the intellectuals, only sparsely discussed by Scott, is particularly relevant to this study. Following Abercrombie *et al.* (1980), Scott writes that 'the function of the dominant ideology may be largely to secure the cohesion of dominant classes, while the conformity of subordinate classes rests instead primarily on their knowledge that any other course is impractical, dangerous, or both' (1985: 320). Thus, to critically assess the working of a supposedly dominant ideology it is more important to investigate the everyday life of the dominant classes, urban-based intellectuals included, than rural peasants. The former are apparently the primary targets of the dominant ideology, and its primary reproducers.

Another major contribution to the theoretical debate of consent versus coercion that is worthy of mention is Maurice Godelier's *The Mental and the Material: Thought, Economy and Society* (1986). Curiously, Godelier makes no reference to Gramsci, although he engages in serious reflection on the central issues in the hegemony debate. Godelier takes the view that domination is less than perfect and total, and thus there is a possibility for resistance and for social transformation. Most importantly, he argues that consent, rather than coercion, constitutes the most important source of domination (1986: 13, 156–7). What distinguishes Godelier from many other proponents of the hegemony thesis is that he attempts to qualify his primary argument by stressing the inseparability of consent and coercion in the practice of exercising power (1986: 156–7). While noting that 'violence and consent are not, fundamentally, mutually exclusive' (1986: 156) and that it is 'pointless imagining a form of lasting domination resting solely upon violence or upon total consent' (1986: 157), Godelier believes that 'of the two components of power, the strongest is not the violence of the dominant but the consent of the dominated to their domination' (1986: 157).

In Godelier's view, domination by violence and coercion is seen as something unusual, occurring in 'transitory, indeed ephemeral, states of historical evolution' (1986: 157). This is the line of thought which I wish to question.

Sharing with the subtle emphasis implicit in the works of Gramsci (1971) and, more explicitly Anderson (1976/7, 2002) I want to suggest the relative importance of violence, while agreeing with the idea of the inseparability of violence and consent. I also want to emphasize that power relations do not follow a single dimension of coercion, compromise, or consent.

Raymond Williams, too, has stressed the dynamic, open-ended, and multiple character of hegemonic practices:

A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular . . . while by definition it is always dominant, it is never either total or exclusive.

(Williams 1977: 112, 113)

Because it is neither total nor exclusive, hegemony does not 'exhaust the full range of human practice, human energy, human intention [. . .]' (Williams 1977: 125, 1980: 43). On the contrary, in every case of hegemony, there are always various sorts of space, or moments, of resistance. This is possible, as Williams notes, because modes of domination 'select from and consequently exclude the full range of actual and possible human practice' (1977: 125, 1980: 43).

In general, Williams' reformulation of hegemony is innovative and sound. It is far too sophisticated to succumb to the attack that James Scott launches several years later. A point also noted by Michael Adas (1992: 133). Ultimately, the efficacy of any mode of domination cannot be measured as a simple difference between the weight of domination and the resistance of the dominated. Williams contends:

If . . . there were merely an imposed ideology, or if it were only the isolable meanings and practices of the ruling class, or of a section of the ruling class, which gets imposed on others, occupying merely the top of our minds, it would be – and one would be glad – a very much easier thing to overthrow.

(Williams 1980: 39)

As shown above, in most power relations the dominated, or segments of the dominated, participate in their own subordination, in varying degrees and styles.

However, Williams' formulation is not without problems. First, his formulation is highly abstract, so that it is never easy to relate it to more micro-level and empirically-observable phenomena. Second, he attempts to establish a utopian balance between the 'wholeness'³¹ of the effects of hegemony (1977: 108–9) and the disclaimer that such effects are less than total, as previously cited. Consequently, when weighing the significance of resistance

in the face of domination, Williams is caught somewhere in the middle of the hegemony debate.³² Third, and most important for our purposes, while stressing the dynamic qualities of modes of domination, he says nothing of the crucial importance of coercion and its interrelation with consent.

Culture and coercion

The lack of attention to coercion in accounts of power relations may be partly attributable to Gramsci himself, and not just to a careless reading of Gramsci's text. Anderson explains that Gramsci's preoccupation with the problematics of consent, 'at the expense of that of coercion' (1976/7: 49), was presumably motivated by his intention to complement the already taken-for-granted assumption concerning the ultimately necessary use of force and coercion for constituting or transforming domination.³³

Gramsci's real intention aside, Anderson considers Gramsci responsible for what he calls a 'weakness' (1976/7: 52, 76) in the Prison texts, which 'contains a potential political danger' (1976/7: 44). This is dangerous, according to Anderson, because Gramsci 'allowed the conclusion that bourgeois class power was primarily consensual' and that culture was a determinant mode of bourgeois power in the West. 'It thereby omits the unappealable role in the last instance of force' (Anderson 1976/7: 45).³⁴

Despite their disagreements, sympathetic readers of Gramsci (like those already mentioned: Anderson, Cox, and Mouffe) agree that Gramsci is aware of the importance of coercion to the extent that it is not to be subordinated by consent in any social formation. It is understandable, therefore, that many of these sympathetic readers reassert the importance of coercion in their response to Gramsci's concept of hegemony and to the contemporary debates that the concept has generated.

The logic of Marxist theory indicates that it is in the nature of the bourgeois State that, in any final contest, the armed apparatus of repression inexorably displaces the ideological apparatuses of parliamentary representation, to re-occupy the dominant position in the structure of capitalist class power. The coercive State machinery is the ultimate barrier to a worker's revolution, and can only be broken by pre-emptive counter-coercion.

(Anderson 1976/7: 76)

Coercion as a primary means of state rule is of course a classic notion with a long history well beyond Marxism, as Anderson suggests. Vico, Machiavelli, Sorel, Fanon, and Foucault are some of the key thinkers whose contribution to this view has been well documented in Western literature (see Anderson 1976/7; Said 1988: 55). Weber's famous definition of the State as a body that holds the monopoly of legitimate violence over a given territory under-

scores this view, which finds further elaboration in the work of Anthony Giddens (1987).

Alluding to Weber, Anderson describes the working of consent and coercion as the “normal” condition in Western bourgeois-democratic states. Ideological subordination of the masses is ‘in effect simultaneously and indivisibly *dominated by culture* and *determined by coercion*’ (1976/7: 42). The conditions of this subordination are, in Anderson’s words:

constituted by a silent, absent force which gives them their currency: the monopoly of legitimate violence by the State. Deprived of this, the system of cultural control would be instantly fragile, since the limits of possible actions against it would disappear. With it, it is immensely powerful – so powerful that it can, paradoxically, do ‘without’ it: in effect, violence may normally scarcely appear within the bounds of the system at all.

(Anderson 1976/7: 43)

Anderson’s observation above is largely in agreement with Cox’s reading of Gramsci on hegemony:

To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time.

(Cox 1983: 164)

Still speaking specifically of Western bourgeois-democratic states, Anderson envisions a situation of ‘supreme crisis’, where ‘coercion becomes both *determinant and dominant*’ (1976/7: 44). And this, he adds, ‘is a law of capitalism’.

Apart from his rational-instrumentalism, I find Anderson’s analysis tenable. But what he says is true not only of Western bourgeois-democratic states. Nor is the phenomenon he describes uniquely a ‘law of capitalism’. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a historical case that counters Anderson’s observation. Undoubtedly, differences exist among various states’ power relations, their various methods of deploying violence and the workings of their ideological apparatus. These differences have been a matter of debate over power relations. More specifically, the question of a post-colonial mode of domination as distinct from its colonial and metropolitan counterparts has become another major issue in the debate.

Post-colonial specificity

In New Order Indonesia, as in many contemporary militarized societies, coercive forces do not simply sit idle in the background and come to the forefront only in moments of crisis. As suggested in the preceding chapters, very

often these forces make their appearance excessive and ostentatious in public. To repeat Rhoda E. Howard's description of Kenya in the 1980s, 'actual physical coercion frequently becomes the weapon of first, rather than last, resort against the opposition . . . when all else failed' (1991: 81, 93). Coercive forces appear as elements of the dominant culture itself! They assert themselves in official simulacra. Therefore, examining the culture of terror as a dominant discourse is more urgent than is generally assumed.

Having been born and raised in New Order Indonesia, one of my astonishments about Western societies in my first encounter with them in the early 1970s was the hierarchized separation between verbal and physical interaction. To a naive teenage outsider like myself, Westerners often appear to have the ability to be very aggressive to each other or the state apparatus, but strictly in words, while refraining from making any physical assault on the object of their attack. The state alone seems to reserve the legal and legitimate monopoly of physical violence. Westerners appear to take this practice for granted as "normal". Has this institutionalized separation not made the debate over consent and coercion possible and important? And, from this do we not see some of the reasons for the attraction of post-structuralist attempts to deconstruct that separation?

Outside Western industrial and liberalist societies, for better or worse, states have been obsessively intimidated by the words of dissidents. All of the preceding chapters have demonstrated this phenomenon. The New Order state ruthlessly repressed "independent" thought, but non-state agents have strikingly similar dispositions towards symbolic violence. Likewise, successive forms of radicalism throughout the history of the society have never failed to accord high status to the importance of ideas. Both the dominated and the dominant share a common discourse and set of values. This disposition does not preclude the usually known "anti idealist" movements of Marxism. Robert Cribb (1985) characterizes the Indonesian Marxist tradition as one that laid emphasis on the world of ideas, rather than class-based revolutionary action. In the same vein, Margaret Scott (1990) observes that for the PKI, '[i]deas became a potent weapon and literature, the arts and the universities became major battlefields'. To emphasize the irony, I must also add that by and large, the Indonesian Marxist tradition predominantly subscribed to the "classical" tenets of Marxism, not the so called "Western Marxism" in which ideas occupy a much more significant status (see Anderson 1976/7 for a comparative discussion between them).

For anyone under the spell of Western ethnocentrism, it is tempting but wrong to be seriously upset about the all-embracing official censorship in societies like Indonesia, and to describe it primarily as a violation of human rights. Unlike the workings of censorship, exclusion, and silencing in Western bourgeois-democratic societies, censorship in their postcolonial counterparts is neither subtly hidden behind the facade of "Asian-style" democracy, seriously enforced, nor politically significant. Because it is not hidden, no "archaeology of knowledge" *a la* Foucault (1972) is necessary

to unearth it. Vulgar repression and censorship in postcolonial societies rejects the Western-derived identification of coercion with the body politic and persuasion with the realm of subjective consciousness.

In the West, Michel Foucault has been famous, among other things, for his erudite investigation into how contemporary power demands docility from subjects through self-surveillance and discipline. In New Order Indonesia, state agents unsolicitedly made regular and overt pronouncements, demanding that 'society should police itself'.³⁵ Contemporary Indonesians hardly need a Foucault, Illich or Bourdieu to inform them that schools (like factories or hospitals) have carceral elements. The then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces implied this in his 1990 call for special security measures during school vacations (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 19/06/1990: 11). By no means is this to suggest that the authorities' unashamed desire for social control mirrors reality in practice throughout, and thus that Indonesians are helplessly more repressed than Westerners. Can the reverse not conceivably be true? The Indonesian state agents' pronouncements are significant precisely because of the obvious lack of self-policing. In the West, radical thinkers like Foucault or Illich are allowed to speak subversively because they do not threaten the status quo, given the entrenched state of self-policing. In Indonesia the conscious manufacturing and sanctifying of simulacra announce the absence of a totalitarian capacity of an ambitious regime.

It is equally tempting – but wrong – to dismiss complacently all "pretexts" of post-colonial state violence against individuals who do nothing to oppose the regime except speak, think, and write. To dismiss them amounts to belittling the capacity of those victims that sympathetic observers paradoxically try to defend. But the opposite extreme is equally unhelpful. Ideologically motivated self-delusion through overestimation of the resisting force of the dominated is of little value beyond morale boosting and as a contribution to the noble campaigning for human rights. I suggested earlier that the New Order state attempted to make superficial pretexts. We cannot take them at face value, but neither can we afford to dismiss them altogether. We can read and interpret them, although we will never achieve a final truth.

As discussed, and illustrated with empirical examples in Chapter 1, the power of ideas and words in non-Western societies is partly explicable in the light of the absence or minimalness of a separation between words and deeds, meanings and reality, the mental and physical, persuasion and coercion. Furthermore, regimes in these societies have usually been less successful in monopolizing the legitimate use of violence. We must keep in mind those differences, suggested only sketchily here, as we try to explore the significance of the various empirical observations presented in the previous chapters (though they are of course not clear-cut differences between two types of homogeneous societies).

There is much to be learned from Achille Mbembe's 'The Banality of Power and the Aesthetic of Vulgarly in the Postcolony' (1992a), and the debate it has provoked.³⁶ The term "post-colony" is useful, but not without

the danger of homogenizing the significantly heterogeneous plural entities. The same is true of the “post-colonial” mode of domination, or of the “post-colonial” state terrorism I have been invoking in this book. Some observers suggest that we avoid those terms, because of some parallel and historical links between elements of post-colonial power relations and those of the colonial, pre-colonial, or metropolitan societies. However, to drop those terms and to lump together all modes of domination under one category is to overlook significant differences and the asymmetry of relations of power across the globe.

Against the danger of essentializing “post-colonial” modes of domination, differences among them, or their differences from those of colonial, pre-colonial, or metropolitan, Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s suggestion is appealing. As noted in Chapter 5, he proposes that we focus our research on the neutral question of ‘under what conditions is the vulgarity . . . [of state power or state terrorism] . . . enhanced or weakened through public discourses and manifestations?’ (1992: 79). That position necessarily favours a study of power relations ‘through historical particulars, rather than as a general principle’ (1992: 80). Still in keeping with the spirit of problematizing dichotomous categories in recent studies of power relations (dominant/dominated, consent/coercion, or post-colonial/colonial/metropolitan), post-structuralists have made a major contribution. To their methodological criticism we must now pay due attention.

Post-structuralist criticism

Certain post-structuralist writings (e.g. Collier and Yanagisako 1989; Asad 1987; O’Hanlon 1988: 222–3; Mitchell 1990) question the validity of the use of metaphors of consent and coercion, either as alternatives or in combination. Mitchell (1990) observes that dualistic metaphors such as consent and coercion are misleading and bound to be self-defeating. In his view, they imitate and reproduce the effects of the power to be analysed and challenged. Thus, using such metaphors means collaborating with that very same power.³⁷

Contemporary power in capitalist societies, according to Mitchell, is effective as it manages to appear ‘as somehow non-particular and non-material, . . . something ideal, . . . [a] transcendental dimension of reality’ (1990: 569). It gives the illusion of coercion as a physical force that is external and threatening to the autonomous and self-constituted consciousness of subjects. Most authors mentioned in the debate on hegemony above admit the inseparability of consent and coercion. Mitchell mentions Jean Comaroff’s critique of similar dichotomies and her emphasis on their interdependence in her own study of power and resistance among the Tshidi of southern Africa. However, Mitchell wants more than this. He suggests that the dichotomies should be not reconciled but abandoned.

In my view, Mitchell posits a utopian project. His critique of the overuse of consent-coercion dichotomies is well taken, and his alternative understanding of the nature of power is bold and radical. However, his ambitious step is bound to meet an impasse, or 'the labyrinth without exits' as he himself calls it in an earlier, thematically related, and remarkably Derridean work (1989). Perhaps unwittingly, in attempting to push his critique furthest, Mitchell implies a totalizing capacity of the "new" mode of capitalist domination where there seems to be no space for opposition, resistance or avoidance. His postulated situation is one where 'power in fact becomes most internal, most integral, and continuously at work within social and economic practices' (1990: 571). Symptomatic of many post-structuralists, while offering an instructive 'alternative understanding' (1990: 545) of the working of contemporary power, he offers no clues about an alternative way of tackling the problem. If the use of consent-coercion is collaborative with domination, his critique is disorienting and disempowering.

I view Mitchell's endeavour as utopian rather than faulty. I find his insights useful. But this should lead us to question not only what alternative metaphors are more satisfying in lieu of consent and coercion, but also to the more important question of whether any metaphors could ever fully live up to his expectations. Most of us, including Mitchell, believe that there must exist some reality outside metaphor, language, and discourse. Some of us lament the imperfection and deception of prominent metaphors of the day as tools to grasp that reality. In a manifesto-styled article, 'Post-Modern Anthropology', Stephen A. Tyler writes that Post-modern Anthropology

declares that: 'The world is what we say it is' does not mean: 'The world is all we say it is' and asks: 'What sense can we make of a silent universe with no voice to speak the name of its silence?'

(Tyler 1986: 24–5)

In his discussion of Orientalism, Mitchell writes in a series of negative phrases that

[i]n claiming that the 'East itself' is not a place, I am not saying simply that Western representations created a distorted image of the real Orient; nor am I saying that the 'real Orient' does not exist, and that there are no realities, but only images and representations.

(1989: 236)

In his critique Mitchell implies the existence of a "real" referent of the social world which he calls "power", against which he appraises the signifying capacity of binary metaphors like "consent" and "coercion". What he does not tell us is that "power" is also a metaphor, itself highly problematic. Mitchell substitutes the binary opposition of "metaphors" and its implied counterpart ("non-metaphors") for that of the ideal (consent) and the

material (coercion).³⁸ Thus his critique of Clifford Geertz's metaphor of music in speaking of culture as a text seems to backfire: '[i]ts elusiveness begins to become apparent when one ceases adding metaphor to metaphor and starts trying to pin down the nature of this "unphysical" entity' (Mitchell 1990: 560).

Post-structuralist insight helps sharpen our sensitivity to the complexity of power relations. However, such insight need not pre-empt or dissolve attempts to deal with the difficulty of employing available and admittedly imperfect metaphors to confront the formidable complexity in question. M.J. Merquior's (1985) critical appraisal of the works of Foucault provides one of the early critiques of the view of omnipresent and omnipotent power, such as we find in Mitchell's.³⁹ Similar responses to the rise of post-modernism and post-structuralism came from feminists and minority groups in the 1980s in the West, among others Barbara Christian. Her critical response, coming from a critique of the recent critical theory that she considers to be 'as hegemonic as the world that it attacks' (1990: 572) may not be easily appreciated by those outside the marginalized positions of the minority or post-colonial Asia:

These writers did announce their dissatisfaction with some of the cornerstone ideas of their own tradition, . . . But in their attempt to change their orientation of Western scholarship, they concentrated as usual on themselves and were not in the slightest interested in the worlds they had ignored or controlled. Again, I was supposed to know them, while they were not at all interested in knowing me. Instead they sought to 'deconstruct' the tradition to which they belonged even as they used the same forms, style, language of that tradition, forms that necessarily embody its values.

(Christian 1990: 573)

Christian does not mind if contemporary theorists want 'to philosophize about how we know what we know'. What she resents is 'the fact that this particular orientation is so privileged and has diverted so many of us' from more pressing issues such as social and material inequity (1990: 573, 574). As I have discussed elsewhere (Heryanto 1995b: 41, 2002a: 19), there is an irony in the ways these approaches have been deployed by outsiders to analyze Southeast Asian realities. Many of these post-isms, particularly Foucault's archaeology of knowledge and account of the discourse of power and Derridean deconstructive strategies, are radical self-critiques in their self-conscious challenge to some of the most fundamental givens in Western epistemology and social order from within the very structures and discursive practices they are critiquing. The main targets of these approaches as originally developed are not knowledge or domination in general, but specifically Western knowledge, violence and domination (R. Young 1990: 17–19). In the hands of some Southeast Asianists in the West, however, these new approaches have been 'a handy methodological instrument both

for ridiculing post-colonial despots,' and depreciating those who live under these despots, while at the same time 'enhancing professional credentials in the increasingly competitive academic industrial complex' (Heryanto 1995b: 41). In doing so, they recuperate – most likely in unconscious ways – the sort of domination and discursive practice that these approaches were originally meant to attack.

It remains unresolved how intellectuals from minority groups or post-colonial societies should confront the hegemonic discourse of the privileged West. Many are not as optimistic or utopian as Christian. They do not yet see a way to make any promising radical critique of the foundation and practice of dominant Western discourse from any position totally outside that tradition (see e.g. Chatterjee 1990: 120; Clifford 1988: 11; O'Hanlon 1988; R. Young, 1990). Others see that "entanglement" is not a very bad thing (for more on this see Heryanto 2002a: 20–1).

Conclusion

To conclude, let me sum up my position on the potential complexities pertaining to the recent debate over modes of domination, resistance, consent and coercion. Any form of domination involves some degree of denial of unequal relations, of domination, or of exploitation. A guarded use of dualistic metaphors such as the 'dominating/dominated' to designate agents within a form of social asymmetry can still be useful to a certain limit, given their generalizing qualities as analytical devices. The denial of existing domination may take a form of mystification, within or without simulacra. Either way, this denial operates inseparably from the forces of coercion and violence, past or present. Where mystification takes place, it is not necessarily and exclusively deliberate manipulation by the ruling group. As mentioned earlier, if there is such a thing as a dominant ideology, it often functions primarily to reinforce the ruling groups' cohesion rather than to deceive the ruled and to obtain their consent. Hence the former's tendency to be lured into the belief that they really control the subordinate.

Self-mystification is not the monopoly of any particular group. When the ruled are mystified, it is often the result of their own making rather than something external imposed upon them. Stable domination inevitably involves some degree of participation, if not direct collaboration, of the dominated in the social reproduction which is against what outsiders view as their own interest. The participation of the dominated usually involves a mixture of both their further subordination and fragmented resistance. Self-mystification contains contradictions and conviviality.

No domination is total, exhaustive, or permanent. This is not always due to the relative success of deliberate resistance to the dominance, but also to shortcomings of various kinds in the dominant group. Resistance or opposition to the status quo is, again, never a monopoly of any group from any particular position within an asymmetrical social structure. Challenge to

the social order may come through divisions within the dominant as well as the subordinate groups. The opportunity for and the force of the challenging groups may be different across time and societies, and there is no satisfying general theory or method available for us to explain those differences universally. They require study of the particulars.⁴⁰

Conversely, resistance is not simply a direct function of objective opportunity, subjective consciousness of the injustice, and material prowess on the part of the dominated agents either individually or in combination. Opposition may derive energy and inspiration from illusion or mystification about injustice or moral imperatives. There can be a lack of active opposition among those who have both the awareness of the injustice and sufficient material resources to challenge the status quo. Lack of challenge to the status quo may derive from apathy, opportunism, or other reasons. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers offer a case in point when they refer to the 'paradoxical combination of extreme media servility and minimal state control of those media' in the USA (1991: 17). Cohen and Rogers mention survey data in the USA that regularly confirms widespread public conviction that the US government contains corrupt, immoral and undemocratic features. 'But this confirmation is provided in a context of *profound stability*' (1991: 24). This leads them to draw the conclusion that

Even individuals who know the ugly truth may consent for reasons of, for example, material self-interest, cynicism, fatigue, or simple lack of concern, and much evidence suggests that many *do* consent for some combination of these reasons. . . . This suggests that something other than illusion and ignorance are producing that stability.

(Cohen and Rogers 1991: 24)

State terrorism is a mode of domination where consent, coercion and narratives are neither separable nor easily distinguishable from one another. Agents of state and their victims are both active perpetrators as well as being actively affected by the perpetration. However, this neither dissolves nor reduces social inequality and unnatural suffering. It remains a mode of domination.

The past chapters suggest that the New Order state's adoption of terrorism was not because it had full control of its citizens and confidence in its authority. To the regime, massive violence and show trials were not simply rational instruments of domination. Terror prevailed and violence broke out because of mutual paranoia between the perpetrating agents and their victims. These can be efficacious, thanks to the dominant discursive practice shared by agents of the state and the victims alike.

State terrorism is so pervasive that it seems to normalize the lives of contemporary Indonesians, and becomes difficult to recognize outside its reign. Thus I can sympathize with the reservation among some foreign observers of Indonesia to my proposed use of the term "terror" – as I did –

prior to the US-led anti-terrorism campaign following the 11 September 2001 violence in New York. In New Order Indonesia state-terror had the impersonal quality of 'the opacity and permanence of things' that can 'escape the grasp of individual consciousness and power' (Bourdieu 1977: 184). Even the perpetrating agents of the state might not have recognized the process as such. Neither did they need to.⁴¹

This last chapter indicates some aspects which are involved in the making of the opacity discussed above. Of crucial importance is the coercive force of torture, violence and terror that constitute and are reconstituted by the dominant discourse. A sense of rationality does not precede, let alone motivate, state terrorism. Violence and terror invent their own rationality where one does not pre-exist. As Taussig explains it '... the victimizer needs the victim for the purpose of making truth, objectifying the victimizer's fantasies in the discourse of the other' (Taussig 1992a: 138).

Perhaps there is more than that. I suspect there are both parallels and genealogical links between yesterday's anthropology and culture and today's state terrorism. They are all marred by a totalizing ambition, 'in which the same constitutes itself through a form of negativity in relation to the other' (R. Young 1990: 13). Anthropology and culture were to the formation of the "West" via European colonial construction of the "East" (see Kahn 1989; Said 1985, 1988; Clifford 1988; R. Young 1990; Dirks 1992) what state terrorism is to the making of contemporary states' self-identity via the construction of subversives.

Glossary

Note on names

Most Indonesians, like their first two presidents, have neither 'first', 'last' or 'family' names. This also applies to Indonesians whose names consist of two or more words. In the following list, entries of Indonesian names are organised a little differently from the general practice in Western literature. In the case of a name consisting of more than one word, the most commonly used is put first. For instance, Ngadimin Brontak is listed below in the reverse not because 'Brontak' is his family name, but because the person is mostly known as 'Brontak'.

It is common to find names of older Indonesians which are spelled in more than one way. The name of the New Order president is spelled 'Soeharto' in this book, although some authors prefer to spell it 'Suharto', as appears in some of the citations.

BAKIN *Badan Koordinasi Intelejens* or 'Intelligence Coordinating Body'.

BAKORSTANAS *Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional* or 'Coordinating Body for Assisting the Consolidation of National Stability'.

BAKORSTANASDA provincial branch of BAKORSTANAS.

BAP *Berita Acara Pemeriksaan* refers to a number of legal documents, including 'records of interrogation' and 'minutes of court hearings'.

DPR *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or 'People's Representative Council'.

DPRD *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* is the provincial-levelled People's Representative Council.

Dwi Fungsi 'Dual Function', official doctrine of the armed forces, giving military officers and soldiers the power to occupy leading and managerial positions in civilian life and institutions.

ET Eks Tapol ('ex-political prisoner').

G-30-S/PKI *Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia*, the '30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party', is the New Order's official designation of the abortive coup d'état on the late evening of 30 September 1965 and early the following morning.

- Hasyim Rachman** Chief Director of Hasta Mitra Publishing House. Hasyim Rachman was one of the thousands of people suspected of being associated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) that were sent to the island of Buru, being fellow inmates to Pramoedya A. Toer. Upon their release in 1980, Hasta Mitra was the first to publish all Pramoedya A. Toer's works, which were banned by the government in the first months of their respective publication dates.
- Kasto** employee of Hasta Mitra, a publishing house directed by Hasyim Rachman.
- KEJARI** *Kejaksaan Negeri* or 'Office of District Attorney'.
- KEJATI** *Kejaksaan Tinggi* or 'Chief Public Prosecutor's Office'.
- KODAM** *Komando Daerah Militer*, 'Regional Military Command'.
- KODIM** *Komando Distrik Militer*, 'District Military Command'.
- KOPKAMTIB** *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* or 'Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order'.
- KOREM** *Komando Resort Militer* or 'Resort Military Command'.
- KSSPY** *Kelompok Studi Sosial Palagan Yogyakarta*, the Palagan Social Study Group of Yogyakarta, often shortened to Palagan.
- KUHAP** *Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Acara Pidana* is the Criminal Procedural Code, promulgated 1981. A revised version of the colonial code of criminal procedure for "Indonesian" natives.
- KUHP** *Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana*, Criminal Code, inherited from the Dutch colonial regime.
- LAKSUSDA** *Pelaksana Khusus Daerah* is the regional level organ of the KOPKAMTIB. On 5 September 1988 Kopkamtib and Laksusda were transformed into central and local co-ordinating security bodies called BAKORSTANAS, and BAKORSTANASDA.
- LBH** *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* or 'Legal Aid Institute'. It was founded in 1971 by prominent human rights activists. The LBH remains the most important source of legal counsel for political cases. It now has 13 branches in the country and they all offer legal service with no fee.
- NGO** Non-Governmental Organisation.
- OTB** *Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk* or 'formless organization'.
- Palagan** see KSSPY above.
- Pancasila** The official state ideology of the Republic of Indonesia, literally meaning 'Five Principles' (Belief in One God; Just and Civilised Humanity; Nationalism; People's Representation; Social Justice).
- PKI** *Partai Komunis Indonesia* or 'Communist Party of Indonesia', banned in 1966 immediately following the de facto transfer of state power from Sukarno to Major General Soeharto in March 1966. From then on the PKI was officially declared responsible for the aborted "coup" and the killing of six generals at the end of September 1965.

Notes

1 Remembered signs, dismembered bodies

- 1 I am grateful to Suhendra, executive director of Offstream Allied Film, for a complimentary video compact disc copy of the event (Rambadeta 2001).
- 2 One example that comes immediately to mind involved Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's president (2001–4). In 1997 the headquarters of her Indonesian Democratic Party was brutally raided by heavily-built men under the supervision of the state security forces, following an extended stand-off with the New Order government which opposed her chairpersonship and wide popularity in the months preceding a general election. The party launched a series of legal litigations against the government in the months that followed. Ironically the actual trials that took place during her presidency in 2003 indicted only five rank and file officers, and acquitted all defendants except one in 2004. Throughout the post-Soeharto years, and up to her presidency in 2001, Megawati established remarkably intimate political relationships with military officers, including the retired general Sutiyoso, the governor of Jakarta, who had been the Jakarta Military Commander when her party headquarters was raided in 1996. Disregarding the wide public protests, including those from her former dedicated supporters, Megawati became a staunch supporter of Sutiyoso's controversial reelection in 2002. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, Megawati's party won the largest number of votes, but her ascendancy to the presidency was obstructed by her opponents on religious grounds (namely several Muslim groups would not endorse a female leader), most strongly voiced by Hamzah Haz, Chair of the Islamic Unity Development Party. Then from 2001, Hamzah became Megawati's Vice-President.
- 3 Unless indicated otherwise, all translations in this book are mine. In most cases I have attempted a "surface translation", a notion I first learned from Alton L. Becker. I have tried to retain the original 'surface structures', and thus a "foreign accent" in the translation.
- 4 Following the novel's publication format, I will treat all references to the novel as if Arswendo Atmowiloto holds the sole and chief authorship. Following the standard official practice, I adopt the spelling 'G-30-S/PKI' (with dashes) for general discussion rather than the term used in the film/novel. 'G.30.S/PKI' has been used in some references in the ensuing chapters; I adopt this alternative spelling only when making direct quotations from such sources that use it. "Popular" fiction has been the standard term in Indonesian since the 1970s, referring, rather pejoratively, to literary works allegedly oriented primarily towards mass consumption, as opposed to aesthetic or socio-ideological accomplishment.
- 5 The film is now available in major CD shops in the popular video compact disc format (Virgo 2001). After *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, PPFN produced two other

films with similar or related themes, namely *Operasi Trisula* (1987) and *Djakarta 1966* (1988). In fact these two films are sequels to *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*. The production of these films is one indicator suggesting that the 1980s were a crucial period in the establishment of the New Order's ideological legitimacy. Krishna Sen (1994: 81) notes one other film, *Operasi* (1968), bearing a similar theme, whose production preceded *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, but notes that it 'was never released commercially'. After President Soeharto's involuntary resignation in 1998, the prominent film director Garin Nugraha produced the semi-documentary film *Puisi Tak Terkuburkan*, officially translated as *The Poet* (2000). In 2000, audiences at the Jakarta Film Festival also had access to screenings of an Australian-made melodramatic movie *The Year of Living Dangerously* (1983), which enjoyed some public attention because it is set in Indonesia during the 1965 turmoil. The most important cinematic challenge to New Order's version of the 1965 event comes in another foreign made documentary film *The Shadow Play* (2002), which was shown to the public in several cities in Java in October 2003. Aspects of the troubled past was one notable theme among local documentary film makers that took part in the 2004 Indonesian Film Festival (*Koran Tempo*, 08/11/2004), although none won any of the Festival awards.

- 6 According to *Tempo* (07/04/1984: 78–9), the production took two years to complete, costing more than one thousand million rupiah (US \$1 was Rp. 661 in 1982; Rp. 909 in 1983; and Rp. 1,026 in 1984) and involving over 120 actors plus over 10,000 extras.
- 7 A reader responded by protesting at both the illegitimate compulsion to see the movie and the unusually high price of the tickets (*Tempo* 05/01/1985: 10).
- 8 See *Kompas* (21/10/1984: 6).
- 9 Even with these minimally agreed fragments of information, one can easily and unwittingly fall into an ideologically biased narrative, as one organizes the familiar information, makes a beginning, chooses emphases (no matter how mild) or ellipses of the different parts, and gives a closure to the constructed narrative. For convenience, I will reproduce a very familiar version of the narrative that circulates among diverse and opposing camps.
- 10 For a more updated list and brief reviews, see Adam 2004; Purwadi 2003: esp. 1–15; Zurbuchen 2002: esp. 565 fn.3, 569–71.
- 11 'The development of mythic thought, as of any thought,' he notes, 'is both structured and open-ended, but the activity of exegesis depends on the positing of a restricted set of symbols by the hermeneutical imagination . . . a stable corpus for interpretation' (Clifford 1988: 86).
- 12 Early western media estimated the Beijing death toll at between 2,000 and 5,000 (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 22/06/1989: 10). Later estimates are lower. Although now disputed, Bertrand Russell wrote that 'in four months, five times as many people died in Indonesia as in Vietnam in twelve years' (in Caldwell 1975). I thank Mark Seldon for his inputs on updated death tolls of these events.
- 13 See Tanter (2002) for an analysis of the striking silence of the government and media in Australia.
- 14 Readers of Foucault will notice the difference between the working definition employed here and the Foucauldian concept of discourse. The latter declares the subject and content of discourse as totally irrelevant. However, Foucault's notion of discourse as practice is also very relevant to this study.
- 15 When discussing ethnographic authority James Clifford (1988: 39–40) mentions the distinction between discourse and text as Ricoeur and Benveniste had previously done: any discourse ceases to exist as soon as it is completed.

- 16 See the comparative assessments of Derridean deconstructionism with the Bakhtinian notion of heteroglossia in Allon White (1984), and with the Foucauldian notion of discourse in Edward Said (1978). See also Christopher Norris' reappraisal of Habermas' critique of Derrida (1990: 49–76); and the critique of post-structuralism in general from a feminist viewpoint (Hartsock 1987: 190) and from the perspective of ethnic minority writers in the West (Christian 1990: 572–4).
- 17 The New Order discourse draws a sharp dichotomy not only between friends and foes, placing them into two core categories *ekstrem kiri* (left extreme) and *ekstrem kanan* (right extreme) and thus positioning itself at the centre.
Ekstrem kiri refers not only to Marxist-oriented thinking and movements but also to any secular sympathy for the underprivileged, with populist connotations. *Ekstrem kanan* is the official designation not of a “right-wing” or defenders of state and capital, but Islamic-based alternative causes and discourse. So fundamental is the New Order's discursive dichotomy that even the space within a prison compound or the statistics of prisoners is invariably split into two: *ekstrem kiri* and *ekstrem kanan*.
Intolerance to plurality motivated the regime to dissolve the 10 existing parties in 1973 into three. Following the dominant iconology, the three parties are portrayed in all graphic representations in the fixed order: the ruling party Golkar (*Golongan Karya*: Functional Groups) in the middle, the Islamic PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*: United Development Party) on its “extreme right”, and PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*: Indonesia Democracy Party) on its “extreme left” (see Pemberton 1986: 3).
- 18 In *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* both the overstatement of the G-30-S/PKI's brutality and the narrative silence on the massacre of PKI are cases in point. Likewise, total dominance always takes a limited sphere, leaving other spaces for resistance and opposition or escape. I am grateful to Alton L. Becker for many private discussions of Ortega's observation that ‘each people leaves some things unsaid in order to be able to say others’. The notable Marxist literary critic Pierre Macherey is famous for a similar line: ‘for in order to say anything, there are other things *which must not be said*’ (1978: 85, italics original).
In contemporary Indonesian politics, the regime does not recognize the legitimacy of any “opposition”, let alone *trias politica*. The New Order government wanted not only consent, but *total* consent, at least in nominal representation and simulacra. Even discussions of how many times an incumbent president could be re-elected, or of nominating more than one presidential and vice-presidential candidate, were proscribed.
- 19 With eloquence, Bourdieu and Passeron (1977: vi, 4) formulate the mutually reinforcing relations between the dominant discursive practice and its pre-requisite condition: ‘every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations’.
- 20 Here the word is used in the plural form, its singular counterpart is ‘simulacrum’. See (1983b, 1988) for more on his concept of ‘simulacra’. For a critical assessment on Baudrillard, see Douglas Kellner (1989). I am grateful to Joel S. Kahn for bringing Baudrillard's insight of ‘simulacra’ to my attention, and to Keith Foulcher for making Baudrillard's works accessible.
- 21 Of course, my previous reading of the texts from outside Indonesia is a privilege that has partially informed my thinking, and facilitated my choosing and reading the Indonesian text for discussion here. Now I cannot read the Indonesian master-narrative and pretend that I have not read its foreign counterparts.

- 22 On 5 October 1988 the Minister of Information issued a formal final warning of banning to the oldest Jakarta daily, *Merdeka*, in response to a recent editorial. The Minister had the power – and had used it several times – to ban any media at any moment without any legal procedure. The *Merdeka* editorial was accused of glossing over the PKI's involvement in the 1965 events by suggesting that the events were more complex and problematic than the familiar view allowed, and that foreign scholars were still pursuing the issue further for more truth (*Merdeka* 30/09/1988 and 06/10/1988). At the premiere of the film *Djakarta 1966*, President Soeharto stressed that the late President Sukarno's fall 'was by no means the [result of] a covert military coup' (*Kompas* 06/11/1988: 1). He added that wrong accounts about the succession of power from Sukarno to Soeharto were still circulating overseas.
- 23 Historian Asvi Warman Adam, who has been one of the country's most prominent critics of the official narrative of 1965–6, observes something that supports my analysis here. By looking at the index of the New Order government's latest version of the master narrative, Adam comes to the following conclusion (2000):

The book *The September 30 Movement, Rebellion by the Indonesian Communist Party* contains a list of names of 306 people (in 10 pages). If you look at the list, the case was essentially about President Sukarno (mentioned 128 times), two PKI leading figures (Aidit and Syam, 77 times), and two camps of Armed Forces officers (107 times). In the index of important words, three phrases appear most often: 1) September 30 Movement. 2) Council of Revolution. 3) Council of Generals. The word 'PKI' was mentioned only twice. So actually, this book talks more about the leading figures in the PKI, Aidit and Syam, than about the PKI as a socio-political organization.
- 24 In 1988 the accusation surfaced that President Sukarno might have conspired with the G-30-S (to subvert his own government!), provoking widespread popular outrage. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
- 25 Post-1965 political violence in Indonesia reminds us of Michael Taussig's remark of the case in Putumayo: 'The military and the New Right, like the conquerors of old, discover the evil they have imputed to these aliens, and mimic the savagery they have imputed' (1992a: 139).
- 26 'The point about silencing and the fear behind silencing is not to erase memory. Far from it. The point is to drive the memory deep within the fastness of the individual so as to create more fear and uncertainty in which dream and reality commingle' (Taussig 1992b: 27). This is conceivable because '[w]hat mattered for terror was how it was passed from mouth to mouth across a nation, from page to page, from image to body' (Taussig 1992b: 2).
- 27 Two ironies come to mind. First, soon after co-operating with the army in the massacre, the Muslim community became the next target of violent military repression (see Rochijat 1985). Second, four years after Arswendo Atmowiloto novelized *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, he became the defenceless target of a violent mob of Muslim youths who accused him of defaming Islam. He had published a poll asking readers to nominate their most admired figures, and the result ranked the Prophet Mohammad below several other names. In a politically motivated act intended to demonstrate sympathy with the protesters, the government brought Atmowiloto to court and sentenced him to five years in prison.
- 28 *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* tells us that the G-30-S conspirators described those generals differently in a radio talk on the morning of 1 October: 'These generals and officers are power-thirsty, neglecting the welfare of their subordinates, living in luxury on their subordinates' sufferings, humiliating women, wasting the

- state's money. They must be kicked out of the Army and be punished accordingly' (Atmowiloto 1986: 168).
- 29 I am grateful to David Bouchier for his information about the publication of books in the late 1960s on the events of 1965. The most notorious stories in these mass media that survived well into the 1990s originated from the Jakarta-army dailies. These published graphic accounts, in great detail, of the sadistic and barbarous torture by PKI cadres of the seven officers before plunging into a mass orgy. These accounts fly in the face of the official autopsies conducted by a team of five forensic experts under the order of Major General Soeharto himself. See Anderson (1987) for a translation of the documents and a helpful introductory note.
 - 30 Subsequent chapters will discuss major political events in this period. Suffice it to note here that since the mid-1980s, and more obviously before the mid-1990s, the New Order government faced a series of legitimation crises and significant domestic challenges (see Heryanto and Mandal 2003). Partly this was a result of the drastic decline of oil prices on the world market, growing friction within the ruling elite, and an increasing level of criticism on social issues on the part of the growing middle classes in business and in intellectual fields.
 - 31 The master narrative alleges that the People's Republic of China was implicated in the G-30-S by attempting to provide weaponry. This provides the official pretext for the material destruction of Chinese communities and subsequent discrimination (favourably in business, but negatively in all other spheres) against them. Contrary to the strong rumours and suggestions by some commentators, the ethnically Chinese population was not singled out as primary victim, nor did victims from this social group constitute the largest proportion of the total sum (see also Coppel 2002: 15).
 - 32 Southwood and Flanagan (1983: 100–20) examine at length the uninterrupted cycles of 'legal victimization' and re-victimization of these ex-political prisoners.
 - 33 Two notable cases were the government's publicized harsh threats of closure to two major Jakarta-based mass media publications, for publishing letters from readers who were previously political prisoners. Chapter 2 will elaborate upon this further.
 - 34 The official figure for those directly condemned to 'pariah status' [in Indonesian] in one of the three categories (A, B, or C) was 1.7 million in 1985 (*Sinar Harapan*, 09/10/1985: 1) and 1.4 million five years later (*Tempo*, 06/10/1990: 25). Even if these figures are reliable, we must multiply them to account for those who shared their plight by virtue of association either by marriage, blood or other links.
 - 35 So far-reaching have the effects of the phenomena been that the very word *terlibat*, "involved", has become taboo. A colleague told me about an interview he conducted during field research in the 1980s with a Javanese peasant. The interviewer was going to ask about local participation in building a bridge nearby. As soon as he said: 'Were you involved in . . .', the peasant turned pale and rushed to insist: 'No! I was not involved at all in anything'.
 - 36 Several ill-co-ordinated legal sources enforced this. Here I am referring to the notable 'Administrative Guidance' of KOPKAMTIB, No. 15/Kopkam/V/1982, dated 27 June 1982. For a brief survey of the various screening regulations see *Kompas* (09/09/1988: 1). It will be recalled that victimization by association had been in practice since 1965. The 1982 decision provided a legal basis for the extra-legal punishment far more extensive than might have been officially intended.
 - 37 Most of these events were not reported in detail. For fragments about the case see *Sinar Harapan* (07/11/1985: 1) and *Kompas* (17/11/1985: 1; 14/01/1989: 1). For further analysis see Chapter 2 of this book.

- 38 See van de Kok *et al.* (1991) for an assessment of the government's attempt to regain control and order over this chaotic discourse.
- 39 This regulation, still effective at the time of writing, is well-known as *Litsus for Penelitan Khusus*, "Special Investigation" of Presidential Decree No. 16/1990, dated 19 July 1990. A point of special importance in the document defines what constitutes the charge, and thus automatically the conviction, of 'being involved in G.30.S/PKI . . . anyone, any time, whose attitudes, utterance, conduct and writings contain elements that are in favour of the bygone PKI or G.30.S/PKI or in accord with the political lines and strategy of the PKI or G.30.S/PKI' (point 4.d., p. 6).
- 40 *TAPOL Bulletin* (No. 88/August 1988: 18) published an English translation of a report (*Tempo*, 16/07/1988: 24) of a university-teacher who went through a cycle of rehabilitation and stigmatization. Another victim, who will appear in Chapter 2, is H.J. Koesoemanto. He was alternately employed (cleared/rehabilitated) and dismissed (stigmatised) several times.
- 41 Commenting on the early release of some ex-tapols, the largely conservative daily *Kompas* (30/12/1977: 4) published a sincere editorial which now appears ironically naive: 'The government has declared them free unconditionally. It has requested that society treat them properly as fellow citizens, in everyday encounters as well as in employment. They no longer need 'free of [association/involvement] of the G30S' clearance, and companies need not worry about employing them . . .'.
- 42 See Dwipayana and Ramadhan (1988: 364). For an analysis of the killings see David Bouchier (1990).
- 43 See *TAPOL Bulletin* (No. 61, January 1984: 8–9). In Kediri, the corpse of a victim was crucified in front of a shop. Passers-by who lowered the body, out of pity, were later arrested and interrogated by the military (*TAPOL*, No. 61, January 1984: 10).
- 44 Speculating on the motive for the summary execution, Nordholt (2002: 48) suggests three converging causal factors; a) losing control over increasing crime, the state attempted to discipline and punish criminals; b) recouping central power, the central government destroyed the alliance between criminals and local authorities; and c) it was a war of proxy between two generals in Jakarta (Ali Murtopo and Benny Moerdani). Although it has some grounds, a "rationalist" theorization of this nature requires critical scrutiny, for the reasons just explained.
- 45 It is to be recalled that one lieutenant killed by the G-30-S was a mistaken victim. See Bouchier (1990: 197–9) for more parallels between *Petrus* and the 1965 massacre, and *TAPOL Bulletin* (No. 61, January 1984: 9–10; No. 64, July 1984: 10–11; No. 65, September 1984: 18) for the various and familiar ramifications of *Petrus*.
- 46 This observation came from various friends in Salatiga, a small Javanese town, my research base in much of the 1990s. Reportedly this naming was most popular among the underprivileged and, thus, most affected classes. It is unclear how widespread this naming was across regions.
- 47 Indonesians are fond of witty puns which in Java constitute a genre called *plesetan*. The word is a Javanese noun, a derivative of the verbal root word *pleset*, "to slip". Slips are a dominant element in Indonesian farce. I have attempted a modest account of the nature and political significance of *plesetan* during the New Order authoritarianism in Heryanto (1996b).
- 48 In New Order Indonesia, "Development" was one of the most salient keywords, referring to a self-styled ideology of the state and embracing all areas of state-sponsored programs – thus the capital letter and a status as an independent

noun henceforth. For more on the semantic history of the New Order's "Development" see Heryanto (1995a).

- 49 Golkar enjoyed the second-highest vote in the first post-1998 elections. Despite its tarnished reputation in public, especially in Java, Golkar has been the most powerful source of political power in many provinces away from Jakarta. One of its leading figures throughout the New Order period, Akbar Tanjung, managed not only to outlive the political history of Soeharto, but to hold his position as Chair of the parliament body Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Council of People's Representatives) even after the court found him guilty of serious corruption, and there were public demands for him to step down.
- 50 Although the names and composition of the teams are different from those in Kaliworo in 2000, the fearless young human-rights activist cum lawyer Esther Indahyani Jusuf is central to both.
- 51 Despite the conceivable elements of complicity by state officials in most of these incidents, it is not easy to determine the extent of their culpability, the point when and where they began to take part, or their motives.
- 52 See the special issue of *Asian Ethnicity* on 'Speaking out: Chinese Indonesians after Suharto', guest-edited by Sarah Turner and Pamela Allen (2003); especially relevant to the discussion here are the articles by Purdey (2003) and Allen (2003).

2 The implosion of stigmas

- 1 For a more general review in English of the sweeping stigmatization, see Motek (1988).
- 2 Given the significance of this statement, the original is provided here for readers who are familiar with the Indonesian language. The parallel with the 'war against terrorism' rhetoric since 2001 is striking.

Tak mudah mengenali gelagat orang komunis. Lebih-lebih lagi bila mereka bergerak 'di bawah tanah'. Dalam keadaan terpaksa, selagi lemah, mereka konon bisa menjelma bak bunglon, musang berbulu ayam, bermuka dua . . . untuk mencapai tujuan, mereka bisa menempuh cara apapun. Dengan kata lain, tujuan menghalalkan cara. Dalam praktek-operasional, sudah bukan rahasia lagi bila mereka selalu menerapkan penyusupan ke dalam organisasi atau lembaga-lembaga yang dapat mereka manfaatkan untuk perjuangan. Taktik yang terkenal dengan sebutan 'sistem sel' ini mereka lakukan di semua bidang untuk kemudian mereka kuasai: parpol, ormas, angkatan bersenjata, lembaga pemerintahan . . . mereka menghilang, menyamar, menyusup, bergerak di bawah tanah. Lalu diam-diam menghimpun kekuatan kembali. Setelah G-30-S/ PKI gagal misalnya, mereka melakukan taktik GTM (gerakan tutup mulut) dan OTB (organisasi tanpa bentuk).

- 3 The concept of key terms is adopted here from Raymond Williams: 'significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation; they are significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought' (1983: 15).
- 4 One infamous example of this was when hundreds of peasants near the town of Boyolali in Central Java in 1987 refused the ridiculously small compensation they were offered for their land where the government intended to build a dam, sponsored by the World Bank, that would flood six villages and affect 1,555 families. Around 25 men fled to nearby forests in hiding to avoid arrest and constant intimidation from local state officials and military rank and file. Others saw their ID cards stamped "ET" in order to intimidate the rest. For a journalist's report of the incident at the time, see *Kompas* (18/06/1987: 1). For a more critical analysis of the protracted case see Stanley (1994).

- 5 *Dwi Fungsi* (Dual Function) is the official designation for the New Order's conception of the military's role, giving it far-reaching power and responsibilities in non-military spheres including politics, business, the arts and sport, telecommunication, and education. For more details see Harold Crouch (1978) and David Jenkins (1984).
- 6 PNI A-Su is a derogatory term invented by outsiders. "*Asu*" is a swear word, literally meaning "dog" in low Javanese (the single largest spoken language in the country, its speakers outnumbering those of the national language *Bahasa Indonesia*).
- 7 The book generated one of the first heated controversies since September 1965 about the events of that time. At issue was the question of President Sukarno's role and responsibility in the 1965–6 affair. The author implied a considerable degree of culpability on his part. The book was published at the time when the government was launching a vigorous nationwide campaign to discredit the late president, which included a ban on the public display of Sukarno's portrait. This campaign, in turn, was a response to the shocking discovery of popular adulation for him during the PDI's (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, "the Indonesian Democratic Party") recent election campaign. The account of Sadjarwo's case here was taken from a report in *Editor* (11/02/1989: 20–1).
- 8 The survey's respondents were mostly from Java and Sumatera, with only 12 per cent from other islands. 53 per cent of the respondents were aged between 21 and 30, and 24 per cent between 31 and 40. About 33 per cent were students; 18 per cent were civil servants and military officers; another 18 per cent were employees in private enterprise; and 7 per cent were unemployed (*Tempo* 17/08/1985: 14).
- 9 The surveys were conducted by telephone (25–6 September 2002, and 29–30 July 2003). The total number of respondents were 825 (2002) and 865 (2003), 17 years of age or older, residing in the cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Palembang, Samarinda, Makassar, and Manado in 2002, plus Pontianak, Banjarmasin, and Jayapura in 2003.
- 10 Outside Indonesia, and often in foreign languages, the period witnessed the publication of memoirs by a participant in the anti-communist campaign from the 1960s and by surviving former political prisoners or their families. Examples include Rochijat (1985), Nusa (1987) *Inside Indonesia* (1990), Scrine and Lane (1990), Marni (1989) and Havelaar (1988–90). For a review of the domestic scene, see *Tempo* (08/10/2000).
- 11 Here I refer only to periodization, and not to the attribution of responsibility. In one private communication with me, Toer insisted that his jailing in 1963 was not by Sukarno's government, nor was it endorsed by President Sukarno. He attributed his imprisonment to the Jakarta military command as retaliation for his published book *Hoakiao di Indonesia* (*The Chinese diasporas in Indonesia*) (Toer 1960 and 1998). The book is a stinging criticism of the government's racist measures against Chinese traders in villages and of the regional military's excessive force during evictions of members of this ethnic minority in West Java.
- 12 For a fairly comprehensive bibliographic reference to Toer's life, his works and other people's writings about him, see the website <<http://radix.net/~bardsley/prampage.html>>. A newer but less extensive website is <<http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Orchestra/9632/>>.
- 13 See interview with Jusuf Ishak (*Inside Indonesia*, October 1989: 31) and an unpublished record of Hasjim Rachman's interrogation on the occasion of Rudy's prosecution, 14/11/1989, to be discussed in Chapter 5.
- 14 I was fortunate to have access to a copy of the manuscript prior to publication. When it was published I found some discrepancies between the manuscript and the book. When I reported this to Toer, and asked if it had been his own decision

to omit some sections, his answer was in the negative. He suspected that the poor quality of the press had been responsible for this and other shortcomings of the published novels.

- 15 One of the rare exceptions was the major newsmagazine *Tempo*. It ran both a small advertisement for one of Toer's works during this period and a mildly critical review of the first two volumes of the tetralogy. Significantly, this was only after they had been banned; the review was presented tactfully as part of a long report on the government's decision to ban them (*Tempo* 06/06/1981: 12–13).
- 16 As early as May 1981, translations of *Bumi Manusia* into six languages were underway (*Tempo* 06/06/1981: 12–13). At the time of writing, Toer's 50 works have been translated into 30 languages (*Tempo* 2002). In his testimony at Rudy's trial (20 August 1990), Hasyim Rachman of the Hasta Mitra Publishing House mentioned that Toer had been nominated for the Nobel Prize five times. PEN American Center awarded Toer their "Freedom-to-Write" citation in 1988.
- 17 This student was the young Hermawan Sulistyono who – 19 years later – became the first Indonesian to publish a doctoral thesis on the violence of 1965–6 (Sulistyono, 2000). The publication is more significant, since it is in Indonesian.

3 The Yogyakarta case

- 1 All names of the accused as well as their immediate relatives and fellow activists who appeared in court as witnesses are pseudonyms. A few exceptions are made for the names of senior figures who appeared before the same court because of their allegedly "unclean" status.
- 2 At about the same time, several other trials were held of those involved in the same or related demonstrations. The defendants were either non-students or were prosecuted under laws other than the Anti-Subversion Law. For more see *Inside Indonesia* (31/06/1992: 11).
- 3 In 1983 Southwood and Flanagan (1983: 172) noted that the arrest of Yap Thiam Hien, a well-known human rights activist and lawyer, prompted 'the one case where a G-30-S detainee became the subject of a release campaign' in early 1968. However, the scope of support for the Yogyakarta campaign, its accompanying violence and political consequences went well beyond the quick and successful campaign for Yap's release.
- 4 I am very grateful to Darmawan, Hidayat and Rudy for having generously provided details of their cases, reviewed lengthy drafts of an earlier study of their cases on which Chapters 3 and 4 in this book are based, and supplied many useful and critical comments on those drafts. Responsibility for any flaws in the accounts and analysis of their cases here is, of course, mine alone.
- 5 As soon as the newspapers revealed news of their exile there was public outrage. Both the Minister of Justice (whose reputation had just been badly damaged in a separate but well publicized conflict with a faction of the military) and his deputy at the General Directorate of Corrections denied any foreknowledge of or responsibility for their exile. They ordered the immediate return of Darmawan, Hidayat, and the six Bandung students to their original prisons, leaving the other four convicts from Yogyakarta in Nusa Kambangan. The embarrassed minister quickly suggested that local officers in Bandung and Yogyakarta were responsible for these allegedly aberrant actions. He called publicly for an inquiry into the case and promised to take disciplinary action against those found guilty. No one believed he meant it, and indeed nothing happened to any of the local officers subsequently.
- 6 Yogyakarta is second only to Bali in tourism. In the period that concerns us here, the transportation and industrial sectors obtained the biggest share

- (27.2 per cent or Rp. 7.29 thousand millions) in the annual expenditure budget of the local government (Rp. 26.8 thousand millions) (*Yogya Post* 02/06/1990: 8). In 1989 Yogyakarta attracted 178,421 (nearly 11 per cent) of the total 1,625,935 foreign tourists to Indonesia, supplying over 20 per cent of the local income (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 21/03/1990: 11). Yogyakarta's Malioboro sidewalk market is a favourite spot for tourists, where over 4,000 vendors offer exotic souvenirs (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 24/11/1990: 2). Malioboro is also a legendary place for gatherings of avant-garde artists at night.
- 7 For more details on these killings see Bouchier (1990: 185–7, 193); for their significance, and an open letter from an anonymous eye witness of the killings in Yogyakarta see *International Herald Tribune* (18/07/1983, reproduced in *TAPOL BULLETIN* 58 [July] 1983: 2).
 - 8 One cannot but wryly concur with the title of a 1984 Monash University publication, *Other Javas; Away from the Kraton* [Javanese Court] (Hatley *et al.* 1984). The island of Java constitutes only 6.75 per cent of the country's archipelagic territory (almost 1.9 million square kilometers), but it accommodates between 58.83 (in 2000) and 61.88 per cent (in 1980) of the polyglot population of 179.3 million (in 1990) or 206.3 million (in 2000) (BPS 1991, 2001).
 - 9 One intriguing consequence of this decision was that 'In 1977, twenty-one of the twenty-seven – that is, 78 per cent – of the provincial governors were army men. In Java, four of the five provinces or special territories had military governors, the one exception being the Special Territory of Yogyakarta' (Jenkins 1984: 47).
 - 10 As Hatley has perceptively remarked (1984: 9), 'current Indonesianness is – at centre – Kejawen [Javanese], statist, elitist and military'. But this is only half the story. Progressive and radical praxis are burgeoning there also.
 - 11 The total population of the DIY in 1988 was 2,998,332, of whom 435,061 lived in the municipality (KS 1989: 2, 35). In that same year over 145,000 foreign and 425,000 domestic tourists visited the city. In 2000 Yogyakarta's population was 3,122,268 and its population density was 980 (BPS 2001). The DIY has one municipality (*kotamadya*) at the centre, that is the city of Yogyakarta proper, and four surrounding regencies (*kabupaten*). The DIY covers an area of 3,185.80 square kilometers, only 32.50 of which belongs to the municipality.
 - 12 In 1990 the total combined length of streets in the municipality was 166.7 kilometers. The total number of motorized vehicles registered in Yogyakarta was over 100,000 (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 30/05/1990: 2), including nearly 300 actively operating taxis (*Yogya Post* 21/11/1990: 4) and 77,000 motorcycles (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 08/06/1990: 4), and there were 370 registered *andong*s (Tjokrokusumo 1990), and 50,000 bicycles (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 08/06/1990: 4). In the wider area of the DIY there was a total of 5,265,836 kilometres of roads with 244,822 registered motorized vehicles (*Yogya Post* 21/09/1990: 2).
 - 13 The qualifier has been commonly used in reference to Muhammadiyah for a convenient, albeit problematic, contrast to the 'traditional' and the country's biggest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, founded in 1926. A 1987 TAPOL report documented some of Muhammadiyah's achievements in that period: it has 'a membership of about one million, and runs some 20,000 schools, sixteen universities, twenty-one academies, nine general hospitals, hundreds of smaller clinics and over 10,000 mosques. The Muhammadiyah women's organization, Aisyah, also has an impressive array of girls' and women's educational institutions' (TAPOL 1987: 5). In 1990, in the city of Yogyakarta alone, Muhammadiyah had 33 elementary and 22 secondary schools.
 - 14 The *Laskar Jihad* won worldwide media attention during its short existence (2000–2), mainly for its mass and armed intervention in the bloody warfare in the Maluku islands and Sulawesi in support of its Muslim brethren against

- local Christians. Occasionally some of its members joined similar organizations in raiding entertainment centres (gambling, drinking, and prostitution) that are “un-Islamic”, or in making public vows to search and expel white tourists out of Indonesia by force. For more on *Laskar Jihad* see Davis (2002), Fealy (2001), *Koran Tempo* (26/01/2002), Paddock (2001), and Rahayu (2000).
- 15 In 1988 the adult population of the DIY was 1,926,420, of which 306,697 lived in Yogyakarta city proper. The total number of college and university students was 74,015 (KS 1989: 36, 90).
 - 16 Indonesia’s population in 1990 was 179.3 million. The latest estimate of the total student population in 1987/1988 was 1,179,500. They were enrolled at one of the 48 state or 744 privately run tertiary institutions across the nation (BPS 1991: 83). Even in Jakarta only one of every 53 residents was a student; the total number of students was 156,496 in a population of over 8,254,000 (BPS 1991: 41, 120).
 - 17 Parallels in minor details between the fate of this victim and the accused discussed in this chapter and the following one are worthy of mention. In response to the controversy about the rape case, state agents kidnapped the victim and forced her to sign an incriminating statement which later brought her to trial for allegedly fabricating the case, slander and instigating social unrest. During interrogation, she was ‘intimidated. Her head would be crushed to pieces if she refused to comply with the police. She was accused of being a member of Gerwani [a pre-1965 women’s mass organization with an affiliation to the PKI]’ (Kamajaya 1981: 90). Slamet Djabarudi, a local journalist, was detained for 9 days for publishing an investigative report on the rape in defence of the victim (which eventually facilitated her acquittal of these charges). For more on the aftermath of 1965 in Yogyakarta see Sullivan (1982: 92, 180–3).
 - 18 Censorship is more acute for public meetings. When I was invited to give a public talk in Yogyakarta in 1985, organized by *Kelompok Study Palagan* (which was co-founded by Hidayat), the committee demanded that I submit a draft of my talk, because the police would not issue permission for the meeting unless the material to be discussed was first cleared. A similar procedure was widely reportedly to have applied to the process of obtaining permission for play productions and poetry readings.
 - 19 Suryadi A. Radjab (1991) also construes the construction of New Order student activism as inseparable from the power of the dominant discourse. However, his analysis and conclusions differ substantially from mine below. He views the discourse in question as a New Order invented myth, and he adopts a politico-economic structuralism (popular among student activists in Indonesia in the 1980s) to challenge that myth.
 - 20 See an interview with Arief Budiman in *Suara Merdeka* (09/05/1986: 12).
 - 21 Actually this designation has been broadly applied by the Indonesian public to so-called “intellectuals” more generally. In the controversy over Yahya Muhaimin’s published dissertation in 1991 (see above), many expressed concern that an academic thesis having gone through a formal examination should be put under question at all. Unlike more senior intellectuals, in the general public imagination students best personify (or at least personified during the New Order rule) the ideal image, by virtue of their being seemingly pure, and free from the dirty compromising world of politics and the economy. Their enthusiasm for issues of human rights and social justice and their youthful spontaneity give them special credentials. To dismiss the validity of contemporary student protests, the government regularly makes accusations that external parties “mastermind” (*mendalangi*) these students, invoking the alleged role of the PKI in 1965. In this way, the government preserves the fetishized image of students’ moral purity and political innocence.

- 22 Significantly, the three activists in Yogyakarta were given much more severe sentences than the more overtly subversive leaders of the anti-colonial movements in the 1930s. Sukarno, a most dangerous nationalist, was sentenced to four years by the colonial regime, which was later commuted to two years. For another historical comparison between Sukarno's political career and prosecution and those of Budiman Sudjatmiko, leader of the People's Democracy Party mentioned earlier, see Heryanto (1997a).
- 23 Freedom to organise and freedom of speech are most visible during this period. During the New Order period, the 1945 Constitution stipulated that the People's General Assembly held the highest sovereignty in the country. The Assembly elected and re-elected the President. From 1987 and up to 1996, the Assembly consisted of 1,000 members, of whom 600 (including more than 200 seats allocated for the military and police) were government appointees and 40 per cent were elected. Of those elected, around 70 per cent belonged to the government's ruling party (Golkar), and the rest had to pass government screening. Once seated in the Assembly, any member who spoke critically of the status quo was liable to being recalled immediately by their parties – as actually took place on several occasions. Although the Constitution has undergone several amendments since 2001 and especially in 2002, the parliament continues to suffer a serious lack of public respect and trust.
- 24 Even as late as 1989–90, after years of unprecedented expansion in state-sponsored education, only 6.8 per cent of state employees were university graduates, and only 1.4 per cent of all the nation's labour force had any post-secondary school training (BPS 1991: 26, 65).
- 25 A 1989 census report shows that at least 96.65 per cent of Indonesian students were directly financed by their parents. The rest found other funding, such as from relatives and scholarships (Pratikno 1991).
- 26 According to the 1989 national census, most Indonesian high school graduates claimed that they could not go to tertiary institutions as they wished because of financial constraints (Pratikno 1991). My rough estimate, from fieldwork in 1990–1, suggests that the average student's living allowance in Yogyakarta was around Rp. 150,000 per month (when AUS \$1 was equal to Rp. 1,400 and US \$0.70). The officially stipulated minimum wage in Yogyakarta that year was Rp. 900 per day, this being the lowest figures of all Indonesia's 27 provinces (*Kompas* 28/04/1990: 2). Young shop assistants in the city, 68 per cent of whom had graduated from secondary school, received Rp. 1,125 per day (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 07/01/1990: 12; 21/10/1990: 1, 11). In 1988, 78 per cent of the labour force in the DIY had only completed elementary school (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* 11/04/1990: 2).
- 27 The parallel with the logic of the “war against terrorism” since 2001 is striking, especially in Indonesia following the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002. Nonetheless, I will refrain from any serious comparative analysis that will divert from the issue at hand.
- 28 Once again, the parallel with the post-2001 antagonism between Islamist radicals and the “West” (whatever that means) is striking, although no bombings or suicide planes were involved in the anti-authoritarian sentiments among Indonesia's student activists in the late 1980s. Each fed the other's fantasies, premonitions, intimidations, and provocations, and together they collaborated to build up their aggressive action and retaliation.
- 29 The original word is *'mencemarkan'* which can also be translated as “discredited”. The expression in the original was as strange as it sounds in the English translation suggested here. One possibility was that Soleh did not want anyone to

lead him and his gathering into a situation that would be deemed politically 'unclean' in the eyes of the security officers.

- 30 The Attorney General had signed the banning decree the day before, but the press did not publish the banning until the day after Darmawan's arrest.
 - 31 Due to the small size of Yogyakarta and the small number of activists at this time, some of the student leaders and intelligence officers became familiar faces to each other through repeated encounters. Like his colleagues, Brontak also worked as a bouncer in a pub where college students went. Ironically, the word "brontak" in Indonesian means "rebel".
 - 32 In a letter to me, Darmawan described Mawardi's appearance in detail with profound repulsion, identifying him as a 'Pangemanann with a double "n" at the end', who put Darmawan in a 'Rumah Kaca'. The first phrase is from Toer's semi-historical novel *Rumah Kaca*, referring to the antagonist, a native who worked for the colonial East Indies intelligence office and was responsible for the arrest of Minke, the nationalist hero.
 - 33 This constitutes yet another parallel with the interrogations that generated the dramatic confessions of the first few suspects in the Bali bombing in 2002.
 - 34 The standard practice included beating with electric cables, putting a table leg on a suspect's toe and sitting on it, putting bullets between a suspect's fingers and squeezing them, and burning parts of the body with lighted cigarettes. The London based *TAPOL BULLETIN* regularly features some of the experiences of former communist suspects and contemporary Muslim victims in the country. See Asia Watch's published reports (AWC 1989, 1990a: 45; 1990b: 37–40, 49–52) and Southwood and Flanagan (1983: 106–9) for more on this matter.
- Upon his return from Nusa Kambangan island in September 1990, Darmawan shared with me a story from a first-hand source. An old man from Central Java was arrested because of a lecture he gave. He was put inside a sack and then beaten from the outside because he refused to sign a prepared confession. Being still resistant, he was not released from the sack and the whole thing was thrown into water. Only when his life was threatened did they pull him out and open the sack to proceed with the interrogation. However, because he was still unwilling to sign the confession, the torture was repeated day after day. On the fifth day he broke down and gave up. He was sentenced to 12 years. He described himself as weak, unlike other inmates who endured worse treatment.
- 35 Letter 22/06/1990.
 - 36 Letter 22/06/1990.
 - 37 According to Darmawan, soon after his arrest his brother went to Darmawan's close friends to ask for advice about what to do with these books. They all suggested that these books should not be removed, because the military officers would find out and consider this an act of conspiracy (Letters, 31/08/1991; 16/05/1992).
 - 38 Hasyim Rachman was one of the directors of Hasta Mitra, for whom Kasto worked.
 - 39 The book was translated by Th. Sumartana and published in Indonesia in 1986 by Sinar Harapan. It was banned by the government in the same year.
 - 40 This is another publication from TAPOL in London that the government proscribed. The book is a critical report and analysis of the New Order government's mistreatment of the Islamic political leaders and aspiration.
 - 41 It may not be obviously clear to readers in the more politically liberal societies why such a book was politically sensitive in Indonesia during this period, and possessing it was very risky. The next chapter shall help clarify more vividly the significance of this matter.

- 42 Guruh Sukarnoputra is a prominent musician, son of former President Sukarno. In 1993 he became a controversial member of the People's General Assembly for opposing the re-endorsement of President Soeharto's tenure. In a letter (31/07/1991), Darmawan told me that he and his friends had the pictures of Marx and Engels reproduced at a local studio from a book cover, and put them on their bedroom walls. On the frontispiece of the copy of *Anak Semua Bangsa* which officer Brontak confiscated, Darmawan had written: 'Dear Pramodya A. Toer, my teacher, my friend, my hero, my idol. . . . With the recent publication of your works, you have proven that Soeharto's military repression has failed to crush you . . .' (Letter, 01/02/1992).
- 43 *Ibunda* is an Indonesian translation, apparently by Toer, of Maxim Gorky's *Mat* that has been published in several editions (i.e. Gorky 1951). One of several English translations of the novel is by Wettlin (1949). Hidayat had borrowed this novel from Darmawan, who had borrowed it from a public library. Several months afterwards, mass media and human rights reports in Indonesia and overseas reproduced the incorrect story of Hidayat being implicated in Darmawan's case due to his borrowing *Ibunda* (e.g. *Editor* 22/04/1989; *Inside Indonesia* No. 18/ April: 1989: 20; and No. 19/July: 1989: 8; *TAPOL* No. 93/June: 1989: 8; *AWC* 1989: 70). This story originated from Hidayat's (and later his close friends') initial assumption about why Darmawan had come to look for him with the intelligence officers.
- 44 Actually in the days that followed there was interest, understanding and attempts from both sides to explore extra-legal arrangements in regard to their respective personal interests. However, no agreement was achieved owing to inhibition and mutual distrust.
- 45 Political prisoners in Indonesia and the Philippines that I talked to made similar remarks, saying that waiting for the moment of an expected arrest was more disturbing and painful than the actual arrest or detention.
- 46 Hidayat told me later that he voluntarily offered to clean the KODIM hall, because he wanted to explore the building and to find out if Darmawan was still being kept there.
- 47 Interview, 07/10/1990.
- 48 This strong phrase is hard to translate. Roughly, "*ampun*" can be translated into the phrase "please have mercy upon me". *Ampun* is an expression of full submission of a religious convert to God, or a child to an angry parent, and thus by extension of a subordinate to her/his superior or conqueror. "Pak", derivative of *Bapak* ("father") is the common term of address to adult males, and can be the equivalent for "Sir".
- 49 Letter from Darmawan, 28/07/1990.
- 50 Letter from Hidayat, 09/08/1991.
- 51 The following cited conversation is taken from letters sent by Darmawan to me (11/08/1990 and 14/08/1990).
- 52 It was not entirely clear whether Hidayat had any idea at all about possible reasons for Harman's detention. Earlier we noted his account of his incriminating discussion with the intelligence officer about Harman.
- 53 The rest of this section is based primarily on a letter from Darmawan to me (14/08/1990). Unless indicated otherwise, all citations in the following are from that letter.
- 54 Ideas and statements from this open discussion were used by the public attorneys to prosecute Darmawan and Hidayat (see Chapter 4).
- 55 The following description of Rudy's arrest is based primarily on his partner's letters to me dated between 19/02/1991 and 02/05/1991. The subsequent account

of Rudy's interrogation is based on his long series of interviews with me in March 1991.

- 56 For a report of this demonstration see *Kompas* (12/06/1989: 3). Many cases in 1989 and the early 1990s encourage me to think that immediate protests against illegal abduction, detention and interrogation in political cases may save innocent suspects not only from torture but also from formal prosecution. Although this has not always been the case, such protests can be an effective initial reaction. This point indicates that the seemingly terrifying and powerful military apparatus can be more susceptible to pressure than most of the population are accustomed to believe.
- 57 Much worse "security" measures were adopted in several other incidents. In my former home base, where I conducted this study, there was a case in point. In an attempt to pick up a single, unarmed and in fact very compliant young activist for interrogation, the local and regional security apparatus barricaded off the whole neighbourhood. The arrest was under the pretext of his suspected involvement in distributing a 1991 calendar with a caricature illustration which allegedly insulted the President and his government.
- 58 In a cell next to his own, there were two men arrested on suspicion of involvement in the Lampung resistance. For details of this incident, see ICG (2002).
- 59 From 2002 Nusantara has chaired the prestigious National Commission of Human Rights.
- 60 For more on BAKIN (*Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara*, 'State Intelligence coordinating Body') and BAIS (*Badan Intelejen Strategis*, 'Strategic Intelligence Body'), which we will soon encounter below, and the relationships between them, see Tanter (1989, 1990b, 1991).
- 61 To the best of my knowledge Richard Robison has never written in Indonesian. This may well have been an anonymous translation of one of his articles from the late 1970s or early 1980s. One of the many small circles of student activists was probably responsible for the translation and its restricted circulation among their peers.

4 Law and state terrorism

- 1 The following account relies on my reading of AWC (1989: ch. 4), Andi Hamzah (1987); Daniel Lev (1972, 1978, 1985, 1999); Southwood and Flanagan (1983: chs 5–8); and Thoolen (1987). This is not to indicate full acceptance of those works. Many of their rich discussions have been reduced and simplified here.
- 2 Southwood and Flanagan (1983: 145) think that Sukarno had in mind members of PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or Indonesian Socialist Party) and the Islamic political party *Masyumi* (*Majelis Syurro Muslimin Indonesia*). These two parties had allegedly been involved in a CIA-backed PRRI *Permesta* rebellion in the late 1950s.
- 3 Private communication with David Bouchier in 1992.
- 4 This estimate should not be taken as anything more than a rough figure. While it is not a surprising figure, I had difficulty verifying it. It was reportedly quoted from Justice Minister Ismail Saleh. I first found the quotation in the AWC (1989: 138), citing the Indonesian News Service, whose source was the largest Indonesian newspaper *Kompas* (07/07/1988). I found a copy of this newspaper, but not the report on the subject.
- 5 Translation from Southwood and Flanagan (1983: 229–30).
- 6 In 1993 Xanana Gusmao, leader of the armed struggle of the East Timorese nationalist movement, and later the first President of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, was tried. To the surprise of many, he was charged with laws

other than the Anti-Subversion Law. A senior official of the prosecutor's office explained that subversion charges 'are used when prosecutors do not have sufficient evidence to meet the stricter requirements of criminal law' (AWC 1993: 12). While this admission is instructive about the function of the Anti-Subversion Law, it can give a misleading impression about the degree of such distinctions and the criminal law in actual practice.

- 7 For samples of critical analyses of, and protests against the government's (ab)uses of the law at the period under study, see Andi Hamzah (1987); *Tanakator* (20/10/1990: 35–6); Muladi (1990); Ismet N.M. Haris (1991) in addition to most defence pleas for subversion cases. For further calls for the dissolution of the Anti-Subversion Law during this period see the *Yogya Post's* interview with Lukman Sutrisno (21/08/1990); *Kedaulatan Rakyat's* report (05/02/1990) of the view of Albert Hasibuan, Head of the Indonesian Association of Law Students (PERSAHI); and a series of interviews and essays in *Forum Keadilan* (15/04/1993: 9–21, 60).
- 8 In the 1980s the government launched a nationwide campaign against gambling, while skimming off thousands of millions of rupiah (chiefly from the poor) from the weekly state-monopolized lottery at the same time as it severely prosecuted 'illegal' lotteries. In July 1991 the government earned nearly 580 thousand million rupiahs (AUS \$413 million or US \$289 million) from this business (*Kompas* 13/09/1991: 1). In November 1991, student activists in the city of Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi) and several cities of Java launched a series of separate demonstrations, the biggest since 1978. Thousands of students joined the peaceful protests in each of these cities. In most instances, heavily armed soldiers broke up the rallies (*Kompas* 20/11/1991: 14; *Bernas* 23/11/1991, and *Tempo* 30/11/1991: 35–6).
- 9 For further analysis, see comments of the Hukum Online editor at <http://www.hukumonline.com/artikel_detail.asp?id=169>, accessed 30 December 2002.
- 10 See *Tempo* (07/07/1990: 30) and *Tanakator* (07/07/1990: 37) for complimentary remarks to the court. The first case in Yogyakarta where a victim's family filed a lawsuit and won the case over a compensation for an illegal arrest by the police occurred in mid December 1987. In this case, the victim had also been killed. The court decided that the family was entitled to Rp. 693,000 (AUS \$500) or about seven per cent of the Rp. 10 million requested by the plaintiff (*Tanakator* 19/12/1987: 54).
- 11 Before imposing a life sentence, the Dili District Court allowed the defendant Xanana Gusmao on 17 May 1993 to read only the first two or three pages of his 28–page defence plea. This deprivation of Gusmao's right to present his defence plea in this political trial was under the pretext that the defence plea was 'too political'.
- 12 In New Order Indonesia this practice dated back to when the regime was barely two years old. Lev (1972: 276–7) documented the arrest of the renowned lawyer Yap Thiam Hien on 4 January 1968. Organized protest against the arrest and attacks against the police soon followed. This public reaction sounded extremely odd from the perspective of the 1980s and early 1990s, when no solid opposition existed and the association of lawyers was in disarray.
- 13 Rudy suggested, I think correctly, that the multi-layered charges indicated the grave lack of confidence on the part of the judicial functionaries as a whole (Letter, 17/07/1990). They needed to reassure themselves that the victims could not possibly escape from the predetermined convictions. The previous section on the legal structure makes it difficult to understand this lack of confidence. The ensuing discussion of official incompetence will partly explain that lack.

- 14 Members of the prosecuting team in Darmawan's trial were three district attorney's personnel: Akhrul Latief (chief), Mrs. Yuyu Djumhana, and Nurlian Effendi. In the Council of judges there were H. Djajusman (chief), Mrs. Sriwarsiki, and Maswar Darnosuwito. Four lawyers served as his defence counsel: Mrs. Sunaringsih (LBH Yogyakarta), Suprpto (Yogyakarta's Golkar Legal Aid Service), H. Abdurachman (Yogyakarta private lawyer), and Mrs. Sih Hariris Warsito (Yogyakarta private lawyer).
- 15 Syam was, in the words of Southwood and Flanagan (1983: 130), 'a star witness for the [New Order] state' in the special military tribunals of a few selected suspects of the 1965 events. He had given exuberant self-incriminating testimony that also victimized many others.
- 16 *Theories of Underdevelopment* (Roxborough 1979) was translated as *Teori-Teori Keterbelakangan* and published in 1986 by the Jakarta-based LP3ES. This book was never banned; it was and presumably still is available to the public in university libraries.
- 17 What exactly Hidayat said will be specified below in our discussion of the indictment against Hidayat.
- 18 Hidayat's prosecuting team consisted of A.H. Ritonga (chief), M. Siddiq Welemuly and D. Sutopo Hendro. The judges were Zulkifly Lubis (chief), Moeljono, and R. Didi Gunardi. Nur Ismanto (LBH Yogyakarta), Jeremias Lemek (Yogyakarta's IKADIN), Heniy Astiyanto (Legal Aid Institute of the UII, Islam University of Indonesia, Yogyakarta), and Achiel Suyanto (TRISULA's Legal Aid Institute) were the defence counsel.
- 19 Most Indonesians after 1970 have been unaware of the existence of any legal regulation that requires official permission for any gathering of more than five people. The law dates back to the 1950s, and its existence has been barely recognized since the New Order managed to consolidate its power base in the 1970s.
- 20 In Rudy's trial, the appointed judges in charge included Sutrisno (chief) who was also Head of the Yogyakarta State Court, Ida Bagus Ngurah Somya, and R. Didi Guhardi. The prosecutors were all from the Yogyakarta Office of the High Attorney: T.B. Djumhana (chief), Doni Kadneser, and M. Syafei. Rudy's defence counsel was composed of Nur Ismanto (LBH Yogyakarta), Luhut Pangribuan (LBH Jakarta), Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara (LBH Jakarta), Frans Hendra Winarta (Institute for the Defense of Human Rights), Prastowo (Jakarta's IKADIN, Association of the Indonesian Advocates), and Ramdlon Naning (Yogyakarta's IKADIN).
- 21 Toer authors the first book, and edited re-publication of the second title.
- 22 See his published memoir *Surat-surat Politik; Iwan Simatupang 1964-1966* (Simatupang 1986) and a brief biographical essay (Hasibuan 1991).
- 23 As a passing comparison, it may be worth noting that one of the major criticisms of the anti-terrorism bill drafted in Indonesia in 2002 was the absence of any clear and satisfying legal definition of what constitutes 'terror' and 'terrorism'.
- 24 Darmawan was a very distant nephew of Sutarji, by neither blood nor marriage. The two are related by virtue of Darmawan's father having once been adopted by his uncle. These facts were totally ignored in the trial.
- 25 It will be recalled Kasto worked for Hasta Mitra, publisher of Toer's books. Hasyim Rachman was one of Hasta Mitra's directors.
- 26 A total of 51 individuals testified in one or more of the three trials. Only two of them were female. As many as ten appeared in all three trials, 17 in two of either combination, and the remaining 24 testified only once. Thirty-three testified at Darmawan's trial, only one of them as a witness for the defence; 31 testified at Hidayat's, including two defence witnesses; and 24 at Rudy's, of whom three were for the defence. Pursuant to the KUHAP, the defence counsels in

- all three trials demanded that the court allow expert witnesses of their choice to testify, but the court overturned all these demands.
- 27 Darmawan's brother and several students at Gadjah Mada University confirmed that outside the court Farouk had actually been in great distress. He changed addresses several times, stayed away from old friends, and became bad-tempered during that time.
 - 28 The demonstration took place five days prior Darmawan's arrest. This was one of the earliest post-1978 student demonstrations that involved leading figures from different cities in Java. The students were protesting against a relatively insignificant incident in Brest, France, where Indonesian students were assaulted by a local skinhead youth gang with apparently racist motivations. The demonstration was an effective learning experience in organizing a public demonstration, which was illegal at that time. Since it appeared "nationalistic", the event was left alone by security officers.
 - 29 The security apparatus did, however, retaliate against Arjun's continued activism on other occasions and less openly. He had difficulty getting an overseas travel permit following an offer of post-graduate admission to study in the USA under the Fulbright scholarship scheme. Soon after graduating in 1990, Arjun applied for a full-time teaching position in his home department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences. The department was happy to appoint him, but the security apparatus reportedly prevented it from doing so.
 - 30 In Indonesia the use of the left hand in public is often, as here, interpreted as an insult. It is not very clear whether any insult was intended in this case. The prosecutors took issue with this in their requisition.

5 Hyper-obedience as subversion

- 1 Some of the arguments in this chapter have appeared in significantly different versions in Heryanto 1996c and 1999c.
- 2 Raymond Williams' insight on "ideology" can be extended to many other power relations, including those pertaining to our present discussion on the New Order's authoritarianism:

For if [it] were merely some abstract, imposed set of notions, if our social and political and cultural ideas and assumptions and habits were merely the result of specific manipulation, of a kind of overt training which might be simply ended or withdrawn, then the society would be very much easier to move and to change than in practice its has ever been or is.

(1980: 37)

- 3 When the newsmagazine *D & R* published a critical editorial calling into question the genuine nature of the demonstration, a counter demonstration was launched against it.
- 4 There was no evidence that the PRD had either the capacity or the intention to play any major role in the wave of protests in 1996. It tried to be and succeeded in being an initial catalyst for broad-based opposition (see Aspinall 1996). The 1996 protests were largely unorganized, involving the urban masses and NGO activists of different ideological stripes. They were a response to the government's systematic attempts to oust Megawati Sukarnoputri from the leadership of *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party) or PDI, and the brutal government-sponsored raiding of the party's headquarters. As the 1997 parliamentary elections drew close, the government wanted to ensure not only an extended victory for the ruling Golkar party, but a victory without challenge. For more on the fate of the PRD and the 1996 riots, see Heryanto (1997b).

5 James Siegel writes ‘... no one seemed to have anticipated Suharto’s resignation’ (Siegel 1998: 75). Henk Nordholt notes ‘[i]n 1997 ... a political crisis ended President Suharto’s regime, which until then had seemed indestructible’ (Nordholt 2002: 33). William Liddle wrote a book chapter entitled ‘Indonesia’s Unexpected Failure of Leadership’, and asks ‘[h]ow can we explain Suharto’s rapid [sic] political demise, after so many years of near-absolute power?’ (1999: 17). The opening chapter of the same book was authored by Adam Schwarz, who begins his analysis with an admission ‘[w]hen the Indonesian Study Group of the Council on Foreign Relations first convened in early 1998, virtually all 50 members of the group prudently took the view that the post-Suharto era lay beyond the immediate horizon’ (Schwarz 1999: 1). Anja Jetschke describes the 1998 event as a ‘sudden change of power in Indonesia’ (Jetschke 1999: p. 134). In retrospect van Klinken acknowledges the difference in perception among Indonesians and their overseas observers about the same (2001b: 263). The list can go on. One notable exception to the mainstream accounts is Mary Zurbuchen who dated the series of events that led to the fall of Soeharto from the 1980s (2002: 567–70).

By contrast, at least since the mid-1990s regular discussions with fellow Indonesians had led me to take the soon-to-be “end of New Order” as given. Unlike most the dominant views circulating in English outside Indonesia, many Indonesians understand that increased political activism in the country is not merely a product of, but it was also instrumental in producing post-New Order Indonesia. Even as late as a few months prior to the actual collapse of President Suharto’s New Order government, it was not easy for outsiders to share the view that appeared to be so obvious to many Indonesians. When I wrote an essay, entitled ‘INDONESIA: Towards the Final Countdown’, the editor sternly insisted that I should put a question mark at the end of the title (Heryanto 1997b).

6 *Jakarta-Jakarta* (361, 5–11/06/1993: 33).

7 To emphasize the everlasting communist cruelty, other official narratives date the PKI’s earliest coup attempt to 1926 (see for instance Getal 1994). Ironically this suggests a nationalist struggle against the Dutch before Indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945.

8 Until Soeharto resigned in May 1998, only two legal cases had been brought to court by former political prisoners or their families to claim compensation for the material damage, killings, loss of property and civil rights, and the penal exile of hundreds of thousands of citizens for more than ten years without proper legal procedure in the aftermath of the 1965 bloodshed. The first came from the novelist Pramoedya A. Toer (*Kompas*, 13/06/1996, *Forum Keadilan* 1996a). The second came from a certain Mrs. Syofinar (see *Forum Keadilan* 1996c: 32).

9 Many of the cases mentioned here derive from recent times, and most are from Central Java, one of the major sites of the 1965–6 killings. However, the reproduction of simulacral communist threats can be found nationwide with differences in nature, intensity, frequency, and effects.

10 The reverse is true of parks and monuments in the two regimes. Disneyland, as Baudrillard sees it, is created as a fiction in order to make us think that the rest of the country is real when they are all similarly hyper-real (1988: 172). The New Order built the *Museum of the PKI’s Treason* to eradicate the distinctions between real, unreal, and hyper-real. This regime publishes the same narrative of the communist coup in school textbooks, official history, white books, films, and in what it calls a ‘novel’.

- 11 For more on the logic of narrative imputation in state political violence, see Helen Fein's comparative discussion on the massacres in Indonesia and Kampuchea (1993).
- 12 Pioneering examples during the New Order would include the theatrical production of *Orde Tabung* (1988) by Teater Gandrik, *Opera Ular Putih* (1994) by Teater Koma, or literary pieces like Putu Wijaya's *Nyali* (1983), and the political writing of Pipiet Rochijat (1993). See also Keith Foulcher's discussion (1990) on Ajip Rosidi's *Anak Tanah Air* (1985). From an earlier period, the late 1940s short stories of Idrus are striking for their fierce deconstruction of the official narrative of national revolution, and for their bitter comments on the tyranny of signifiers and simulacra.
- 13 See Baudrillard's (1983a: 47–8) view on the possible destruction of hyper-simulation and hyper-conformity.
- 14 Journalist Michael R.J. Vatikiotis offers an interesting observation on the significance of elections from the viewpoint of President Soeharto: 'The results are not significant; the votes don't have to be rigged. . . . For Suharto it is important for the people to be granted an act of choice, not actually to choose. The appearances are everything' (1994: 240).

In the 1997 elections, the New Order regime was confronted with an unprecedented challenge by the establishment of the first independent body to monitor the poll, Komite Independen Pengawasan Pemilu (KIPP). Irritated state officials perpetrated all sorts of violence to repress KIPP activists and activities. However, when asked in a private conversation what he hoped to achieve, one of KIPP's co-founders and leading figures reportedly remarked, tongue-in-cheek: 'The government is pretending to administer fair and honest elections. So we are pretending to keep a close watch on their activities'. This is a rather unusual remark coming from a well-established intellectual, but not an unusual tacit attitude among the masses (as will be elaborated below).

- 15 One striking feature of the first general election of Independent East Timor in September 2001 was its campaign style that emulated its former colonizer, New Order Indonesia. Details of this style will be elaborated in this section.
- 16 Elsewhere I have discussed some of the illustrations from the 1992 election campaigns (Heryanto 2001).
- 17 Soon after the 1992 elections the New Order government sought to put an end to this tradition, and prepared a new and contained form of election campaign, namely a series of boring and sanitized "talk-shows" at the state-controlled mass media.
- 18 Since the 1987 elections, it has been against the law to display portraits of the late President Sukarno. The deceased was the only significant rival to the incumbent President during the campaign period.
- 19 Private communication with a local reporter in 1993.
- 20 One caricature in a newsmagazine shows a mother calling to her son who was leaving the house and running off to school. She screams from the house: 'Brush your teeth first'. From a distance the son replies: 'No need; I'm for yellowization!'

On another occasion in 1996, Abdurrahman Wahid (Indonesia's president, 1999–2001) came very late to a public gathering in Semarang, the hotbed of yellowization. The audience were disappointed and suspected that he might have been barred from appearing in public because of his reputation as a critic of the government. When he finally appeared, he explained the reason for his late arrival: 'All flights from Jakarta were held up. Later on they figured out that all pilots and airlines companies were afraid that if planes flew to Semarang they'd be painted yellow as soon as they landed.'

- 21 Defendant Nuku Soleiman appeared in full colour on the cover of *Inside Indonesia* (38: Mar/1994). An overview of his case can be found on pages 11–12. Sadly, he died of a stroke on 16 February 2003, at the age of 40. *Plesetan* is a Javanese style pun (see note 47, Chapter 1).
- 22 In this sense Nuku and his supporting groups are much more radical and subversive than the victorious defendant lawyers in the trial of John Hinckley as wonderfully analyzed by Rosanne Kennedy (1992), who has demonstrated the profound challenges that simulacra have posed to the fundamental principles of law in modern societies.
- 23 A magazine specializing in legal affairs published a full two-page collection of colour photos of these events, under witty titles 'Panggung Peradilan Twenty-One', and 'Court Stage 21' (*Forum Keadilan* 1994: 110–1). The number '21' refers to the common designation for the trials of the 21 students, as well as to the biggest inter-city chain of entertainment complexes, owned by the President's brother-in-law. In the same issue the magazine published an editorial entitled 'The Face of the Court', emphasizing the significance of spectacles of law and politics in operation. A sketch of an actor's mask is located at the centre of the editorial page as an illustration. For many weeks the media were preoccupied with expressions of public anxiety over the seriously tarnished credibility of law and the judicial system. Commentaries in the largest daily, *Kompas*, often chose titles alluding more straightforwardly to the world of arts and festivity: 'Theatrical Performance in Courtroom' (17/03/1994), or 'A Stage, A Mockery' (23/04/1994).
- 24 Theorizing the origin and early spread of nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1983: 21) argues that nations as imagined communities could only come into being when such a belief in the unity of signs and referents (or language and the world) was seriously eroded by the expansion of print capitalism, the rise of novels and newspapers. If we accept such an argument, Indonesia can be understood as a nation in the making, and at a rather incipient stage. 'Indonesia still produced fewer books per head of population than most of its neighbours and even in absolute terms remained lower than South Korea and Thailand, which have much smaller populations' (Sen and Hill 2000: 24).
- 25 See Baudrillard's admission to his being polemical, provocative, exaggerating, and the fact that he is not as pessimistic as he may have sounded in his works (Gane 1993: 132–3). Bryan S. Turner's (1993) critical and yet sympathetic assessment of Baudrillard's contribution and challenges to social sciences is also worthy of mention here.
- 26 On this, see a series of critical comments on Mbembe's position in *Public Culture* (1992: 47–122).
- 27 For more arguments that Baudrillard's account of late-capitalist Western societies also applies in different degrees and forms in many other and previous societies, see a collection of essays edited by Rojek and Turner (1993).

6 Identity, power, and history

- 1 There is something relevant in Bakhtin and Medvedev's critique of Russian Formalism: 'The wider the horizon, the brighter and more distinct is the individuality of each concrete phenomenon' (1985: 72).
- 2 In a similar vein, Robert Young writes: 'You cannot get out of Hegel by simply contradicting him, any more than you can get out of those other Hegelian systems, Marxism and psychoanalysis, by simply opposing them: for in both your opposition is likewise recuperable, as the workings of ideology or psychic resistance' (1990: 6).

- 3 After 11 September 2001 an additional and unnecessary overtone is embedded in the dominant discourse, implying that terrorism takes place when the violence kills mainly innocent people of "our" kind (members of the rich, industrialized, liberal, democratic and modern nation-states in North America, Western Europe, or Australia). Thus systematic attacks with explosions of much greater power, frequency, and scale – such as those taking place in Iraq in the early months of 2003 – killing as many as (if not more than) most suicide bombs would be called anything except "terrorism" while a small bomb in front of an American embassy in Southeast Asia would be readily designated as such.
- 4 Although analyzing different subject matter, Anja Jetschke's observation about Indonesia's isolation in the international network of human rights advocacy (1999: 144) is a relevant point to our discussion here.
- 5 Schmid and Jongman (1988) provide one of the helpful surveys of the existing literature on terrorism in general, including theorizing endeavours, prior to the post-11 September 2001 panic. More recent reference sources include R. Ferguson (2003) and Whittaker (2003).
- 6 Yale Ferguson articulates the overwhelming variety of states so aptly:

Actual states run the gamut from the world's one remaining superpower, to the varied older (and not so old states) of Europe and Latin America, to the restive conglomerates of India and China, to the trading city-state of Singapore and other somewhat troubled Asian economic powerhouses, to the oil emirates of the Middle East and conservative monarchy of Saudi Arabia, to the shaky republics spun off from the former Soviet Union, to the Taliban's Afghanistan and the Iran of the mullahs, to several failed states in Africa . . . down to the numerous mini-states such as Nauru or Tuvalu (whose main asset, that provides about half of its GDP, is its possession of 'tv' as a web address).

(Ferguson, Y. 2003: 87)

- 7 This misnomer-sounding phrase dates back to the years immediately after 1965, when the ascending military government of the New Order justified the arrests of many left-wing politicians and their sympathizers on the pretext that the detainees would have been killed by the angry nationalist masses had the state security apparatus not made its pre-emptive intervention. Many young Indonesians born after 1965 seem to be unaware of this historical context, and appeared puzzled by this ironical-sounding measure.
- 8 Designating perceived enemies and victims of state terrorism as 'extreme left' and 'extreme right' is not a monopoly of the New Order state's discourse. The same designation is used in El Salvador (George 1991b: 3). On the Orwellian inversion of the meanings of 'terrorists' by state spokespersons see Herman (1991) and Chomsky (1991a).
- 9 This was the response that Rudy's sister received from an official of the office of the Attorney-General, when she identified him and protested against the accusation that Rudy was a communist (see Chapter 3). President Lusinchi of Venezuela produced the same line when dismissing a counter-report of state-sponsored political violence in 1988 (Coronil and Skurski 1991: 301–2).
- 10 For samples of reviews and critical examinations of contemporary state terrorism with a special interest in its international dimensions, see Brennan (2003), George (1991a), Lakos (1986), Lowe and Shargel (1979), McCamant (1991), Norton and Greenberg (1980), Wilkins (1992) and Selden and So (2003).
- 11 Most of these arguments refer to American violent intervention overseas. We must not overlook American state terrorism at home against various minority groups. It is also important to add that ordinary American citizens have not been exempted from their government's terrorist acts abroad (see George

1991b: 4). In the Dili incident of 12 November 1991, Indonesian soldiers tortured two American reporters before they gunned down hundreds of unarmed East Timorese youths.

- 12 Browsing through several libraries in Australia and the USA when this work began in the early 1990s, I noted that nearly all books related to terrorism invariably portray it as an evil threat to the First World, most notably Washington, DC and London. Two major categories of perpetrators in these books are non-state terrorists (including nationalists) and the Communist regimes. According to William D. Perdue:

[t]he actual loss of life and property for U.S. citizens does not appear to match the publicity surrounding the issue throughout the 1980s. To illustrate, by reckoning of the Task Force, 23 U.S. citizens lost their lives to international terrorism in 1985, and 2 were victims of the domestic variety. This compares with 18,980 domestic homicides in the same year.

(1989: 16, fn. 1)

The 11 September 2001 violence has obviously galvanized this tradition even more zealously.

- 13 Quoting J. Black, Herman wrote: “[b]etween 1960 and 1969, eighteen regimes in Latin America, of which eleven had held office constitutionally, were overthrown by the military. By 1969, more than two-thirds of the people in Latin America were living under military dictatorships”. Some eighty per cent of the core group of generals participating in the Brazilian coup of 1964 were United States-trained, whereas only twenty-two per cent of those not involved were products of United States programs. . . . Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told Congress in 1966 that . . . developments in Indonesia, which involved a military takeover and the massacre of somewhere between 500,000 and a million civilians, were “dividends” of our military training programs’ (1991: 89).
- 14 See the works of politico-economists in the field for further details, e.g. Tanter (1991: pp. 167–205), Robison (1986), Anderson (1990).
- 15 In highly comparable contexts Achille Mbembe (1992a: 13, 14), Robert Young (1990: 86–7) and Talal Asad (1987: 605) make separate but equally forceful arguments in support of this old, familiar view to the effect that collaboration seems to be a universal element in unequal power relations.
- 16 The main point here is the isolation and the breaking down of sense of selfhood and familiar order. Phrases such as ‘[h]e can rely only on himself’ or ‘[p]hysically he may be untouched’ understate the agony of the victims. For another compelling analysis of the dehumanizing effects of protracted communal violence, see Daniel (1996).
- 17 Panopticism is Foucault’s adaptation of Bentham in *Discipline and Punish* (1977). It designates the modern technique of surveillance and discipline, comparable to that in modern prisons, where prisoners are made to know that they can be observed at any time, but without knowing when. Consequently, prisoners are made to watch themselves and behave compliantly all the time.
- 18 Though the context is different, Jane A. Margold’s (1999) critique of totalizing accounts of terror and violence as she found in the work of Taussig is worth considering here.
- 19 See also a totalizing view of hegemony in Raymond Williams’ (1977: 110).
- 20 To be fair, it must be noted that Welsh’s conception of “weak” states differs from most that I know, including that adopted here. But regardless of the concept chosen, it is the binary equation as proposed by Welsh that I find seriously problematic.

- 21 In his *Capital*, Marx notes that 'we erect our structure in imagination before we erect it in reality' (1967: 178; cited in Harvey 1992: 345). Also see the quotation from Sutopo Yuwono, former head of Indonesia's State Intelligence Coordinating Body, in Chapter 5. Agents of the state may proceed with an attempt to deceive the public, not themselves, by creating fabricated issues. But the public's reactions to the issues often make the original authors of the issues rethink: 'perhaps they are real after all'.
- 22 Hambali (alias Riduan Isamuddin), born 4 April 1964 as Encep Nurjaman in West Java, was named as the most wanted suspect of the Southeast Asian-based terrorist network "Jemaah Islamiah", allegedly with connection to Al-Qaeda. He was captured without resistance at the apartment where he was hiding by Thai security forces on 11 August 2003, in Ayutthaya (80 kilometers north of Bangkok). He was suspected to be involved in 41 bombings in Indonesia between 2000 and 2003. He was placed in US custody soon after his arrest, and the US government denied its political allies in the anti-terrorist network any direct access to investigate him.
- 23 This is a commonplace that appears repeatedly in public. One case during my fieldwork where the phrase found a privileged expression was the official speech of the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces on the occasion of the Armed Forces Day in 1991 (*Bernas*, 05/10/1991).
- 24 Tanter notes:

[p]erhaps the machinery of surveillance was unevenly applied and less than competently administered, but we must conclude that the development and application of such psychometric tools was undertaken to meet a felt bureaucratic need. Ideologically motivated or not, military administrators were faced with a vast problem (entirely of their own making) to solve: how are large but finite surveillance resources of the state to be deployed to deal with hundreds of thousands of tapols and militant Muslims and their families? (1991: 3)
- 25 P. Anderson (1976/7) presents a sympathetic yet critical analysis of the text, considering the different senses of Gramsci's concept as well as their various contexts. Robert W. Cox (1983: 162) accuses Anderson, I think incorrectly, of having made the mistake of taking Gramsci's ideas in abstraction and isolation from their contexts. In a no less rigorous manner than Anderson, Chantal Mouffe (1979) reached an alternative understanding of Gramsci's conception of hegemony, and took issue with some of Anderson's major conclusions. For a post-11 September 2001 example of the adoption of the concept in an analysis of American foreign policy see Anderson (2002).
- 26 Scott mentions other authors who are critical of the hegemony propositions, such as Joseph Femia, Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner. Some critical responses to Scott are Timothy Mitchell (1990), Susan C. Stokes (1991), and Michael Adas (1992). Among the Indonesian intelligentsia, *Weapons of the Weak* has obtained fairly wide attention. For a sympathetic reappraisal from an Indonesian scholar, see Muhammad A.S. Hikam (1990). A local newspaper in Yogyakarta ran a series of polemics on the issues that the book raised (*Bernas* 08–09/1992), and another daily in Surabaya published an editorial in 1992 on the significant contribution of the book.
- 27 A more thorough critique of Scott's theoretical arguments in *Weapons of the Weak* can be found in Timothy Mitchell (1990). My purpose here is only to point out the more glaring problems in Scott's arguments in relation to my own discussion.

- 28 Although Williams (1980: 38) suggested that a hegemonic situation exists in 'any society, in any particular period', Gramsci (1971: 106–20) seemed to have made a more modest claim, as indicated by his discussion of 'passive revolution'. Cox (1983: 167) writes: '[t]he concept of passive revolution is a counterpart to the concept of hegemony in that it describes the condition of a non-hegemonic society – one in which no dominant class has been able to establish a hegemony in Gramsci's sense of the term. Today this notion of passive revolution, together with its components, caesarism and *transformismo*, is particularly apposite to industrializing Third World countries'.
- 29 In a critical discussion of Bukharin's *Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology*, Gramsci noted: 'One gets the impression that the author wants to combat only the weakest of his adversaries and the weakest of their positions (or the ones which the weakest adversaries have maintained least adequately), in order to obtain facile verbal victories – for one can hardly speak of real victory' (1971: 432). Gramsci is not as naive as he is presented in *Weapons of the Weak*.
- 30 An attempt to systematize Gramsci's ideas on this subject can be found in Chantal Mouffe (1979: especially pp. 190–5).
- 31 As he put it:

[h]egemony is . . . then not only the articulate upper level of "ideology", nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as "manipulation" or "indoctrination". It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living; our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.

(Williams 1977: 110)
- 32 It can be persuasively argued that all or nearly all initiatives and contributions, even when they take on manifestly alternative or oppositional forms, are in practice tied to the hegemonic: that the dominant culture, so to say, at once produces and limits its own forms of counter-culture. There is more evidence for this view [. . .] than we usually admit. [. . .] It would be wrong to overlook the importance of works and ideas which, while clearly affected by hegemonic limits and pressures, are at least in part significant breaks beyond them, which may again in part be neutralized, reduced, or incorporated, but which in their most active elements nevertheless come through as independent and original.

(Williams, 1977: 114)
- 33 The theory and practice of the Third International, from the inception of its history with Lenin to the incarceration of Gramsci, had been saturated with emphasis on the historical necessity of violence in the destruction and construction of States. . . . They form as it were the familiar acquisition, which no longer needed reiteration, in an intellectual enterprise whose energies were concentrated elsewhere – on the discovery of the unfamiliar.

(P. Anderson 1976/7: 46, 47)
- 34 Anderson argues further '[t]hus just as his use of hegemony often tended to imply that the structure of capitalist power in the West essentially rested on culture and consent, so the idea of a war of position tended to imply that the revolutionary work of a Marxist party was essentially that of ideological conversion of the

- working class. [. . .] In both cases, the role of coercion – repression by the bourgeois State, insurrection by the working class – tends to drop out. The weakness of Gramsci's strategy is symmetrical with that of his sociology' (1976/7: 76).
- 35 This is part of the official propaganda. The quotation here refers to a title of journalistic report, with no irony, in the local daily during my fieldwork (*Yogya Post*, 10/03/1990: 1, 11).
 - 36 See a series of ten responses to Mbembe in *Public Culture* (1992, 5 [1, Fall]: 47–122), and Mbembe's reply in the same issue (pp. 123–45).
 - 37 Asad's insight is more agreeable when he suggests that all '[p]olitical discourses are collaborative processes. The collaboration may rarely be equal, but it remains nevertheless a quite different phenomenon from conditioning' (1987: 607).
 - 38 In a discussion on post-structuralist literary theories Selden notes that "'literal" language is in fact "figurative" language whose figuration has been forgotten' (1985: 91). In his critique of the consent-coercion model either as a dichotomy or in combination, Talal Asad, unlike Mitchell, concedes the Kantian phenomenology: 'There is no privileged access to "reality" independent of accounts that tell us what it is' (1987: 605).
 - 39 For a defence of Foucault in this regard, see Robert Young (1990: 86), and of Derrida, see Christopher Norris (1990: 49–76).
 - 40 For more elaboration of the argument outlined here, and with specific reference to New Order Indonesia, see Heryanto and Mandal (2003).
 - 41 As Karl Mannheim wrote, 'ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination' (cited in Perdue 1989: 7).

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